

Military Historical Society of Australia
Sabretache



Copyright © 1957-2019 Military Historical Society of Australia on behalf of the Society and its authors who retain copyright of all their published material and articles. All Rights Reserved.

Sabretache policy is that the submission of material gives the Society permission to print your material, to allow the material to be included in digital databases such as the MHSa website, Australian Public Affairs-Full Text, INFORMIT and EBSCO. Reprints to non-profit historical and other societies will be approved provided suitable attribution is included and a copy of the reprint is sent to the author. Copyright remains with the author who may reprint his or her article or material from the article without seeking permission from the Society.

The Society encourages the download and distribution of *Sabretache* for personal use only and *Sabretache* can not be reproduced without the written consent of the Society.

www.mhsa.org.au

Military Historical Society of Australia
PO Box 5030, Garran, ACT 2605.
email: webmaster@mhsa.org.au

EDITORIAL

As this significant centenary year of 2015 draws to close, I look back over it personally as a time of several elective surgeries and short hospital stays – none of them serious, rather just part of ‘the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to’, as the Bard says. But the unfamiliarity of the circumstances set me thinking a number of times about the situation in which all too many military personnel have found themselves: as casualties of war.

A mere century ago, in the midst of the Great War, there still weren’t any of the sulphonamide drugs – predominantly penicillin – available for the treatment of wounds. Infections such as gangrene were an ever-present danger, and even successful evacuation to a casualty clearing station or field hospital was no guarantee of recovery, no matter how attentive the medical staff. Wading through the tables in Butler’s *Official History of the Australian Medical Services 1914-18* for some idea of how many personnel actually ‘died of wounds’ is a bewildering exercise, and besides, as Butler points out, the category itself is problematic. But according to one online source, 7% of all those wounded in action in the British Army died of those wounds (<http://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/army/some-british-army-statistics-of-the-great-war/>). Even so, this doesn’t even take into account those killed by disease – including the horrendous influenza pandemic of 1918-19 – and the many who succumbed to their injuries in the years following the war.

Looking back a further century to 1815, we enter the realms of first aid and surgery even more bereft of the procedures and medicines we now take for granted. Tim Clayton’s book *Waterloo: Four Days that Changed Europe’s Destiny* (2014) paints a grizzly picture of the thousands left wounded and languishing on the field after the battle, possibly as many as 20,000 from both sides after the final encounter on 18 June – and bear in mind there were three days of battle on at least four different fields. Surprisingly, perhaps, the official figures published nearly a year later indicate that around 11% of British Army wounded had subsequently died, while another 11% remained in hospital, their fate still in the balance, one assumes.

While this may appear to be a low – perhaps even somewhat ‘massaged’ – statistic for easier public consumption, I came across an amazing piece of information regarding the survival rate of a group of almost untreated wounded after Waterloo. An online article dealing with the apparent deterioration of survival conditions in modern American hospitals compared with the past uses a very pertinent example. It quotes a certain Prof Mervyn Singer who, in researching the medical records of the Battle of Waterloo, found that

‘Of the 52 privates in the 13th Light Dragoons wounded by sabre, gunfire and cannon injuries at Waterloo, only two subsequently died.’ This was despite the fact that they all had serious infections and nearly complete shutdown of all internal organs, only two of 52, or 4% died as a result.

Thus, says Singer: ‘Survival statistics from the battle of Waterloo throw up an even more radical theory – that multiple organ failure, triggered by severe trauma or subsequent infection, may actually represent the body’s last-ditch attempt to survive in the face of critical illness.’ More damningly, the article asserts that ‘today’s hospitals have a death rate of about 30% from septicaemia following heroic life-saving attempts with modern techniques and medications’, which, compared to the death rate among the wounded 13th Light Dragoons at Waterloo, represents ‘a 750 percent increase in “Death by Doctor” in the last two hundred years’ ([http://spaces.msn.com/members/brojondigest/Blog/cns! ...entry](http://spaces.msn.com/members/brojondigest/Blog/cns!...entry)) [accessed 24 Feb 2005]. Or perhaps the men of the old 13th were just made of very tough stuff – I make no further comment, other than to say that I’m glad I received the treatment I did!

Paul Skrebels

A 'FALLEN SAINT': THE SACRIFICE OF 3216 LANCE CORPORAL COLIN BAYLY (1886-1915)

Paul A. Rosenzweig¹

Most 1914-15 Australian profiles trace a storyline from enlistment to an AIF training camp such as Morphettville Race Course, posing for a uniformed portrait photograph proudly wearing 'Rising Suns' and khaki, transfer by troopship to the Middle East, and then on to the Gallipoli Peninsula. By contrast however, South Australian-born Colin Bayly had already served under fire for several months prior, and lost his life just nine days before the heroic Anzac landing. He too wore khaki, with a tartan kilt and the White Horse of Hanover as a glengarry badge. Bayly was a Semaphore lad and 'Old Boy' of St Peters College in Adelaide, who died on 16 April 1915 serving on the Ypres Salient with the Liverpool Scottish.

The press report of Colin Bayly's death in Belgium was published in South Australia on the same page as headlines which read 'Our Soldiers. The Dardanelles Attacks' and 'Landing Under Fire. Australians' Grim Work'.² Two years later it was recorded that his elder brother Brian, 'lived and died splendidly' in also realising the great tradition of Imperial service.³

Semaphore

Colin Bayly was born on 24 August 1886, the eighth child of William Henry Fox Bayly of South Esplanade, Semaphore, a civil servant with the Customs Service.⁴ William had been born at Ackworth in Yorkshire in 1842, the eldest son of the Reverend Edmund Goodenough Bayly MA.⁵ He was an 'Old Wykehamist', a graduate of the famous Winchester College – so named in memory of William of Wykeham who had established the college. William Bayly paid homage to this heritage in the naming of his third child, Percival George Wykeham Bayly, who went by the given name of 'Wykeham'. The Old Wykehamists include amongst their number Sir Vyner Brooke GCMG (the third and last 'White Rajah' of Sarawak), Field-Marshal Archibald Wavell GCB GCSI GCIE CMG MC PC, George Mallory who died on Mount Everest (the speaker of the three most famous words in mountaineering), and the historian Antony Beevor.



Fig.1: Private Colin Bayly of the 1st/10th (Scottish) Battalion, The King's (Liverpool Regiment), (The Advertiser, 5 May 1915)

¹ Paul Rosenzweig is a medal collector and non-professional military historian and biographer, who has contributed to various Australian historical journals and Defence publications for over thirty years.

² *The Register* (Adelaide) 5 May 1915, p.7.

³ *The Straits Times* (Federated Malay States) 19 July 1918, p.10.

⁴ Birth Certificate No. 570, District of Port Adelaide, entered 6 October 1886.

⁵ *The Register* (Adelaide) 3 September 1925, p. 13; *The Observer* 11 May 1907, p.31 and 12 September 1925, p.10; Diary of W.H. Bayly (1859), State Library of South Australia, D 8009(L).

William Bayly came to Adelaide in the first six months of 1859 on the *Europa*, and in 1871 began a long career with the Customs Service. His brother Charles arrived in South Australia in that same year and from 1880 also worked for Customs, in Port Augusta and at Port Germein near Port Pirie. William Bayly married on 5 August 1871, in Queenstown, South Australia – named after the garrison troops which had established the township, the 50th Foot (Queen's Own Regiment). The regiment itself was named after Princess Adelaide of Saxe-Meiningen, who became Queen Consort of the United Kingdom and of Hanover and who gave her name to the city of Adelaide, founded in 1836 during King William IV's brief reign.

William took as his bride Delia Ann Brock (1847-1893) from Queenstown, who had been born in Port Adelaide in 1847 and was known to all as 'Annie'. She was the daughter of Daniel George Brock (1811-1867) from Devon and Delia 'Lucy' (nee Mellor; 1820-1886) who had married in South Australia in 1842 and were both buried in Alberton Cemetery in Port Adelaide. Brian Brock Bayly was their seventh child, born on 21 November 1884 and named in honour of his grandfather Daniel George Brock and his great-grandfather William Stocker Brock (1785-1867), both of whom are also buried in Alberton Cemetery.

Born in 1886, Colin was William and Annie's eighth and last child. Three years later William Bayly was made First Assistant Landing Surveyor with the Department of Trade and Customs. Annie died on 2 October 1893, leaving William to raise six sons and a daughter by himself (their first child had died in infancy), with no grandparents to assist. Fortunately the elder ones were in their late teens, but Brian was aged 9 and Colin was 7. Brian and Colin were cousins of Halcombe Ferrier Brock, who later served as a lieutenant in the 3rd Light Horse Regiment AIF (the story of his sword appeared in *Sabretache* in December 2014).⁶ They finished their schooling at the turn of the century at St Peter's College in the Adelaide suburb of St Peters, educated in the Anglican tradition.

The Bayly brothers attended the School of Mines and Industries: the local newspaper recorded results in 1904 for Brian in Assaying, Machine Drawing, Mechanical Engineering and Surveying, in the same batch as Felix Giles and many other notable South Australians who were the first to enlist a decade later. Colin Bayly was there as well, studying Electrical Engineering at the Gawler School of Mines.⁷ So too did their older brother Wykeham Bayly, who was subsequently an analyst and assayer to the Victorian Mines Department. By this time their father was Sub-Collector of Customs for South Australia.

Volunteers

Colin Bayly's newspaper obituary in 1915 recorded: '*He left Adelaide three years ago to take up engineering in the old country*'.⁸ It is highly likely that by 1914 he was already a volunteer in the Territorial Force. Brian followed Colin to England in 1915 at his own expense. Bean noted that commissions, 'were to be had almost for the asking by any educated Australian if he chose to go to Great Britain'⁹ – with an engineering degree from the University of Adelaide (1903) and a Diploma in Mining and Metallurgy (1905), Brian was immediately granted a commission in the Royal Engineers. Beyond these qualifications, he had gained considerable

⁶ Harris, A.F. (2014) 'Linking the Artefact: Lieut Halcombe Ferrier Brock, 3rd Light Horse Regiment, AIF'. *Sabretache* vol.55, no.4 (December 2014), pp.32-37.

⁷ *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 13 December 1904, p.8.

⁸ *The Adelaide Chronicle* 8 May 1915, p.38.

⁹ Bean (1921) p.43.

experience at Broken Hill and Port Pirie, and in the deep lead mines in Victoria, as well as in gold-dredging in South Australia. More notably perhaps, he had been Inspector of Mines in the Federated Malay States since 1908.

Brian was assigned to the 254th Tunnelling Company which supported the evacuation from Cape Helles, and then served in France in the northern Givenchy area from Spring 1916. Sapper William Hackett VC (1873–1916) from the 254th Tunnelling Company was the only tunneller to be awarded the VC during the Great War, and today remains entombed beneath the fields of Givenchy.

Liverpool Scottish

Colin Bayly meanwhile, aged 27, had joined the 10th (Scottish) Battalion of The King's (Liverpool Regiment) at Fraser Street in the Liverpool city centre. The 'Liverpool Scottish' had its origins in the educated and professional young Scotsmen in Liverpool who had banded together on 30 April 1900 to form a volunteer regiment. From 1901 they were approved to wear Highland dress, choosing the Forbes tartan in honour of their first Commanding Officer, and the glengarry with blue hackle. In 1908 when the Territorial Force was established, the battalion became known as the 10th (Scottish) Battalion, the King's (Liverpool Regiment).

The regiment's Highland full dress uniform featured a khaki tunic with scarlet collar and facings, Forbes tartan kilt and a feather bonnet or glengarry and tartan plaid. Newspaper photographs of Colin Bayly show him wearing the glengarry with diced band, with a white-metal badge on the left side: the regimental glengarry/bonnet badge featured the White Horse of Hanover backed by a St Andrew's cross, the heraldic symbol of Scotland, contained within a circle with thistles and the title 'Liverpool Scottish'.¹⁰ Photographs of Bayly and others from the Liverpool Scottish show that they wore leather 'football' buttons on the tunic rather than the General Service metal buttons.

Upon the outbreak of war, on 4 August 1914 the 1st/10th (Scottish) Battalion mobilised and deployed to Scotland under the command of Lt Col William Nicholl, to man the defences on the River Forth. Bayly served with this first-line battalion of the Liverpool Scottish, while duplicate battalions were formed in Liverpool from personnel not accepted for active service: the 2nd/10th (Scottish) Battalion was responsible for training recruits and providing reinforcements for overseas service, and did not itself go to France until 1917. The 3rd/10th (Scottish) Battalion was a third-line battalion responsible only for training and providing reinforcements, and it remained in Britain for the duration of the war.

The 1st/10th (Scottish) was the seventh Territorial battalion to join the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). The battalion embarked at Southampton aboard the SS *Maidan* on 1 November 1914, and disembarked at Le Havre two days later. These original members, who qualified for the 1914 Star, proudly knew each other as 'Maidaners'. It has been estimated that more than 10,000 men served with the 10th Battalion, of whom some 10% died during the Great War – among them, Colin Bayly from South Australia as *The Adelaide Chronicle* reported:

3216 Lance Corporal Colin BAYLY, a 27 year old Soldier from South Esplanade, Semaphore, South Australia. He mobilised as a Liverpool Scottish Territorial in the BEF on 4 August 1914 and was allotted to the 1st/10th Battalion The King's (Liverpool Regiment) which embarked from

¹⁰ Officers and senior NCOs wore this badge in sterling silver, soldiers wore it in white metal. There is another 10th Battalion badge very similar in design surmounted by the words 'Scottish Liverpool', which was a sporran badge used from 1900.

Southampton, England, on board SS Maidan on 1 November 1914. BAYLY was Killed in Action, 16 April 1915, at Voormezele, Belgium.¹¹

Notable in its war record, the 1st/10th (Scottish) came to boast a twin Victoria Cross – their Medical Officer Captain Noel Chavasse winning the VC at Guillemont on the Somme in August 1916, and a year later (posthumously) a Bar to his VC.

Ypres

On 27 November the Liverpool Scottish entered the line at Kemmel Hill, about six miles south-west of Ypres and settled into a pattern of trench warfare that was to persist for most of the next four years. They belonged to the 9th Brigade of the Regular Army's 3rd Division ('The Iron Division'). Unlike their Regular Army counterparts, the territorial battalions were organised into eight rifle companies, and the Liverpool Scottish was still armed with the long version of the Lee-Enfield rifle. The battalion entered the front line with 26 officers and 829 other ranks – by the end of January 1915 however, following terrible winter weather, the battalion's total strength had fallen to 370 able-bodied men. Actual battle losses accounted for just 32 men, the remainder were mostly victims of trench-foot.

The Liverpool Scottish next occupied the Line at various parts of the Ypres Salient including Hill 60 and St Eloi, about 4km south-west of Ypres. During the big Allied offensive against the German fortifications along the Western Front in December, Colin Bayly was wounded. In Adelaide, *The Advertiser* reported that he had been among those evacuated:

MR COLIN BAYLY KILLED

An old St. Peters Boy

News has been received by cable that Mr Colin Bayly, an old St. Peter's College Boy, and youngest son of Mr. W.H.F. Bayly, of the Semaphore, was killed in action in Flanders on April 16. He joined the 10th Scottish Battalion of the King's Liverpool Regiment on the outbreak of the war, and proceeded to the front early in November as a private. After serving in the trenches he was invalided home in December ...¹²

His initiative and ability was rewarded with a promotion which he announced to his father in what was to be his last letter home: 'I have been given a stripe, and am now Lance-corporal Colin Bayly.'¹³ A restless Bayly could not sit around in an English hospital so, as soon as he was able, took himself back to his battalion as his newspaper obituary later recorded:

the young South Australian was most anxious to return to the front, and early in March he had his reward. He saw much desperate service up to the day of the engagement which caused his death.¹⁴

While he was on the train rumbling its way to Southampton on 8 March 1915, Bayly wrote a letter to his father which was subsequently released to the press:

We came down to Tunbridge Wells last week, and this morning I am off to the front again in a draft of 120 men ... They have arranged to send out my commission in the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry when the War Office gazettes it, but I couldn't stand being in England waiting about; hence my departure for the front once more.¹⁵

Colin Bayly was of the type documented by Bean: 'the men whose greatest fear was that they

¹¹ *The Adelaide Chronicle* 8 May 1915, p.38.

¹² *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 5 May 1915, p.8.

¹³ *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 25 May 1925, p.14.

¹⁴ *The Register* (Adelaide) 5 May 1915, p.7.

¹⁵ *The Register* (Adelaide) 5 May 1915, p.7.

would not be “in” whatever was going, and that the war might be over before they reached the fighting’.¹⁶ Had he not been so restless he would have been granted his British Army commission in the Duke of Lancaster’s Own Yeomanry, an opportunity to ride with the 1st Cavalry Division.

Second Ypres

Bayly rejoined the 10th (Scottish) in Flanders on 8 March 1915 and was killed-in-action on 16 April during the Second Battle of Ypres. Initially nothing was known about how Colin Bayly actually died: the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) online database gives just his regimental particulars and cemetery – Voormezele Enclosure No.3 in Belgium, where he has a marble headstone bearing the White Horse of Hanover badge of The King’s (Liverpool Regiment). While death is generally a lonely business, during the Great War it was rare for deaths to be solitary instances, so the hypothesis was proposed that at least one other soldier had died contemporaneously with Bayly.

Fortunately, the CWGC results can be searched and sequenced. By first ordering the casualty records for Enclosure No.3 (1,004 names) it was possible to isolate every casualty that died on 16 April 1915. These results were then sequenced by unit. This revealed that *just two men* from The King’s (Liverpool Regiment) were killed on 16 April 1915 – 3067 Pte George Veitch and 3216 Lance Corporal Colin Bayly, aged 28. It also showed that three days later the battalion’s machine-gun officer 2nd Lt Vyvian Leitch died of wounds, aged 21 – possibly connected to the event which had caused the deaths of Bayly and Veitch.

Being the only three deaths in the battalion around that time, Bayly, Veitch and Leitch would no doubt have been buried side-by-side in the regimental burial ground established by the Liverpool Scottish three miles (four kilometres) south-west of Ypres. However, when each of these men is looked up in the CWGC database they seem to have been buried widely apart – in plots VI-C-1 (Bayly), VI-B-2 (Veitch) and VI-A-3 (Leitch). Were they exhumed and reburied? On the assumption that Bayly and Veitch were probably killed in the same incident, and that Leitch may have been mortally wounded at the same time, further investigation was conducted on Pte George Veitch which ultimately revealed research including, fortuitously, various diary entries relating to that day.¹⁷

St Eloi

The battalion’s war diary records its disposition in trenches near an abandoned village at St Eloi in early April: Bayly was serving with the Machine-Gun Section sharing Q2 trench with C Company (reinforced with one platoon from A Company) under Capt G.B.L Rae, and the remainder of A Company were in Q3. Slightly to their front flank, the 1st/5th Northumberland Fusiliers held Q1 and an advanced trench running from St Eloi across the front of Q2 for about 100 metres. St Eloi was noted as being ‘on the whole a quiet sector’.¹⁸ In early to mid-April 1915, the enemy threat mostly comprised night-time sniping on exposed parts of the road up to the trenches, and the afternoon shelling of Q2 trench with ‘whizzbangs’ and 5.9-inch *Feldhaubitze* howitzer shells.

At about 2300 on 14 April, the enemy directed rifle and artillery fire at Q1 and the advanced trench, apparently as a prelude to an attack. An immediate SOS call brought in accurate battery

¹⁶ Bean (1921) pp.43-44.

¹⁷ The Western Front Museum Foundation.

¹⁸ McGilchrist (1930).

fire on the enemy's trenches, but all communication lines had been cut between Q2 and Q3, and between them and the Liverpool Scottish headquarters. A signaller left Q3 trench at great personal risk to pass back the SOS, as wounded Fusiliers began drifting into Q2. A work party with spades, and all stretcher bearers and medics, were sent forward to Q1. As the wounded men were extracted from the debris, they were carried to a ruined cottage where the medics rendered first aid. The enemy targeted the cottage, but were unable to make good their attack. In the early morning of 15 April the Northumberland Fusiliers were reinforced, and the Liverpool Scottish work parties, stretcher-bearers, first-aiders and signallers all returned to Q2 by 0550.

