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

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THE BRITISH GARRISON IN AUSTRALIA 1788-1841

THE MUTINY OF THE 80TH REGIMENT AT NORFOLK ISLAND

Clem Sargent

The recorded histories of Norfolk Island during its time as a secondary penal settlement usually give detailed accounts of the convict uprisings of 1834 and 1846 (the 'cooking pot' mutiny) and the executions which followed them, but little is recorded concerning the July 1839 mutiny of the guard detachment of the 80th Regiment, The Staffordshire Volunteers, later 2nd Battalion, South Staffordshire Regiment, and there is a corresponding lack of knowledge of the incident by the residents of the island. In view of the emphasis placed by the local tourist industry on the convict occupation, this is, perhaps, a strange oversight.

The 80th mutiny has been considered previously by Doctor Peter Stanley in an article – 'A mere point of military etiquette' which appeared in *The push from the bush* No 7. He believed the mutiny to be an expression of social unrest, albeit in a military organisation. This current article considers the man-management styles of the two principal players in the lead up to the mutiny and in its aftermath - two Peninsular War veterans, Majors Joseph Anderson, 50th Regiment, and Thomas Bunbury, 80th Regiment, and whether indifferent man-management by one may have precipitated the mutiny. Both Anderson and Bunbury were sufficiently proud to have compiled detailed published records of their service, and much of the material for this article has been drawn from these sources. Their styles give some insight into their personalities.[1]

Anderson was a Scot; commissioned into the 78th Regiment, the Ross-shire Buffs, on 27 June 1805 at the age of fifteen; he joined the regiment at Shorncliffe where he 'attended all daily parades, morning and evening, and was drilled and instructed in a squad with the men'. He served with the 78th at Maida and in Egypt before transferring on promotion to the 24th, the Warwickshire Regiment, and in the Peninsula was at the battles of Talavera, Busaco, and Fuentes d'Onoro. In his old age, writing his 'Recollections', he recalled an incident in Portugal, while acting as the paymaster of the regiment, which led him to form a high opinion 'of the general honesty and integrity of the British soldier'.[2]

Anderson returned home on sick leave after Fuentes and acted for a short while as Brigade Major before being promoted to captain, as a company commander in the York Chasseurs; a 'regiment formed in the winter of 1813-1814 in the Isle of Wight from the better class of deserters from the Army. It was sent to the West Indies in 1814, and was shortly afterwards augmented by a draft of 540 deserters and culprits from the Isle of Wight ... This regiment was clothed in 'green with red cape and cuffs.'[3]

In Barbados he was at one time Acting Paymaster of his regiment, and later Deputy Judge Advocate to the British Forces in the West Indies.[4] He rejoined the Chasseurs and accompanied

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1 Lt Colonel Joseph Anderson CB KH, 1913 Recollections of a peninsular veteran, Edward Arnold, London; Lt Col Thomas Bunbury CB, 1861, Reminiscences of a veteran, Charles J Skeet, Charing Cross. These works are hereafter referred to as 'Anderson' and 'Bunbury' respectively.

2 Anderson, pp. 54–59.

3 W J Baldrey, 1937, 'Disbanded Regiments', Journal Of The Society For Army Historical Research, London, Vol XIV, p. 235.

4 At the time of Anderson's appointments the presiding officer of General Courts Martial held the title of Judge Advocate. He was the prosecutor, drafting the charge/s and producing the witnesses to

them in the expedition to seize Guadeloupe, being one of the few officers in the unit with field experience. Following the success of the operation, he was appointed to another spell of staff work as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General before rejoining the Chasseurs in Jamaica. Anderson returned to England in April 1818 for another period of sick leave. While there, he was advised that the Chasseurs were to be disbanded and he was placed on half-pay, where he rusticated until May 1821 when he gained an appointment to a company of the 50th, The Queen's Own Regiment, then serving at Port Royal in Jamaica.

He joined the regiment in January 1823 and was again appointed Deputy Judge Advocate before being sent in command of a detachment to Port Maria, a notoriously unhealthy station where he lost half his men and dependents before returning to Port Royal and applying for a further period of sick leave in England. Anderson rejoined the regiment at Portsmouth in 1827, following its return from the West Indies and served with it in Ireland before the 50th was selected to provide guard detachments for convict transports to New South Wales. Anderson arrived in Sydney on the *Parmelia* on 2 March 1834 to find Sydney agog with the news of a convict uprising on the secondary penal settlement of Norfolk Island.

On his arrival Anderson presented letters of introduction to Governor Sir Richard Bourke who offered him the post of Commandant at Norfolk Island to replace Lieutenant Colonel James Morisset who had been suffering ill-health for some time, and who had left all responsibility for dealing with the convict mutiny of 1834 to Captain Foster Fyans, in charge of the garrison detachment of the 4th Regiment. Anderson, accompanied by his wife and family, and two soldiers of the 50th, sailed from Sydney on the schooner *Isabella* on 12 March 1834. They were met on arrival at Norfolk Island by a Guard of Honour of the 4th and the Acting Commandant, Captain Fyans; Morisset had already left the island. The new Commandant and his family took up residence in the very comfortable Government House.[5] His first duty on the island was to take depositions against prisoners charged with mutiny. One hundred and sixty two were charged; thirteen were ultimately executed on 22 and 23 July 1834 with all prisoners paraded to witness the executions.

Anderson recorded in his Recollections 'from that time on order reigned on the island during the whole of my government, from March, 1834 to April, 1839'. He also recollected that 'The troops behaved remarkably well. We had only six court-martials during the whole period of my command. All the soldiers had gardens near their barracks in which they grew all sorts of vegetables; they were also allowed to keep fowls. This not only kept them in excellent health, but gave them employment, and they were always at hand and ready for any emergency which might arise.' The gardens were to become the focus of the later military mutiny, but it had been the custom to allow the soldiers gardens from before Anderson's time; Foster Fyans, of the 4th Regiment, the predecessors of the 50th, recorded in his Memoirs that during a scare that the soldiers' bread, baked by convict bakers, had been poisoned, so great was the belief of the troops in the rumour that they refused to eat it –'not a morsel of it was used,....and, may I add, only for the produce of their gardens, each man being allowed a fourth of an acre to cultivate, their

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support the charge/s; he was the expert who gave advice on points of law raised by members of the Court; he guided them on forms of proceedings and on the legality of final sentences and judgement. In addition, by general and accepted practice, he assisted the prisoner in the conduct of his defence. See – Richard Glover, 1963, Peninsular Preparation, the Reform Of The British Army 1798-1809, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 172-174.

5 P L Brown (ed), 1986, Memoirs Recorded at Geelong, Victoria, Australia by Captain Foster Fyans (1790-1870), Geelong, Geelong Advertiser, p. 125; WO 17/2318, July 1834.

situation on the island would be one of extreme misery'.[6] The gardens provided some off-duty occupation for the soldiers. There were no inns on the island, the grog issue was at a reduced rate to the mainland and there were no women except the dependents of the garrison and officials.

Amongst the 1000 to 1200 prisoners on the island Anderson found about 100 former soldiers most of who had been transported from Australia and India for assaulting or threatening to shoot their officers, usually when drunk. In 1832 an instruction had been issued by the Home Government that soldiers sentenced to transportation by Court Martial in New South Wales or the East Indies should be transported to Norfolk Island. These Anderson separated from the remaining prisoners, all secondary or even third civil offenders from the colonies. He wrote ' I always found the soldier gangs willing to be obedient, and most thankful for the promise of being trusted with arms should any general outbreak take place which might justify in calling for their assistance. I had indeed a soldier's feeling for them. For their continued good conduct I recommended many of them at various times to the Government for pardon and restoration to their regiments.' One of their number was Daniel Shean of Anderson's own regiment 'who afterwards served with me in India, and I found him a good and faithful soldier'.[7]

In June 1834 Anderson reported to the Colonial Government that the settlement on the island had been inundated by a heavy sea which caused considerable damage to the public buildings. Governor Bourke's response was to send a Superintendent of Works (Mr Ferguson) to Norfolk Island with plans to erect a Commissariat Store. This building is one of the most substantial on the island; restored, it now provides accommodation for All Saints Anglican Church and, in the basement, an Archaeological Museum. The new military barracks, completed the following year, now houses the Island Administration. The old barracks now accommodates the Island Courts and the Legislative Assembly. A plaque is fixed in the gable above the main entrance of the Commissary Store; it bears the inscription '1834, MAJOR ANDERSON, 50TH REGIMENT, COMMANDANT'. A fitting memorial to an old soldier. It is evidence that the construction of significant buildings was commenced well before the arrival of Royal Engineers in 1838. In 1834, Anderson was visited by his elder brother, John, a colonel in the Madras Army, who after leaving the island, wrote to his brother from Sydney suggesting that they should together take up a cattle and sheep station in the newly opened up Port Phillip district. Joseph agreed, his brother purchased stock and made arrangements for a drive to the station site in October 1838. This began a new phase of Anderson's life, one which he did not fully take up until retiring from the 50th Regiment in 1848.

Anderson remained at Norfolk until April 1839 when his detachment of the 50th was replaced by the 80th and Anderson, himself, by Major Thomas Bunbury as civil superintendent and military commandant. The first detachment of the 80th as relief for the 50th arrived at Norfolk Island on 28 August 1838 but Bunbury did not embark from Sydney until February 1839. He was held over waiting the arrival of the new Governor, Sir George Gipps, for his appointment as Commandant to be confirmed.

In common with every other commandant at Norfolk, Anderson has been criticised in some writings for the harshness of his treatment of prisoners. It is not the purpose of this article to consider Anderson's convict administration in detail but some assessment of it is pertinent in establishing the differing attitudes of Anderson and Bunbury to the troops under their command. Anderson, himself, recalled that he made a daily study of the prisoners' records to identify those noted for good conduct on which he based recommendations for commutation of sentences, on a varying scale for prisoners subject to seven, fourteen years or life sentences. This policy was

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6 Brown, p. 122.
7 Goderich to Bourke, 24 Feb 1832, HRA I, XVI, pp. 528-529; Anderson, p.167.

remarked on by the Roman Catholic Vicar General, Ullathorne, who visited Norfolk Island in 1836. He wrote:

> I record the name of Major Anderson with unmingled satisfaction. His minute personal knowledge of the desperate men under his charge, and the discrimination with which he encourages the well disposed, has been attended with the most salutary consequences.

Ullathorne had been at Norfolk in 1835 to attend the execution of the 1834 mutineers. In 1836 he added to the above comments:

> What was my delight to find that, for the fifteen months elapsed since my last visit, there was not one Catholic to be brought before the judge.[8]

The Quaker, James Backhouse, had expressed similar views following his 1835 visit to the island. He spoke favourably of Anderson's appointment of two prisoners with religious training, one Protestant, one Roman Catholic, to conduct separate services for prisoners who, previously, had attended one ceremony conducted by an officer of the garrison. Backhouse recorded speaking to an overseer:

> who had long been on the island. He informed us, that there had been a progressive improvement among the prisoners for some time past, especially since Major Anderson has availed himself of the means within his reach, for their religious instruction and had regulated the appropriation of punishments to the nature of the crimes committed.

Backhouse received from the members of his farewell congregation, on 29 April 1835, a petition:

> Permit us to implore that you will convey to Major Anderson, our Commandant, the deep sense we entertain of his great anxiety, since he assumed the command, for our well being here and hereafter.[9]

On the debit side, Colin Roderick in 'From the Quarterdeck to the Gallows', based on the narrative of the notorious John Knatchbull, depicts Anderson as a sadistic tyrant, a view Roderick considers supported by Thomas Atkins, an Independent clergyman who was sent to Norfolk Island as a Chaplain in November 1836 on the recommendation of the London Missionary Society. Atkins considered Anderson the 'disciple of Nicholas, autocrat of the Russians'.[10] Knatchbull, one-time RN Captain, had, under the name of John Fitch, been sentenced in England in 1824 to 14 years' transportation, having been found guilty of theft. Granted a ticket of leave in 1829, two years later in Sydney he was sentenced to death for forgery but his sentence was commuted to seven years' secondary punishment at Norfolk Island, arriving in 1832, and leaving in 1839 on the same vessel as Anderson and his family, to serve out his original sentence at Port Macquarie. He returned to Sydney on completion of his sentence, and on 6 January 1844 he murdered a shopkeeper, Mrs Jamieson. He was arrested, found guilty of the murder and on 13 February 1844 he was hanged. Knatchbull's complaints against Anderson were that he substituted potatoes for the bread ration during a shortage of maize, that he had furniture made on the island which he sold in Sydney, where he also attempted to sell arrowroot produced at Norfolk for his own benefit. Atkins' view of Knatchbull was that '. from his personal appearance and conversation, as all traces of a gentleman had long disappeared, he

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8 Dr W B Ullathorne, 1837, The Catholic Mission To Australia, Ed 2, Rochliff & Duckworth, Liverpool, p. 43.