Having failed in their attempt to storm Q1, the enemy shelled the Liverpool Scottish trenches throughout the day on 15 and 16 April, 'sometimes with crumps, sometimes with whizz bangs'. On 16 April, Capt Bryden McKinnell of the Liverpool Scottish noted in his diary that he had breakfast at 0600, and then slept from 0900 until early afternoon. Sgt D. Marples of Y Company noted: 'Got to rest after the stand to at 4:30 a.m., and had brekker at 11:30 a.m. Got a lot of intermittent artillery fire in afternoon'.¹⁹

Just before 1700 on 16 April, the German 5.9-inch 'crump' gun was shelling a road and the remains of a village in front of the Liverpool Scottish trenches, when suddenly one high explosive shell fell directly into the left-hand end of Q2. Capt McKinnell made a diary entry later that day: the enemy 'without any warning put its next shell right behind the machine-gun dugout on the left. The dugout vanished and killed two men sitting inside it'.²⁰ This diary entry confirms that Lance Cpl Bayly and Pte Veitch were instantly killed in the machine-gun dugout. Various reports also confirmed that 2nd Lt Leitch from Mossley Hill in Liverpool was indeed wounded in the same incident, as also was 1667 Lance Cpl A.R. Fraser of the Machine-Gun Section. Leitch had been commissioned from the ranks on 17 November 1914, and had only just rejoined the battalion as their new machine-gun officer. This was the last of the shelling for the rest of the month.

Honours

Colin Bayly's death was announced to the South Australian public in *The Advertiser* of 5 May 1915 under the title 'The Roll of Honour, Faithful unto Death'. It was not until 1984 that a brief profile of Colin Bayly was published, in the Australian Army newspaper.²¹ Bayly qualified for the 1914 Star, as a member of the BEF who served in France or Belgium between the commencement of hostilities on 5 August 1914 and midnight of 22/23 November 1914 (the end of the First Battle of Ypres). He did not qualify, however, for the clasp '5th Aug.-22nd Nov. 1914' as this was awarded only to those who actually served under fire in France or Belgium during this period – and the 10th (Scottish) did not serve 'under fire' until 27 November.

In Adelaide, William Bayly received his son's British War Medal and Victory Medal, plus also the Memorial Plaque with the accompanying Commemorative Scroll and King's Message (see fig.2).

¹⁹ Diary of Sergeant D. Marples (later WO1 Marples MC) of the 1st/10th Battalion, The King's (Liverpool Regiment), 16th April 1915 (cited by The Western Front Museum).

²⁰ Diary of Captain Bryden McKinnell MC, 1 November 1914 to 14 June 1915, privately published (cited by The Western Front Museum). McKinnell went on to win the 10th Battalion's first Military Cross of the war, killed in action during the gallant Scottish charge at Hooge on 16 June 1915.

²¹ Rosenzweig, P.A. (1984) 'Answered the Call'. *Army*, 4 October 1984.



Fig.2: The Commemorative Scroll and King's Message presented to William Bayly in memory of his son Colin. (Author's photo)

Commemoration overseas

Immediately behind the British lines at St Eloi was the village of Voormezeele, and it was here that Bayly, Veitch and Leitch were taken to be buried, in a regimental grouping of graves (one of four 'Enclosures') northwest of the village. Voormezeele fell to advancing German forces on 29 April 1918, but was retaken by the American 30th Division on 31 August 1918 (see 'Collectors' Corner', pp.33-37). Just three Enclosures were retained as war cemeteries of which Enclosure No.3, commenced in February 1915, was the largest.

There are some 1,613 Great War casualties commemorated in Voormezeele Enclosure No.3 in the town today known in Flemish as Ieper ('Ypres' in 1914-1918 French spelling) in West-Vlaanderen (West Flanders), Belgium including 11 Australians – with 1,004 named casualties and over 600 unidentified. The CWGC database shows there are 29 members of the Liverpool Scottish buried here, throughout Plots I to IX. All eleven burials within Plot VI are members of the Liverpool Scottish, including 2nd Lt Leitch (grave VI.A.3), Pte Veitch (VI.B.2) and Lance Cpl Bayly (VI.C.1). The answer to their apparently disconnected graves in three separate rows can be found by looking carefully at the ground plan for Enclosure No.3. When each of their grave locations are marked on the map, within the structured orientation adopted by the post-war Imperial War Graves Commission, the original side-by-side alignment as laid out by the regiment in 1915 can still be seen (see fig.3).




Fig.3: The layout of Voormezele Enclosure No.3 showing the graves of Lt Leitch (grave VI.A.3), Pte Veitch (VI.B.2) and Lance Cpl Bayly (VI.C.1) in three different rows within Plot VI – however the original side-by-side alignment of their burial in 1915 can still be seen.

Meanwhile in England, unknown to the Bayly family, the Liverpool Cenotaph was unveiled on Armistice Day 1930, dedicated to the men of that town who fell in the Great War. While no names are listed there, the long bronze panel facing St George's Hall depicts an army on the move, as Colin Bayly had marched out with the 1st/10th (Scottish) Battalion in 1914. He was individually recognised though by one of the 12,000 poppies hand-sewn on a large green cloth which was used for the unveiling, representing each of those from the regiment who died.

Brian Brock Bayly

In France in July 1916, Brian Bayly was severely wounded and was evacuated to England. He returned to the Front a few months later, earning the Military Cross on the Ypres Salient in early 1917:

For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He carried out a daring reconnaissance, obtaining valuable information, blew up two enemy mine shafts, and captured three prisoners. He has previously done fine work.²²

Bayly's death at the age of 32 came following his participation in a routine patrol forward of the trenches during the period of the Third Battle of Ypres on 29 October 1917. On their return, three men were found to be missing, so Bayly immediately called for three volunteers to join him in a search (from the CWGC database, these can be identified as Sappers Dawes, Taylor and Thomas). The enemy were alert to their movements by this time, and caught them in the open with shellfire.

The badly-wounded Bayly and his men were evacuated, most likely via the 44th Casualty Clearing Station at Lijssenthoek; Sapper Thomas died on 29 October. They were taken to a hospital in the rear where the matron happened to be an Australian nurse, who had also been in England on the outbreak of war. She had given her staff strict instructions that if any

²² *London Gazette* No. 30023, Supplement dated 17 April 1917, p.3678; *Edinburgh Gazette* No. 13079 of 17 April 1917, Supplement dated 19 April 1917, p.748.

Australian soldier was brought in, she was to be informed at once:

One of the nurses came to her and told her that a dying English soldier was asking for an Australian officer. She went to the bed of the dying man, and found that his one anxiety was to get news of the condition of his Captain who had been seriously wounded. He described him as an Australian and the bravest man who ever lived. Searching the ward she found a wounded officer described by the bed ticket as Captain Bayly. He was unconscious and disfigured beyond recognition, but a pocketbook with his name B.B. Bayly and his home address identified him as an old friend from down under.²³

Unfortunately Brian Bayly died without regaining consciousness, and his dying sapper was denied a final reunion. His Commanding Officer reported that Captain Bayly,

was a splendid officer, and I feel his loss very deeply. He was always so particular in looking after the comfort and welfare of his men. He died a gallant soldier's death.²⁴

The notice of his death was published with other South Australian fatalities under the title, 'Patriots Who Answered the Call'.²⁵ Like his brother Colin, Brian Bayly was also buried 'under the sad sod of Belgium'²⁶ – in Nine Elms British Cemetery in Poperinghe, grave VI.A.11. An examination of CWGC records suggests that Capt Bayly's hospital colleague might have been either Sapper Dawes or Sapper Taylor, both of the 254th Tunnelling Company RE who died that same day and were also laid to rest in Nine Elms Cemetery.

National commemoration

The names of both Colin and Brian Bayly, who died while serving as members of an allied force, are included on the Commemorative Roll (in a book located in the Commemorative Area) at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra.

State commemoration

Colin Bayly's name is commemorated by the South Australia National War Memorial on North Terrace in Adelaide, which was unveiled by the State Governor on Anzac Day 1931. This monument typifies the lives of Colin and Brian Bayly: the two sides comprise marble and bronze depictions of 'the prelude' and 'the epilogue' to war – one face depicting the call to duty, while the other reveals the sacrifice of young Australians. 'All honour give to those who, nobly striving, nobly fell that we might live', commands the imposing memorial.

Inside the crypt, bronze panels contain the names of the 5,511 South Australians who fell in the war – Colin Bayly is listed under his regiment, one of the 39 South Australians listed there as killed-in-action while serving with British forces (see fig.4). Unusually though, Brian Bayly has not been listed – perhaps this is because he went to England from the Federated Malay States, and volunteered in the UK, so he was not recorded as a South Australian enlistment. However, his entry in the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Record of War Dead clearly shows his family as living in Semaphore, SA. So the tally of South Australians who enlisted overseas and were killed or died is actually 40.

William Bayly did not live to see Colin's name on this memorial, however; he died in

²³ *The Straits Times* (Federated Malay States) 19 July 1918, p.10.

²⁴ *The Straits Times* (Federated Malay States) 19 July 1918, p.10.

²⁵ *The Mail* (Adelaide) 10 November 1917, p.16.

²⁶ Lieutenant-Colonel L.O. Betts OBE, President of the Semaphore and Port Adelaide Branch of the RSSILA: *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 25 May 1925, p.14.

Semaphore on 3 September 1925 at the age of 83. The names of his two soldier sons were included on William's headstone in Cheltenham Cemetery as a lasting tribute, but not a permanent one – in a redevelopment in 1993 the Bayly family plot was resumed and the headstones removed and, being unclaimed, were eventually destroyed.

Fig.4: Colin Bayly's listing inside the crypt of the South Australia National War Memorial, North Tce, Adelaide. (Author's photo)



Colin and Brian's only sister, Nora Brock Bayly was the fifth child of William and Annie, born in Semaphore on 25 December 1879. Nora was 13 years of age when her mother died, and undoubtedly played a significant role in helping to raise her three younger brothers, Charlie, Brian and Colin. By the time the boys had finished at Saints

and were attending the School of Mines, she was in her mid-twenties enjoying life: she was prominent in the Adelaide social world, often 'noticed in the audience' by correspondents from *The Advertiser*, and her outfits at the Cheltenham races were commented upon even after the war. As a 28-year-old she had the privilege of travelling to London with her father, and Switzerland with friends. Nora was a contributor to such activities as selling cakes to raise funds on Soldiers' Relief Button Day. Being the only female in the family, and in her mid-thirties during the war, the loss of Colin and then Brian was no doubt felt as closely as the loss of her own children.

The confluence of these circumstances saw her marry late, at the age of 57 – in the St Peters College Chapel to Mr James Howard Phillips of Adelaide, three years her elder. Nora Phillips passed away on 18 June 1970 aged 90, predeceased by her husband on 24 April 1951, with none of her family left to place a notice in *The Advertiser*. Nora and James' family headstone in Cheltenham Cemetery also honours her parents William and Annie Bayly.

Local commemoration

In the South Australian coastal suburb of Semaphore in 1925, the Semaphore War Memorial on the Esplanade was dedicated to honour those who fought in the war.²⁷ At first, while designs for a permanent war memorial were being considered and funds raised, a temporary 'Memorial Arch' of wood and iron was erected at the entrance to the Semaphore Jetty bearing the banner title, 'For King & Empire'. On 27 April 1924, four foundation stones for the new memorial were laid at the approach to the jetty – one on behalf of the citizens of Port Adelaide district, one for the RSSILA, one on behalf of the parents of the fallen men, and one on behalf of the widows and orphans. William Bayly and his daughter Nora were no doubt among the several thousand people who attended the unveiling of the monument on 24 May 1925.

The following year, a granite obelisk was erected on the foundation stones, with an electric 'turret type' clock and topped by a marble Angel of Peace with wings outspread. The local newspaper noted, 'all the names of those who enlisted from the district or who made the

²⁷ *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 15 August 1923, p.9; 21 May 1925, p.9; 25 May 1925, p.14. *The Register* (Adelaide) 20 March 1924, p.10; 28 April 1924, p.13; 25 May 1925, p.11. A Soldiers' Memorial Hall on Semaphore Road was dedicated on 13 July 1929.

supreme sacrifice cannot be placed on the monument'²⁸, so it instead bears a simple commemorative plaque. Locally, this iconic landmark has become known as the 'Semaphore Angel'.

St Peter's College

As Old Scholars, both Colin and Brian Bayly have their names inscribed in gold lettering on the Honour Roll in the War Memorial Hall which commemorates the 1,800 students and masters who volunteered for service during World War 1. This hall was opened on 22 September 1929 by the State Governor Sir Alexander Hore-Ruthven VC KCMG CB DSO* (subsequently Governor-General of Australia, 1936-45).²⁹ Colin Bayly's name was recalled at the 1915 annual meeting of the St Peter's Old Collegians' Association as one of the Old Boys who had died at the Front. The preceding year, the Chairman observed, had been the most momentous in the history of the school: 'It was a noble record that at the first call to meet the dangers which beset the Empire no fewer than 234 of their old boys were among the first to join the colors.'³⁰

It was at this 1915 meeting that the proposal for a memorial in honour of those who volunteered was first raised. The names of Colin and Brian are inscribed in gold lettering on the panelling of the face of the balustrade. Notable among the other names are Arthur Blackburn VC, Felix Giles DSO VD, and Lt Eric Wilkes Talbot Smith who was Mentioned in Despatches for bravely leading the 10th Battalion scouts inland on the morning of the Gallipoli landing and capturing three machine-guns before he was fatally wounded in the head.

Semaphore & Port Adelaide RSL

For the 2015 commemoration of the Anzac Centenary, the Semaphore & Port Adelaide RSL has created a virtual Honour Board listing the names of over 2,000 local men who volunteered to serve in World War 1. They came from the broad geographic area of Semaphore, Port Adelaide, Largs Bay, Ethelton, Glanville, Rosewater, Exeter, Peterhead, Queenstown and Alberton. The names of Colin and Brian Bayly with brief biographical profiles have now been added to this Semaphore-Port Adelaide 'Local Diggers Honour Board'.

Ironically, if Colin Bayly had been in Australia in August 1914 he would have served in another 'tenth battalion' – the 10th Australian Infantry Battalion AIF, most likely in D Company under Maj Mervyn James Herbert. Port Adelaide volunteers almost completely made up 'Don' Company. Wounded at Gallipoli and evacuated, Herbert later told a reporter about the Gallipoli landing: 'The Port Adelaide boys deserve great credit for the part they played' and 'The Port Adelaide boys always had a reputation for daring'.³¹

*

The St Peter's Old Collegians' Association noted in 1915 that, 'The great war had roused every part of the Empire, and Australians had responded nobly to the call of the motherland'.³² These

²⁸ *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 15 August 1923, p.9.

²⁹ *The Register* (Adelaide) 23 September 1929, p.2.

³⁰ *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 27 May 1915, p.9.

³¹ Herbert, Capt M.J., press interview, Outer Harbour, Port Adelaide, SA, 3 August 1915 (Mortlock Library of South Australiana, C.B.L. Lock Private Record Group, PRG 272/9); *The Advertiser* (Adelaide, SA) 5 August 1915, p.7: see Rosenzweig, P.A. (2013) 'The first three days: Memories of the ANZAC landing'. *Sabretache* vol.55, no.1 (March 2013), pp.36-47.

³² *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 27 May 1915, p.9.

two South Australians responded promptly: Colin was already in England and was among the first to go across to Europe, and his brother Brian made his way to England from Malaya as soon as he could. They typify Australia's response to the call, as represented by the four foundation stones of the Semaphore War Memorial:

The corner stones are symbolical of the men who rallied from the four corners of the globe in answer to Britain's call.³³

From the fire-ravaged ruins of a domestic home in the suburbs of Adelaide in the 1970s, two smoke and water-stained reminders of Colin Bayly survived to be passed via a small second-hand shop into the hands of a collector. The blackened memorial plaque and medals were perhaps washed away with the debris. But his Commemorative Scroll and King's Message, the more ephemeral of the Great War commemorative pieces, managed to survive and today perpetuate the name of a South Australian who nobly did his duty:

Let those who come after see to it that his name be not forgotten.

Novelist Mary Ann Evans (in her first novel under the pen-name George Eliott) wrote in 1859: 'Our dead are never dead to us until we have forgotten them'.³⁴ As families pass, homes are lost and gravesites are subsumed, the militaria collector and researcher plays a significant role in preserving the memory of the fallen, perhaps one as vital even as such a body as the CWGC – even with no living descendants, the smallest relic of a veteran's existence is enough to keep their memory alive.

Acknowledgments

Bert Caloud, the Assistant Superintendent at the Manila American Cemetery in the Philippines, has an admirable and indefatigable commitment to honouring the fallen. With his support an American Battle Monuments Commission colleague was approached, and Christopher Arseneault, Superintendent of the Flanders Field American Cemetery and Memorial in Belgium, kindly photographed Colin Bayly's headstone in nearby Voormezele Enclosure No.3. Bert and Christopher's support for this project is greatly appreciated.

References

1st/10th Battalion, The King's (Liverpool Regiment) War Diary 14 to 21 April 1915 (*cited by The Western Front Museum*).

Bean, C E W (1921) *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918*. Volume I, 'The Story of Anzac' (UQP reprint 1981).

McGilchrist, Lt Col A.M. (1930) *The Liverpool Scottish 1900-1919*. Henry Young and Sons Ltd.

Semaphore-Port Adelaide RSL 'Local Diggers Honour Board':

<http://semaphoreportadelaiderl.com.au/index.php/remembrance/honour-boards/51-diggers-honour-board>

The Western Front Museum Foundation:

<http://ator1149.home.xs4all.nl/wfm/ww1/remembrance.html>

-o0o-

³³ *The Advertiser* (Adelaide) 25 May 1925, p.14.

³⁴ Eliott, G (1859) *Adam Bede*. Book 1, Chapter 10: <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/507/507-h/507-h.htm>

BRITISH ARMY DEATHS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA 1839-1870

Anthony F. Harris

‘And foreign constellations west each night above his mound.’
Drummer Hodge, Thomas Hardy¹

When researching the Royal Sappers and Miners who served in South Australia between 1839 and the 1860s a mention was found to a young private of the Corps who died in Adelaide in 1845. I could find no reference to the funeral in the newspapers of the day but a biographical index produced by the Genealogical Society of SA showed that he was buried in West Terrace Cemetery (WTC). Fortunately the cemetery has a simple computer database available for public use that should show that he was indeed buried there but, despite further enquiries, the location of the grave was not recorded. Details were noted but nothing more was done until another reference was found, this time in the Australian Joint Copying Project (Flinders University) microfilms, of a private of the 50th Regiment who also died in Adelaide. Again, I could find no mention of a funeral in the newspapers but also there was no mention of a cemetery. However, checking the WTC registers again gave a positive result and, after further enquiries, this time a grave location was found. Yet another reference to a death in the 50th Regiment made me realise that perhaps these were not particularly isolated incidents. Despite the number of burials where a cemetery is not recorded, the likelihood that West Terrace Cemetery was the resting place of most, if not all of the soldiers who died in Adelaide is very high, given that it was the closest cemetery to both their barracks and the hospital and that it catered for all religious persuasions.

Following a redeployment prior to retirement I had occasion to refer to some early Death Registers within the holdings of the State Archives; the purpose being to try to determine if an individual being researched at the time had died in the colony. Although that search led nowhere, I did realise how the registrations were listed and consequently how to search quickly and reasonably effectively within the registers. Fortunately the early Death Registers often give a variety of information, one of the entries being under the heading of ‘OCCUPATION’ (of the deceased), and entries are all more or less in chronological date order. A quick search through the ‘Deaths’ covering the years that the British Army was in garrison in the colony (1841-1870) was reasonably successful. But to do that first you need the name of the deceased, which of course I did not have; their names were what I was actually looking for. But the registers were there on the shelves so while I had access to the registers my lunchtime reading took me through them page by page to see what may be found.

Because I did not have the luxury of time at my disposal the research had to be fairly quick, so I simply went through the registers looking only under the heading ‘Occupation’ and looking only for the word ‘soldier’ or some similar entry that suggested a military connection. This proved to be a reasonably successful trace and resulted in a list of 21 names. To these were added three more from other (correspondence) files concerning the Royal Marines of 1836-38, so to date there are a couple of dozen men listed who died while stationed for duty in the colony. However, there may be others who were not found by this method. I was curious to find that one name I had previously recorded and whose grave I had subsequently located, did not show up in the ‘Occupation’ column. Going back to check the entry by using the known date of his death, I found that he was actually listed as ‘labourer’.² Consequently it is quite possible that one or two more may have been similarly identified and would be missed if looking only for a

¹ *The Bedside Thomas Hardy*, Edward Leeson, Macmillan, London, 1979, p.434.

² Martin Lally, 50th Regt.

military connection under 'Occupation'. Lack of time and extended access precluded further checking.

From a list such as this, short though it is, a few statistics may be gleaned:

Royal Marines	3
Royal Sappers and Miners	2
11 th Regiment	8
40 th Regiment	3
2/14 th Regiment	3
50 th Regiment	4

No local deaths have been noted among the 96th Regiment, 99th Regiment, or the 18th Regiment.

Causes of death show:

Not given	3
Drowning	2
Pulmonary/tubercular	7
Apoplexy	3
Disease of the liver	1
Disease of the heart	1
Fever	1
Measles	1
Bronchitis	1
Inflammation of the lungs	1
Aneurism	3

So it appears that only two, or 16.5%, were accidental (both by drowning), the rest, or 83.5%, were from sickness or disease. Where cause of death is given, pulmonary and tubercular disease accounts for a third of all deaths. The oldest is given as 44 years, the youngest 23 years and, where age is given, that average shows as 32½ years. Of these unfortunates, only two graves have been located,³ both within West Terrace Cemetery and both men of the 50th Regiment.

The three members of the Royal Marines all died in 1838, one of these being caused by 'Serious apoplexy the result of habitual intoxication'. The cause of death of the other two is not recorded. Corporal William Finlay of the Royal Sappers and Miners was found drowned in October 1842 while stationed at Moorundie on the Murray River. In some off-duty time he had gone out to shoot some game and in the process of retrieving a downed duck he got tangled in the reeds. An inquest was held in the village (a report of which is held in the State Archives) and his demise is recorded in the unit history as also in a Register of Casualties of the R.S. & M.⁴ The second drowning was that of Charles Taplin of the 11th Regiment in October 1847 when he had been bathing in the Torrens near the SA Company's Mill (near the north-eastern boundary of the city). The second sapper who died in the colony (the one responsible for this extended project) was Pte Henry Hearnden, 27 years old, married with two daughters.⁵ A few months after his death his 23 year old widow was to bury the younger of the daughters.

³ Martin Lally and James Shea, 50th Regt.

⁴ The National Archive (TNA) WO97, 1148-1152 and State Records SA (SRSA) GRG24/11 No.37, 1847.

⁵ GRG24/6/1845 No.787.

Unfortunately it is difficult to find information on many of these men who died of accident or disease during their service, simply because they were not actually discharged – hence no Discharge Record. And, of course, it is this document that is so useful in tracking the background and service of British military personnel. Of the men who died in South Australia, only one Discharge Record has been located; that of 40-year-old No.1224 Corporal James Moon of the 2/14th Regiment. The only reason his record is available is that his discharge was submitted in January 1867, approved in Melbourne in April 1868 and sometime around this period he moved to Adelaide and died in hospital just three months after his discharge was approved.⁶ He was not stationed in Adelaide during his service but had served six years in New Zealand. His Discharge Record also states: ‘He is in possession of two Good Conduct Badges, Crimea and Turkish medals and medal for South Africa’. It would appear that he may have served in a different regiment to earn these medals as according to his discharge papers his service with the 2/14th amounts to only eight years and five months and no earlier service is shown in his discharge documents.

The first of the men of the line regiments to die in South Australia was Pte John Grendy (or Gready, or Grady, depending on which document you read), a 25-year-old in the 11th Regiment. His funeral is the first I found reported in the press, which surprises me as I would have thought that a military funeral was a spectacle that would attract some sort of comment in a small community like Adelaide. Maybe any sort of funeral was just too common in those days:

On Sunday last we witnessed the solemn and affecting spectacle of a soldier’s funeral, which was conducted with all the decorum and circumstance possible in so small a garrison. The deceased was a private in the 11th Regiment, named John Gready, formerly of Timme four miles from Wexland in Ireland. Among the disciplined attendants and spectators of the unfrequent [sic] spectacle, were the native boys and girls belonging to the Aborigines School, who seemed to take a great interest in the proceedings. The place of interment was the Catholic cemetery, and thither the sable attendants accompanied the soldier’s remains: but when, upon the conclusion of the services of the Catholic Church the firing party prepared to bestow the last military honours, the young blacks, of both sexes, took to their heels ... until the firing and mournful strains had given place to the quick returning step and lively air.⁷

Another curiosity possibly relating to military deaths has been noted in an early plan of West Terrace Cemetery. It shows a number of plot locations with a list of leaseholder’s names, but also shows a reasonably large area – perhaps sufficient for six or eight single graves – with the name ‘Capt. Frome’ alongside.⁸ Frome of course was the Royal Engineer officer who accompanied and supervised the detachment of Royal Sappers and Miners in the colony between 1839 and 1849. It is not known whether Frome leased this area as a burial space for any members of his family who may have died during his term of his engagement – or was it leased in the event of any deaths among his military charges? Frome left two young daughters in this section but no other adjacent graves are known.

One of the frustrating things about chasing these military burials is that several of the names are registered as being buried in the cemetery but the grave locations appear to be unrecorded. The Genealogical Society of SA has done some sterling work in recording graves and headstone details in most of Adelaide’s and South Australia’s cemeteries, yet even their researchers have not been able to locate many registered burials. It is likely that further military

⁶ TNA WO97, 1434-167 Moon, James.

⁷ The Adelaide *Observer*, 15 August 1846, p.5, col.3.

⁸ SRSA GRG35/585/42 WTC 1847.

deaths may be found in the Monthly Muster rolls of British Regiments held in various libraries holding the microfilms of the Australian Joint Copying Project.



SACRED [?]
 TO THE MEMORY OF
 PRIVATE JAMES SHEA
 50th REGIMENT
 WHO DEPARTED THIS LIFE [?]
 ON THE 30TH MARCH 1868
 AGE 30 YEARS [?]
 THIS TABLET WAS ERECTED [?] TO HIS
 MEMORY AS A TOKEN OF ESTEEM AND [?]
 BY HIS COMRADES [?]

Above: The remains of the headstone of Pte James Shea, WTC Ref: CAO-B6-Peg40. The underlined words on the right are missing, but were recorded by the Genealogical Society of South Australia some years ago. When the author first visited the grave the slate headstone had split and fallen, and the shattered remains had to be carefully positioned to show the surviving text. The shards had been used to hide a hypodermic syringe. Further disturbance has been noted since.

SOLDIERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY WHO DIED WHILE STATIONED IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Ref: State Records SA, GRS2351/2, GRG24/1 & Flinders University PRO microfilms

<i>Bk/Page/ Entry</i>	<i>Surname</i>	<i>Given names</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Cause</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Informant</i>
GRG24/1/ 1838/135a	KING	Henry (John?)	June 1838	Not given	Not given	Pte, Royal Marines	
GRG24/1/ 1838/135a	PAINE	Thomas	June 1838	Not given	Not given	Pte, Royal Marines	
GRG24/1/ 1838/187a	COLLETT	John	18/9/1838	Not given	Serious apoplexy (result of habitual intoxication)	Pte, Royal Marines	
1/4/55	FINLAY+	William	15/10/1842	28yrs*	Drowned at Moorundie	Cpl, RS&M	Coroner, Moorundie
1/34/524	HEARNDEN	Henry	8/7/1845	27yrs	Phthisis Pulmonalis	Pte, RS&M	Cpl Joseph Moore, RS&M

1/55/850	GRENDY (?)**	John	7/8/1846	25yrs	Phthisis Pulmonalis	Pte, 11 th Regt	Cpl John Feather- stone
1/59/899	JONES*	Evan	21/10/1846	23yrs	Phthisis Pulmonalis	Pte, 11 th Regt	Cpl G. Slater, 11 th Regt
1/59/906	HALLORAN*	Michael	30/10/1846	38yrs	Consumption	Pte, 11 th Regt	Sgt Robert Barber, 11 th Regt
1/91/1153	TAPLIN*	Charles	17/10/1847	24yrs	Drowned bathing in the Torrens	Pte, 11 th Regt	Coroner
2/88/1344	SCOTLAND	Robert	5/6/1851	40yrs	Inflammation of the lungs	Sgt, 11 th Regt	Cpl Thomas Lawley
2/212/ 4654	DONAGHOE	Joseph	20/5/1853	38yrs	Disease of the liver	Pte, 11 th Regt	Sgt Henry Stead, 11 th Regt
2/213/ 4658	SEMPLE	John	21/5/1853	44yrs	Disease of the heart	Col Sgt, 11 th Regt	Sgt Henry Stead, 11 th Regt
3/50/933	HAGAN	Matthew	1/4/1854	35yrs	Consumption	11 th Regt?	Not given
5/191/954	HEANEY	John	14/8/1857	24yrs	Not given	12 th Regt?	Not given
9/68/608	CUNNING- HAM	John	3/12/1859	27yrs	Aneurism	40 th Regt	Charles Irvine
9/86/776	SMITH	Alfred	19/1/1860	40yrs	Fever	40 th Regt	Thomas Moyle
9/340/ 3045	CLIFFORD	Patrick	10/2/1862	35yrs	Apoplexy	Cpl, 40 th Regt	Charles Irvine
18/430/ 3667	EGAN	John	7/6/1867	31yrs	Measles	2nd/14 th Regt?	Richard Creswell
18/445/ 3761	HACKET(T?)	James	14/7/1867	27yrs	Consumption	2nd/14 th Regt?	Richard Creswell
29/76/ 449	SHEA	James	30/3/1868	31yrs	Chronic bronchitis	Pte, 50 th Regt	Alexander Vesey
29/109/ 646	MOON	James	28/7/1868	40yrs	Phthisis	Late of 2/14 th Regt	George Easey
29/109/ 649	GILBERT	Samuel	29/7/1868	37yrs	Aneurism	50 th Regt	L/Cpl W. Locks
29/112/ 662	LINGE	George	4/8/1868	Not given	Apoplexy	50 th Regt?	Cpl Sam Astin, 50 th Regt
29/159/ 945	LALLY	Martin	11/2/1869	33yrs	Aneurism	Cpl, 50 th Regt	George Baber

Notes regarding table

* See GRG24/11 Coroner's Inquests, State Records SA

** See also GRG78/12 *Return of Casualties by Death ...*, SRSA

+ See also Connolly: T.W.J. Connolly, *History of the Royal Sappers and Miners*, London, 1857, Appendix X, p.559

Aneurysm/Aneurism = Ballooning of a blood vessel

Phthisis, Phthisis Pulmonalis, Consumption = Tuberculosis

SOCIETY NOTICES

MHSA Seeks Partners in New International Military History Network

The Federal President, Rohan Goyne and Vice President, Nigel Webster have written jointly to fellow national military historical societies with a proposal to partner with the MHSA in a new International Military History Network (IMHN), which will foster the research and study of military history cooperatively internationally, building on the impetus of the Centenary of the First World War.

To date, the New Zealand Military History Society (NZMHS) (as the first fellow Society) has agreed to partner with the MHSA in the IMHN. The Federal President has drafted a Memorandum of Understanding for the partners to consider further. The Military History Society of Ireland has contacted the MHSA asking for further details of the IMHN.

Rohan Goyne, Federal President

***Sabretache* as a Research Resource: Figures and Details**

The Federal President advises that Federal Council has obtained usage reports from Informit online databases which confirm that the usage of *Sabretache* has increased by nearly 600% as at September 2015 from 2013:

Date	Unique Documents	Total Views
2015	636	1770
2014	534	1778
2013	91	277

This reinforces the relevance of *Sabretache* particularly during the Centenary of the First World War and the considerable efforts made by Federal Council through initiatives such as the Special Gallipoli issue in 2014 and the current Amiens series by David Pearson and Paul Thost.

Sabretache has also been referenced in the biographic essay for Volume 3 of the Centenary History for an article authored by Prof Peter Stanley. The volume was launched in Canberra in late September.

Rohan Goyne, Federal President

2015 Returned and Services League (RSL) ANZAC of the Year Award

Western Australian Branch President of the Military Historical Society of Australia, Wayne Gardiner, is one of two Western Australian recipients of the 2015 RSL ANZAC of the Year award and although a highly regarded award within the RSL, generally little is known about it outside of that organisation. As his award is for raising awareness of Australia's military history, it is pleasing that he has been acknowledged in the 100th year in which Australia is commemorating the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign as part of the overall 100th anniversary and commemorations of Australia's involvement in the Great War of 1914 to 1918.

Of the nineteen nominations made throughout Australia, only seven recipients were chosen and it was remarkable that two of those seven are from Western Australia. The annual awards are to recognize the efforts and achievements of Australians who have given service to their fellow Australians and to their community in a positive, selfless and compassionate manner.

Wayne achieved his award in recognition of his years of sustained and enthusiastic commitment to the community through his involvement with many community organisations and in particular through his fostering the understanding and remembrance of Australia's military history. Wayne has been an active member of the Western Australian branch of the Society for forty four years. His interest in Australia's military history goes back to his school days. As a means of having an opportunity to meet with war veterans and while still a student at high school, he volunteered on weekends to work at the RSL War Veteran's Home in 1971 and 1972. Here he met and discussed aspects of military service with last WA veterans of the Boer War (1899-1902) and many World War One former soldiers.



It is not surprising then that he became a volunteer at the Army Museum of Western Australia when it was initially located in Highgate. The museum opened in 1977 and Wayne joined them in 1978. After serving in 10th Light Horse and becoming an officer he was posted to Headquarters of the 5th Military District, serving as the Deputy Curator of the museum from 1985 and in 1996, became the Curator. He remains with the Army Reserve and is still with the Army Museum at its current home at Artillery Barracks in Fremantle as its Assistant Manager. Since the late 1990s, the Army Museum has become a Regional Museum within the Australian Army History Unit

(AAHU). Wayne is in his forty-second year of Army service and in 2006 was awarded the Deputy Chief of Army's Commendation for excellent devotion to duty and performance with the Army Museum of WA.

His civilian occupation was as an auctioneer and valuer of antiques and collector's items specialising in militaria. From 1985 to 2014, he was one of two Commonwealth Government approved Valuers (Militaria) for the Cultural Gifts Program in WA, and since 1996 has been the auctioneer and part of the volunteer Legacy biannual Militaria Auction team who have raised over \$350,000 in support of Legacy WA and its aims. An unusual aspect of Wayne's contribution to the community's understanding of Australia's military history, and raising greater awareness of the contribution Australian and especially Western Australian ex-service men and women have made to our country, is his role for the last twenty years as the military history broadcaster for the ABC's TV coverage of Perth's ANZAC Day Parade.

Peter Shaw

THE AUSTRALIAN ATTACK IN THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, 8 AUGUST 1918: A TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL GERMAN VERSION – PART 4

David Pearson and Paul Thost¹

This is the final instalment of a four-part series involving a translation from relevant pages of the German Official History pertaining to the Australian attack at Amiens. The original work is titled *Die Katastrophe des 8. August 1918 (Schlachten des Weltkrieges, Band 36)* [The Catastrophe of 8 August 1918 (Battles of the World War, Volume 36)] by Thilo von Bose, published by Gerhard Stalling: Oldenburg i.O./Berlin, 1930. The translated pages are from Chapter V(b) ‘Between the Somme and the rail line Amiens – Chaulnes’ and Chapter V(e) ‘Conclusion’.

This is a literal translation. The authors have tried to keep as true to the original text as possible, although some effort has been made to make it more readable by the application (in places) of plain English techniques. The original pagination is indicated within the translated text in square brackets, while footnotes as they appear in the original are marked with asterisks. Footnotes added by the authors are numbered and formatted as standard footnotes. Any additional text by the authors appears also in square brackets. For ease of reference portions of Map 2 from von Bose showing the Australian attack are included in the colour section located in the middle of this issue, and are referred to as [Fig.4.1] and so on.

*

[page 129]

4) The formation of a new front in the sector of the XIth Army Corps

The Headquarters of the XIth Army Corps had fully grasped the seriousness of the position in the early morning hours. But they were unable to deploy quick and powerful support to their frontline divisions. Because of the only Reserve (43rd Res. Division) significant sections of the infantry and the artillery:

Regimental staff of Res. Regts. 201 and 202. 6th Company and 1. M.G.K./Res. 201 [1st Machine Gun Company/Res. 201]² near Sailly-Laurette, Res. *Felda*. Regt. 43 [Res. Field Artillery Regiment 43]³ (without 4th, 6th and 9th Batteries) and I./Fußa. 16 [I./Foot Artillery 16]⁴

had not yet been relieved, others had been deployed prematurely and scattered:

I./Res. 202 on the Canal Mountain and in Méricourt, 1st Machine Gun Company/Res. 201 and 2nd Machine Gun Company/Res. 202 southeast of Cérisy, I./Res. 201 (without Machine Gun Company) on the *Römer* depression, II./Res. 203 west of Proyart, 4th, 6th, and 9./Res. Field Artillery 43 on the *Georgs* Mountain⁵

so that only some [page 130] of the four-and-a-half battalions without artillery were available. Of those, the 6th, 2nd Machine Gun Company and 9./Res. 201 were in Fontaine-Les-Cappy, as well as the III./Res. 203 in Halle (near Peronne) which had just arrived after a tiring night march from the very front line; while the II./Res. 202 (without the Machine Gun Company)

¹ See Part 1 of this series, *Sabretache* vol.56, no.1 (March 2015), pp.4-15, for the authors’ biographies, acknowledgements and introductory remarks.

² M.G.K. = *Maschinen-Gewehr-Kompanie* (Machine Gun Company) (general Staff, 1918: 197). Hereafter, Machine Gun Company is used instead of M.G.K.

³ *Felda* = *Feld Artillerie* (Field Artillery) (General Staff, 1918: 181). Hereafter, Field Artillery is used.

⁴ *Fußa* = *Fuß Artillerie* (Foot Artillery) (General Staff, 1918: 184). Hereafter, Foot Artillery is used.

⁵ In the original text these two indented lists of units appear as footnotes.

was located to the east, the III./Res. 202 was located to the south of Cappy, and the I./Res. 203 was located in St Radegonde (near Peronne) since the day before. However, the Army intervened before those units, exhausted and widely dispersed and partly wearied as they were by their night march, could be moved to the front. The Army had already alerted its reserve, the 107th Infantry Division, at about 6.00am and soon after arranged its transport by lorries to Foucaucourt to keep in front of the enemy advancing on the important *Römer* Road. It was unfortunate, however, that the artillery of this Division, with the exception of three field batteries, was still deployed with the 27th Infantry Division in the previous sector of the 107th (Field Artillery Regt. 213, without Ist [Battalion], and I./Bavarian Foot Artillery 6). Therefore, the Army Field Artillery Regt. 221 similarly deployed as an Army Reserve in the district Estrees-Chaulnes-Villers Carbonnel was also to be centred at Foucaucourt.

Once it was obvious that the enemy attack to the north did not extend any further than to the region north of Morlancourt, the Army also sent the stand-by division in the sector of the General Command 54, the 243rd Infantry Division, on its way at 7.30am in the direction of Bray and Suzanne with the primary intention to deploy it on both sides of the Somme. This division, too, had three field batteries only available, as the bulk of its artillery was used in combat by the 27th Infantry Division as well (Field Artillery Regt. 238 without Ist [Battalion] and I./Foot Artillery 36). Further, the 2nd Army requested additional support from the neighbour army on the right, and it was granted: of the 26th Res. Division (standby division in the Corps Sector adjacent to the north of the 2nd Army), Res. Infantry Regt. 119 was moved on lorries and the I./Res. Field Artillery 26 was marched off, to Cappy.

Both divisions – with the exception of Infantry Regt. 479 which had remained with the 27th Infantry Division (see page 75) – were now attached to the XIth Army Corps. As the latter recognised that the primary danger threatened from south of the Somme, they ordered at 11.10am:

Infantry Regt. 478, Füsilier Regt. 122 (Suzanne), Res. Infantry Regt. 119 and two*Field Artillery units (Cappy) are to arrive at 10.30am in nominated towns and are at the disposal [*page 131*] of the XIth Army Corps. They are under the command of the staff of the 108th Infantry Division.**

*In fact only one unit (I./Res. Field Artillery 26) was deployed.

**As the staff of the 43rd Res. Division had retained the command of its sector to date, that of the 108th Infantry Division was unoccupied.

108th Infantry Division is to hold with these forces the stretch Méricourt-Crossing *Römer* Road/Road Proyart-Harbonnières. One Infantry Regt. [is to be] at the disposal of the General Command to Chuignes.

As per the latest reports Morcourt is held by the 13th Division; enemy tanks have been reported east of Bayonvillers.