7 James Backhouse, 1843, Narrative of a Visit to the Australian Colonies, Hamilton , Adams & Co, York, pp. 252, 289-290.

10 Reverend Thomas Atkins, 1869, Reminiscences of Twelve Years' Residence in Tasmania and New South Wales, Malvern, England, p. 45.

exhibited no evidence that he had been in a higher social position; indeed he appeared to be in his natural place.'[11]

Atkins' stay on Norfolk was short, from November 1836 to January 1837. He resigned in Sydney in April, his conduct on the island considered by Governor Bourke to have been 'highly indiscreet and improper'. Atkins obviously could not reconcile himself to the fact that when Norfolk Island was resettled in 1825 it was as a place 'for the purpose of employing the worst description of convicts'; or as Governor Brisbane had described it to be 'the ne plus ultra of convict degradation' – nothing worse![12]

An appreciation of Anderson's attitude to prisoners can be gauged from his action in support of the plan to move stock to the brothers' station at Port Phillip. In a letter to his brother, in Sydney organising the drive and seeking stockmen, Anderson 'named also three men in Sydney who had been until lately prisoners at Norfolk Island. I knew them to be not only trustworthy, but also well acquainted with sheep and cattle, as they had been formerly employed as shepherds on sheep and cattle stations.' The three men, Joseph Underwood, William Percival and Richard Glegg fulfilled Anderson's trust– but more of that later.[13]

The new Commandant at Norfolk Island, Major Thomas Bunbury, had been born at Gibraltar 19 May 1791, the son of a lieutenant in the 32nd Regiment. He was sent to school at Catterick in Yorkshire where he claimed to have developed his 'pugnacious propensities'.[14] At the age of sixteen he gained an ensigncy in the 90th Regiment, but transferred to the 3rd, the Buffs, without joining the 90th. With the Buffs in the Peninsula, Bunbury was at the crossing of the Duoro at Oporto and at Talavera, then promoted without purchase to lieutenant in the 91st Regiment but served instead as Adjutant to one of the two Battalions of Detachments at Talavera. This unit was to return to England after the battle where the detachments would rejoin their own regiments. Bunbury elected not to rejoin the 91st which was ' a Highland regiment, at that time very clannish, it struck me that I might be subject to persecution and annoyance' so he elected to serve in the Portuguese Army where he would receive a promotion to the rank of captain.[15]

In February 1809 the Portuguese Regency (The Prince-Regent had fled to Rio de Janeiro in November 1807 on the approach of the French to Lisbon) appointed the Portuguese-speaking British General William Carr Beresford as Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese Army. Beresford, in turn, appointed British officers to strengthen the Portuguese service, each officer receiving a step in rank. Hence Lieutenant Bunbury became Captain, in command of a company of the 20th Campo Mayo Regiment of Infantry[16] but remained a lieutenant in the British Army Lists.

Bunbury served with the 20th Line at the battle of Barrosa, then, at the defence of Tarifa, as Brigade Major to Skerret's British Brigade before being transferred to the Portuguese 5th Caçadores Regiment.[17] Bunbury served with the Caçadores at the crossings of the Nivelle and Nive Rivers; he was wounded during the action on the Nive but shortly after was promoted to the rank of major and appointed to the command of the 6th Caçadores. He took part in the battles of Orthes and Toulouse, the last of the Peninsular campaign which saw the break-up of the Anglo-

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11 Ibid, p.57; Colin Roderick, 1963, John Knatchbull from Quarterdeck to Gallows, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, pp.156-240.
12 Earl Bathurst to Sir Thomas Brisbane, 22 July 1824, HRA I, Vol 11, p. 321; Brisbane to Under Secretary Horton 24 March 1825, HRA I, Vol 11, p. 553.
13 Anderson, p. 179-180.
14 Bunbury, Vol I, p. 2.
15 Ibid, pp. 48-49.
16 Charles Oman MA, 1903, A History of the Peninsular War, Vol II, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 218.
17 Caçadores were Light Infantry, employed in the same role as British Light Infantry Regiments.

Portuguese Army and the return of the Portuguese to Portugal. Most British officers with the Portuguese service rejoined their parent regiments. Bunbury, elected to transfer to the 3rd Caçadores, and to remain as ' all subalterns so authorised obtained companies in the British service without purchase.' That is, they were promoted to the rank of captain, in October 1814. Nevertheless, those who remained in Portugal were placed on the British Half-Pay List one year later.[18]

The 3rd Caçadores were stationed at Vila Real, in the heart of the port wine producing region of Portugal – the Tras Os Montes Province - and here Bunbury began to enjoy a splendid social life as befitted a major in the Portuguese service. He continued in the same life style when transferred to other Caçadore regiments at Elvas, on the frontier opposite the Spanish fortress of Badajoz and at Castro Marin, in the Algarve, on the southernmost section of the Portuguese/Spanish border. Before posting to Elvas he had obtained leave to return to visit his family in England and from Castro Marin he was employed to visit Cadiz to obtain intelligence for Marshal Beresford, still commanding the Portuguese forces, concerning the involvement of Spanish units in an insurrection aimed at the introduction of a more democratic Spanish constitution. Bunbury recorded that 'I was so completely a Portuguese that I found more fun in their parties, where there was a great preponderance of women, than I should have met in the stiff and formal coteries of my pompous countrymen.'[19]

Unfortunately for Bunbury his idyllic existence came to a close in 1820 when Portugal became embroiled in the same type of political agitation as he had witnessed at Cadiz and elements of the Portuguese army were also involved in agitation for a new constitution. However in Portugal one of the aims of the insurrection was to throw off the perceived heavy British influence on Portuguese political life. Marshal Beresford had played a heavy handed role in the country and was highly unpopular. In March 1820 Beresford sailed to Brazil to consult the Portuguese king, still in exile. During Beresford's absence a rising took place, joined in by military units, and a representative assembly, the Cortes, seized power. The Cortes refused Beresford permission to land on his return and he went to England, where the government of the day had determined not to interfere in the internal affairs of its old ally. The writing was on the wall for the British officers remaining in the Portuguese service and Bunbury, amongst those, returned to England at the end of 1820, to rusticate as a captain on half-pay. Beresford had brought back from Brazil the appointment of Bunbury to Lieutenant Colonel in the Portuguese Army, but it was of no benefit for a British half-pay captain.[20]

On his return to England Bunbury reported his arrival to the Horse Guards, advising the Military Secretary that 'his services were at the disposal of the Government'[21], although he was anxious to spend some time in England and viewed with distaste the prospect of being posted as the junior captain to a regiment warned for service in India. Accordingly he spent the next two years residing with his father in Berkshire and, like many other half-pay Peninsular officers, filled his time shooting, hunting, visiting, and studying painting and the Fine Arts in Paris. This life came to an end in late 1822 when, in spite of his many submissions seeking promotion to Brevet Major, he was gazetted to a captain's vacancy in the 80th, the South Staffordshire Regiment.

The 80th was at Malta where Bunbury duly presented himself. Life in the officers' mess in Malta was not greatly to his liking – he expressed a preference for ladies society; but, in Malta, his

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18 Bunbury, Vol I, p.264.
19 ibid, p.284.
20 James M Anderson, 2000, The History of Portugal, Greenwood Press, Westport, USA, p.130; Bunbury, Vol II, p. 74, 79.
21 Bunbury, Vol II, p. 79.

service in the Portuguese Army was rewarded by the award of Honorary Knight of the Portuguese Order of the Tower and Sword.[22] After some service in Malta, Bunbury was posted to the Regimental Depot at the Isle of Man until early 1828 when he took command of the Depot on its move to Sunderland. In March 1831 the main body of the 80th returned to the Regimental Depot, from the Ionian Islands and was dispersed in detachments throughout the Midlands, to control disturbances which developed as a result of the rejection in Parliament of the Reform Bill, until June 1832 when the regiment was posted to Ireland, returning to the Midlands in April 1834. On 24 November Bunbury achieved his long awaited promotion to the rank of major, by purchase; he had served twenty years as a captain. Orders were received in September 1835 for the regiment to prepare to embark as guard detachments on convict transports to New South Wales. The first guard detachment embarked on 23 May 1836, the last, with Bunbury, left Portsmouth on 5 August 1837.[23]

As soon as Bunbury learned that the regiment was to serve in New South Wales he wrote to Sydney 'to his old friend, the Brigade-Major, Colonel Snodgrass 'to say how glad I should be to find some employment there which would give me something in addition to my pay'.[24] Bunbury was heavily in debt, incurred in payment of his purchase of his majority. Snodgrass, like Bunbury, had served with the Portuguese in the Peninsular War, commanding the Portuguese 13th Line Regiment and establishing a name for himself at the siege of San Sebastian (August 1813).[25]

Immediately he arrived in Sydney on the *Susan* on 23 December 1837 after disembarking most of the prisoners previously at Hobart. Bunbury paraded himself to his friend Colonel Snodgrass, not only Brigade-Major but Acting Commandant of the Military Forces in the Colony and also Acting Governor in the interregnum between the departure of Governor Sir Ralph Darling and the arrival of his replacement, Sir George Gipps. Snodgrass told Bunbury that he had a suitable appointment in view – the command of the Penal Settlement at Norfolk Island – when the detachment of the 50th Regiment there was relieved by the 80th. Snodgrass, however, felt that he should delay putting forward the proposed appointment until the arrival of Gipps, who was expected daily. Bunbury joined the Headquarters of his regiment at Windsor, eagerly awaiting his new post.

Governor Gipps and his family reached Sydney on 24 February 1838 but there was no immediate appointment for Bunbury. The first detachment of the 80th, a sergeant and 13 Rank and File did not arrive at Norfolk Island until June 1838 and it was not until August that the first substantial detachment of two subalterns, one the diarist Ensign A B W Best, three sergeants and 41 Rank and File reached the island.[26] At that time Major Anderson's detachment of the 50th totalled 180 All Ranks, so it is not surprising that Bunbury was not appointed to supersede him at that stage.

By the end of 1838 Bunbury was beginning to become fretful about his future and on the arrival of Major-General Sir Maurice O'Connell (Bligh's son-in-law) in December to become the Commander of the Military Forces in the Colony, Bunbury sought his good offices to process the appointment; claiming that he had been prohibited from joining the 80th at Norfolk Island to suit the convenience of Anderson, whose wife was pregnant. O'Connell arranged for Bunbury to meet Gipps during a visit to Government House at Parramatta. The Major was received by Gipps

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22 Ibid, p. 145.
23 Ibid, p. 244; James P Jones, 1923, A History of the South Staffordshire Regiment (1705-1923), Whitehead Brothers, Wolverhampton, p. 54.
24 Bunbury, Vol II, p. 268.
25 Oman, Vol V, pp. 20,25.
26 Nancy M Taylor (ed), The Journal of Ensign Best 1837-1843, 1996, R E Owen, Wellington, NZ, p. 182. Referred to hereafter as 'Best'.

'with a great deal of haughtiness and petulance' and they parted, according to Bunbury, 'with the mutual dislike greatly increased'. Nevertheless Bunbury received his appointment and sailed from Sydney on the *Governor Phillip* on 7 February 1839.[27]

Bunbury had prepared himself for his position as Commandant before leaving Sydney by examining in detail the expenses involved in running the settlement at Norfolk Island and the resources available there; it was his plan to make the establishment self sufficient and he was anxious to put his plans into operation. Much to his chagrin he found, on reaching the island that Anderson was in no hurry to hand over the administration and did not do so until 4 April. Anderson left Norfolk Island about 11 April, arriving in Sydney on 2 May 1839. With Anderson and his family was the last detachment of the 50th on the island.

The men of the 50th left behind them the genesis of the event which would ensure that Bunbury and his detachment of the 80th regiment should enjoy only a short sojourn on Norfolk. The outgoing detachment had sold the gardens they had been allowed to cultivate, the crops on them, and huts for storage of produce and tools to the incoming detachment of the 80th, contrary to the advice of Major Anderson that the transactions were ' against Orders and should have devolved upon them [the 80th] in succession without payment'. This order issued to the troops of the 50th on 9 May 1835 had, it seems, been conveniently forgotten by the gardeners by the time that the hand-over to the 80th took place'.[28]

The gardens and huts were located behind the old barracks, in an area known as 'Irish Town'. Bunbury viewed Irish Town with great suspicion. He believed that the troops resented being called from their gardening activities to carry out their normal military duties and became 'slovenly and dissatisfied', that they wantonly destroyed crops in the adjacent Officers' Gardens when annoyed by the orders of those officers, that lazy soldiers stole produce from the gardens of the more active and that the huts were repositories for stolen tools and places of trading with convicts.

Bunbury took no immediate action on the gardens. During the period he had been waiting to assume command he had been observing many aspects of the management of the establishment and he first wished to implement his ideas for improvement in the efficiency of its administration. He sought permission for and introduced the use of the plough for cultivation which had previously, by Government direction, been carried out by hoe, issued a set of 18 detailed orders to the Superintendent of Agriculture for the improved management of his department, and employed all the old and lame prisoners in the processing of hemp for sale in Sydney. In his most radical move, convinced that most of the convict sick list, 300 in the prison population of 1400, were malingerers, Bunbury introduced a reduced ration for them, with the option of returning to work for full rations, thereby bringing the sick list down to about 70 men.

Busy with his prison management responsibilities, Bunbury directed his 2IC, Captain Horatio Gulston, to take over the military duties relating to the garrison, and it was not until the end of June that Bunbury turned his attention to the soldiers' gardens. He ordered an Overseer and a gang of prisoners to pull down a garden hut, apparently without any prior indication of his intention to the troops, and when the Overseer and his party arrived to begin the demolitions on 1 July the soldiers 'assembled ...in a very riotous manner' and drove away the Overseer and his party. Captain Gulston reported this to Bunbury who issued a Garrison Order

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27 Bunbury, Vol II, p. 292.