The forces between Méricourt and *Römer* Road are to be under the command of the 108th Division which is to instruct the 13th and 41st Infantry Division accordingly.

This order assessed the arrival time of the various regiments much too optimistically. In fact, Infantry Regt. 478 could only march onto Proyart from north of Suzanne at 1.45pm., However, it did so without its IInd Battalion which had only returned from digging entrenchments in the early morning hours and had therefore departed later than scheduled. The I./122 was sent out after it (in place of the missing IInd Battalion). Füsilier Regt. 122 (without Ist [Battalion]) could not even be set in march to leave Suzanne for Chuignes before 3.30pm.

The leading lines of both regiments were faced with rather unpleasant pictures to the north and to the south of the Somme. Suffering from enemy long-range fire and heavy aircraft attacks, baggage columns and carts escaped in panic-stricken disorientation to the east. Here and there single teams of horses that had simply left their vehicles behind rushed to the rear in wild flight. Yet as soon as they saw the fresh and ordered fellows from Württemberg, some of them even singing on the march, they quickly calmed down. However, they too suffered more and more from the enemy aircraft squadrons and the artillery fire so that their advance progressed slowly. At 6.30pm the I./478 was the first unit to reach the southwest edge of Proyart. At 7.00 in the evening the III./478 pushed into the terrain northwest of the village and gradually made contact with the south eastern wing of the I./13. The I./122 under the command of Regt. 478 set itself up as the second meeting point alongside the railway line between Chuignolles and Proyart [see Fig.4.1, p.31]. The *Pi.Komp.* 306⁶ which was with Infantry Regt. 478 was deployed at their disposal to assist with the setup of this rearward position on the dominating height northeast of Proyart. There was to be no more infantry fighting.

When Füsilier Regt. 122 arrived with the IInd Battalion south of I./478 at the same height at about 10.00pm, and for his part joined up firmly on its left [page 132] with the 107th Infantry Division, it had not only built up a continuous new infantry line facing the enemy occupied front from Height 84 and the *Römer* Road, but also established an adequate defence-in-depth. Because the 6th, 2nd Machine Gun Company, 9./Res. 201 and Res. Regt. 203 (without IInd [Battalion]) in Fontaine-Les-Cappy as well the IInd and III./Res. 202 south of Cappy had been assembled and assigned to the 108th Infantry Division, and in the evening Res. Regt. 119 had also arrived at Chuignes as Corps-Reserve.

The assembly of lorries for the transport of the infantry of the 107th Infantry Division had been delayed to an extent that the respective regiments could only depart from their quarters between 12 noon and 4.00pm.

The troops moving to the front were facing a desolate view on the *Römer* Road. An endless train of carts and columns was rolling towards them; in between men from various troop units in a miserable condition were taking to their heels. They certainly could have offered a noticeable resistance to the enemy. Like this, they only contributed to the delay of the progress of the division. Frequently there were almost inextricable bunches of vehicles stuck alongside each other that prevented the progress of our lorries. It was fortunate that there were no aircraft about. One kilometre from Foucaucourt it was impossible to proceed any further as here even escort batteries stopped on the road. So we had to dismount and march on. (From a combat report of Res. Infantry Regt. 232)

The 107th Infantry Division issued orders at 2.00pm in Foucaucourt to their 213th Infantry Brigade to commence an attack on both sides of the *Römer* Road immediately after the arrival of their regiments and to win as much ground to the west as possible. At the front there were purportedly only a few of our own troops on the western fringe of the Bayern forest and in front of Rainecourt. However, it was not before 5.45pm that the 213th Infantry Brigade with Res. Infantry Regt. 232 on the right, and Res. Infantry Regt. 227 to the left of the *Römer* Road (each on a front of 1000 metres) could line up from the depression east of the Bayern forest and north of Herleville [see Fig.4.2, p.32]. Of the I./Field Artillery 221, one battery was assigned to each regiment. The other batteries of this regiment and those of the I./Field Artillery 213 were already in position astride the *Römer* Road (west of Foucaucourt). Res. Infantry Regt. 52 remained in the depression east of the Bayern forest. The two frontal regiments reached a

⁶ *Pi* = *Pionier* (Pioneer) (General Staff, 1918: 201). Hereafter, Pioneer is used.

line about 300m west of the road Proyart-La Flaque – one km west of Rainecourt, troubled only by aircraft. Parts of the II./Res. 227 pushed on as far as the western gateway of Framerville. Here the regiments came under heavy artillery and machine gun fire. In the beginning the attachment to Regt. 478 on the right was only very loose [*page 133*] – Füsilier Regt. 122 had not yet arrived – and on the left still completely insecure. It was soon recognised that they were located in front of a strongly manned enemy position against which an attack was only feasible after substantial artillery action, the preconditions for which were not yet met. They therefore abandoned any further attempts to advance. This was certainly the correct decision. On the one hand the enemy had had time since noon to set himself up in the position he had reached and to gather strong parts of his artillery, on the other hand the 107th Infantry Division had been badly shaken during the past six weeks in combat north of the Somme. The few days' rest behind the front had naturally been insufficient to recover their full strength for an attack.

However, this abandonment of any further attack did not correspond with the viewpoint of the General Command XIth Army Corps, which had issued an order at 6.00 pm that:

The 107th Infantry Division is to attack on both sides of the *Römer* Road against Lamotte. The 108th Infantry Division is to join the combat with all available units, right wing of the 108th Division at Morcourt. Dividing line between 108th and 107th Division: railway station Proyart – 500m north of *Römer* Road; left wing of the 107th Infantry Division upon Bayonvillers.

However, as the 107th Infantry Division did not advance any further, as the enemy was also standing in strong position in front of the 108th Infantry Division and as the arrival of Füsilier Regt. 122 was delayed until 10.00pm, the General Command refrained from the execution of the attack and ordered at 11.00pm to hold fast in the present positions. Yet they were to prepare the attack for the next morning. But even that was no longer to eventuate.

As a result of the loss of the fortification artillery south of the Somme it was not easy to equip the 108th Infantry Division with a satisfactory number of batteries. Only the 3./Field Artillery 238 and the I./Res. Field Artillery 26 had arrived together with Regiments 478, 122 and Res. 119 but they arrived too late to be put into position; they remained at Chuignes (3./238) and Eclusier (I./Res. 26). They could therefore only count on the serviceable batteries of the Field Artillery Regts. 243 and Res. 43, some of which had to remain north of the Somme with 43rd Res. and 27th Infantry Divisions.*

* A consequence of the order to deploy the batteries of the 107th Infantry Division (compare page 77) [*not included in this translation*].

They finally managed to emplace nine Field Artillery batteries in the sector [*page 134*] of the 108th Infantry Division. At this, it was particularly fortunate that they could equip the 2nd and 5./Res. Field Artillery 43, which together with the 7th Battery had lost all their guns, with four guns each from the distribution centre Froissy and that they would be reinforced with crews from the 7th Battery. The available heavy artillery consisted of batteries or guns which had been envisaged, but not allocated yet, as reinforcements or replacements for the sectors of the 43rd Res. Division (south of the Somme), 13th and 41st Infantry Divisions. Of these, the 4./Garde-Landwehr Foot Artillery Battalion had moved into position several times on 8 August but had not received any ammunition as yet. Towards the evening, 12 heavy guns of various calibres were in position at the 108th Infantry Division, ready to commence fire. The 107th Division had control of Army Field Artillery Regt. 221 and the I./Field Artillery 213; for the time being they had no heavy artillery, only half of the 1./Foot Artillery 88 of the 117th Infantry Division was still available, but late in the evening they were repositioned further to the south.* For both divisions there were in total six Field Artillery and eight heavy batteries under way; they,

together with the 3./Field Artillery 238, the I./Res. Field Artillery 26 and the 4./Garde-Landwehr Foot Artillery, ready to fire on 9 August, could prove to be a considerable reinforcement of the defence. The further course of events primarily depended on whether the enemy would delay its renewed attacks long enough for the artillery to arrive and become operational.

*See Map 2 for Artillery positions.

[Here ends the description of the battle which is relevant to the Australian attack. The next section presents the overall conclusion of the battle.]

[page196]

e) Final observations

As night fell on 8 August over the battlefield of the 2nd Army, the German Army's worst defeat since the beginning of the war had become an accomplished fact. Those front-line divisions located between the [river] Somme and the [river] Avre that had been hit by the enemy attack were almost completely destroyed. Front troops north of the [river] Somme, as well as large parts of the reserve troops which had been deployed into the battle during the day, had also suffered severely. The total losses of all units deployed in the [battle] area of the 2nd Army are estimated at 650 to 700 officers and at 26,000 to 27,000 soldiers. *More than 400 guns as well as vast numbers of machine guns, mortars and other war materiel were lost. The enemy breakthrough reached up to 11km into the German front; the enemy had achieved its goals for the main attack nearly everywhere, and could have been even more successful, had it not rigidly adhered to its initial plan.

*Exact figures are missing as the files, as far as they still exist, do not specify all losses or do not specify the losses separately for 8 August.

It is true that the German High Command had been able to form a new more or less continuous front by deploying any available reserves. They had even been able to muster other forces close behind the new front by late evening, and to marshal yet other forces so that they could reach the battlefield by the next day. But these units, too, were to a great extent composed of unrested or even exhausted [page 197] troops and their artillery was not complete or could only later on get to the position. It was therefore hardly likely that resistance against renewed enemy attacks could be successful. In fact, there would be more enemy attacks – also on other front sectors – on the following days; however, they only resulted in meagre successes but did yet again cost the German side severe losses.

But even before that trial was finalised the O.H.L.⁷ tried to clarify how this enormous defeat had become possible. Already on 8 August General Ludendorff detailed General Staff officers to those divisions primarily affected by the enemy attack and to the High Command of the 2nd Army with the order to gather by way of inspection information on the condition of the troops and the situation and to report to him. These officers had plainly devastating impressions that left no doubt where the reason for the defeat was to be found: The troops were in the truest sense of the word at the end of their strength.

‘The greatest injustice that one could do is to blame the troops for this defeat!’ These are the words with which the representative of the High Command was received by the Chief of the

⁷ O.H.L. = *Oberste-Heeresleitung* (General Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, High Command) (General Staff, 1918: 200). Hereafter, German High Command has been used instead of O.H.L.

General Staff of the 2nd Army. And yet there appeared to be substantial facts to counter this opinion: The enemy had reached his success with surprising rapidity and with remarkably few casualties, whereas more than two-thirds of the German casualties were prisoners. Almost everywhere German soldiers had surrendered to the enemy, discarded rifles and equipment, abandoned mortars, machine guns and cannon and betaken themselves to flight. Did this not amount to culpable failure? One can read a 'yes' in Ludendorff's words: 'The divisions that stood there allowed themselves to be overrun completely.' More blunt was Beumelburg: 'For the first time units have quite openly not fulfilled their duty.'* Contrary hereto General von Kuhl concludes: 'One cannot simply explain away failure to perform in battle by the reproach of dereliction'.**

*ibid, page 485 [unknown reference].

**ibid, page 406 [unknown reference].

To resolve these differing judgements answers must be found to the questions, first whether everything had been done on the part of the German High Command [page 198] that could have been done to enable the troops to conduct a successful defence and second whether the combatants of the 2nd Army could have repulsed the enemy attack or at least have forced the attack to a halt in the battle sector under the existing circumstances.

It must be accepted as irreversible that it was neither possible to offer the divisions mounting the defences longer rest periods nor to reinforce the front of the 2nd Army by deploying additional forces. It has been proven in detail that the great majority of their units were therefore incapable of fighting a great battle. It must also be accepted as a given fact that the German High Command did not expect a major enemy attack in this sector in the early days of August. This was an undervaluation of the current capacities of the Entente forces, a misconception that can never be completely excluded in war. And the reasons on which this opinion was based were in fact valid. But between the 4 and 6 August, two reports were made known that should have shaken this opinion: the disappearance of two Canadian divisions from their sector after a short operation at the previous front* and the appearance of about 100 tanks in front of the left wing of the 2nd Army.** The High Command thought it probable that the Canadians would appear in the sector of the 4th (or even the 3rd) English Army; whether they had other reports in support hereof is unknown. However, it had been clear for a longer period of time that the most advanced line of the infantry of the 2nd Army north of the Somme and especially between the Somme and the road Amiens-Roye gave the impression that the enemy was preparing an attack, with tanks even. Therefore the reports of the sound of tanks were thought to be incorrect for a while, on 6 August there could no longer be any doubt that there was a significant number of tanks. They consequently had some not completely irrelevant indications that a thunderstorm was brewing on this horizon.

*See pages 19 and 20 [not included in this translation].

**See page 18 [not included in this translation].

In turn, arguments against an immediate attack include the fact that none of the numerous prisoners captured during the counterattack by the 27th Infantry Division on 6 August knew or mentioned anything of an enemy attack plan. Nevertheless it was quite unreasonable [page 199] that no countermeasures were taken as a consequence of the aviators' reports referring to approximately 100 tanks. It would have been possible and advisable to immediately concentrate aircraft units for a reconnaissance-in-force in the sector in which they suspected the Canadians to be and where the tanks had been sighted. Such a reinforced aerial observation would possibly have led to reliable results, as the enemy had generally felt himself to be quite secure from German planes for some months. So today, knowing how events evolved in

hindsight, one could regard it as even more appropriate if upon receipt of the aviator's reports on 6 August they had placed some reserve divisions behind the front sector that is possibly threatened, but that is cheap wisdom; at any rate, **the enemy attack should not have come as a complete surprise to the German High Command** [*here and subsequent bold text, original emphasis*].

However, it is even less comprehensible that the 2nd Army and its troops were still completely unaware on 8 August of an important experience from the battle on 18 July. Although General Ludendorff says: 'All the experiences of the 18 July had been taken in account' (by the 2nd Army); while the fact that the French had then for the first time commenced their major attack with infantry and tanks right at the start of the artillery fire, and that they thereby succeeded with the total surprise of the German fighters and troops on standby, **about this there is no reference at all in the documents of the 2nd Army, of the General Command and Divisions, and there is certainly no information on how the troops should react to this innovation.** Obviously the German side would have had to expect the repeat application of this new tactic, also in subsequent enemy attacks, as it had been so superbly successful. Several references have been made to the fact of how disastrous its effect was also on 8 August, on the one hand the surprise of the infantry in positions, on the other hand the elimination of the effects of the artillery fire. **This highlights the fact that it is unreasonable to hold the troops only responsible for the defeat.**

[page 200] At the enquiry into the second question, whether the enemy attack could have been intercepted at all, this new method of operation is all the more decisive as the defence was aggravated by the fog. It is undisputed that any serious attack can only be defeated **if the unfailing cooperation and coordination of all defensive weapons is assured. But there was no question of that on the 8 August**, not because the respective armed services failed, but because they did not see anything, because they could not know where to direct their fire and where to seek the enemy. Even if not one mortar, not one cannon had failed, even if they had delayed firing for two or three minutes after the enemy drumfire had started and then shot a well-directed comprehensive destruction fire, they would have missed the decisive moment; because at that time friend and foe were already intermingled. And this 'too late' was getting worse all the time, the 'where' soon became more and more doubtful as long as the fog persisted, not just for mortar and cannon but also for rifle and machine gun. The firefight was restricted – the later the more so – to an aimless firing into the fog; there were only short moments available for aimed shooting.

And now the tanks! One can demand of the infantry that they let them pass and then continue to hold fast, because to fight those war machines is the job of the artillery, mortars further back or machine guns. A well-disciplined and well trained unit will meet this demand provided that their willpower is not affected by exhaustion.

The Army has survived the year 1917 victoriously; but it has also demonstrated that the holding of the front in the West strictly on the defence was no longer assured in light of the enormous employment of equipment by the Entente ... This fact would become even more obvious as the infantry was evolving into militia-like troops as they lost more and more able men by death or injury and as the men's discipline declined.*

*Ludendorff, *ibid*, page 434.⁸

⁸ The actual German edition referred to is uncertain. In the English edition, Ludendorff 1919, it appears to be on pp.541-542. It should be noted that the translation here is not quite the same as that given in Ludendorff 1919.

This assessment of the Army relates to the beginning of the year 1918. In the last 7 months an even greater number of the best and most valuable combatants had been carried off, the ‘militia-like’ character of all units had increased boundlessly – truly not the fault of the units – the men’s discipline had decreased significantly. On the other hand, the ‘enormous employment of equipment’ especially by the unforeseen increase in tanks ([page 201]) had become much more dangerous for the defence. And now the exhausted soldiers of the 2nd Army had to experience on the 8 August that the tanks had not been taken out or not taken out in time by the artillery and the mortars, as they had been completely hidden by the fog. They could see for themselves – for just a few moments – that all other firearms could not do any harm to the armoured monsters, that they simply rolled on, made it into their flank or rear and encircled them in a few paces and shot them down! But if they took cover for a moment to let the tanks pass, or even if they assaulted them with concentrated charges, then they had the enemy storm troopers at their throat! As long as the fog did not disperse, these unfortunate men were confronted with an unsolvable problem. When the fog finally lifted, the contest was over, the enemy had already taken the majority of the artillery and thereby broken the backbone of the defence.

Dishonourable conduct may have occurred here or there, there may have been instigators in too many units who did not want to continue to fight, but those were not decisive events. The disaster happened **because the physical and mental capacities of a majority of the fighters were no longer sufficient to deal with a major attack.** The disaster had taken on this dimension because the 8 August had brought accumulated impediments for the 2nd Army that the defence had hardly ever had to face.

The German Army High Command was confronted with the bitter reality that the attrition of the troops clearly seen in the sector of the 2nd Army was not an isolated incident but was present in a similar manner in the entire Army and concluded:

Our fighting instrument was no longer up to standard ... The 8 August has determined the decline of our fighting force and, given the status of the reserves, taken away my hope that a strategic alternative could be found that would result in a more favourable outcome for us ... The war had to be ended.*

*Ludendorff, *ibid*, page 551.⁹

Six days after the defeat the decisive crown council took place at Spaa [*sic*].¹⁰ in the course of which the commencement of peace negotiations was considered. The dark path across the forest of Compiègne to the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles had commenced with the catastrophe of 8 August 1918.

END

*

References

- General Staff, 1918. *Vocabulary of German military terms and abbreviations* (2nd edition, July, 1918). London: The War Office.
- Ludendorff, E. 1919. *My War Memories 1914-1918*. Vol.2. London: Hutchinson.
- von Bose, T. 1930. *Die Katastrophe des 8. August 1918 (Schlachten des Weltkrieges, Band 36)* [The Catastrophe of 8 August 1918 (Battles of the World War, Volume 36)]. Gerhard Stalling: Oldenburg i.O./Berlin.

-o0o-

⁹ The actual German edition referred to is uncertain. In the English edition, Ludendorff 1919, it appears to be on p.684. It should be noted that the translation here is not quite the same as that given in Ludendorff 1919.

¹⁰ Spa is a town in Belgium where the Kaiser’s H.Q. was located.

THE AUSTRALIAN ATTACK IN THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, 8 AUGUST 1918: A TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL GERMAN VERSION – PART 4 (MAPS)

David Pearson and Paul Thost




Fig.4.1: A portion of the German map of the Amiens battlefield from von Bose (1930: Map 2) showing the positions of the I./13 Infantry Regiment; Ist, IInd and III./122 Infantry Regiment; Ist and III./478 Infantry Regiment; II./Res. 203 Infantry Regiment (II./R.203); 2nd and 6./Res. Field Artillery 43 (6./R.43); 8th and 9./Field Artillery 243 (9./243); 2./Foot Artillery 146 (2./146) and other units around Proyart and Chaignolles. Scale: each grid square = 1000m².




Fig.4.2: A portion of the German map of the Amiens battlefield from von Bose (1930: Map 2) showing the positions of Ist, IInd and III./Res. 52 Infantry Regiment (III./R.52); Ist, IInd and III./Res. 232 Infantry Regiment (III./R.232); Ist, IInd and III./Res. 227 Infantry Regiment (III./R.227); 1st, 2nd and 3./Field Artillery 213 (3./213); 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9./Field Artillery 221 (9./221); 1./Foot Artillery 88 (I./88) and other units on either side of the Roman Road, in the vicinity of Rainecourt and Herleville. Scale: each grid square = 1000m².