28 Bunbury, Report to Major General SirM O Connell.23 July 1839, p. 142. Enclosure to Despatch No 127 Sir George Gipps to Marquess of Normanby, 14 Sep 1839, HRA I, Vol XX, pp. 352-354; AJCP CO 201/287; this Report referred to subsequently as Bunbury, Report.

upbraiding the action of the men and stating that the demolition of the huts would now be carried out under his own supervision, ordered a fatigue party to be formed to carry out the task. The fatigue party had hardly arrived when Bunbury saw that 'a Party of about thirty to forty men had forced their way out of the New Barracks and were rushing with loaded muskets towards the place where I stood'.[29]

Bunbury stood his ground and physically, but unsuccessfully, tried to force the men back to their barracks. It then began to rain and the men retired to the veranda of the barracks where they formed 'armed and accoutered [sic]'; nevertheless Bunbury was able to address them there and they eventually 'quietly returned to their duties' not, however, before putting forward a request for the full mainland ration of spirits in their daily issue, a request Bunbury dismissed out of hand. Bunbury pointed out that they should not have paid for their gardens which he now proposed to withdraw from single soldiers who instead, would be supplied with vegetables from the Government gardens, and debited the sum of one penny per man per day and an extra half penny when rock and water melon was supplied. This charge would have been illegal, as the cost of rations, three shillings per week, was established by Warrant and deducted automatically from soldiers' pay. Deductions for rations and necessaries already reduced the soldiers' pay to less than sixpence a day.

To justify this arbitrary stoppage Bunbury advanced the opinion that ' the notoriously uniform bad conduct and drunkenness which prevails whenever a Detachment from Norfolk Island arrived at Sydney it is to be hoped will be much reduced by the charge of $2^{s}/6^{d}$ per month made for their messing on the Island'.[30]

It is incongruous that while Bunbury was preparing his report at Norfolk Island with its recommendation of a charge to be levied for vegetables, at Sydney in August, a Board had been convened to consider the rations of soldiers on the mainland where Lieutenant Colonel N Wodehouse, 50th Regiment, had claimed that the daily subsistence of soldiers was 'not sufficient for their bodily support, that is to render them fit for every duty an efficient soldier may be expected to perform'.

The Board comprised Lieutenant Colonel C French, 28th Regiment, William Miller, Deputy Commissary General, and Captain W Hunter, Brigade Major. In its report the Board recommended an increase of 2^{d} per day for the purchase of rations. The conditions in Sydney were not common to Norfolk Island, nor were the recommendation applicable, but the Board's investigation did throw light on the true state of a soldier's conditions of service. The ration provided food only for breakfast and a mid-day dinner, the spirit ration was usually issued at night. Six pence of the daily pay was retained for the ration, $2^{1/2}$ pence were allotted for the provision and upkeep of the soldier's Regimental Necessaries and clothing, one halfpenny covered the cost of washing, leaving the soldier with only 3 pence for additional food, particularly for an evening meal, or for his personal needs. Bunbury's proposal would have reduced this to 2 pence or even $1^{1/2}$ pence per day. In that climate it seems unlikely that Bunbury's proposal would have been considered seriously.[31]

Archdeacon John McEncroe, who had arrived on the island on 4 November 1838 to minister to the Catholic convicts, witnessed the mutiny. He witnessed 'the transaction from first to last' and recorded that 'The Major had given orders on a Saturday to the Principal Overseer, a very efficient man in his way, to rebuild one of the huts that had fallen down in a different place

29 Bunbury, Report p. 141; copy of Garrison Order of 1 July 1839 attached as Annex to Bunbury's Report, p, 150.
30 Bunbury, Report, p 146.
31 Horse Guards to Secretary at War, 27 December 1839, CO 201/303, f 317-326

from its former site; he said he intended to remove all the huts ... but did not give orders about doing so. When this Overseer went to remove this one hut he said the Commandant was about taking down all the huts, or something to that effect ... the soldiers flew into a rage and said they would allow "no convicts" to pull down their huts which contained potatoes and other little property. Thus the whole originated in this blunder.'[32]

On 4 July Bunbury issued a Garrison Order instructing Captain Gulston to read at two successive parades the Garrison Order by Major Anderson of 8 May 1835 which informed the troops, inter alia, that the gardens were to pass free from one garrison detachment to the next. Had Bunbury repromulgated this Order before proceeding to the destruction of the huts, particularly by ordering a gang of convicts to carry out the task, the mutiny may have been avoided. Then on 23 July, Bunbury finally penned his Report. In addition to a detailed account of the mutiny, his Report contained direct and implied criticism of his predecessor's administration of the settlement, not only in relation to the soldiers' gardens, but claiming that there were no daily parades of troops on duty, failure of troops to appear on parades, and generally 'a relaxed state of discipline' inferring that' the reins were held too loosely'.

Bunbury forwarded the Report to Sydney with Gulston who was proceeding there in charge of a guard, so that Major-General O' Connell could 'by referring to him [Gulston] obtain any further information you may require.' [33]

The Report was received in Sydney on 5 September and on 14 September a detachment of 176 All Ranks of the 50th Regiment, commanded by Major Thomas Ryan, sailed on the chartered vessel, the *Cornwall*, accompanied by HMS *Alligator*, commanded by Sir Gordon Bremer, to relieve Bunbury and the detachment of the 80th, who were to embark immediately and return to Sydney.[34]

The contentious huts, the cause of the mutiny, by order of Major General O'Connell, were destroyed by the soldiers of the 80th before embarkation and the hand-over of the command from Bunbury to Major Ryan. A plan of the settlement of Norfolk Island, prepared by Lieutenant H W Lugard RE, in January 1839 shows the location of the soldiers' gardens, not immediately behind the old barracks, but separated from them by Military Officers' Gardens, across Soldiers Gully.

Ryan's detachment of the 50th was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Hulme with a detachment of the 96th in 1840. The prison reformer, Captain Alexander Maconochie, had arrived at Norfolk Island on 6 March, 1840 as 'Superintendent'.[35]

On arrival of the 80th detachment in Sydney a Court of Inquiry was instituted and Bunbury, who had not taken any immediate disciplinary action against the mutineers in Norfolk Island was ordered to frame charges against the ring-leaders, eight of whom appeared before General Courts Martial between 4 and 14 November 1839, charged with 'Disobedience of Orders and Mutiny'. Seven of the mutineers were sentenced to Transportation for Life, one, Private Andrew Murray,

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32 R A Daly, 1959, Archdeacon McEncroe On Norfolk Island, 1838-42, Australasian Catholic Record, Vol XXXVI, No 4, p. 285-305.
33 Bunbury Report, p.145-147.
34 HRA, I, Vol XX, pp. 352-4; Bunbury's detachment was 138 All Ranks including Bunbury, Ryan's detachment was 176 strong; see WO 17/2323-4.
35 Gipps to Normanby, 24 October 1839, HRA I, XX, p. 372.

to fourteen years transportation. According to Bunbury, Murray's sentence was remitted on the recommendation of the Court.[36]

The mutineers were not sent back to Norfolk Island to serve their sentences; instead they went to Port Arthur in Van Diemens Land. In May 1844, Lieutenant-General Sir M O'Connell (he had been promoted in November 1841), at the half-yearly inspection of the 80th before their embarkation for India, to mark his appreciation of the good behaviour of the Regiment, was 'pleased to remit the remaining portions of the sentences of such prisoners as are under confinement by awards of Court's Martial'. Whether this applied in the case of the mutineers has not been determined.[37]

Section from '*Plan of the Settlement, Norfolk Island*' produced by H W Lugard Lt RE, January 1839. The Settlement was that part of Norfolk Island now known as Kingston. The full plan shows all the buildings existing in the area at that time. The section depicts a cluster of small buildings, identified as 'Fowl Houses' immediately to the North of the Old Military Barracks. These are the garden huts described by Bunbury, in his Report of the mutiny as in 'rear of the Old Barrack' The Soldiers' Gardens are not shown in this plan but they appear in the 1848 plan 'Project for supplying with Water Principle Buildings on Settlement' prepared by Lugard's successor Capt R G Hamilton RE. The gardens are shown about 140 metres North of the Officers' Gardens, between

36 Best, p. 213; WO 90/2, f20; Bunbury, Vol 3, pp. 30-37; The mutineers sentenced to transportation for life were: Privates Michael Moore, Ralph Ord, William Langston, P—Irons, Benjamin Perkins, Richard Callaghan, James Kernahan; Archibald Murray was sentenced to 14 years transportation.

37 Best, p. 213.

the current Town Creek and Middlegate Road. No 'Fowl Houses" appear on this plan. Although no huts replaced those destroyed in 1839 by the departing detachment of the 80th Regiment, it seems that the Soldiers' Gardens had been retained contrary to Bunbury's decision to destroy them, and to charge the troops for the supply of vegetables to augment their daily ration of bread and meat.

Captain Gulston, the bearer of Bunbury's Report to Sydney, had on arrival, succumbed to the same temptation as troops returning from Norfolk Island which Bunbury had proposed to circumvent by the imposition of the stoppage for vegetables in the ration, for on Bunbury's arrival in Sydney he was told that the bearer of his despatch had been frequently sent for 'but that he always appeared drunk or fuddled, being unable to give any account of himself or of the occurrence which had taken place on the island'.[38]

Could Gulston's befuddled state have been brought about by a disinclination to become involved in Bunbury's handling of the event? Strangely too, Ensign Abel Best, who meticulously maintained his diary both before and after the period of the mutiny, did not continue his daily entries over this time, stopping on 11 April 1839 and not formally resuming until 4 June 1840, by which time he was with a detachment of the 80th in New Zealand. In a general entry in his diary for 11 April 1839 to 4 June 1840 Best dismissed the mutiny, surely the most noteworthy occurrence during his time on Norfolk Island, with the words 'The mutiny of the Troops on the 1st of July has long ceased to be a subject of wonder or conversation'.[39]

It seems that Gulston was to become a victim of the mutiny. After the inquiry he was posted to Port Macquarie; where the post was no longer Commandant of the Settlement, but commander of the guard detachment. The commandant's position had been down-graded in June 1832 with the increase in the civil population in the region. Gulston's command was now one sergeant and 24 Rank and File significantly less than the subaltern, three sergeants and 128 Rank and File Bunbury had made him responsible for on Norfolk Island. A report appeared in *The Australian* of 18 August 1840 that Gulston was to take up a posting with the 80th in New Zealand but there is no evidence that he did so. The Monthly Return for July 1841 shows Gulston 'Absent on leave 5th May until answer to application to retire from the Service is received'. He no longer appears in the Monthly Returns from February 1842 and has no entry in the Army List in 1843 or later. It is interesting to speculate why he took this step.[40]

Major Joseph Anderson, in Sydney when the report of the mutiny was received, was questioned by Governor Gipps and the Major-General O' Connell concerning the gardens. He then become aware of suggestions that Bunbury blamed, him, his predecessor for the uprising by the men of the 80th, but no explanation was forthcoming from the O'Connell. Before Bunbury returned to Sydney on the *Cornwall* Anderson had taken leave to visit the sheep station in Victoria. Arriving in Melbourne by ship, he found the so-called overseer, Howell, had deserted the property with a record of alcoholism on the road with the stock, leaving the ticket-of-leave men, Underwood, Percival and Glegg, to take possession of the grant and to establish its boundaries. Anderson's confidence in these men was justified. The grant was of 85 000 acres on the banks of the Goulburn River, north of Seymour. Anderson named it "Mangalore", 'in compliment to my brother, that being the name of his military station in India, of which he was very fond'[41]

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38 Bunbury, Vol 3, pp. 19-20.
39 Best, p. 213: History Of The South Staffordshire Regiment, p. 55.
40 WO 17/2325.
41 Anderson, p. 178-187.

An 1891 Victorian Department of Crown Lands Parish Map of 1891 shows the land surrounding the settlement of Mangalore divided into small holdings but the name is well known to Australian military historians, originally, as the location in 1939 of 6 Ordnance Ammunition Depot AAOC, and, since August 2001, as part of the Australian Defence Industries Organisation.

When Anderson returned to Sydney from Mangalore the Courts Martial of the mutineers had been held and Anderson soon learned from friends that Bunbury, in his evidence had blamed Anderson "for the relaxed order and system and total absence of military discipline" which Anderson had allowed on Norfolk Island. Anderson's reaction can easily be imagined. He paraded to Sir Maurice O'Connell and requested an immediate Court of Inquiry into his system of command to clear his 'reputation and character'. After some prevarication O'Connell ordered a Court of Inquiry 'to inquire into the system and discipline maintained by Major Anderson during his command at Norfolk Island'.[42]

Anderson addressed the Court at some length, a week according to Bunbury, calling his Commanding Officer, the Adjutant, officers of the 50th who had served under him at Norfolk Island and others, including the Brigade Major to testify on his behalf (by this time Bunbury's friend, Snodgrass, had sold his commission and retired to his estate at Raymond Terrace). Bunbury considered the proceedings 'a laughable farce' and that during his evidence he 'had indulged in too much irony and levity to be agreeable the authorities'[43]. The findings of the Court were not promulgated in the Sydney Garrison. Anderson waited for some months after his arrival in India to receive official notification from the Brigade-Major in Sydney that the findings of the Court had been concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards who directed that a severe reprimand be conveyed to Bunbury, and 'that if he again attempted to insinuate any such charges against Major Anderson he would be brought before a general court martial'[44]. Bunbury makes no mention of this in his 'Reminiscences'.

Anderson made a further visit to Mangalore to check progress and on his return to Sydney was greeted with the news that the 50th was to embark for service in India. He had made the decision to settle in the Colony at the end of his service and consequently that Mrs Anderson and their family would remain in the Colony to wait his eventual return.

The Headquarters and the first division of the 50th embarked on the *Crusader* on 29 January 1841. Anderson, who was to accompany this division, remained on shore with his family while embarkation went on. Before embarkation was complete Anderson's two sons became ill with 'scarlatina', (scarlet fever) and the eldest son died before Anderson sailed. The younger son, Acland, survived, to be later commissioned in the 50th and ultimately to become a figure in Australian colonial military history. From Sydney the *Crusader* carried Anderson's division to Calcutta, the start of seven years service in India. Anderson took command of the 50th in an expeditionary force to Burma and on return to India accompanied the regiment in its redeployment to Cawnpore, travelling up the Hoogly and Ganges rivers by boat.

During the voyage the troops were forbidden to bathe in the rivers but Anderson recollected that Private Daniel Shean, who had been reformed at Norfolk Island, defied the ban on swimming and ventured into the river, and, although a strong swimmer, sank and was never

42 Ibid, pp. 188-189; quotes are Anderson's own.
43 Bunbury, Vol 3, pp. 38-39.
44 Anderson, pp. 191-192.

seen again; 'the firm belief of every one was that he was seized and pulled under by an alligator' [sic].[45]

Anderson assumed command of the 50th on promotion to Lieutenant Colonel on 31 January 1843 and in the Gwalior campaign he commanded a brigade at the Battle of Punniar; Anderson personally led a successful attack to take the Mahratta guns and was severely wounded. In recognition of his leadership he was created a Companion of the Order of the Bath. In January 1845, still suffering the effects of his wounds and with other injuries and illnesses, Anderson was granted two years' sick leave and returned to Sydney. At the end of the first year of leave Anderson and his wife travelled by steamer to Melbourne to determine whether they would settle there, and to visit the Mangalore station. They found the station in good shape and on return to Melbourne, before leaving for Sydney, found land suitable for a permanent residence. Anderson returned to India in August 1847, meeting the 50th as it marched into cantonments at Cawnpore. He was greeted by the regimental band which marched him into camp to the traditional Scottish air 'John Anderson My Jo' (The words for this air had been collected by Robbie Burns)

During Anderson's absence the 50th had been engaged in the battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal and Sobraon and was approaching the end of its service in India. The regiment embarked for England in February 1848, and shortly after his arrival there Anderson sold out his commission, returning to join his wife and family in their Melbourne property 'Fairlie House'. He became a nominated member of the Legislative Council of Victoria 1852-1856, and died in Melbourne on 18 July 1877, his name preserved in 'Anderson Street', separating the Victorian Royal Botanic Gardens from the suburb of South Yarra. 'Fairlie Court' and 'Acland Street' run off 'Anderson Street'.[46]

Anderson's surviving son, Acland, was appointed an ensign in the 50th Regiment in April 1846 and, after service in India and New Zealand, sold his commission and retired from the British Army in March 1854. He returned to Melbourne, holding various civil and military offices until, in January 1871, he was appointed Commandant of the naval and military forces of Victoria, and gained the honour of CMG on 24 May 1878. He died at 'Fairlie House' on 23 January 1882.[47]

Bunbury remained in Sydney until April 1840. He claimed in his Reminiscences that the Governor and O'Connell had intended that he should have returned to the post of Commandant at Norfolk Island but that the Home Government had appointed the prison reformer Alexander Maconochie, a retired RN captain, as Superintendent. Bunbury's recollection of the Governor's and the Commander's intention is incorrect as Gipps had been aware, as early as 28 September 1839, before Bunbury's return to Sydney, that Maconochie had been appointed to the post.[48] Relief from the boredom of garrison life in Sydney came for Bunbury at the end of March 1840 when he was put in charge of a detachment of the 80th for service in New Zealand where the Lieutenant Governor, William Hobson, a half-pay RN captain, was beset by the agitation of too ardent land speculators and, physically, by a partial paralysis.

Bunbury was briefed by Gipps on his responsibilities in the event of Hobson succumbing to his ailment or if the latter survived; in the briefing Gipps intimated to Bunbury that should Hobson succumb Bunbury should assume the office of Acting Lieutenant Governor. On 4

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45 Ibid, p. 222.
46 ADB, Vol I, entry for Joseph Anderson.
47 Ibid, Vol 3, entry for William Acland Douglas Anderson.
48 Bunbury, Vol 3, p. 41;Gipps to Normanby, HRA I, XX, p. 400.

April the *Buffalo* sailed from Sydney for New Zealand with Bunbury in command of a detachment of one captain, two subalterns, three sergeants and 80 Rank and File. The detachment reached the Bay of Islands, and on 20 April disembarked where the settlement of Russell was to be established as the proposed seat of government. Hobson's health was much improved and in May he commissioned Bunbury to sail to the South Island (then known as Middle Island) to extend British sovereignty there, and to those parts of North Island not already ceded to the Crown. On 17 June 1840, at Cloudy Bay, after a round of negotiations with Maori chiefs, Major Bunbury and Captain Nais of HMS *Herald*, hoisted the Colours, fired a 21 gun salute and declared British Sovereignty over the South Island of New Zealand.

His task in the South Island successfully completed Bunbury returned to Russell to find action in hand to move the seat of government to Auckland, nearer the main centres of both Maori and British settlement. Bunbury set about establishing new barracks there and took up farming in the district as a hobby. New Zealand was declared a separate colony; independent of New South Wales on 1 July 1841 and Hobson was elevated to the post of Governor. The charter of the new colony precluded the officer commanding the garrison from succeeding to the office of Governor should it become vacant; in that case the office was to be filled by the Colonial Secretary. Hobson died on 10 September and the Colonial Secretary, Willoughby Shortland, duly succeeded as Acting Governor. General O'Connell wrote from Sydney to Bunbury expressing his disappointment that the plan for Bunbury to succeed had 'been defeated by the arrangement made by the Ministry'. No doubt Bunbury was disappointed also as he would have received an additional £1000 per annum for the position.

The new Governor, Captain Robert Fitzroy RN, Charles Darwin's navigator, reached Auckland in December 1843. By that time Bunbury had already been advised of the relief of the 80th Regiment and its impending move to India. Relieved by the 96th Regiment, Bunbury and his detachment reached Sydney on 10 May 1844 and on 12 August the 80th embarked for Calcutta on the transports *Royal Saxon, Briton, Lloyds,* and *Enmore.*

Bunbury sailed with the Nos 2 and 3 Companies on the *Briton*; they totalled 318 all ranks, with 35 women and 43 children. The vessels took the traditional route to India – through Torres Strait, calling at Kupang and while the other vessels sailed to the west of Sumatra the *Briton* sailed for Singapore, watered, and headed north through the Straits of Malacca. Emerging from the Strait into the Andaman Sea the *Briton* was caught in a wild tropical hurricane, badly damaged and washed over a reef, through coastal mangroves to end up, on an even keel, grounded on Little Andaman Island. In the same storm the transport *Runnymede*, carrying troops of the 10th and 50th Regiments, with their wives and children, was beached a short distance from the *Briton.* Bunbury assumed command of both bodies of troops and the ships' crews, proclaiming martial law in an order of 12 November 1844 to ensure the maintenance of order and discipline.

A ship's boat from the *Runnymede* was despatched to the mainland and reached Mergui on the Burmese coast, opposite the Andaman Islands. There they found a small outpost of the East India Company; rescue soon followed and the detachment of the 80th eventually reached Calcutta on 17 January 1845. Bunbury submitted full reports to the Adjutant General of the Forces in India and this, along with his personal recollections of the incident, are recorded in his *Reminiscences.* [49]

The detachment was shipped by steamers up the Ganges to Allahabad, and then marched to Agra where it rejoined the Regiment. There Bunbury, who had been promoted to Lieutenant

49 Bunbury, Vol 3, pp. 208-244.

Colonel, succeeded on 5 October 1845, to the command of the 80th. The Regiment then marched to Umballah (now Ambala), forming part of the Army of the Sutlej. On 11 December 1845 the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej River from the Punjab and invaded British India, beginning the First Sikh War. The 80th were involved in the Battles of Moodkee (18 December 1845), where Bunbury was wounded in the knee, and Ferozeshah (21/22 December 1845); Here two officers of Australian interest were killed, Captain A D W Best, whose diary recorded much of the activities of the 80th in Sydney, on Norfolk Island and in New Zealand, and Captain R Sherberras, the first commandant of the 80th's detachment at the Towrang stockade on the Great South Road. The last engagement of the 80th in this war was Sobraon where Bunbury was awarded the CB for his leadership.

Suffering with his knee and from tropical illnesses, Bunbury was granted two years sick leave in England. There in August 1846 he drew the Duke of Wellington's attention to the fact that, contrary to a recent statement by the Duke in the House of Lords, his (Bunbury's) conduct in the shipwrecks of the *Briton* and *Runnymede* had not been recognised in any way. The Duke's response was terse, he 'declined to discuss with any gentleman what is reported to have passed in debate in the House of Parliament of which he is a member' and that if Bunbury had reason to complain he should make a representation to the Commander-in-Chief. At that time the C-in-C was Wellington himself. Bunbury admitted he had received his 'quietus'.[50]

He returned to India to rejoin his regiment at Dinapore but quickly decided to sell his commission and to retire. Bunbury appeared at a farewell parade of the 80th on 31 December when he presented a new set of Colours to the regiment. On his return to England he married, and saw out the rest of his life quietly. Following his death at Regents Park, London, on 25 December 1861, his medals and awards were preserved with the memorial to the 80th in Litchfield Cathedral.[51]

The 80th Regiment returned to Britain in June 1854 after an absence of eighteen years.

What caused the mutiny? Peter Stanley, in his article, has attributed the occurrence to a growing awareness among the troops of a right to protest against their perceived injustices, engendered by the increasing urban discontent in industrial England where the 80th had served to control disturbances in the Midlands in 1831 and 1834. To assess the likelihood of the spirit of protest being taken up by the troops it would be necessary to examine the composition of the regiment's manpower; how many were dispossessed weavers, how many were agricultural labourers? This would require a detailed examination of the personnel records of the mutinous detachment, a task beyond resources in Australia.

Thomas Bunbury claimed the mutiny was caused by 'the relaxed state of order and system and total absence of military discipline' during Anderson's administration; in other words that the cause was the result of unsatisfactory man-management. To make an assessment of whether the mutiny of the 80th on Norfolk Island could be attributed to indifferent man-management it is necessary to compare the careers and experience of both Anderson and Bunbury, and their administrations on the island. Elements of the 80th which had reached the island from September 1838, had, of course, been under Anderson's command until Bunbury's arrival in late February 1839.

Anderson had joined the Army at the age of fifteen and his initial regimental training in the ranks with recruits remained sufficiently in his memory to warrant a mention of it in his Recollections. Did he gain any understanding of soldiers' outlook from what must have been a

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50 Ibid, pp. 322-326.
51 Frederic Boase, Modern English Biography, 1892, reprinted Frank Cass & Co, 1965.

relatively short period before assuming his position as a junior officer? He served at Maida, in Egypt, and in the Peninsula with British troops, recalling, in later life an incident in the advance from the Lines of Torres Vedras which he considered proof of the good character of the British soldier'. His service with a penal regiment in the West Indies brought him into contact with a different type of soldier. The York Chasseurs 'had a bad name, but improved into an efficient and well-conducted unit and did creditable service in the West Indies'.[52] Good leadership must have been responsible for that.

Joseph Anderson served again in the West Indies with the 50th Regiment, including tours of duty with detachments in localities remote from the main body of the Regiment and, in the case of Port Maria, at a notoriously pestilential station, where he took active steps to maintain the health of his troops. During his service in Britain and in the West Indies he held appointments as Acting Brigade Major, Acting Paymaster, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, and, on two occasions in the West Indies, as Deputy Judge Advocate, which would have given him experience in the system of discipline in the British Army., in both a penal and a line regiment.

At Norfolk Island Anderson recognised the problems likely to rise from the lack of off-duty amenities for his troops and sought and obtained authority for single soldiers as well as married men to be allowed gardens. His scheme to rehabilitate military prisoners brought results in the case of the ill-fated Daniel Shean and probably an unknown number of others. His understanding of his civil prisoners is evinced by his involvement of the three ex-convicts in the establishment of the property at Mangalore.

Bunbury, too, had joined the Army as a youth of sixteen years and had served with the Buffs at the crossing of the Douro at Oporto and at Talavera (28 July 1809). Thereafter he served in the Portuguese Army for ten years, until 1820. He joined the 80th at Malta in 1822 and from 1828 to 1837 served in England and Ireland, ultimately reaching Norfolk Island in February 1839. One of his first actions on taking over command from Anderson was to 'order the military duties to be carried out by the next senior officer, Captain Gulston'. Archdeacon McEncroe wrote in relationship to the mutiny, that 'Unfortunately the Captain immediately in command of the military had as little sense, steadiness or temperance as our redoubtable Superintendent of Convicts. The men had little respect for him and the Major could place no trust in him; the soldiers were discontented with him and they wished for an opportunity of stating their grievances; but they loved and respected Major Bunbury , who they said "was a soldier every inch of him".'[53]

Gulston had limited experience; he entered the regiment as an ensign by purchase in 1832, promoted lieutenant by purchase in 1834 and a captain, again by purchase, on 23 June 1838, while serving at Berrima with a guard detachment of one subaltern, two sergeants and 30 Rank and File on the Great South Road. Bunbury must have had some knowledge of Gulston's character and they had arrived on Norfolk together.[54] To have given him complete control for the administration of the garrison was a questionable decision, due, perhaps to Bunbury's determination to establish a name for himself by making the island self-sufficient. Under these circumstances his attempt to lay blame on Anderson who had only a small number of the 80th under his control for five months is untenable.