COLLECTORS' CORNER

THE 30TH DIVISION, US ARMY – ‘OLD HICKORY’ PART 1

Paul Skrebels



Fig.1: A page from the WW1 divisional patches illustrated in Laurence Stallings, *The Doughboys: The Story of the AEF, 1917-1918*, Harper & Row, New York, 1963. Unit patches generally did not come into use within the American Expeditionary Force until the last couple of months of the war. In fact, the majority were only worn after the Armistice, for example as part of the Army of Occupation or by the interventionist forces into Russia.

Fig.2: Detail from the above. Note that this source is at variance with others (e.g. *The National Geographic Magazine*, vol.36, no.6 [December 1919], p.513) in not depicting the 30th Division patch with its more usual red background:





Fig.3: A page from the charts of WW2 patches illustrated in *Shoulder Sleeve Insignia, Insignia of Rank: Service Ribbons, Decorations and Insignia of the U.S. Armed Forces*, Joel & Aronoff, New York, 1945.

Fig.4: Detail from the above. Note that patches manufactured during the early stages of the Second World War often had an olive drab border:



Notice also that the 30th Division patch is still illustrated as being worn horizontally rather than the usual vertical configuration associated with WW2. Yet another source provides a clue as to the reason for this. According to Smith and Pelz, *Shoulder Sleeve Insignia of the U.S. Armed Forces 1941-1945*, (Richard W. Smith, 1981, p.36): ‘Letters indicate that the patch was originally worn horizontally except that the Divisional Artillery was detached when the insignia was adopted so the Artillery Commander ordered that his men sew it on vertically as this appeared the “natural way.” It became the custom of the division to wear the patch in this mixed manner for many years until the vertical wear ... became standard during WW II.’

THE 30TH DIVISION, US ARMY – ‘OLD HICKORY’ PART 2

Paul A. Rosenzweig

In the article in this issue on Lance Corporal Colin Bayly of the Liverpool Scottish (see pp.4-15), reference is made to the regimental burial ground established on the Ypres Salient by The King's (Liverpool Regiment). This was located near the village of Voormezele immediately behind the British lines at St Eloi. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission records that Voormezele and the four Enclosures (regimental groups of graves) were captured by the advancing German forces after very heavy fighting on 29 April 1918.¹

Fig.1 shows an American officer of the 30th Division, which was responsible for the recapture of Voormezele. The significance is that, had the Doughboys of ‘Old Hickory’ not been successful in their campaign, these lands may have stayed as occupied territory for the remainder of the year, or longer, and the graves of Colin Bayly and many others might have been lost forever. But beyond this association, the history of the 30th Division has some unusual aspects which might be of interest to collectors.

Fig.1: A Major or Lieutenant Colonel of the 30th Division, circa 1918-19. (Reproduced with owner's permission)

‘Old Hickory’

This photo was shared from the extensive collection of Bert Caloud, the Assistant Superintendent at the Manila American Cemetery in the Philippines. It shows a US Army machine-gun officer wearing the shoulder sleeve insignia (the upper patch) of the American 30th Division during World War 1. The insignia is scarlet and comprises the letters ‘OH’ (for the division's nickname ‘Old Hickory’) containing the Roman numerals ‘XXX’ (the numerical designation ‘30’) in royal blue. While this symbolism is significant, it is not readily apparent in the shoulder patch as worn: during WW1, the insignia of the 30th Division was worn as a horizontal emblem.



The division was named after Andrew Jackson, a tough old ‘Indian fighter and backwoodsman’ who had been nicknamed ‘Old Hickory’.² Jackson gained national recognition through his decisive victory in the Battle of New Orleans in 1815 when he drove the British permanently out of the area. After the purchase of Florida from Spain, Jackson was the first Federal Territorial Governor of Florida; he was subsequently Senator from 1823, and then the 7th President of the United States from 1828.

When the 30th Division was formed on 18 July 1917 it comprised National Guard units from

¹ <http://www.cwgc.org/find-a-cemetery/cemetery/52600/VOORMEZELE%20ENCLOSURE%20NO.3>

² See for example: <http://www.30thinfantry.org/history.shtml>

North and South Carolina, Georgia and Tennessee; it adopted the name ‘Old Hickory’ in tribute to the fact that Andrew Jackson had been born near the North/South Carolina border and had risen to fame in Tennessee during the Indian Wars.

In this image, the officer is wearing a bronze Arm of Service device (collar badge): at first glance it looks like the standard ‘crossed rifles’ device of the infantry. These *are* crossed rifles, but barely visible in the left and right angles are the letters ‘M’ and ‘G’ denoting ‘machine gun battalion’. The 30th Division included the 113th, 114th and 115th Machine Gun Battalions – it looks like this officer belonged to the 115th Machine Gun Battalion. He was also a veteran of the 1912 Nicaraguan campaign, as shown by the Nicaraguan Campaign Medal ribbon he wears.

The 27th and 30th Divisions arrived in Belgium in May 1917, belonging to II Corps of the American Expeditionary Forces. The 30th Division saw action in the Ypres-Lys and Somme offensives, and the Battles of La Selle, St Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne, its men winning twelve Congressional Medals of Honor. Later in the year it shared the credit with the 27th Division for breaking the Hindenburg Line in the Battle of St Quentin Canal.

In particular, these two divisions fought with the British Army near Wytschaete from 18 August to 4 September 1918, with the 30th Division responsible for capturing Voormezele and the associated burial grounds on 31 August. A white stone memorial to the 27th and 30th Divisions was established at Kemmel in 1929 to commemorate 1,300 men from the 27th Division (‘New York’) and 800 from the 30th Division (‘Old Hickory’) who died on the surrounding lands – this monument features the insignia of each of these divisions, with that of the 30th Division in its horizontal position as also seen worn by the officer in image 1.



Fig.2: The memorial at Kemmel to the 27th and 30th Divisions, depicting the divisional insignia of the 30th as worn in WWI. (Author's photo)

The pictured officer also wears the shoulder insignia of the US 3rd Army, which was stood up to be the occupation army (see image 5). Since the 30th Division was not one of the divisions assigned to the occupation army, presumably this major or lieutenant colonel fought with the 30th Division and was reassigned to the 3rd Army during the occupation. Regulations standardising the wearing of shoulder sleeve insignia had not yet been developed at this time!

30ID

Shoulder patches were not worn between the wars, but this insignia was worn again in WW2 when the division was reactivated – this time designated ‘30th Infantry Division’. The ‘Old Hickories’ fought in the Normandy breakout from D+4 and in the Bulge, and from its work-rate the division was known as the ‘Work Horse of the Western Front’. Curiously though, the shoulder patch during this time was worn vertically (fig.2). Had it been worn incorrectly throughout 1917-18, or did they get it wrong in 1940?



Fig.3: An original shoulder insignia of the 30th Infantry Division worn during WW2: with this orientation the ‘OH’ and ‘XXX’ symbolism is clearly apparent. (Author’s photo)

The American Battle Monuments Commission, guardian of America’s overseas commemorative cemeteries and memorials, manages eight war cemeteries in France. An anecdote passed down to Bert Caloud by a colleague who had worked in Paris gives a credible interpretation:

When I worked in Europe my boss in Paris had an extensive family history (they are from North Carolina) in the WWII 30th ID [30th Infantry Division]. The story he told me was this [ie: horizontal] was the way the 30th Division patch was intended to be worn. When it was re-activated in 1940 a bunch of GIs were handed the patch to sew on their khaki shirt. So they thought how the hell does this go on? Better show the O ... once it was on and they got challenged about it the CG [Commanding-General] figured it looked better that way and voila ... GI Joe ruled!

It seems unusual though that a division would *choose* to wear the insignia incorrectly, in such a way that the letters ‘OH’ were not readily recognisable and the designator ‘XXX’ was not clearly apparent as a Roman numeral. Having been ‘rectified’ in WW2, the tradition continued during the Cold War era when the 30th Infantry Division existed as a North Carolina Army National Guard formation, and the same ‘Old Hickory’ patch continued to be worn vertically.

The relevance of this back-story is that 3216 Lance Corporal Colin Bayly (1886-1915), a South Australian serving with the Liverpool Scottish, was killed-in-action in 1915 and buried in a regimental burial-site near Voormezele which was taken by the Germans in 1918 and subsequently recaptured by the US 30th Division. This allowed it to be established as a war cemetery by the (then) Imperial War Graves Commission. Thanks to the efforts of the ‘Old Hickories’, Colin Bayly and 11 other Australians, plus some 1,600 other Commonwealth soldiers today rest not actually on foreign soil but in the Commonwealth War Graves Commission war cemetery of Voormezele Enclosure No.3. And along the way there is the curious story of a shoulder insignia with significant heraldic elements which regained their visible meaning by having the patch rotated 90 degrees during World War 2.

THE 'LAST TO LEAVE': AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL HOURS OF THE EVACUATION OF ANZAC – PART 1

Ian C.M. Littler and Guy M. Littler

Introduction

The evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula occurred at two different times and in three places: Anzac, Suvla and Helles, as detailed in a recent article by Stanley.¹ The last Australians to leave the Peninsula on 20 December 1915 comprised a group of sailors, as part of the 1st Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train. They left from Suvla Bay, about 8km north of Anzac Cove, at around 04:30, somewhat after the Australian and New Zealand area of operation (Anzac) had been evacuated. However, it is the last to leave Anzac, not the British areas, that this work deals with.

In 1917 the official Australian war correspondent Charles Bean named Capt Charles Augustus Littler as the last Australian to leave Anzac.² Later in 1924 Bean changed his mind in preference for the rear-guard commander, Lt Col John Paton,³ but yet again in 1934 revised his determination to be an anonymous sailor who untied the ropes of the boat.⁴

The last time the question of the last to leave the Anzac shore was subject to academic scrutiny was in the early 1980s. Matthew Higgins of the Australian War Memorial was tasked with creating an entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography for the late Capt Charles Littler (1868-1916). While researching the biography, he came across evidence from a living eyewitness, Lt Col Stanley Holm Watson, which led him to the firm belief that the last Australian to leave the Anzac shore was indeed Capt Littler. Higgins wrote: 'According to reliable sources, at around 4am on December 20, 1915, he was the last allied man to step aboard ship and leave Anzac.'⁵ In the Australian Dictionary of Biography entry Higgins wrote that 'Littler was probably the last to leave.'⁶ He later explained that he used 'probably' because he was only 99% sure, since 'no one at this distance could be totally sure'.⁷

In Higgins's article in the *Canberra Times* he mentioned the various revisions by Bean and others, as to the identity of the last to leave. In 1929 the Returned Services League in their magazine *Reveille* entered into the controversy, coming out firmly in favour of Lt Col Paton as being the last man off the Anzac shore.⁸ They based their determination on the statement by Gen John Lamrock, noting his qualification as 'Chairman of the Moorefield Racing Club,' that Paton was the last Australian to step aboard the last boat. Lamrock commanded one of the last redoubts at the Plugge's Plateau and supervised the withdrawal from that Plateau above South Beach. However, Lamrock provided no first-hand witness of the last to embark. Lamrock's statement was based on the assurances of Brig Gen Evan Alexander Wisdom who was Paton's

¹ Stanley, Peter. 'First and the Last of Gallipoli'. *Daily Mail Australia*. 25 March 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/aap/article-3010180/First-Gallipoli.html>. Accessed 28 Nov 2015.

² Bean, C.E.W. *Letters from France*. Melbourne: Cassell, 1917. Chap.23, 'Mouquet Farm September 7th'.

³ Bean, C.E.W. *The Story of Anzac*. Vol.2. The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. 1st Edition. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1924. Chap.31 'The Final Stages'.

⁴ Bean, C.E.W. *The Story of Anzac*. Vol.2. The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. 2nd Edition. 'Paton changed to Seaman'. Sydney, 1934. Corrections. AWM44 18/3 Part 2 to 18/5.

⁵ Higgins, Matthew. *Canberra Times*. 'The adventures of the "Duke of Anzac"'. 29 December 1991.

⁶ Higgins, Matthew. 'Littler, Charles Augustus Murray (1868-1916)'. *Australian Dictionary of Biography*. Canberra: National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, 1986. Vol.10.

⁷ Lahey, John. 'Littler, the last anzac to leave'. *The Age*. 29 March 1990.

⁸ 'Gallipoli: First and Last Digger'. *Reveille*. RSS&AILA, NSW Branch, 31 July 1929. p.8.

staff officer at the time. It was not disclosed to *Reveille* by Lamrock that he was an ‘old friend’ of Lt Col Paton.⁹

In a follow-up article in *Reveille*, the diary of Capt Charles Littler was introduced for the first time.¹⁰ The article stated that that Littler, as Beach Commandant, was quite unequivocal about being the last to leave. However, a conclusion that Paton must have been the last off the beach was reached after comparing the times between Paton’s and Littler’s accounts. Yet Littler’s diary, made available to *Reveille*, clearly stated ‘having been preceded by N.T.O.,¹¹ Colonel Paton and all others.’ In relying on specific times, no mention was made of the fact that Littler incorrectly noted the time of the Russell’s Top mine explosion as occurring at 03:00 rather than the accepted time of 03:30. The article ended with a slight against Littler, noting Bean’s reference that Littler was considered by some to be too outspoken. This was not a meticulous investigation, yet the conclusions of the RSL magazine circulate on the internet until the present day.¹²

In books, modern media, as well as government and private websites, Bean’s first edition of the Official History is often referenced with Paton still named as the last man to leave.¹³ The version in Bean’s later editions, where ‘a seaman who cast off the lines to the boat’ replaces ‘Paton’ is rarely referred to, except in a recent book.¹⁴ Yet in other versions, reference is made to the last digger or Australian to avoid the complication introduced by the British seaman. Some works prefer to name Lt Col Paton as part of a group,¹⁵ and yet others choose to broaden the scope of the question to include the entire Gallipoli Peninsula.¹⁶ Very recently a novel, based on the testimony of two eye-witnesses, names Littler as the last to leave.¹⁷

This two-part article explores some of Bean’s misunderstandings, the flaws in his logic and shows that his investigation was superficial, yet much weight is placed on his conclusions. It then examines the available evidence, including evidence which has never been considered before, to generate the most comprehensive analysis yet undertaken. Firstly, the evacuation plan is considered to understand how the evacuation was meant to be executed. This helps understand the location of troops in relation to North Beach and when they were meant to reach the beach in accordance with withdrawal orders. The effect of last-minute changes to those orders is also considered. Next, the methodology Bean used to determine the last to leave is examined. This is followed by an exploration of the course of the final hours of the evacuation by cross-referencing a number of eye-witness accounts. This shows that the evacuation did not

⁹ Lamrock, John. Letter, Lamrock to Bean. ‘Lamrock and Paton old friends’. Sydney, 23 August 1928. AWM44 18/2 Part 3.

¹⁰ ‘The last Australian: Gallipoli’. *Reveille*. RSS&AILA, NSW Branch, 30 April 1930. p.29.

¹¹ N.T.O.: Naval Transport Officer.

¹² ‘First and Last’. *Lost Leaders of Anzacs*. <http://www.anzacs.org/reveille/firstlast.html>. Accessed 18 April 2015.

¹³ *A walk around 14 battlefield sites*. Chap.14, ‘The Last of Anzac’. Department of Veterans’ Affairs and Board of Studies NSW, 2015. http://www.anzacsite.gov.au/2visiting/walk_14olooknbeach.html. Accessed 18 April 2015; Reid, Richard. *Anzac Portal 100 years of Anzac*. ‘North Beach Gallipoli’. Department of Veterans' Affairs. <http://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/history/publications/north-beach-gallipoli-1915/page-11>. Accessed 18 April 2015; Stacy, B.V., Kindon, F.J. and Chedghey, H.V. *The History of the First Battalion A.I.F. 1914-1918*. Sydney: James J. Lee, 1931, p.47; Scalon, Mike. ‘Gate opener a real hero’. *Newcastle Morning Herald*, 19 May 2012.

¹⁴ FitzSimons, Peter. *Gallipoli*. North Sydney: Random House Australia, 2014, p.682.

¹⁵ Reid, Richard. ‘The evacuation of Anzac, December 1915’. *Gallipoli and the Anzacs*. Department of Veterans' Affairs and Board of Studies NSW, 2015. <http://www.gallipoli.gov.au/north-beach-and-the-sari-bair-range/evacuation-of-anzac.php>. Accessed 18 April 2015; Van Dyk, Robyn. *Wartime*. ‘The evacuation of Anzac’. Issue 50 (2010).

¹⁶ Stanley. ‘First and the Last of Gallipoli’.

¹⁷ Funder, Joshua. *Watson's Pier*. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2015.

run entirely according to plan nor was it accurately recorded in the rear-guard commander's Official Report and his staff officer's Narrative of Operations, which form the basis of the Official History. Finally, the evidence is weighed, revealing conclusively the identity of the last Australian to leave the Anzac shore.

The Evacuation Plan

A select group from the 2nd Division formed the final rear-party to cover the withdrawal. Apart from the 2nd Div, the men of the 1st Brigade and 2nd Light Horse Brigade defended the far right flank and those of the New Zealand and Australian Division, including the 4th Brigade, and 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades were covering the left flank.¹⁸ They were arranged in a similar way to 2nd Division but their final parties were embarked earlier than 2nd Div so will not be considered here.¹⁹

The plan for the evacuation of Anzac was meticulous. From the 2nd Div plans, at the start of the last 24 hours (19 to 20 December) there were to be 3000 defending troops from the 2nd Div remaining (10,000 all units),²⁰ with the front-line defences divided up into A, B and C withdrawal parties. The A and B parties consisted of approximately 1000 and 1500 men respectively. The final C party (but not the final rear-party), which consisted of around 400 defending forces, was further divided in C1, C2 and C3 parties, containing 128, 128 and 154 men respectively. These were divided amongst seven battalions being the 17th to 22nd Battalions and also the 24th Battalion, each with responsibility for a particular section of the outer defensive line.²¹

A final rear-party consisting of 50 from the 18th Battalion plus eight machine gun crews under Capt Ernest George Radford totalling 35 men was stationed on Plugge's Plateau to cover the right flank of North Beach.²² In addition, a force of 40 from the 20th Battalion was stationed at Walker's Ridge, with three machine guns of the 28th Battalion (attached to the 20th Battalion), covering the left flank of North Beach for the C3 withdrawal.²³ According to orders, the final rear-party stationed at Walker's Ridge was to be on the beach within 15 minutes of leaving their post.²⁴ Not included in these numbers were engineers, divisional and brigade signallers, the divisional staff and police totalling approximately 65 men. The total number of all the men to be evacuated, including the C parties and rear-party, was 600 men.²⁵ As the emphasis was on defending forces, also not included in the numbers was the 1st Australian Casualty Clearing Station which was maintained for possible casualties. It may have been left to the Turks under a white flag to be evacuated by Red Cross ships after the evacuation.²⁶

¹⁸ For an overview map see 2nd Division H.Q., Orders. Appendix LXVIII 'Map of Defences'. 1915. AWM4 1/44/5 Part 4 p.47.

¹⁹ ANZAC H.Q., Orders. 'Embarkation Table, 1st Division'. 1915. AWM4 1/25/9 Part 15 p.87.

²⁰ ANZAC H.Q., Diary. 'Total troops for withdrawal - last day'. 19 December 1915. AWM4 1/25/9 Part 1 p.50.

²¹ 2nd Division H.Q., Orders. 'Appendix 28, C parties 2nd Div. locations'. 16 December 1915. AWM4 1/44/5 Part 4 p.18.

²² 2nd Division H.Q., Orders. 'Appendix 30, Troops remaining'. 16 December 1915. AWM4 1/44/5 Part 4 p.21.

²³ Shaw, George Duncan. Letters and papers of George Shaw, Private Record AWM. 'Letter to his mother, based on notes from 28th Battalion War Diary'. 16 January 1916. AWM PR83/027 p.3.

²⁴ 20th Battalion, Diary. '20th Battalion Embarkation Table'. 1915. AWM4 23/37/5 p.10.

²⁵ 2nd Division H.Q., Orders. 'Appendix 30, Troops remaining', pt.4, p.21.

²⁶ First Australian Casualty Clearing Station, Diary. 'Last day of the Anzac evacuation'. 20 December 1915. AWM4 26/62/11 Part 2 pp.5-6; Land, William A. 'Barton, Alan Sinclair Darvall (1886-1950)'. *Australian Dictionary of Biography*. National Centre for Biography, Australian National University, 1979. <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/barton-alan-sinclair-darvall-5149>. Accessed 7 May 2015.

For transport from the shore to the awaiting steamer transports, ten motor lighters ('beetle barges'), with capacity for 400 men, and two hospital motor lighters were available for pick-up from piers at Anzac. In addition, there were five trawlers, six steamboats to each tow two cutters, as well as two steamboats for the NTO and two for the superintending captain afloat.²⁷ It took 20 to 30 minutes to load a lighter so the battalion components from each post of each of the three C parties were staggered in arrival times over approximately 25 minutes to avoid too many men accumulating on the beach.²⁸ The times to leave the trenches were calculated back from the arrival times at the beach, taking into account the varying distances and terrain the men had to traverse.

The evacuation of each C party from the outer line was directed by the rear-guard commander Lt Col Paton from his position on North Beach via his staff officer Maj Evan Wisdom. A triplicate and laddered wire phone system connected Paton and Wisdom to each of the redoubts, switched via the 2nd Div signal office located in a disused tunnel in Shrapnel Valley just above South Beach (Anzac Cove). The details of the communication lines, as well as descriptions of events during the last hours, are described in the diaries of Capt Watson and Sgt Both of 2nd Div Signals. The diary transcripts, with explanatory commentary, are contained within a document called *Sapper Signalman* compiled by Watson.²⁹ In two other documents, Watson also recounts, with emphasis on different details, what he saw in the final hours at Anzac.³⁰

To assist the rear-party to withstand an attack by the Turks, mines, booby traps and barb wire barricades were laid across paths. The final men at each post were to draw the barricades across the path as they left and then follow (with padded boots) markings on the paths leading to the beach.³¹ The 21-strong divisional signal team of Capt Watson was held back to provide phone communications until the last possible moment. On South Beach, near Watson's Pier, there was also a naval wireless station whose operators were to send the final signal to the Headquarters on an off-shore ship.³² On North Beach, being the beach allocated for the final stages of the evacuation, were Paton and Wisdom, as well as the beach commandant Littler with two British officers; Maj P.R. Bruce (PMLO) and Maj E.T. Chamberlayne (MLO),³³ tasked with ensuring that the embarkation proceeded in an orderly and efficient manner.

The C1 party was to arrive at North Beach between 02:35 and 03:00 in the morning; the C2 party between 03:00 and 03:15 and the C3 party between 03:30 and 03:50. The allowed traversing times from post to the beach varied from 20 minutes (Russell's Top) to 35 minutes (Pope's Hill). After the departure of the last C party, only the inner line at Walker's Ridge and Plugge's Plateau of 125 officers and men as well as the 65 or so associated critical evacuation personnel would remain, to withdraw when ordered.³⁴

²⁷ Dardanelles Army H.Q., Diary. 'Vessels allotment for final stage'. December 1915. AWM4 1/17/2 Part 3 p.7.

²⁸ 2nd Division H.Q., Orders. '2nd Div. C Party, beach arrival and line departure times, Radford and M.G.s'. 16 December 1915. AWM4 1/44/5 Part 4 p.14.

²⁹ Watson, Stanley Holm. 'Sapper Signalman'. 1977. Private Collection AWM MSS0760.

³⁰ Watson, Stanley Holm. 'Gallipoli... The last seven days'. ca. 1977. Private Record; Watson, Stanley Holm. Letter, Watson to Geoffrey Littler (grandson of Charles Littler). 'Last hours of the evacuation at Anzac'. Belair, S.A., 12 September 1984.

³¹ Bean, C.E.W. *The Story of Anzac*. Vol.2. The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. 11th Edition. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1941, p.883.

³² Watson, 'Sapper Signalman'.

³³ PMLO: Principal Military Landing Officer; MLO: Military Landing Officer. ANZAC H.Q. 'Recommendation for awards: embarkation officers'. 1915. AWM28 2/8.

³⁴ 2nd Division H.Q., Orders. 'Appendix 30, Troops remaining'; 20th Battalion, Diary. '20th Battalion Embarkation Table'; 2nd Division H.Q., Orders. '2nd Div. C Party, beach arrival and line departure times, Radford and M.G.s'.

As it turned out, the plan was accelerated by an order issued at 00:25 on 20 December which moved the C2 party forward by 10 minutes and the C3 party forward by 20 minutes.³⁵ This meant that the last contingents of the C3 party (17th Battalion from Quinn's Post and 19th Battalion from Pope's Hill) would now arrive on the beach at 03:30 for immediate embarkation. The last of the C3 party should, therefore, be away by 03:35. Finally, under the new accelerated programme, and the assumption of no stragglers, the remaining rear-party would embark in the next lighter. Allowing 10 to 15 minutes for boarding the smaller rear-party (approx. half the lighter's capacity), the lighter carrying the remaining men would leave the pier between 03:45 and 03:50 on 20 December 1915.

Bean's determination of the last to leave

The reader may ask the question as to how is it possible, when Bean had access to official documents, diaries and living witnesses, that he was not able to conclusively solve what he described in a letter to the rear-guard commander, Paton, as 'the vexed question' of who was the last to leave.³⁶ It should have been relatively easy to probe inconsistencies, determine which people were in which lighters and cross-reference names and times. At the root of this issue is Bean's non-confrontational style but also the fact that he had a tremendous amount of work to do so he could not spend much time focusing on such a minute detail.

Ten days after the evacuation, on 30 December 1915, Bean interviewed Capt Stanley Watson at Mudros, Lemnos Island, and made notes about the discussion in his diary. Watson told Bean that they tried to raise various posts but the line from their signal office was dead. Watson and his signal officer Sgt Kelynack then trotted (slow jog) from the signal office (in Shrapnel Valley at South Beach), around Ari Burnu to North Beach where they found Littler at the pier. Bean wrote in his diary, 'They were actually last to leave and Littler was last into the boats'.³⁷

Later in June 1924, as the first edition of his *Story of Anzac* was to go to print, Bean wrote on the opposite side of the page to that 1915 entry in his diary that Watson ran from North Beach to Anzac Cove (southward) to deliver a message (to the wireless operators) by word of mouth.³⁸ This is completely contra-sense to Bean's diary entry about his discussion with Watson. According to Watson as recorded in Bean's diary, Watson ran north from his signal office around Ari Burnu to North Beach after finding the phone lines dead.

On 14 June 1924 Bean wrote to Paton wanting to know two things: firstly, the specifics about how the mine was fired at the Nek (Russell's Top) and, secondly, the 'vexed question' of who was the last to leave the Anzac shore. Bean put Lt Col J.M. Antill, Lt Col D.J. Glasfurd and Maj E.J.H. Nicholson in what he called the last lighter, and Paton, Capt C.M. Staveley RN and Littler into the NTO's (Staveley) steamboat. Bean indicated that general opinion was that Staveley was the last to embark, but only suggested that Littler was in the same boat.³⁹

Paton replied on 21 June 1924 and wrote that Wisdom, Littler, Staveley and Paton got onto Staveley's steamboat and Wisdom remarked to him 'You Sir (Paton) are the last man to leave

³⁵ 2nd Division H.Q., Diary. 'Accelerate C2 and C3'. 20 December 1915. AWM4 1/44/5 Part 4 p.46.

³⁶ Bean, C.E.W. Letter, Bean to Paton. 'On Russell's Top and Last to Leave'. 14 June 1924. AWM38 3DRL 7953/35.

³⁷ Bean, C.E.W. Diary. 'Watson's account of the last moments of the evacuation'. 30 December 1915. pp.7-8. AWM38 3DRL 606/36/1 pp.9-10.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Bean. Letter, Bean to Paton. 'On Russell's Top and Last to Leave'.

and I (Wisdom) am the second last.⁴⁰ Paton did not mention when Staveley or Littler boarded this boat but rather reported what Wisdom said to him. Further down in the letter he described his debriefing with Lt Gen A.J. Godley and others at Headquarters on HMS *Heliotrope* in the early morning. Paton reported that all had embarked safely. Godley questioned this assertion incredulously and wished to know whether Paton meant *all* literally, to which Paton replied ‘I mean absolutely, I was the last man to leave.’

The first edition of volume 2 of *The Story of Anzac* went to print in 1924 with Paton’s version of events, following closely Paton’s report⁴¹ and the evacuation narrative by his staff officer.⁴² Bean appears to have misinterpreted Watson’s account. Regrettably, Bean did not consult with the surviving family of Capt Charles Littler, to see if they could provide additional information. It is also unfortunate that Bean did not clarify his diary entry with Watson or correspond with Wisdom directly at the time.

In Paton’s report the execution of the evacuation overseen by the rear-guard commander Paton is portrayed as having gone completely according to plan owing, he says, to the careful preparation and plans by Brig Gen Sir Andrew Hamilton Russell. To be noted is that Paton did not mention any trouble with signals; he placed Littler in the same boat as himself and said that his boat left at 04:10. In the Official History, Bean accepted this version but remarked on the failure of a phone line between North Beach and the naval wireless station. Bean wrote that Paton sent Watson south along the beach to the wireless station to arrange for the message to be sent. However, Watson was clear in his description that it was the phone line between the North Beach pier and Watson’s signal office above South Beach which went dead. Watson waited for a command to withdraw from Wisdom but when that order finally didn’t come he acted on his own initiative.⁴³

Yet five years later doubts still lingered about the details. On 18 September 1929 Bean wrote to the son of Capt Littler, Burnett Guy Littler of Newcastle, about the tribute made in volume 3 to Charles Littler, who was killed at Mouquet Farm leading his company on an assault.⁴⁴ B.G. Littler replied on 14 October 1929 taking the opportunity to ask Bean the reason why Bean changed his mind about the last to leave.⁴⁵ B.G. Littler mentioned in his letter that he was in possession of his father’s diary and that it was very detailed as to the order of events. However, B.G. Littler added to the confusion when he paraphrased the contents of Charles Littler’s diary.⁴⁶ He wrote:

Particular reference is made to the last boat, and he writes that at a certain time he entered the last boat, having been preceded by, and then he sets out to name the Officers, and details, finishing up with the N.T.O. (Staveley) and Colonel Paton.

B.G. Littler, by the qualification of particular reference to the *last boat*, mistakenly implied that the NTO, Lt Col Paton, boarded the same boat as Charles Littler. In contrast, the diary of

⁴⁰ Paton, John. Letter, Paton to Bean. ‘On Russell’s Top and Last to Leave’. 21 June 1924. Private Record.

⁴¹ Paton, John. Report of Col. John Paton. ‘At Anzac evacuation on night of 19th-20th December 1915’. Mudros, Lemnos, 23 December 1915. AWM4 1/25/9 Part 12 p.49.

⁴² Wisdom, Evan Alexander. Narrative of Operations. ‘Evacuation of Anzac’. Lemnos Island, 23 December 1915. AWM4 1/25/9 Part 12 p.53.

⁴³ Watson. Letter, ‘Last hours of the evacuation at Anzac’.

⁴⁴ Bean, C.E.W. Letter, Bean to B.G. Littler. ‘On tribute to C.A. Littler in Volume III’. Paddington, NSW: Commonwealth of Australia Reference 4906, 18 September 1929.

⁴⁵ Littler, Burnett Guy. Letter, B.G. Littler to Bean. ‘The question of why Bean changed last to leave from Littler to Paton’. 14 October 1929. Private Record.

⁴⁶ Littler, Charles. Diary extract, 19/20 December 1915.

Charles Littler mentions only, 'went aboard last picket boat having been preceded by N.T.O. Colonel Paton and all others'.⁴⁷ There was no suggestion that the NTO and Paton were on the same boat as Littler. They simply preceded him at some point during the evacuation.

Bean replied on 22 October 1929 that he made his determination in volume 2 solely on the definitive statement of Paton. He wrote:

had I known of the existence of Littler's diary I would have asked your leave to refer to it and would have probed the matter to the bottom, but the definitive statement by Paton seemed to clinch it.

He then asked for the diary extract and declared, 'If I am convinced that your father is right, there will of course be a correction published in a future volume.' Bean's handwritten postscript on the typed letter reads:

Could you please settle the matter with General Paton, who lives at Newcastle (c/o R Hall & Sons Ltd)? It is possible that your father's diary might refresh his memory, if it is shaky. On the other hand, if your father was wrong, General Paton might be able to explain the misunderstanding.⁴⁸

On 28 January 1930, prompted by a letter from Bean, Wisdom wrote to Bean to explain that he never said that Paton was the last man to leave the Australian area of operation, merely the last Anzac. Indeed, 'Staveley embarked after Paton, and the actual last man to leave was one of the seamen who were casting off the bow and stern lines of the launch.'⁴⁹ It is odd that Wisdom did not mention Littler, given that Paton maintained that Littler was on the same boat in his Official Report. Bean accepted Wisdom's testimony and in the second edition of 1934 replaced the line in the first edition, 'being Colonel Paton himself', with 'being the seaman who cast off the line holding the boat'.⁵⁰

In May 1955 Lt Col Stanley Watson travelled to Sydney to meet with his old friend Capt Charles Bean, as he wished to donate his memorabilia to the Australian War Memorial. After a discussion with Watson about the final moments of the evacuation, Bean wrote to Watson (33).

Clearly Littler embarked in the same barge as you [Watson]. As to Staveley, Wisdom and Paton, I had quite a correspondence with them about the last man to leave. I had always understood that old Littler was; and as he was killed at Moquet [sic] Farm and I couldn't consult him, I must have put him in Staveley's boat by mistake.⁵¹

It appears from the letters which have been found that Bean did not have lengthy correspondence with Staveley, Wisdom and Paton. According to Watson, Littler was in a boat with Watson, Sgt Both (also of the 2nd Division signallers) and others while Staveley, Wisdom and Paton had already left in a different boat. Bean conceded in 1955 that he had made a mistake in placing Littler in the same boat as Staveley, Paton and Wisdom and that he had always thought Littler to be the last off Anzac.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Bean, C.E.W. Letter, Bean to B.G. Littler. 'History based on Paton's statement. Postscript; Sort it out with Paton', Commonwealth of Australia Reference No. 5029, 22 October 1929.

⁴⁹ Wisdom, Evan Alexander. Letter, Wisdom to Bean. 'Last to leave Anzac'. 28 January 1930. AWM44 18/2 Part 3.

⁵⁰ Bean, C.E.W. *The Story of Anzac*. Vol.2. The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. 2nd Edition. Sydney: Angus & Robertson. 'Paton changed to Seaman'. Sydney, 1934. Corrections. AWM44 18/3 Part 2 to 18/5.

⁵¹ Watson. Letter to Geoffrey Littler. 'Last hours of the evacuation at Anzac'.

In Part 2, it will be shown that not only was Littler not in Paton's boat but that Paton, Wisdom and Staveley had steamed away some 15 to 25 minutes earlier than asserted in brigade reports. Using official signals as well as multiple eye-witness accounts, synchronised with the mine explosions on Russell's Top, it will be demonstrated that Paton's account which Bean largely relied on does not factually represent the final hours of the evacuation. Instead Watson's account is upheld and it is Capt Littler, not Col Paton, who remained on the beach until the very last.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Paul Taylor, Matthew Higgins, Anthony Hall and Lesley Gent for their support, advice and time reviewing this manuscript. We thank Russell Schneider for his efforts in retrieving some records. Thanks also to Peter Stanley, Geoff Littler (son of Geoffrey Ashburner Littler) and the descendants of Stanley Holm Watson, whose assistance is greatly appreciated. We are grateful for the very professional assistance provided by the staff at the Australian War Memorial.

The authors are the descendants of Charles Augustus Murray Littler (1868-1916), being the sons of Burnett Guy Littler (1896-1967), the youngest son of Charles.

-o0o-

AS YOU WERE ...

Feedback from Readers and Contributors

In the Editor's contribution to Collectors' Corner in the September 2015 issue, 'Details, Details ...', an Australian Army Medical Corps colour patch is described as 'brown ... with a red "notched" bar'. **Tony Walker** points out that 'The special colour used by the Australian Army Medical Corps was CHOCOLATE, not brown', and cites the *Australian Army Colour Patch Register 1915-1949* (Department of Defence, Canberra, 1993) as the authority.

Tony is correct, of course, and the author apologises for the slip. A search through the *Colour Patch Register* reveals that 'chocolate' is the term invariably used in official descriptions of patches for the AAMC. The occasional qualification 'light chocolate' is applied to some patches authorised during WW2, although there are a couple of instances where 'chocolate brown' is employed.

'Brown' on its own is used in describing infantry colour patches such as that of the 3rd Battalion AIF, a rectangle divided horizontally brown over green. Even so, confusion apparently existed even among veterans over the correct terminology. For example, the 27th Bn (SA Scottish) WW2 unit history is titled *The Chocolate and Blue Soldier*. Given the considerable variety in dye colours used in the manufacture of colour patches during WW2, the confusion is perhaps not surprising.

Paul Skrebels

-o0o-

MILES FITZROY BEEVOR: A CASE STUDY IN THE PERSONAL ASPECTS OF BATTALION COMMAND IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

William Westerman

With the almost continuous technological advancement of warfare since the Industrial Revolution it is important not to lose sight of the human aspects of command, many of the tenants of which have been unchanged for millennia. The task of attempting to understand the nature of command has been an ongoing challenge for those in the profession of arms. Although it can be talked of in technical terms, doctrine, weapons, technology, communications, logistics etc, command is, fundamentally, about the relationships between the commander and those he commands. In his 1976 book *The Face of Battle* historian John Keegan argues that ‘the personal bond between leader and follower lies at the root of all explanations of what does and does not happen in battle’.¹ This assertion is worth testing and this article will use a case study from the First World War, Lieutenant Colonel Miles Fitzroy Beevor, Commanding Officer (CO) of the 10th and 52nd Infantry Battalions AIF, to do so.

Beevor was a ‘portly gentleman’ from Unley, South Australia.² When he joined the 10th Bn at the start of the war he was a 31-year-old accountant and militia officer in the 78th Infantry (Adelaide Rifles). The highly regarded Lt Col Stanley Price Weir commanded the 10th and Beevor was his senior company commander. He was among the first Australians to land on Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 and was able to drive his men off the beach to establish a firing line on the second ridge.³ Although this line held that afternoon he was wounded on his left foot and headed back to the beach to be transported to a hospital ship the next day.⁴ He left the Mediterranean and recuperated from his wound in the UK.⁵ Although he seemed to be an effective company commander at the landing, any positive impression his men might have developed was undone by the perception (real or otherwise) that he was shirking his responsibilities as he only returned to Gallipoli on 21 October. His protracted absence garnered him the epithet of a ‘cold-footer’, one of the ‘Weymouth Brigade’ who lingered at the Weymouth Depot in Dorset.⁶ During the intervening months Weir was invalided and when Beevor returned his seniority made him temporary CO.⁷ He commanded the battalion for the remainder of its time on Gallipoli and oversaw its evacuation back to Egypt. It was believed that the 49-year-old Weir was unlikely to return and Beevor was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 1 February 1916 and was given substantive command of the battalion.⁸

The Challenges of Battalion Command

Each level of command has a unique set of challenges. Platoon commanders are able to know their men personally and their commands have a greater relational role. Officers in high commands enter into the political arena and their decisions influence and are influenced by political considerations. Battalion commanders exercise their commands within a set context

¹ John Keegan, *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme*, Penguin Books, London, 1978, p.114.

² Tom Louch, ‘1916-1917 Regimental Duty’, unpublished manuscript, pp.4-5 AWM, PR85/363; Miles Fitzroy Beevor service record, NAA, B2455, BEEVOR M F.

³ Miles Fitzroy Beevor, ‘My Landing On Gallipoli’, unpublished manuscript, pp.13-18, AWM, MSS0761.

⁴ *ibid*, pp.26-27.

⁵ Proceedings of a Medical Board, 9 June 1915, Miles Fitzroy Beevor service record, NAA, B2455, BEEVOR M F.

⁶ H.E.S. Armitage to parents, 15 January 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0053.

⁷ H.E.S. Armitage diary, 11 October 1915, AWM, 1DRL/0053.