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52 Cecil C P Lawson, A History Of the Uniforms Of The British Army, London, 1967, Kaye & Lord Ltd, Vol V, p. 152.

53 Bunbury, Vol 2, p. 300; Daly, p.293; for information on the Superintendent of Convicts see also p.293.

54 British Army Lists; Gulston disappeared from the Lists in 1843, his 'intemperance' probably proved too much for the Regiment.

There can be little doubt that the cause of the mutiny was the reaction of the troops, who had paid, as they understood for the gardens and the huts, not merely for the crops growing in them as directed in Anderson's Garrison Order of 8 May 1835, and to Bunbury's arbitrary decision to remove the garden huts, destroy the gardens and to impose a pay-stoppage for the supply of vegetables. To have repromulgated Anderson's Garrison Order of May 1835 after the event was futile; rather his soldiers should have had the order drawn to their attention prior to taking over the gardens; nor can his reason of a stoppage of pay for vegetables as a method of controlling drunkenness by troops returning to Sydney be considered as other than flimsy and thoughtless.

Bunbury's attitude towards his troops can be assessed from part of his Report to Gipps 'your Excellency is aware that it is not the Sudden and Capricious bursts of Vigour which forms Discipline, but a steady healthy degree of tension as such although an occasional relaxation may be permitted; with the English Soldier, if we wish to study his happiness the reins must not be held too loosely'[55]

Of the two officers, Bunbury's man-management style was Wellingtonian; Anderson seems to have leaned more towards that of his fellow-Scot, Sir John Moore, who inspired so many officers of the Light Division in the Peninsular War and later.

Both Anderson and Bunbury left accounts of their services which have been drawn upon as the principal sources for this article. Anderson's, not published until 1913, edited by his grandson, Captain Acland Anderson, ex- 3rd Dragoon Guards, is a selection from a 'narrative written only for his family' so it is a very stereotyped account of his *Recollections*. Bunbury's *Reminiscences of a veteran*, published in 1861, appeared during the last year of his life. It seems not to have suffered any editing by heirs or successors and depicts more of the character of the writer than Anderson's *Recollections*. Bunbury identified his 'pugnacious propensities'; at an early age and that characteristic is reflected through-out the three volumes of his *Reminiscences*. There can be no doubt that Bunbury displayed decisiveness when needed, in both the mutiny and the shipwreck, but it is difficult to assess him, from his *Reminiscences*, as other than a vain officer who was indifferent to the well-being of his troops.

I wish to thank Dr Peter Stanley, Principal Historian, Australian War Memorial, and the staffs of The National Archives of Australia and the State Archives, Tasmania for their assistance in the preparation of this article. It is surprising that the mutiny of the guard detachment in July 1839 has not received more publicity; it was, as far as can be determined, the only mutiny of troops of the British garrison during their service in Australia. The Monthly Return for June 1855 shows a 23 man detachment of the 99th Regiment at that station, but the Monthly Returns from August of that year do not show any troops at Norfolk Island.

55 Bunbury, Report, pp. 145-6.

COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING (CMT) IN AUSTRALIA PRIOR TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Samuel Duncan

Compulsory military training (CMT) was made law by the Defence Acts of 1909 and 1910 and took effect on 1 July 1911. It was the end result of continuous debate regarding the national defence of Australia. With the exception of a few, most notably W.M. Hughes, defence matters were largely viewed with apathy until external developments awakened the pressing need for reorganisation and strengthening. Hughes played a critical role in creating and developing the arguments for CMT from federation until its implementation. Although invasion had been credited as a possibility from the outset, the Japanese victory of 1905 and German naval expansion emphasised the immediate need for a more effective system of defence. This need was driven home by the continuous pressure of the National Defence League, established with the objective of implementing CMT. The association of influential Labor men with the league directly impacted on the eventual implementation of CMT.

In 1901, Australia was aware of increasing activity throughout Asia and the Pacific, yet a sense of security prevailed.[1] The French were a significant force in the Pacific, having colonised Tahiti, New Caledonia and Rapa along with numerous other island groups. The US had taken control of the Philippines and Guam in addition to the official annexation of Hawaii in 1898. Russia viewed Korea and Manchuria as within its sphere of influence as a result of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway and search for a warm water port in the Pacific.[2] German expansion involved the acquisition of the north coast of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Caroline, Palau and Mariana Islands.

MHSA Federal President Major Robert Morrison with Sam Duncan who was awarded the ADFA History Prize sponsored by the Society

1 T. Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldiers (Waterloo: 1980) p.54.
2 Ibid, p.53.

The situation in China posed two different threats. Firstly, having displayed a tendency to immigrate to Australia during the gold rush, the Chinese were regarded as potential invaders. Secondly, the extension of European influence in China through the construction of railways signified the coming of more European and Russian ships to the East.[3]

The most prominent activity regarding security concern was the rise of Japan as a modernised and powerful nation. Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war had demonstrated their naval and military ability. The sudden realisation of Japanese modernisation resulted in extensive prophecies regarding future Japanese aims.[4] 'A peaceful isolated people had suddenly become a military menace.'[5] Although Australians were aware of increasing activity and had identified numerous threats, other than alarmists, very few felt that there was any pressing need to reorganise and strengthen military forces. This was highlighted by the decrease in the colonial defence budgets before federation and the nature of the first federal defence debates.[6]These external developments were not extreme enough to awaken a need for reform, as was the case in 1905.

As early as 1903, W.M. Hughes proposed in parliament that CMT should become law. The justifications behind such a scheme were developed and extended and finally accepted by the Deakin government and the Labor party conference of 1908.[7] In the debate surrounding the first defence bill, Hughes outlined two main arguments for the necessity of CMT. Firstly, he claimed that it was necessary for the 'preservation of freedom'.[8] With an appreciation of increasing international involvement in the East, he believed that Australia was vulnerable. Secondly and more seriously, he argued that it would quell any possibility of an internal threat posed by a standing army. Earlier experiences of militarism in Australia had supplied Hughes with this argument for compulsory service.[9] The military was used against the people at the Eureka stockade in 1854 and again at Lambing flat at the time of the anti-Chinese riots. It was also used against the workers in the strike struggles in the 'eighties and 'nineties. CMT, he argued, was a necessary step in creating a democratic army that could not be used in industrial disputes. [10] In 1901, these two arguments formed the basis of Hughes reasoning for CMT.

In the debate regarding the defence bill of 1903, Hughes developed and extended his arguments. He re-emphasised the importance of developing a citizen army to avoid any internal threats that a standing army may pose. By training every fit male, the citizens would be able to protect their freedom without the professional corps.[11] He also stressed the importance of an effective military force and outlined how ineffective a compulsory call up of inexperienced men would be in time of war in the absence of any prior military training. In addition, he raised the potential social benefits that CMT would provide including the 'physical, mental and moral welfare ...' of the growing generation.[12] Military training would improve their physical strength and discipline would inculcate them with good habits for the duties of citizenship. In addition, he argued that it would help undo the destructiveness of city life while promoting fellowship through the comradeship of training and hence prevent men from moving to cities. The arguments that Hughes made in both 1901 and 1903 formed the basis of the drive for a system of CMT.

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3 Ibid, p.53.
4 I. Cumpston, Australia's Defence Policy: 1901 - 2000, Volume One (Canberra, 2001) p.19.
5 Ibid, p.20.
6 Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.54.
7 J. Rawling, Conscription in Australia: speakers' notes (Sydney, 1936) p.7.
8 Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.58.
9 Rawling, Conscription in Australia, p.3.
10 Ibid.
11 Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.58.
12 Ibid, p.60.

The debate regarding compulsory military service took a new direction in 1905. The Japanese defeat of Russia at the Battle of Tsushima facilitated the organisation of the pressure group, the National Defence League.[13] The Japanese had virtually destroyed the Baltic fleet on route to Vladivostok, judged by the British admiralty as equivalent to Trafalgar.[14] Japan emerged from the war as a first rate naval power. Returning to power shortly after the war, Deakin displayed an increased interest in defence. He was the first to outline the significance of the Japanese victory. Japanese naval stations were the most efficiently equipped, supported, protected and nearest to Australia.[15] In addition, Colonel J.G. Legge reported that just 4361 "naval miles" from Yokohama, the Japanese navy could reach Australia in 14.5 days.[16] Tsushima caused an increase in Australian public concern for defence matters.

The National Defence League (NSW Division), established in September 1905, played an important role in arousing interest in defence matters in both politicians and the public. Hughes was appointed the position of honorary secretary. Its objectives were to secure 'Universal compulsory military training (military or naval) of the boyhood and manhood of Australia for the purposes of national defence...'[17]. The military training was to be based on the Swiss system and the naval training to be based on that of the British Royal Naval Reserve. The league also stated the objective of securing 'An adequate and effective system of national defence.'[18] The League outlined two main justifications for the necessity of CMT. Firstly the need for increased defence capacity and secondly, the societal benefits that the physical and character development of Australian youths would provide.[19] The founder of the league, G.R. Campbell stated that the urgent development of Australian military forces was necessary for the purpose of providing a large striking force ready for immediate action...'[20]. In his eyes, the task of the League was more than simply the creation of a reserve. The creation of an organised pressure group with the central objective of securing CMT was an important step for the drive started by Hughes in 1903.

The League was a persistent pressure group that was influential in turning the tide in favour of CMT. The official organ of the league was a quarterly publication, *The Call*. *The Call* was widely dispersed for free to all members of parliament, mayors, landowners and principal ministers of religion.[21] Dedicated to the promotion of CMT, each cover stated the journal's purpose: 'To awaken Australians to realise that the defence of our country is the duty of all.'[22] It contained many unsubtle and influential cartoons by Normal Lindsay that were perhaps more influential than the text itself.[23] The call was a quality magazine that consistently produced propaganda and illustrated every argument in support of CMT.

The inclusion of influential Labor men in the composition of the National Defence League was of key importance. It was central in the conversion of the Labor party to CMT as party policy in 1908. Labor politicians such as A.H. Griffith, Dr W. Maloney, J.C. Watson, W.M. Hughes and H. Dobson among others associated with the league helped convert the Labor party towards adopting the scheme of compulsory training. Watson, leader of Labor in the federal parliament

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13 Ibid, p.78.
14 Ibid, p.71.
15 I. Cumpston, Australia's Defence Policy, p.21.
16 Ibid, p.22.
17 Rawling, Conscription in Australia, p.6.
18 Ibid.
19 Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.74.
20 J. Barrett, Falling In: Australians and 'boy conscription' 1911-1915 (Sydney, 1979) p.47.
21 Ibid, p.48.
22 Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.86.
23 Ibid, p.88.

from 1901 to 1907 joined the league in August 1905. By 1907 Watson stated that he would ascertain the public's opinion on CMT in the hope to find a large proportion in favour.[24] It was Watson who took the decisive step at the Labor conference of 1908. He moved a successful resolution for the compulsory training of all males for national defence in light of the potential threats of Japan and China. In addition, he justified it on the grounds that a 'citizen force was the antithesis of militarism.'[25] The motion was voted in favour 24 to 7.

The vulnerability of Australia to invasion was highlighted by the visit of the US Navy and the 'dreadnought crisis' in Europe. The American fleet visited in 1908 and left Australians 'awed by the power of modern navies and even more alarmed by their own exposure to attack.'[26] If a Navy with the strength of the US fleet arrived, the Royal Navy operating in the Pacific and Sydney's defences were completely inadequate to protect anything.[27] Deakin's invitation to the Americans served its purpose. It added fuel to a powerful argument regarding the necessity of increased defence. A similar visit by a British fleet would have simply inspired 'confidence and inaction.'[28]

The 'Dreadnought crisis' had a similar effect in highlighting the vulnerability of Australian defence. An alarmed British public feared German aims to contest 'naval mastery' with the Royal Navy demonstrated by the German Dreadnought-building program.[29] The possibility of the Royal Navy losing its pre-eminence to the German Navy as a direct result of their Dreadnought building program created deep concern in Australia. The concentration of the Royal Navy in the North Sea would detract from British commitments to the Pacific. Apprehension grew with the realisation that British interests in the Pacific may be left open to attack.[30] The 'Dreadnought crisis' highlighted the need for an Australian Navy, as the Royal Navy would not always be adequate and reliable. This also outlined the necessity for CMT as a means of developing effective land forces. It was estimated in 1908 that it would take 50 years to develop an effective naval force yet only 20 years to develop effective land forces. In addition, effective ground forces would be necessary to back naval defence. [31] The visit of the 'Great White Fleet' and the 'Dreadnought crisis' in Britain exposed the vulnerabilities of Australian defence. The drive for CMT as an integral part of defence received greater attention.

Following the unsuccessful attempts of the Deakin and Fisher governments, the bill for CMT pushed by the Deakin-Cook government became law in December 1909. In conclusion, the successful implementation of CMT can be credited to a combination of continuous campaigning by Hughes and the National Defence League coupled with the awakening of the inadequacy of Australian defences highlighted by external developments. Hughes was responsible for the creation and development of the foundational justifications behind CMT. He continued his cause with stubborn persistence and there was rarely an argument for the case of CMT that Hughes had not created. From 1905 onwards, the National Defence League and external developments worked simultaneously to develop a public awareness of Australian vulnerability and the necessity of strengthening defences. This led to the adoption of CMT by the Labor party in 1908. CMT was designed to play a crucial role in the strengthening of defences by developing an Australian youth that could quickly and easily be developed into an effective fighting force if circumstances required.

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24 J. Barrett, Falling In, p.52.
25 Ibid, p.52.
26 Ibid, p.10.
27 Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldier, p.129.
28 Ibid, p.129.
29 J. Grey, A Military History of Australia (Melbourne, 1999) p.72.
30 I. Cumpston, Australia's Defence Policy, p.13.
31 J. Barrett, Falling In, p.12.

The 1916 AIF Mutiny

Peter Hopper

On Monday, 14 February 1916, about 5000 AIF troops refused to accept the introduction of a new training manual and marched out of their Light Horse training base at Casula, 35 kilometres southwest of Sydney. They headed to nearby Liverpool barracks and persuaded 10000 troops to join them.[1] From here they moved into Liverpool itself and raided several hotels and seized large quantities of alcohol. The manager of the Commercial Hotel in Liverpool later declared that over 100 gallons of rum had been stolen from his hotel[2]. Many then boarded trains for Sydney. They arrived there about 11 am and continued to march and roam through the streets. Some shop windows were smashed and military and mounted civilian police were called out to restore order. Vehicles were even commandeered by the rioters and fruit stalls were stripped of their produce. At the Central Railway Station (Sydney) the troops used a fire hose to repel the authorities.[3] Shots were exchanged and one soldier was shot through the head and died.[4] Nine others were wounded.

The actions of these troops came as a great surprise to the military authorities and indeed to most Australians. The Gallipoli campaign had only just come to an end and stories of unparalleled bravery and firm resolve were fresh in people's minds. The editor of the *Sydney Morning Herald* maintained that the honour of the state had been 'cruelly besmirched' by this action which he declared was nothing short of 'rank mutiny'.

Why would Australian troops be persuaded to behave in such a manner? Were they justified in opposing the introduction of the new training manual? What happened to those troops? These are just a few of the questions worth considering. The accredited cause of the mutiny involved the introduction of a new training syllabus which increased the number of hours of drill from 36 to $40^{1}/_{2}$ hours per week. The authorities maintained that the increased hours were necessary in order to adequately prepare the men for overseas service. The federal government was aiming to raise 300,000 soldiers by June 1916. Losses at Gallipoli were high and replacements had to be quickly trained and sent overseas. A private at Casula, where the mutiny began, reported that in the week leading up to the unrest their training had been very strenuous and morale was low.[6] Many of these new recruits were between 17 and 19 years of age and perhaps were easily led astray by older men. There were also suggestions that German agents were active among the troops but there is no evidence to support this claim. A section of the rioting men smashed the shop window of a tobacconist called Kleindorf in Sydney.[7] This would hardly be the work of German agents.

Although nearly all the troops attended the compulsory parade at 11 am the following morning, the authorities were quick to take action against those involved in the mutiny. Over 1000 troops were discharged from Liverpool and Casula Camps for misconduct, drunkenness and absences without leave. The Casula Camp was closed down and its trainees were distributed to other centres in New South Wales under a new policy of decentralisation. One hundred and fourteen

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1 Newspaper reporters are prone to exaggerate crowd figures. Bill Gammage puts the total number of troops involved at about 2000. See W. Gammage. The Broken Years, Ringwood, 1975, p. 34.
2 The Argus, 23/2/16
3 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15/2/16
4 Private Ernest William Keefe, 6th Light Horse
5 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15/2/16 . Editorial "Is It Mutiny ?"
6 *Sydney Morning Herald* ,15/2/16
7 Ibid

men were held in custody for a general court martial. This began on 1 March at Darlinghurst courthouse and lasted for about one month.

The supposed ringleaders of the mutiny faced the court martial on 1 March 1916. They were charged with having joined in a mutiny on 14 February and that being present they did not use their utmost endeavours to suppress it. Many of the accused were found not guilty. The authorities found it very difficult to secure reliable witnesses and the men pleaded all sorts of excuses. Private James Wilson claimed that he took rum to cure his cold and afterwards became so drunk he couldn't remember anything.[9] Private Jackson claimed that he only joined in the mutiny because he did not wish to be regarded as a blackleg by his peers. Private Neasby, who marched holding the battalion colours, maintained that he only did so because of pressure from his mates. He then maintained that he should be forgiven because he was only 19 years of age[10]. Another ringleader, Private Short claimed he was only 17 years old and that his real name wasn't Short.[11] The defence lawyers then argued that it wasn't a proper mutiny and by the time the men reached Sydney they could only be charged with being disorderly.

Strenuous efforts were made by the authorities to repair the damage caused by the mutiny. To begin with there was the widespread closure of hotels in Liverpool and Sydney, the day following the mutiny. There were also calls for prohibition to be introduced but the government merely reduced the hours of hotels for a few weeks before the situation returned to normal. On 22 March the Liverpool barracks were inspected by the Commandant. Everything was found to be in order. Photographs of the troops training at Liverpool were also published in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 30 March and 6 April. The Governor-General even inspected the Liverpool camp on 2 April and regular military police patrols within Sydney were commenced about this time.

It is, however, interesting to note the decline in the number of volunteers coming forward to sign up for active service in NSW during the first three months of 1916. In the week ending 8 January, 2922 men were accepted. A month later this figure had fallen to 1035 per week. The mutiny then broke out on 14 February. In the week ending the 19 February only 819 were accepted. It was not until mid-March that the figures moved back above 1000 per month[12]. What had led to this general drop-off in volunteers and why were so many men at Casula and Liverpool clearly unhappy with their conditions?

The Bulletin , in its outspoken and forthright manner, gives us some indication of what was really going on. In the issue of 24th February, it ran an article under the following:

The Army that came to town

The sequence of events at the big Liverpool training camp had gone this way :

- Muddle
- Chaos
- Royal Commission
- More Chaos
- Change of Command
- Men placed on their honour to behave
- Fight, bash, booze
- General McCay arrives and makes remarks
- Men assured they must work or be fired

9 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16/3/16
10 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24/3/16
11 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28/3/16
12 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7/4/16

Although it went on to state that no kind of excuses can be offered for the mutiny, glaring problems at those camps clearly contributed to the unrest. Firstly there was the problem relating to the size of the camps at Casula and Liverpool. According to The Bulletin they were far too large. They were also located too close to a major city. There were enormous bodies of men living within a few miles of Liverpool. More importantly, they were enclosed in a totally unrealistic environment by being *deprived of a civilised drink at the end of a hard day's training.* The Bulletin was also critical of the failure of the authorities to provide BILLJIM with a wet canteen on site. The army chaplains had opposed this idea, a policy, according to The Bulletin, that was totally unacceptable[13]. It also attacked the argument that the early closing of hotels would have prevented the mutiny. It argued that even if all the beer in Sydney had been locked away it would not have been safe from *the human tornado* that struck it that morning.

It also pointed to the findings of a Royal Commission headed by Justice Rich into the state of affairs at Liverpool in November and December 1915. On 26 November 1915 a riot had broken out when sentries tried to prevent troops from going into Liverpool without proper leave passes. On 30 November another disturbance broke out in Liverpool when about 1000 troops asked for and were denied 'patriotic drinks' (*gratis*) at a number of hotels.[14] Two days later the State Commandant, Colonel Ramaciotti, visited Liverpool barracks to talk to the men. He told them that Manly was now no longer out of bounds. He also set up a system where the troops could purchase rail tickets in camp instead of having to wait in long queues outside Liverpool railway station. He also removed the Military Police from the Provost-Marshall's staff. Finally, he appealed to the men to use their *commonsense* and asked for their *improved co-operation.*[15]

On 7 December a report by a medical committee into conditions at Liverpool Camp was released. It highlighted three major problems (i) intoxication by alcohol (ii) defective ventilation and (iii) overcrowding.[16] These problems had certainly not been overcome in the following months although additional leave was granted to the troops at Casula and Liverpool.[17] Meanwhile, a time bomb was just waiting to go off and with the demand for additional drill in February 1916, it exploded.

Complaints about the Liverpool Camp had actually predated the war. On 29 November 1913 a riot of sorts had broken out among Compulsory Service trainees. This led to a court of inquiry that exposed poor leadership and discipline. With the outbreak of war in 1914 , the camp also housed German soldiers and sailors caught in Australia at the time as well as those transported from overseas. Military personnel were therefore mixed in with German civilians from all walks of life and with assorted nationals from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[18] This mixture was resented by many of the AIF troops. They felt that conditions in the concentration camp were superior to those they were experiencing.

The Argus also pointed to complaints by the troops regarding travel on NSW railways. The troops maintained that they should be entitled to free travel on the railways.[19] The commandeering of the trains from Liverpool to Sydney on 14 February and a refusal to pay for their fares was no doubt fuelled by this grievance. Three days after the mutiny the Army

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13 The Bulletin, 9/3/16
14 *Sydney Morning Herald,* 1/12/15 The practice of troops asking for 'patriotic drinks' was quite common throughout Australia during the First World War. A refusal by the publican would often result in a disturbance.
15 *Sydney Morning Herald,* 3/12/15
16 Ibid, 7/12/15
17 Ibid, 8/12/15
18 J. Beaumont, Australia's War, 1914-18, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1995, p. 88
19 The Argus, 17/2/16

announced that second-class season tickets would be issued to the troops at 1s per week. This was a belated attempt to overcome one of the grievances.

To be fair to the men who participated in the mutiny it must be stressed that there was also an element of order in their behaviour. The march through Sydney was clearly intended as a protest demonstration and, as each train arrived from Liverpool, the men were formed into columns of four and marched from the station by appointed leaders (NCOs).[20] The column was headed by standard bearers carrying the battalion colours and a Union Jack. A photo of this in the *Daily Telegraph*[21] shows one of the troops in the front row holding a placard **STRIKE WE WON'T DRILL 40½ HOURS.** It must also be pointed out that many of those participating in this demonstration were dismayed when unruly elements began stealing produce and creating disorder.

Throughout the First World War there was a history of rebelliousness among the AIF troops. In 1915 many had run amuck in Cairo prior to heading off to Gallipoli. The film *Gallipoli* portrayed this and British officers often commented on the refusal of the Australian soldiers to salute. It has been suggested that by consciously embracing a divergent attitude to that advanced through formal military discipline, the AIF troops were defining themselves as civilians first and soldiers second.[22] In both the two referenda on conscription in 1916 and 1917, the serving troops voted No. This must have clearly disappointed the government and military authorities. The troops were still not going to be pushed around and they certainly didn't want to push their mates into serving overseas against their will. This refusal to 'toe the line' was clearly exposed on 14 February 1916. The inability of the military authorities to handle such large groupings of men in confined conditions had quite clearly increased the likelihood of an outburst of discontent.

20 D. Blair, Dinkum Diggers : An Australian Battalion at War, MUP, Carlton South, 2001, p.42
21 15/2/16
22 Blair, Dinkum Diggers, p.45

The Secret War 1914-1918
Part One – The Land War

Tom Johnstone

Espionage in war is as old as history. The Israelites under Joshua inserted spies into Jericho to reconnoitre before their attack. The Assyrians created an entire section of government devoted to intelligence. In all his campaigns, Alexander of Macedon used both strategic and tactical intelligence to conquer much of the Middle East, and part of Central Asia. But even before Alexander, the Chinese ruler Sun Tzu advocated in what was probably the first published treatise on war, the use of spies to obtain "foreknowledge" of potential enemies. Later, Wellington took great pains and spent much gold to 'look over the hill' at his Napoleonic adversaries, who had a complete ministry devoted to intelligence. However, in the twentieth century technological revolution changed utterly the nature of intelligence gathering. Electronic warfare began almost immediately war was declared in 1914; and for the succeeding four years the Central Powers and the Allies waged a secret war against the other. Beginning with a few radio sets and a handful of operators, by 1917 each side had created vast organisations, to electronically attack and counterattack the other by physical and electronic means. After the end of World War One, every major nation continued to secretly develop some aspect of electronic warfare, which was destined to play a major role in World War Two. But not until the last quarter of the 20th Century did knowledge of electronic warfare become widespread. It had been the *Ultra* secret of all nations. This article will concentrate on the development of British electronic warfare during World War One.

Electronic Warfare on the Western Front

Despite the experience of the South African War and successive reports following annual manoeuvres; the British Army was unable to form a separate Signal Service for their field army. Disagreement regarding "the minimum of intercommunication services considered necessary by the General Staff, and the maximum expenditure which could be admitted by the Finance Member of the Army Council," delayed its formation until 1911.[1] When agreement was finally reached, it was because a British Expeditionary Force for service on the continent of Europe had become British government policy. A Signal Service was formed in 1912, but because of financial considerations the Army Signal Service (ASS) remained part of the Royal Engineers; and its modest scale of equipment and manpower establishment, 75 officers and 2,346 NCOs and men, reflected the belief, and desire, that any future war would be short.