⁸ Miles Fitzroy Beevor service record, NAA, B2455, BEEVOR M F.

and while there are many similarities with other commands, a battalion CO has a distinctive role. Field Marshal Sir William Slim called it an officer's first 'real command' as the unit has 'a life of its own' and whether it was 'good or bad' depended on the CO alone.⁹ General Sir Frank Hassett, the former Chief of the Defence Force Staff who served in the Second World War, Korea (as a battalion commander) and Malaya, believed that command of a battalion in action was 'generally regarded as a pinnacle of Army leadership'.¹⁰

Within the context of the First World War (but in many respects still largely applicable), the characteristics of battalion command were as follows. A battalion commander usually was a lieutenant colonel in command of a unit of around one thousand men. *King's Regulations* stated that he was 'responsible to the King for the maintenance of discipline, efficiency, and proper system in the unit under his command'.¹¹ He was responsible to their brigadier both for training the battalion as a whole and his officers in particular.¹² British Army doctrine also stipulated that he was to see that 'due care and economy are exercised in demanding the provision of such personnel, animals, supplies, material, and money as the successful execution of the duties allotted to him may require'.¹³ In preparation for battle he issued orders through his adjutant as well as overseeing the general preparations made by his HQ and his company commanders. In combat he remained at the HQ and managed the flow of information from their forward companies back to brigade HQ. If his men captured their objectives he organised the consolidation of captured trenches and facilitated the movement of reinforcements, supplies and *matériel* forward. After an operation he would write a report, articulating a narrative of events and hopefully analysing the lessons of the operation to draw conclusions for incorporation into future operations.

These descriptions merely outline a battalion commander's technical function. Much of the CO's respect is based on how he carries out these technical aspects of his command. Men respond to a CO who demonstrates tactical competence, which hopefully will keep the men alive, or at least not get them killed so easily. Men also respond to administrative ability, which is likely to improve their living conditions with the provision of things such as extra food, good billets, clean clothes and recreational activities. Yet as noted there are personal aspects that are not outlined in doctrine and regulations. At its simplest level, an infantry battalion is comprised of a series of relationships, both horizontal and vertical, that need to work effectively for the battalion to fight effectively.

If men respect their commanders then they are normally willing to fight and endure for them. The most basic source of respect for a battalion commander is the institutional position they hold as the Commanding Officer. The CO has legal authority within the army's hierarchy to command his unit. Although all commanders hold an institutional position of authority, these positions seldom generate respect among subordinates entirely on their own. Men usually require their commander to do something to earn the respect and authority that his rank and position entail.

As a CO had one thousand men under his command he could not develop trust through intimate

⁹ Sir William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, Cassell, London, 1956, p.3.

¹⁰ Sir Francis Hassett, 'Military Leadership', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, No. 148, May/June 2001, p.56.

¹¹ General Staff, War Office, *The King's Regulations and Orders for the Army 1912, Re-printed with Amendments published in Army Orders up to 1st August, 1914*, HMSO, London, 1914, p.20.

¹² General Staff, War Office, *Infantry Training (4-Company Organization) 1914*, HMSO, London, 1914, p.4.

¹³ General Staff, War Office, *Field Service Regulations Part II Organization and Administration 1909 (Reprinted, with Amendments, 1913)*, HMSO, London, 1913, pp.29-30.

personal relationships. The relationship between the CO and his men was done in broad brushstrokes. From the men's point of view they only really interacted with their CO in formal setting, such as the orderly room or the parade ground, neither of which was able to provide deep insights into the CO's character. Although he was distant he was not entirely unknowable, and their opinion of him was formed through large gestures, broad policies introduced, and the tone of the battalion life, particularly as it related to discipline.

Commanders had two basic levers of influence: punishments and rewards. Both were required at various times and balancing them was a delicate task for a CO, one that could be disastrous if gotten wrong. The battalion was organised, equipped, and trained for combat and it was necessary for a commander to push his men hard as the demands of warfare required men to be fit and well trained as well as well disciplined. Yet too much punishment and the men would grow to resent their officers, with the ultimate expression of displeasure being the fragging of a superior officer. Men respected COs who were 'strict but fair'. Most men in a battalion (except for 'hard cases') accepted discipline as a feature of army life, and respected a CO who was able to use it effectively. Too much punishment and a commander was a martinet, too little punishment and they were not hard enough for the serious business of warfare.

To be effective a CO's authority needed to derive from a source beyond their institutional position and the threat of punishment – it needed to derive from his character and his capabilities, both of which developed his respect. Some of the officers who were most successful in the army's structure were junior officers, and many of the best COs learnt well when they themselves were in command of platoons and companies. Alexander Watson argues that they exercised the greatest influence over the combat performance of First World War armies.¹⁴ This was less about their tactical commands and more about how they related to their men, encouraging and inspiring them to persevere through often terrible conditions, holding their ground under attack and going 'over the top' when necessary. Watson says that effective junior officers provide a sense of order, empowerment and safety, display fortitude, courage, competence that provided a 'comforting sense of control'.¹⁵ They also need to develop 'mutual trust and liking between ranks'.¹⁶ These were the aims of battalion commanders too, and effective COs needed to have the same approach to officer/man relations as a good junior officer but be able to maintain his perspective as a commander of one thousand men.

Finally, the CO had a different relationship with his officers as he knew them personally and he worked closely with them. In the British Army the officers' mess was traditionally a convivial environment where officers were expected to refer to each other by their Christian names. Strong bonds could develop between a CO and some of his officers, particularly those where the CO was a father figure for younger officers. The trust and mutual respect engendered amongst battalion officers benefitted how the unit operated. The battalion's size meant that the CO was required to exercise his command through his officers, rather than controlling the men directly himself. He issued orders through his HQ to his company and platoon commanders who then passed on the commander's intentions to the men. Thus the CO needed to trust his officers that they could do what he required of them.

¹⁴ Alexander Watson, *Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British armies, 1914-1918*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p.114.

¹⁵ *ibid*, p.110.

¹⁶ *ibid*, p.111.

10th Battalion

Beevor's period in command of the 10th Battalion was inauspicious. He spent three days with the battalion in the front line of Gallipoli before it was withdrawn from the peninsula to Lemnos for rest, reorganising and training. On Boxing Day they left for Alexandria and then on to Tel-el-Kebir for elementary and platoon training. At the end of January the whole 3rd Brigade marched out to Serapeum where they garrisoned the Suez Canal Defences, alternating between trench work and further training. They remained there for the rest of February before returning briefly to Tel-el-Kebir, when his time in command of the battalion came to an end.

During this period Beevor managed to attract a lot of criticism – by February many of his officers and men hated him. He was excessive in his use of punishments without seeming to care for his men's welfare. After the actions of 'a few miscreants' on New Year's Eve 1915, the entire battalion was 'raked fore and aft', much to the anger of his men: 'If he had shot one or two men who were innocent – he could not have rankled them more', Lt Harold Armitage wrote.¹⁷ Beevor addressed the men 'as if they were dogs', and Armitage believed that 'it was only the men's respect for some of us [the officers], and our influence over them, that there was not serious trouble.'¹⁸ As a further insult, Beevor placed a cordon around the camp with a sentry every few yards, requiring a man in need of the latrines to be passed from one sentry to another.¹⁹

Beevor's adjutant, Lt Ben Leane (brother of the famous Brig Gen Ray Leane), wrote on New Year's Day: 'I am about fed up with the doddering old fool. Between ourselves, so are the men and most of the officers. They have no respect whatever for him.'²⁰ Concerned about the lack of sufficient food at their camp at Tel-el-Kebir, Leane suggested to Beevor that additional provisions should be purchased for the men; the CO 'wouldn't hear of it' and wanted to know 'who was going to 'recoup' him'. When Leane said he would be willing to 'put in a fiver', did not care whether he was 'recouped' or not and suggested that the other officers would like follow suit, Beevor became 'quite cross'.²¹ Only after further persuasion from Leane did Beevor relent, to the benefit of his men.²²

Nine days later Leane wrote: 'I am getting more and more fed up with my job though. Or rather, it is not so much with the job as with the CO ... If I were the only one I would think that perhaps the fault lay with me, but he is at logger-heads with nearly all the officers, and the men openly make a joke of him.'²³ Armitage confirmed this state of affairs, telling his parents that Beevor was 'not on good terms with me – nor with any others of the officers. ... His is the antithesis of Col Weir – and is very unpopular.'²⁴ In mid-February he continued: 'Everybody is thoroughly sick of this bounder – especially our Senior officers – and he is a most impossible CO.' Armitage criticised Beevor's manners as 'Hunnish', and sympathised with the senior officers who cursed his name: 'The officers loathe and despise him & only obey because of his position – & a strong sense of duty – while the men absolutely hate him.'²⁵

¹⁷ H.E.S. Armitage to parents, 15 February 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0053.

¹⁸ H.E.S. Armitage to parents, 15 February 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0053.

¹⁹ B.B. Leane diary, 1 January 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0412, Folder 3 of 3.

²⁰ B.B. Leane diary, 1 January 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0412, Folder 3 of 3.

²¹ B.B. Leane diary, 1 January 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0412, Folder 3 of 3.

²² B.B. Leane diary, 2 January 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0412, Folder 3 of 3.

²³ B.B. Leane diary, 9 January 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0412, Folder 3 of 3.

²⁴ H.E.S. Armitage to parents, 15 January 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0053.

²⁵ H.E.S. Armitage to parents, 15 February 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0053.

Leane was looking for an avenue of escape. He wrote: 'I would be sorry in many ways to leave the old 10th – but then, it isn't the old 10th after all, and I am afraid it will grow less and less like the old 10th the longer friend Beevor is in command.'²⁶ For those officers who could not escape through other means their salvation came when the AIF decided to raise two new divisions in Egypt, primarily by dividing the original sixteen infantry battalions in half and forming new units. Armitage was one of the lucky ones who left to form the new 50th Battalion. He wrote: 'In our Batt[alio]n there was not much heartburning on leaving ... B. was such an impossible C.O., that no one had any love for him. The 50th has the better half of the officers of the 10th.'²⁷ On 4 March, Lt Col Weir returned to the battalion and assumed command.²⁸ As Beevor was a lieutenant colonel he could not serve as Weir's 2iC so he was transferred to command the newly raised 52nd Battalion.

52nd Battalion

Almost from the commencement of Beevor's new command he irritated his officers and men. Corporal Ernest Hodge recalled a lecture just three days after Beevor took command, where every NCO in the battalion listened as Beevor 'rambled on for about an hour re-iterating the same thing over and over again. ... It is a strange thing but the "Heads" seem to think that an NCO has nothing else to do but listen to their masterly addresses.'²⁹ He commanded the 52nd Battalion for 186 days between 3 March and 3 September, the unit's time almost evenly divided between training in Egypt and training and front-line duty in France. Beevor's task was to build a new battalion from scratch, training it to be able to fight at the Somme in September. He made the battalion march long distances with few if any breaks. After one 'terribly heavy march' the cobbled roads of France cut '[their] feet to pieces.'³⁰ By treating his men 'like a lot of pack horses', he became 'more of a pig every day' in their opinion.³¹ During one particular march in Egypt, Beevor's men travelled seven miles 'through heavy sand' with full packs and 120 rounds of ammunition. Beevor 'made some caustic remarks' about the marching powers of Hodge's company, but he himself was riding on a horse and had no pack to carry. 'He is pretty uncouth and is loathed by all', Hodge wrote.³²

Beevor's poor treatment of his men extended to the administration of the battalion. His Regimental Medical Officer criticised him for the paucity of food that he was giving his men for breakfast. The doctor 'served the CO ... up rather severely and told him he would kill the men marching them like he did on the food [they] were getting.'³³ One officer recalled that the men were having a 'jolly rotten time in the dust' with 'only one water bottle of fresh water per day'. Their clothes were washed in the Suez Canal and the quality of the food was 'not too bad' but the quantity was 'very limited'.³⁴ As CO these issues fell within his responsibility to address.

In conjunction with his apparent apathy towards the needs of his men he was a pedant when it

²⁶ B.B. Leane diary, 9 January 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0412, Folder 3 of 3.

²⁷ H.E.S. Armitage to parents, 1 March 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0053.

²⁸ Robert Kearney, *Silent Voices: the Story of the 10th Battalion AIF in Australia, Egypt, France and Belgium During the Great War 1914-1918*, New Holland, Frenchs Forest, NSW, 2005, pp.167-68.

²⁹ E.G. Hodge to family, 12 March 1916, AWM, PR87/208, folder 1 of 11.

³⁰ E.G. Hodge to family, 25 June 1916, AWM, PR87/208, folder 2 of 11.

³¹ E.G. Hodge to family, 16 July 1916, AWM, PR87/208, folder 2 of 11; E.G. Hodge to family, 25 June 1916, AWM, PR87/208, folder 2 of 11.

³² E.G. Hodges to family, 21 May 1916, AWM, PR87/0208, folder 2 of 11.

³³ E.G. Hodge to family, 4 April 1916, AWM, PR87/208, folder 1 of 11.

³⁴ L.L. Wadsley to family, 15 April 1916, AWM, 1DRL/0590.

came to dress and cleanliness. Although such issues are important to a military unit, he seemed to see them as an end in themselves, rather than as a tool to build morale and *esprit de corps*. During one inspection Beevor found ‘a few pieces of equipment about and the water bottles were not in their exact place and about 3 pieces of rag lying about’ and thus told the RSM to ‘put in a crime sheet for neglect of duty’.³⁵

The 52nd Battalion’s officers held a similarly poor view of their CO. On the voyage from Alexandria to Marseilles at the start of June the 52nd travelled with the 51st. One evening, the 52nd’s officers taught their comrades a ‘regimental ditty’, lampooning their CO. Although he had gone to bed, Beevor heard the singing, and the next morning he summoned all the officers of both battalions together and chastised them for ‘the disgraceful happenings of the night before’. He had words to his own officers and ‘had no doubt’ that Lt Col Arthur Ross, the 51st’s well respected CO, would have words to say to his men. Unbeknownst to Beevor, Ross himself had been making as much noise as anyone the previous night, and when his men were assembled he merely remarked: ‘if someone would please push the bell we might all have a small drink’.³⁶

By the time the battalion was ready to go into action on the Western Front even Charles Bean, the official Australian war correspondent, had weighed in on Beevor. Beevor’s brigadier, Thomas Glasgow, told Bean that there were only two good officers in the battalion, Arthur and Duncan Maxwell. Bean believed this to be slightly unfair, but he conceded that many officers ‘were not good enough and the Colonel was wretched.’³⁷ He also praised Capt Charles Littler, commanding A Company, a ‘brave, honourable, and experienced leader’ whom ‘the whole battalion looked up to him as to no other’, a clear statement that Beevor may have been the battalion’s commander but he was not its leader.³⁸

In Battle

The most important outcome for a battalion commander is to achieve success in combat. In the First World War infantry battalions were required to cross no-man’s land, close with the enemy, kill or capture him, seize his ground and hold it against counter-attacks until they were relieved. That was the purpose for which a battalion was raised, trained, organised and equipped. Although these technical factors were all very important in determining a battalion’s effectiveness, its leadership and morale were also key factors in determining how well it fought. If a battalion did not respect its commander and were in a poor state of morale it was unlikely they would be willing to train hard and fight for him. Glasgow recognised the problems in the 52nd Battalion and placed it in reserve for its first period on the Somme at Pozières in mid-August. On 1 September the battalion again moved into the front-line trenches with the intention of being used to assault Mouquet Farm on the morning of 3 September. However, Beevor never made it to zero hour – he was wounded on 2 September. His service record indicates that he received a gunshot wound to his thigh as he was standing outside his HQ, but Bean believed it was a shrapnel wound.³⁹ Conveniently, no one else was wounded in this event.

³⁵ E.G. Hodge to family, 7 May 1916, AWM, PR87/0208, folder 2 of 11.

³⁶ Louch, ‘1916 – 1917 Regimental Duty’, pp 4-5.

³⁷ C.E.W. Bean diary, 5 September 1916, AWM38, 3DRL606/58/1.

³⁸ C.E.W. Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918* [hereafter *AOH*] Volume III – *The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1916*, 12th edition, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1941, p.846. [See also the article in this issue, ‘The Last to Leave: An Analysis of the Final Hours of the Evacuation of Anzac – Part 1’, pp.38-45 – Editor].

³⁹ Miles Fitzroy Beevor service record, NAA, B2455, BEEVOR M F; C.E.W. Bean diary, 5 September 1916, AWM38, 3DRL606/58/1.

With Beevor incapacitated his 2iC, Major Denis Lane, took command.

Although Beevor was not in control of his battalion on 3 September, his influence was still very much present within the morale and fighting efficiency of the battalion he raised and trained for six months. The battalion's task was to advance on Mouquet Farm with the 49th to their right and the 51st on their left.⁴⁰ Placing the 52nd in the centre made its task easier, as it had the protection of the adjacent battalions and thus would not have to deal with exposed flanks. If it did not succeed, however, there would be a significant gap in the assault. The battalion advanced with all four companies, running left-to-right: B Company – C Company – A Company – D Company.⁴¹

While many operations on the Western Front failed due to poor artillery support, this was not one of them. Both Ross and Lorenzo praised the supporting barrage; the latter stating that he could personally see 'almost a wall of lead on the 1st objective'.⁴² When the operation commenced at 0510 both the 49th and 51st Battalions co-ordinated their advance with the barrage and captured the first objective easily.⁴³ In the *Official History*, Bean wrote that the 52nd 'should have taken the enemy's line between the 51st and 49th'.⁴⁴ This did not happen.

Although Lane wrote that each company 'seized its objectives', this is doubtful, with only A Company appearing to be successful.⁴⁵ At 0750 Lane got word from A Company that it was on its objective. He ordered C and D Companies to work inwards and connect with A Company, but this was a futile move as both companies 'had ceased to exist as tactical units'.⁴⁶ Lane later acknowledged that '[i]t was not yet known that C Company was to all intents and purposes out of consideration' and the 'exact position of D Company was also obscure'.⁴⁷ C Company had 'pushed forward under our own barrage' and chaos ensued.⁴⁸ Bean wrote privately that the men of the three other companies believed that C Company had 'failed & turned & run in the organised attack'.⁴⁹ Something similar probably happened to D Company. Early on they lost their commander and Maxwell found that the men had turned and 'were moving back past him'.⁵⁰ This retreat 'was spreading', and he tried to counter this by 'persuading his men and others to 'sit down in shell-holes and wait a bit'.⁵¹

On the left B Company was also crumbling. Apart from two platoons that were able to link up

⁴⁰ Bean, *AOH Vol III*, p. 841.

⁴¹ Report on Attack on Mouquet Farm, 9 September 1916, 52nd Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/69/6.

⁴² Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Lorenzo to 13th Inf Bde HQ, 9 September 1916, 49th Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/66/4; Report on Operation at Mouquet Farm 1st/4th September 1916, 51st Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/68/7.

⁴³ Summary of Operations near Mouquet Farm – period 1st. – 5th. Sept. 1916, 13th Brigade unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/13/8.

⁴⁴ Bean, *AOH Vol III*, p. 846.

⁴⁵ Report on Attack on Mouquet Farm, 9 September 1916, 52nd Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/69/6.

⁴⁶ Report on Attack on Mouquet Farm, 9 September 1916, 52nd Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/69/6.

⁴⁷ Report on Attack on Mouquet Farm, 9 September 1916, 52nd Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/69/6.

⁴⁸ Report on Attack on Mouquet Farm, 9 September 1916, 52nd Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/69/6.

⁴⁹ C.E.W. Bean diary, 5 September 1916, AWM38, 3DRL606/58/1.

⁵⁰ Bean, *AOH Vol III*, pp.847-48.

⁵¹ *ibid*, pp.847-48.

with the 51st the main body of the 52nd never connected.⁵² Lt Col Ross's report stated that B Company 'apparently lost direction and shortly retired', which opened up Ross's right flank to German penetration.⁵³ A similar situation developed on the right, where Lt Col Francis Lorenzo of the 49th Battalion reported that the 52nd had been 'blown out of their position', leaving his flank in the air. The 49th were able to hold their battalion in place, consolidating the position even when the 52nd had fallen back on their left. By the afternoon the 52nd Battalion's position was so poor that Glasgow sent two companies of the 16th (Canadian Scottish) Battalion in to support them.⁵⁴

The 52nd Battalion had failed to do its job: to close with the enemy, kill or capture him, seize his ground and hold it against counter-attacks. Both the 51st and 49th performed better, and had the 52nd been able to capture and hold its objectives it is likely that both flanking battalions would have held their positions. Although Beevor's men were fresh (having not been used in August) and were equipped and supported identically to those weaker battalions on their flanks their morale and leadership was poorer. Few men are willing to risk their lives for a commander they do not respect. Even without Beevor physically in command, the culture he cultivated within the battalion did not seem to induce a robust commitment to aggressive action and steadfast determination.

Conclusion

In the *Official History* Bean wrote that the 52nd was comprised of 'magnificent material' but was 'unevenly commanded.'⁵⁵ This was a typical Bean euphemism and a very generous one at that. It was a poor unit under Beevor's command. This state of affairs can be attributed to Beevor's personal approach to command. In one sense he had the wrong priorities – he seemed to care little for the welfare of his men whilst maintaining a very high opinion of himself. Ben Leane described Beevor as 'self-opinionated' with 'a large idea of the dignity of his position'.⁵⁶ This gets to the core of what made Beevor a poor CO: he had not realised that command was intrinsically a selfless act. When Beevor addressed his men Hodge wrote that he seemed to think he was one of the 'Prophets of Israel' and needed to be 'listened to with open-mouthed wonder'. Hodge concluded that 'the tremendous jump from what he was getting in civil life to what he gets now has been too much for his brain.'⁵⁷ He conformed to historian Gary Sheffield's assertion that an officer relying on institutional position and the power to administer punishments was likely to be a poor leader.⁵⁸ The failure of Beevor's battalion in combat was an indictment of his approach to managing his command and an illustration of just how important the personal aspects of command can be.

-o0o-

⁵² Report on Attack on Mouquet Farm, 9 September 1916, 52nd Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/69/6.

⁵³ Report on Operation at Mouquet Farm 1st/4th September 1916, 51st Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/68/7.

⁵⁴ Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Lorenzo to 13th Inf Bde HQ, 9 September 1916, 49th Battalion unit diary, September 1916, AWM4, 23/66/4.

⁵⁵ Bean, *AOH Vol III*, p.846.

⁵⁶ B.B. Leane diary, 20 November 1915, AWM, 1DRL/0412, folder 2 of 3.

⁵⁷ E.G. Hodge to family, 7 May 1916, AWM, PR87/208, folder 2 of 11.

⁵⁸ G.D. Sheffield, *Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, p.42.

THE VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS AND WESTERN AUSTRALIAN RAILWAYS DURING WORLD WAR TWO – PART 1

Michael Firth

With England's declaration of war in Europe, Australia followed and the thoughts at home turned to how to defend our own shores. Most of the able-bodied men had signed up for the 2nd AIF, others wanted to do this but couldn't owing to their age, occupation or other enlistment restrictions. This gave rise to a variety of home-grown units designed to defend their local areas. Formed by the Returned Services League (RSL) and operating with government approval by June 1940, the Returned Services League Volunteer Defence Corps was shortened to Volunteer Defence Corps or VDC. The VDC was formed from the 'B-Class' volunteers who were under sixty years and originally members of the RSL.¹ Each RSL branch became a local unit of the VDC. Over 4,000 members of the VDC had been recruited in Western Australia by the close of 1940 with the Army taking control in May 1941. By now the VDC was also open to men who were employed in reserved occupations including railway workers. In 1942 the Western Australian Government Railways (WAGR) workers from the Midland workshops formed the major part of H Company, 3rd Battalion (Swan) VDC in Western Australia.²

It was not just the Midland WAGR members who joined local VDC units, but also WAGR personnel from all over the rail network including the other railway operators in WA. With the members coming from a reserved occupation group, each person had to get permission from the Commissioner of Railways or the Secretary of Railways to enlist in their local VDC unit. Permission was also sort from the Commissioner for assisting with the shortage of some equipment for the local VDC units.

In one such case the local VDC unit requested help from WAGR in making Segregated Pipe Grenades to be manufactured from disused superheater element tubing filled with No.8 shot. The possibility was discussed by a couple of WAGR members from the local VDC unit with a mechanical engineer at the Midland Workshops, resulting in a letter being sent from the Commander of the 3rd Bn (Swan) VDC to the Commissioner of Railways on 6 April 1942.³ It seems that a couple of VDC members had been experimenting during their own time with the manufacture of the grenades before the proposal was made. A more detailed letter was sent to the commissioner on 13 April 1942 providing further information on the proposal and to clear up any misunderstandings. This letter also explained why the proposal had been made, for it seems the VDC units were allocated grenades but the Army did not have enough to supply the units.

The proposal was for several VDC members employed by WAGR at the Midland workshop, in their own time, to use a couple of the workshop machines to cut and serrate the tubing into lengths, closing one end with metal. Into the pipe segments, an amount of No.8 shot was added before a gelignite plug was added with a detonator and fuse. A similar amount of shot was added before the pipe was sealed with Plaster of Paris. The grenade would be about 150mm (6 inches) in length and approximately 30mm (1.25 inches) in diameter.

¹ Jenny Gregory (ed.), *On the Homefront: Western Australia and World War II*, Uni WA Press, Nedlands, 1996.

² Philippa Rogers, P. *Troops, Trains and Trades: The Wartime Role of the Railways of Western Australia, 1939-1945*, P. Rogers, Bassendean WA, 1999.

³ State Records Office of WA (SRO WA) 'Volunteer Defence Corps – for use of machine at Midland Junction Workshops for making grenades' Series (S)- 1247, Consign.(C)- 1240, Item (I)-1942/12663.

On 23 April 1942, the commissioner gave his permission for the proposal for making grenades to proceed. This was not the only correspondence between the Commissioner and the military authorities, as questions were raised at the start of 1942 regarding WAGR employees joining the VDC and their ability to carry out their WAGR duties. A letter dated 21 January 1942 from the Secretary for Railways to the Deputy Commissioner of the VDC, stated:

In order that there should be no misunderstanding as to the position, I have to advise that while as a general policy there is no objection to employees volunteering and training for defence work, owing to the essential nature of their own work and the possibility that in an emergency they may be needed both for their own work, and for the work of some outside body, railwaymen can only join outside bodies by first obtaining permission from the Department, when each case will be taken individually as to its effect of railway work.⁴

Just over a month after this letter it was proposed that a VDC unit could be formed at the Midland workshops for the local defence of the area. The unit would be part of 3rd Bn (Swan) VDC being trained on weekends, armed with rifles and bayonets. The unit would provide guards for the workshops and be trained by the local 28th Battalion or by VDC instructors. After further meetings between the commissioner, the local unit commanders and the army headquarters in Melbourne, it was agreed that members of WAGR could enrol in the VDC, once permission had been given. The members would train on weekends or week nights, being called on to perform their VDC duties in time of invasion or attack if they are unable to perform their normal WAGR duties. By the end of March, this had been extended to the major towns and WAGR depots in the south-west of Western Australia including Bunbury, Busselton and Albany.

Listed below is a table of railwaymen who applied for permission to join the local VDC units and whether permission was granted. The table is based on the information taken from the file titled ‘Volunteer Defence Corps – Conditions etc.’ held by the State Records Office in Perth, Western Australia. Included in the table are the person’s name and the local VDC unit which would have operated in the area where the person was located. The unit shown may not be the unit they joined as this can only be confirmed by examining their service records, and some men might have joined a unit later once permission had been granted as numerous men applied several times for permission. As can be seen from the list, nearly 550 members of WAGR applied to become members of the local VDC while they served their state as railway employees.

Name	Position	Home Station	Recommendation	VDC Battalion Area
Adams, J.J.	Porter	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth
Beckett, F.W.	Turner	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Blix, K.J.	Assistant Engineer	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Botterall, H.	Clerk	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Brown, P.P.	C & W Examiner	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Browne, J.M.	Turner	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Campaign, A.E.	Class. Ledger Keeper	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Carr, F.H.	App. Turner	Midland	Y	1st Bn Perth
Castle, A.	Stower	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth
Cheeseman, E.	No. Taker	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth

⁴ SRO WA ‘Volunteer Defence Corps- conditions etc.’ S- 1247, C- 1240, I- 1942/12334.

Collins, F.	Timekeeping Asst.	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Cramer, H.S.	Lifter	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Dryden, M.C.	Labourer	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Edgecombe, E.H.	Assistant Engineer	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Feinberg, D.	Clerk	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth
Fullerton, D.L.G.	Engr. Asst.	Perth	Y- part time	1st Bn Perth
Hay, J.H.	Junior Clerk	Perth	Y- part time	1st Bn Perth
Hepburn, C.	Clerk	Fremantle	N	1st Bn Perth
Huntley, S.	Clerk	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth
Kelly, H.O.D.	Wireman	Perth	Y- part time	1st Bn Perth
Lowry, G.	Timekeeping Asst.	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
McAdam, G.	Clerk	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth
Pedgion, A.J.	Checker	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth
Pedgion, A.J.	Checker	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth
Pellowe, M.O.	Clerk	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Pepper, H.S.	T.E.L. Examiner	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Smith, O.W.	Coppersmith	Midland	Y	1st Bn Perth
Sorenson, F.	Timekeeping Asst.	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Stafford, L.	Junior Clerk	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Thomas, L.G.	Clerk	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Tuke, J.P.	Excess Fare Clerk	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Walters, A.W.	Authorities Clerk	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Wright, J.E.	C.S.C	Perth	N	1st Bn Perth
Jones, T.K.	C.O.D. Clerk	Perth	Y	1st Bn Perth
Allan, N.	Shunter	Fremantle	Y	2nd Bn Fremantle
Bearsby, W. J.	Guard	Fremantle	Y	2nd Bn Fremantle
Benthien, A.	Checker	Fremantle	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Coote, J.G.	Turner	Perth	Y	2nd Bn Fremantle
Dodds, W.J.	Ganger	Goodwood	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Faulkner, J.	Clerk	Perth	Y	2nd Bn Fremantle
Fitzpatrick, J.	Stower	Fremantle	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Gannaway, V.	Guards Porter	Fremantle	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Haynes, B.S.	Checker	Fremantle	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Huckstep, V.A.B.	Labourer	Perth	Y- part time	2nd Bn Fremantle
Jones, K.D.	Car Builder	Perth	Y	2nd Bn Fremantle
Magennis, J.R.	Relief Clerk	Perth	Y	2nd Bn Fremantle
Martin, G.C.	Guards Porter	Fremantle	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Moran, H.P.	Clerk	Perth	Y- part time	2nd Bn Fremantle
Outridge, M.J	Clerk	Perth	Y	2nd Bn Fremantle
Penaluna, A.	Checker	Fremantle	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Reeves, E.L.	Clerk	Fremantle	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Svenson, L.	Junior Worker	Fremantle	N	2nd Bn Fremantle
Wilkinson R.H.	Record Clerk	Perth	Y	2nd Bn Fremantle
Lancater, J.O.	Moulder's Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Barbour, A.W.	T & M Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Barnett, T.M	Tarpaulinmaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan

Baskerville, F.	Repairer	Chidlow	Y- part time	3rd Bn Swan
Bennett, J.	Machinist	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Beresford, J.	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Bickle, H.T.	Process Worker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Blundell, A.E.V.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Bond, W.B.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Boyd, J. McF.	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Boyes, A.E.	Turner	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Bracknell, A.E.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Bradford, L.H.	Turner	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Brewer, J.	Guards Porter	Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Carey, W.	Labourer	Midland	N	3rd Bn Swan
Carroll, M.	Turner	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Carter, F.S.	Asst. to Acquitting Officer	Perth	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Chadwick, H.P.	Patternmaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Clark, F.	Repairer	Chidlow	Y- part time	3rd Bn Swan
Clemow	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Clune, F.	Stricker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Cole, J.H.	Turner	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Cole, W.E.	C.S. Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Considine, A.	Clerk	Perth	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Cook, E.T.	Ldg. Repairer	Chidlow	Y- part time	3rd Bn Swan
Copley, C.W.	Patternmaker Asst. Chief Staff	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Cornish, F.W.	Clerk	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Cory, B.J.	Shed Fireman	Midland	N	3rd Bn Swan
Coultas, N.I.R.	Coppersmith	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Dacey, M.	Repairer	Chidlow	Y- part time	3rd Bn Swan
Davis, N.	Storeman	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Dewar, A.	Sub. Foreman	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Dickman, M.J.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Doxey, J.G.	Plumber	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Eckett, R.G.	App. Turner	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Emerton, J.H.	Blacksmith	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Emms, J.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Erickson, E.	App. C & W Builder App. T.& I.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Errington, G.H.A.	Machinist	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Evans, S.H.	Storeman	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Farmer, E.	Clerk	Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Fildes, W.	Boilermaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Forbes, A.	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Fraser, A.J.	Stower	Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Freeman, A.J.	Elec. Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Frith, H.C.	Watch & Clock Repr	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Fry, W.A.	Fitter's Assistant	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan


Fulford, B.	Process Worker Annx	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gale, A.E.	C.S. Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gale, L.T.	App. C.& W. Builder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gamble, A.	Striker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gardiner, G.S.	App. C & W Builder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gartnell, C.	Lifter App. T.& I.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gibbings, S.I.	Machinist	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gilbert, G.A.	Boilermaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Giles, E.C.	Lineman	Perth	Y- part time	3rd Bn Swan
Girdlestone, E.J.	Process Worker Annx	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Godfrey, W.	Eng. Asstant	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gore, J.H.	Coppersmith	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Gray, E.	Storeman	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Griffiths, D.A.	Fitter's Assistant	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Guy, A.E.	Elec. Crane Dvr	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Hadrill, H.T.	C.S. Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Haley, A.	S.R.O.	Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Hamilton, T.A.	Patternmaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Hardie, C.R.	Boilermaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Harmsworth, W.H.	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Hayward, L.G.	Patternmaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Hellmrick, C.V.	Lifter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Herbert, L.W.	Plumber	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Heys, R.	Clerk App. T.& I.	Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Hogan, G.P.	Machinist	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Hogg, W.T.	Coppersmith	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Holland, H.F.	Clerk	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Horton, R.H.	Machinist	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Howden, A.J.	Boilermaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Hudson, K.	Process Worker Annx	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Huish, D.P.	Turner	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Hummerston, V.M.	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Innes, R.L.	W.O. Man	East Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Jackson, E.	Ganger	Mundaring	N	3rd Bn Swan
Jacques, R.D.C.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Jarvey, R.M.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Jeffries, O.J.	Striker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Jelavich, G.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Johnson, F.	Signalman	Chidlow	N	3rd Bn Swan
Jones, L.J.	Wood Mchst	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Jones, P.J.	Patternmaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Kelly, G.	Blacksmith	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Kelly, J.J.	Repairer	Goodwood	Y- part time	3rd Bn Swan
Kenworthy, G.A.	Wagon Builder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Kilpatrick, H.L.	Process Worker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan

King, L.R.	App. Boilmaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Klem, E.C.	Elec. Fitter	Chidlow	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Kneale, R.C.	Machinist's Assistant	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Knox, A.P.	Turner Annexe	Midland	y	3rd Bn Swan
Langdon, W.F.	Stay Lathe Mchst	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Lauder, N.	Repairer	Midland	Y- part time	3rd Bn Swan
Leyland, E.	Asst. Engr. Class 2	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Logue, A.K.	Temporary Labourer	Perth	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Logue, K.A.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Lovell, W.J.	Turner Friction Saw	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Lowry, R.J.	Machinist	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Manning, T.H.A.	Boilermaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Marsh, R.E.W.	Boilermaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Maskew, J.C.	App. Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
McAloon, J.	Process Worker Annx	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
McCarthy, J.L.	Blacksmith	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
McGregor, A.W.	Stricker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
McInnerney, K.R.	Fitter's Assistant	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
McKeown, F.	Welder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
McMullen, J.	Coppersmith	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
McShera, D.P.	Stricker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Mercer, J.	Station Master	Chidlow	N	3rd Bn Swan
Mercer, N.E.	Stricker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Messer, R.	Elec. Fitter	Midland	N	3rd Bn Swan
Miller, E.C.	Relief Clerk	Perth	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Mitchell, G.W.	App. C & W Builder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Morley, M.	Jnr. Clerk	Perth	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Motteram, H.W.	App. C & W Builder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Mouchemore, V.	Tinsmith	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Mountain, W.	Stoker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Moyle, N.J.	App. Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Muir, A.Mcd	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Mullin, F.G.	Boilermaker Act. 1st Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Munday, H.S.	Purchasing	Perth	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Murphy, J.A.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Netherway, G.E.J.	Storeman Labourer-Act.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Nixon-Davis, L.	Storeman	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
O'Brien, B.	Painter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
O'Grady, O.H.	Machinist	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
O'Neill, J.R.	App. Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Page, E.L.	Turner	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Palmer, C.T.	Clerk	Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Park, C.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Patterson, R.W.	Ganger	Claremont	Y- part time	3rd Bn Swan

Pearce, H.A.	App. Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Pervival, T.H.	Patternmaker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Pether, W.	Clerk	Midland	N	3rd Bn Swan
Phipps, S.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Pickard, J.M.	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Pittaway, W.T.	Toolmaker	Midland	N	3rd Bn Swan
Pow, J.R.	Shipping Clerk	Perth	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Powell, I.C.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Priddle, C.G.	Moulder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Priest, S.C.	Repairer	Chidlow	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Quinn, E.J.	C & W Builder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Quinn, J.F.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Rackner, E.	Rec. Porter	Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Redfern, G.	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Renshaw, W.	N.S.M.	Chidlow	N	3rd Bn Swan
Richardson, G.T.	Ganger	Kalamunda	N	3rd Bn Swan
Ripp, J.B.	Storeman	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Roper, J.H.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Russell, T.W.	Fitter's Assistant	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Savage, E.A.	L. Runner	Bellevue	N	3rd Bn Swan
Scarfe, A.E.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Scott, H.A.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Seal, A.F.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Sharp, F.	App. C.& W. Builder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Sheldon, G.R.	Process Worker Annx	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Shepherd, R.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Sherratt, F.	Labourer	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Smith, F.A.K.	Wood Mchst	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Smith, W.A.	B/Mkr's Assitant	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Stanniforth, T.E.	C & W Builder	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Staples, G.L.	App. Painter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Steel, J.R.	App. Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Stephens, E.A.	Checker	Perth	N	3rd Bn Swan
Struthers, H.K.	Clerk	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Styles, S.J.	Porter	Midland	N	3rd Bn Swan
Sullivan, W.T.S.	C.I.C. (Clerk-in- Charge)	Perth	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Taylor, W.J.	Acid Room Attendent	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Threader, H.	Plumber	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Tipping J.A.	Fitter	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Truslove, A.T.	Process Worker	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Turner, H.	Saw Doctor	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan
Twogood, G.H.	Fitters Asst.	Midland	Y	3rd Bn Swan

[To be continued]

Military Historical Society of Australia
Sabretache



Copyright © 1957-2019 Military Historical Society of Australia on behalf of the Society and its authors who retain copyright of all their published material and articles. All Rights Reserved.


Sabretache policy is that the submission of material gives the Society permission to print your material, to allow the material to be included in digital databases such as the MHSa website, Australian Public Affairs-Full Text, INFORMIT and EBSCO. Reprints to non-profit historical and other societies will be approved provided suitable attribution is included and a copy of the reprint is sent to the author. Copyright remains with the author who may reprint his or her article or material from the article without seeking permission from the Society.

The Society encourages the download and distribution of *Sabretache* for personal use only and *Sabretache* can not be reproduced without the written consent of the Society.

www.mhsa.org.au

Military Historical Society of Australia
PO Box 5030, Garran, ACT 2605.
email: webmaster@mhsa.org.au

Military Historical Society of Australia
Sabretache



Copyright © 1957-2019 Military Historical Society of Australia on behalf of the Society and its authors who retain copyright of all their published material and articles. All Rights Reserved.


Sabretache policy is that the submission of material gives the Society permission to print your material, to allow the material to be included in digital databases such as the MHSa website, Australian Public Affairs-Full Text, INFORMIT and EBSCO. Reprints to non-profit historical and other societies will be approved provided suitable attribution is included and a copy of the reprint is sent to the author. Copyright remains with the author who may reprint his or her article or material from the article without seeking permission from the Society.

The Society encourages the download and distribution of *Sabretache* for personal use only and *Sabretache* can not be reproduced without the written consent of the Society.

www.mhsa.org.au

Military Historical Society of Australia
PO Box 5030, Garran, ACT 2605.
email: webmaster@mhsa.org.au

Military Historical Society of Australia
Sabretache



Copyright © 1957-2019 Military Historical Society of Australia on behalf of the Society and its authors who retain copyright of all their published material and articles. All Rights Reserved.

Sabretache policy is that the submission of material gives the Society permission to print your material, to allow the material to be included in digital databases such as the MHSa website, Australian Public Affairs-Full Text, INFORMIT and EBSCO. Reprints to non-profit historical and other societies will be approved provided suitable attribution is included and a copy of the reprint is sent to the author. Copyright remains with the author who may reprint his or her article or material from the article without seeking permission from the Society.

The Society encourages the download and distribution of *Sabretache* for personal use only and *Sabretache* can not be reproduced without the written consent of the Society.

www.mhsa.org.au

Military Historical Society of Australia
PO Box 5030, Garran, ACT 2605.
email: webmaster@mhsa.org.au