Radio Telegraphy

The security implications of using wireless telegraphy in field operations was well know, and the mistrust in which codes and ciphers were held by staff and Signals ensured that wireless was hardly used by the BEF during the early years of the war. Initially, staff officers preferred line telegraphy for intercommunication, because it produced a written record; however, the telephone rapidly gained favour and its use became widespread. Like all units of the BEF, although superbly trained, the ASS was severely stretched during the encounter battles of 1914. In the fluid operations of August – November, although high precedence messages and verbal orders were transmitted by telegraph or telephone, the despatch rider letter service (DRLS), delivered by cyclist, motorcyclist, or mounted orderly became the principal method of passing messages. There was, therefore, no security problem; although on several occasions messengers failed to get through, messages not delivered, and units cut off. Radio was not used during the encounter battles of the BEF, except to maintain contact with cavalry formations acting independently.[2]

Because the available radio receivers were not used in a communications role, the radio operators manning these sets turned their attention toward intercepting enemy radio communications with good

1 Major R.E. Priestley. The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918. Institution of the Royal Engineers and the Signals Association. Chatham 1921: p5.
2 Ibid pp. 28-29.

results. Additionally, during October 1914, the BEF Signal Service received a 'wireless compass'. This, a Bellini Tosi directional receiver, modified by Marconi incorporating the vacuum diode valve invented by Professor Sir John Fleming of University College, London. Fleming also coined the word 'electronic'. That instrument was highly successful in locating enemy headquarters; and the results galvanized radio interception in the BEF. With the new valve, receivers were improved and as they became available, a line of these stations was deployed behind the front out of enemy artillery range, and gained for the BEF Intelligence "a weapon of incalculable value... [and] contributed in no small degree to the efficiency of the British Intelligence Service."[3] The British were helped in their secret war by the attitude of the German General Staff to the use of radio communications in operations. Field-Marshal Hindenburg attributed his success at Tannenberg to intercepts from Russian communications. Consequently, as late as the spring of 1917 he remained resolutely against the use of radio in the field; he was however, overruled by the General Staff in Berlin.[4] For their part, the British seldom used radio on the Western Front until 1917, and radio did not become the first line of communications until mobility returned to the battlefield in 1918, and then only when stringent security precautions were followed.

Line Telegraphy and Telephony

When the battle lines were formed from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier in November 1914, the combatants settled down to the problems of static positional warfare. The battlefield became a mass of zigzagging saps and parallel lines of trenches, fronted by vast aprons of barbed-wire, dominated by almost ceaseless machine-gun and artillery fire. Upon this vast body of mutual destruction the signal services of the combatants laid their opposing communication cable systems; each in their various ways as extensive and intricate as the nervous system of the human body. The British eventually opted for rigid sector grids of buried cable, a system, which encompassed operational flexibility by the ability to bypass shell-damaged sections.[5]

During 1915 British military intelligence became aware of many manifestations of an informed enemy on their sector of the Western Front. Even the most carefully planned and executed minor trench operations were met by well directed artillery, machine-gun and small arms fire; new British artillery or machine-gun positions were subjected to bombardments even before they had opened fire. Sudden bombardments would take place at the precise time relief was being effected on a unit sector, when trenches were filled with double their normal complement; or on quiet sectors the incoming unit would be greeted with welcoming notices being hoisted over the German lines, even with the name of the relieving regiment. British liaison officers with flanking French formations reported similar occurrences on their sectors. Such obvious evidence of enemy prior knowledge and preparedness, gave rise to spy mania in rear of the battle areas; sometimes with comic overtones or tragic outcomes. Yet despite all precautions in countering espionage, leakage of information continued with grievous effects for frontline troops.

At much the same time, in mid-1915, users of the British military telephone system, a gigantic cat's-cradle of wire throughout the forward and rear areas, were experiencing considerable trouble from cross-talk. It had reached such proportions that when an officer picked up a phone in either a trench dug-out or headquarters office; "he was never sure who would answer".[6] The possible correlation between cross-talk and leakage of information demanded and was given the closest attention by both the Signal Service and Staff. Transmission of electromagnetic energy through *space* had been proved by Sir William Preece in 1892; however the conductivity of *earth* was scientifically unproven. Once again UK scientists were asked to help and proved *earth* could conductor voice or telegraph electromagnetic radiation. Knowing how

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3 Ibid p. 54.
4 Ibid p. 151.
5 Ibid p. 120. Curiously, in describing the gradual development of cable laying, from the haphazard development in the Ypres salient into a planned cable grid system, in and around Ypres and in other sectors as the British share of front expanded; the Official Signals historian compared Sydney's 'old world' street development, with the planned grid of Melbourne's streets.
6 Ibid p. 100.

involved German scientists - such as Ohm, Gauss, Lenz, and Hertz - had been to the development of both electricity and wireless, Signals officers were already alert to the possibility of eavesdropping electronically, when a report was received from the French Signal Service of German attempts to tap into French artillery wires; by running connecting wires along a stream bed into the French positions.[7] Given that there were railways, pipelines and watercourses bisecting the frontline this was comparatively easy. Experiments began to test the theory of earth conductivity in forward areas.

Initial British experiments took place in First Army area using a wireless receiver with additional reception coils. Even with this Heath Robinson arrangement, telephony reception was obtained at 100 yards and telegraphy at twice that distance.[8] The possibilities of using the technique with improved equipment to eavesdrop on the enemy were obvious. At the same time, experts in the Signal Service realized the importance of instituting measures at source to deny the enemy eavesdropping facilities, and also to institute Staff measure to make all telephone users aware of its security limitations. However, human nature and a mistaken sense of security when speaking on the telephone, together with inexperience, combined to thwart all efforts to prevent misuse of the telephone in forward areas. For a considerable time, well into 1917, leakage of information continued.

The earliest authenticated information that the Germans had a listening apparatus came from a British civilian who had been interned for a time in Germany. In the hospital at Ruherleben Camp he had overheard a medical orderly tell visitors at the hospital of an apparatus at the front through which valuable information was being obtained. As early as September 1915 German prisoners disclosed that stringent precautions had been taken in the German lines on the use of the telephone long before these were initiated on the British front. Conclusive proof of the efficacy of the theory of earth conductivity and the source of German tactical intelligence was given when a French infantry conscript, who had been a civilian electrician, constructed a primitive listening-set. It was an apparatus consisting of no more than the ganging together of two civilian telephone receivers. These were connected in parallel to a length of cable laid through tunnels and saps to a position close to the German front line; the cable-cores were then connected to a spread of empty 75 mm shell-cases buried in charcoal. In a dugout within the French front line, the French soldier tuned his 'set' for maximum sound and an interpreter overheard faint German conversations.[9]



Diagram of the First French Listening-Post Installation

N.B. *E = Earth. The earths, consisting of 75 mm shell-cases (buried in charcoal to prevent oxidation) were placed in mine galleries no more than fifteen metres from the German trench. The 'receivers' were French Post Office telephones.*[10]

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7 Ibid pp. 100-101.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid 102.
10 Ibid plate XI.

The news of the seminal listening post experiment and its results was passed by liaison officers to the British. From then on, French and British Signal Services cooperated closely. Firstly, to immediately instigate countermeasures to deny leakage of information; and secondly, exploiting this new discovery.

Allied Countermeasures

Casualties during the first and second battles of Loos between September 1915 and April 1916 reached serious proportions; at the same time vast preparations were already in-hand for the 'Big Push' due to commence in June 1916. Both events concentrated wonderfully the minds of Signals and Staff of the BEF on security and intelligence. To protect one, and exploit new technology for the other became a technical priority to both protect and exploit. One of the first Army measures was to create the Intelligence Corps in 1915, and staffed it with many German linguists.

On the technical side, Signals experts devised a new type of perfectly insulated twisted pair cable known as 'metallic'; which was to be used in what was considered to be the 'danger zone' - 1,000 yards from the front line trench. Orders were placed immediately in England for the cable, but it did not arrive in large quantities until the end of 1916. Meanwhile a major cleanup of disused field cable and multi-core cable was undertaken throughout the frontline. This was a task of major proportions for the personnel available. In the Somme sector alone there was 43,000 miles of overhead cable behind the lines and in the front itself there was a further 7,000 miles of cable buried to a depth of six feet, in addition to "large quantities" of ground laid cable. In Ypres, which was almost continually under shellfire from heavy siege artillery, the medieval sewers were used. In places small boys were paid to carry string through narrow sections to pull cable through.[11] Until the task was done there was no rest, "even for the grumbling so dear to the soldier's heart".[12]



Early Precautions on Forward Telephone Circuits[13]

11 Ibid p. 119 fn.
12 Ibid p. 12
13 Ibid plate XII.

In addition, orders were distributed to all telephone users outlining forbidden subjects of telephone conversation; unit names and code words, movements, artillery locations and shellfire results. Precautions which later were taken for granted had to be enforced by disciplinary action in 1916-17.

Despite all warnings, breaches of telephone security continued. Casualties throughout the Somme battle were horrendous. Fortress villages were captured after prolonged siege and many repulses. When the village of Ovillers-la-Boisselle was finally captured in this way, a complete copy of a BEF Corps operation order was found. Investigation revealed it had been passed over forward telephones by a Brigade Major to one of the battalions, despite his protestations, on the express order of his Brigadier.

> Officers could not be made to understand that half their own worries and a considerable proportion of the casualties suffered by their units were due to their own indiscreet use of forward telephones ... It was not until disciplinary action was taken and carelessness made the subject of a court-martial charge, that forward telephones were used with any degree of care.[14]

Since it was the Germans who initiated listening posts on the Western Front, it followed that they took great precautions to guard against similar attack by the British and French. Moreover, having a large pre-war conscript standing army, with a commensurately sized dedicated and highly trained staff corps, their communication systems was better organized, trained and disciplined to resist electronic attack than the British. This made the task of Allied eavesdroppers more difficult than those of the enemy. Using primitive listening apparatus it soon became apparent to the British staff that German security discipline in the forward areas was infinitely better than their own. With remarkable frankness the Signals historian recorded this was because:

> The possession of a more highly-trained Staff, the stricter signal discipline of a conscript army, the better material available for the making of linesmen and operators in a nation long trained in bulk for war, and, lastly, the more workmanlike system of trenches in which his lines were laid. It is not surprising, therefore, that at first attempts, little German conversation was overheard. His circuits were fewer and better controlled. His signal discipline was good both in the Signal Service and rank and file of other arms.[15]

However this situation was to change when better listening sets became available. In February 1916 the French Signal Service produced a listening-set incorporating the triode valve they were already using in a wireless-compass. Utilizing three triode valves in a sound-frequency amplification circuit, they produced what the British called the I.T. Set; it was an instant success. Revolutionizing as it did the possibilities of covert listening, the Allies immediately increased the depth of their own 'danger zone' from 1,000 yards to 3,000 yards. This meant that telephone conversations forward of brigade headquarters were at first restricted to urgent messages then completely forbidden. Because it was realized, that in the circumstances of the 'zone of frequent shelling', cable insulation could not survive completely intact for very long; damaged insulation meant leakage to earth and that risked detectable radiation. It was yet another measure of the seriousness of the threat to information security. Signals and Intelligence officers warned the general staff that telephone discipline rather than technical advances was the only sure way to safeguard security.

To prove this point, some I.T. sets were used in a self-monitoring role as well as eavesdropping. In the middle of the battle of the Somme, September 1916, a single station policing just 3,000 yards of the British sector in a period of one month, heard over thirty units mentioned by name, including one army and several divisions; troop movements were mentioned, forthcoming operations discussed: whole operation orders quoted; even the report of fifty casualties by 'friendly fire'. Grimly the official historian commented:

> It would not have been surprising if the German Intelligence Service had been able to reconstruct from its listening set reports practically the whole constitution of the British Army as it existed at that time, and to anticipate the most jealously-guarded intentions of the Staff.[16]

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14 Ibid p. 102
15 Ibid pp. 109-110.
16 Ibid p. 109.

Breach of security reports submitted to the Staff eventually did have their effect. But limited resources meant that only a few divisions could be monitored at one time, therefore improvement was slow. It was, moreover, achieved only by severe disciplinary action; but the corollary of disciplinary action against transgressors to telephone security was the ostracism of listening-post personnel. In forward areas, host infantry units had to be detailed by explicit orders even to obtain rations and accommodation for them. "In the early days it [life] was made as uncomfortable as possible both by the enemy and by our own forward troops."[17] However stern measures did eventually proved effective; by the end of the Somme battle in November 1916 leakage of information by telephone had decreased considerably. Yet the BEF Signals Service by necessity had to continue monitoring its telephone users until mobility returned to the Western Front in 1918.

The Allied Listening Post

The first two I.T. sets used by the British in an eavesdropping role were deployed near Vermelles in January 1916 opposite the Hohenzollern Redoubt. The longer range of the new set, probing as it did beyond the rigidly disciplined frontline and support trenches into the comparatively relaxed rear areas, greatly improved the flow of intercepted German conversations. And with it came a constant flow of exploitable intelligence. As the flow of listening sets from the manufacturers increased so did the flow of intelligence and the demand for suitable personnel to man the listening posts. The BEF and home army was trawled for German speakers, and a new army trade interpreter-operator was created. Trained in both set handling and Morse code, they were destined to lead a hazardous existence operating either in the frontline trenches or saps deep in no-mans-land.

The I.T set, augmenting and corroborating as it did the radio intercepts, Allied intelligence gathering on the Western Front was revolutionized. As the flow of raw intelligence increased so did the necessity for a sophisticated organization for collation, analysis and confirmation of raw material, and the dissemination of the finished product to users by secure means. By 1917 Intelligence Centres of mixed Intelligence Corps and Signals personnel were established at each Army headquarters. Although evolved independently, all Centres had dedicated communication circuits for intelligence traffic to and from Corps, Divisions, RFC headquarters, listening- posts and direction-finding stations; and lateral links to flanking Armies, and rearwards to GHQ BEF. In the secret war, interception, code breaking and direction finding was widely used; however, radio jamming was used sparingly by both sides because it interfered with own transmissions. Photographic interpretation was added to intelligence specialization when aerial cameras were introduced to air force observation squadrons; and aerial reconnaissance was often used to corroborate intelligence gained by other means. Unfortunately, this only covered the front line. The massive German build-up behind the lines of March 1918 went undetected. By the end of 1918, with the exception of deception and radio jamming, most aspects of 20th century electronic warfare was developed at these centres.

The German Final Throw

While doubt and disagreement attended the French and British staffs as to its start date and probable thrust lines; none doubted that a great German spring offensive was planned for the spring of 1918. Naturally the German commanders played on the doubts and fears of their opposite numbers with widespread deception. Their intention was to deceive the French; crush the British by two massive blows, on the Somme and then the Lys, aimed at driving a wedge between the Allies and capturing the channel ports. With this achieved, they intended to overwhelm the French on the weak Chemin des Dames and steamroller through to Paris. The eventual battle came close to success; but although the Allied lines bent they never broke and ultimately for the Germans it proved a pyrrhic victory. They lost the ability to holdout for a stalemate settlement in 1919.

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17 Ibid p. 108.

Corroborated Intelligence and the German 1918 Offensive

In war it is inevitable that intelligence from one source may be insufficient to convince a commander to a specific course of action. An important, if not essential aspect of intelligence is to obtain corroborative information from alternate sources, communication intelligence (Comint), electronic intelligence (Elint) or human intelligence (Humint). In the months preceding the great attack of 21 March 1918, despite much front-line information by comint and in May 1918 aerial photographic reconnaissance, there are two examples of humint which assisted Allied countermeasures in March and May 1918. The first was an almost insignificant news item in a newspaper obtained through Switzerland, which disclosed the interpolation of von Hutiers 18th Army opposite Gough's Fifth Army in March 1918 just before the attack on 21 March. Another example was about the Marne break-through on 27 May 1918; this concerned a German POW in British hands. Among his possessions was a postcard from a friend on the Laon sector; the message on it, in veiled language, indicated that his unit was about to launch an attack on the Chemin des Dames. That information, flashed to French GQG, gave General Pétain two days warning of the massive third phase of the German Spring offensive; because it confirmed photographic intelligence.[18]

Security and the Black Day of the German Army

The Allied 95 day advance to victory began at Amiens on 8 August 1918. In many aspects it resembled the Cambrai attack of the previous year, chiefly the use of tanks, no preparatory bombardment, and security. In the relatively short preparatory period, great emphasis was placed on the latter aspect. The vast movement of troops, cavalry, armour, artillery and logistics was made only during the short summer nights. Moreover, every soldier in Fourth Army, which would deliver the initial blow, had been warned repeatedly about the need to maintain security. At this time, such was the secrecy surrounding the impending attack that no one outside Fourth Army was officially aware of it with the exception of Haig and his army commanders. Sir John Monash, the Australian Corps commander later wrote:

> The loss to us of a single talkative prisoner would have been sufficient to disclose to the enemy at least the suspicion, if not the certainty, that an attack was in preparation.[19]

On the night of 6 August a German raid on the 13th Brigade sector netted five Australian prisoners. Nor was that all; whether irritated by "incessant 'nibbling' activities of Australian troops"[20], or as part of a wider intelligence gathering raid, a heavy Germany raid in regimental strength supported by artillery surprised a unit of the newly arrived 58th British Division and captured 200 prisoners. Fourth Army held its collective breath; but no prisoner talked except to give his number rank and name.[21]

The move of two Canadian divisions to Fourth Army was cloaked by a deception plan, which moved two Canadian battalions temporarily to Flanders. It also involved a theatrical telephone conversation between two Canadian officers for the benefit of German eavesdroppers. The Canadians complained of the short notice move of their divisions to the Flanders front. At the same time planted rumours of a pending Canadian assault on Kemmel Hill. So successful was the deception, that it reached as high as King Albert of the Belgians; he complained to Marshal Foch about not being informed of a pending major attack within in his kingdom.[22] All Australia know the success of the attack on 8 August 1918.

The Middle East Secret War

During early operations in the Middle East against Turkey, during 1915 a radio intercept station was established close to the Great Pyramid near Cairo. Later, deception was used by General Sir Edmund Allenby before the Third Battle of Gaza to induce the Turkish command to believe his main attack was against Gaza; while in fact Allenby positioned his mass of manoeuvre against Beersheba. This was done

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18 Tuohy pp. 236-237.
19 Sir John Monash. *Australian Victories in France*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1936, p. 56.
20 Ibid p. 77.
21 Ibid p. 97.
22 Ibid p. 80 fn,

through radio transmitted cipher messages 'intended to be deciphered' and other devices including the 'haversack ruse'.[23] This latter involved a staff officer on reconnaissance pretending to be chased and wounded, dropping a blood-stained haversack with a marked map and other documents. That evening a general routine order (GRO) was circulated ordering every effort to be made to find and recover the haversack. This was followed by a simply coded message, aimed at being decoded, to units in the affected sector repeating the GRO. German controlled Turkish intelligence at first suspected the veracity of the documents. But the efforts made to recover the haversack convinced them of its authenticity. The attack at Gaza sucked in the available Turkish reserves, and the attack at Beersheba broke the Turkish lines. [24]

A year later, before the final offensive in September 1918, by secrecy and deception Allenby massed on his left 35,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry and 400 guns across fifteen miles, against 8,000 infantry and 120 guns; while on the remaining fifty miles front he had 22,000 infantry and 120 guns against approximately 23,000 Turkish infantry with 270 guns. When General Sir Henry Chauvel's Desert Mounted Corps moved from the Jordan Valley to the Plain of Sharon, his wireless detachments remained at Jericho passing dummy traffic; while mule teams in camps left standing, dragged huge bundles of brushwood to raise vast dust-clouds at horse watering times. Meanwhile, an hotel in Jerusalem was earmarked as the new GHQ, with telephone lines laid and doors marked for staff branch's. Of course the move never occurred. East of the Jordan Lawrence's agents were spreading rumours that much fodder would shortly be required at Amman.[25] When it came, by deception, surprise and audacity, Allenby's thunderbolt offensive achieved, without an effusion of blood, the complete destruction of the Fourth, Seventh and Eight Turkish Armies. Turkey sued for peace just six weeks after the commencement of the offensive; and the problem of the Middle East for the Western World began.

Conclusion

With the Battle of Amiens as its springboard, the Allied armies on the Western Front began a series of short sharp limited offensives, each following rapidly on the next; which in modern military parlance penetrated the enemy's decision-making cycle, shattered his cohesion and destroyed his will to fight. The return of mobility to the battlefield by the use of tanks and armoured cars, supported by ground attack aircraft, saw radio communications for command and control on the battlefield come into its own. But the Armistice of 11 November 1918 came too quickly for further development of electronic warfare. Nevertheless, despite major reductions in defence spending in the 1920-30's, passive electronic warfare continued. In the British Army this was restricted to detachments in China, the North-West Frontier of India and Palestine. There the 'great game' continued, providing electronic assistance to real life equivalents of Kipling's Creighton Sahib; replacing agents like Mahbub Ali and Kimball O'Hara. This time *Soviet* Russia was the adversary; although now under the red banner, Mother Russia had not abandoned her imperial expansionist policy.

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Members Notices

Information wanted

Do you have a great-grandfather who fought at Gallipoli in World War One? A military historian is writing a book about the campaign, and is seeking copies of diaries, letters, and personal photographs of men that served at the Dardanelles. For more information please contact: Bud Feuer, P.O. Box 1145, Roanoke, VA 24006, USA e-mail: budfeuer@worldnet.att.net

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23 Wavell, Sir Archibald. *Allenby*, Harrap, London, 1940; p. 202.
24 Major-General Sir G.G. Aston. *Secret Service*, Faber and Faber, London, 1933, pp. 194-195 and Tuohy pp. 283-284.
25 Wavell p. 269

BRITISH FREE CORPS (BFC): Traitors to the King

Rohan Goyne

The British Free Corps of the Waffen SS was a small and little known unit of volunteers recruited from Commonwealth prisoners of war (POWs) from prisoner of war camps in German controlled Europe. This paper will examine the origins of this unit and the motivations of POWs who joined the unit including an Australian POW, all of whom became traitors to the King.

Overview

The BFC or Legion of St George is not mentioned in the standard texts on the Waffen SS and indeed a passing reference to the unit in John Keegan's out of print text *Waffen SS - the Asphalt Soldiers* provided the catalyst for this paper. This obscurity may have a number of reasons: It may have been the small size of the unit or alternatively it may have been a deliberate policy of the British at the conclusion of the war not to publicise that some of their soldiers had changed sides and actually pledged to fight for the enemy. These possible reasons will also be explored.

The Founder of the Legion of St George

In 1946, a 33 year old, son of a British Cabinet Minister, was escorted to the scaffold in Wandsworth prison where he was hung for his crime of treason. He was John Amery. His father Leopold Stennet Amery had been First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for the Colonies and during World War Two, he was Secretary of State for India and Burma.[1] In any examination of the BFC the role of John Amery is pivotal.

At the beginning of the war Amery went to France were he joined forces with the French fascists known as the Gagoulards and the German authorities were aware of him. He was subsequently invited to Berlin in 1942 where he met Dr Friedrich Hansen, a member of Hitler's staff. Hansen was chairman of a political body known as the England Committee. The Committee had been set up to study matters of a diplomatic nature with Britain. Amery expressed an interest in opening a radio station to conduct propaganda broadcasts to Britain and to raise a force from British POW's to fight the Russians on the Eastern Front.[2]

On 19 November 1942, Amery conducted the first in a series of propaganda broadcasts for the Nazi's on the New British Broadcasting Station. In relation to his second aim Amery was the instigator of the Legion of St George. In September 1942, he presented the idea of a British legion to battle the Soviets to Hitler who was attracted to the idea.[3]

Similar national legions had already been raised from amongst Nazi sympathisers in Norway, Holland, Belgium and France so Amery's idea was not unique. He received support from the German High Command and the Foreign Ministry to raise a brigade of 1,500. Amery set about drafting a proclamation as the first recruitment drive was to be made at the St Denis internment camp near Paris. On 20 April 1943 Amery visited St Denis camp and delivered his proclamation.[4] Amery gave his speech to a rag tag group of civilian internees and soldiers who had been instructed to present themselves in the visitors hut of the camp by the camp commander. During his speech Amery was interrupted by a formal British consular official

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1 Seth, Ronald. Jackals of the Reich, London, 1972, p.18.
2 Seth, p. 19.
3 Seth, p. 23.
4 Seth, pp. 24–25.

Wilfired Brinkman who asked Amery a series of simple questions to which he had no reply. Those questions included:

> What will happen if, by chance, the Legion finds itself against British soldiers?
> What will be the Legionnaire's status if he is taken prisoner?
> What will happen to him after the war?

The crowd gradually became more agitated and the situation was diffused by the intervention of the camp commandant. The hut was cleared and as Amery left the camp he was confronted by a jeering crowd. The mass recruitment campaign had thus been an initial failure forcing Amery to reconsider his recruitment techniques. A new strategy based on individual interviews with prospective recruits was initiated. The targeted camp would be saturated with propaganda two to three days before Amery's interviews. The propaganda included the distribution of Amery's manifesto John Amery Speaks and the posting of his proclamation in every hut.[5]

As a result of the revised recruitment strategy Amery secured three volunteers from St Denis camp for his legion. One of the volunteers was Maurice Tunmer, a naturalised Englishman, who was born in France and another was Edward Jordan, a 17 year old crewman of an ammunition ship captured when the ship was sunk by a German surface raider in May 1940. The pair were transferred from St Denis to an apartment in Paris where they were at liberty to explore the city. However, Tunmer had joined the legion with the sole purpose to escape to Spain and then return to Britain to join the Free French Forces. His disappearance from the Paris apartment significantly undermined the credibility of Amery's exercise with the German authorities.

Subsequently the Gestapo arrested Jordan and he was held in prison for a week. He was interrogated several times before being released. He was then sent to Berlin were his was met by Amery. However, Amery's interest in the legion was already waning. He made other visits to civilian internment camps and POW camps but his campaign was a consummate failure.

The SS and the British Free Corps

Whilst Amery's enthusiasm for the unit faltered the German High Command's increased and in October 1943 the unit officially became part of the SS with the title Britisches Frei-Korps.

SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Johannes Roggenfeld was appointed commander of the BFC. He had lived in America prior to the war and he spoke fluent English. The administration of the unit was also shared with SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Hans Werner Roepke. Roepke also conveniently spoke English. The BFC was issued with standard German uniform of field grey but with a number of distinct insignia.[6]

The insignia included:

> a Union Jack armshield, worn on the left arm; and
> a three lion of St George collar patch.

The role of the BFC was altered from a propaganda tool to that of a combat unit at the behest its members. Five of Amery's recruits Bartlett, Milton, Regan, Montgomery and Wood had formed a committee and they attended a meeting in October 1942 where the role, formation, training, designation, uniform, oath of allegiance and officer complement were considered. The German members of the meeting agreed that the existing members of the group should embark on a new intensive and wide recruitment campaign to bring its strength up to platoon strength of thirty. It was further agreed that following recruitment there would be revision courses in basic military

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5 Seth, pp. 27–29
6 www.wssob.com

training and ideological training. Then the unit would be ready for transfer to the Eastern Front.[7] It was during this period of that an Australian POW was recruited into the BFC.

Story of Private Albert Stokes

Albert James Stokes was born in Fremantle, Western Australia on 3 August 1917. He enlisted in the 2nd AIF on 4 March 1940 at Subiaco in Western Australia. After training he served with 2/32nd Battalion in Egypt and Syria.[8] He was taken prisoner by the Germans on 17 July 1942 at the battle of El Alamein. He was handed over to the Italians and held initially in prisoner of war camps at Benghazi and after Tripoli. In December 1942 he was transferred to Camp 85 in Italy. When Italy capitulated he was transferred to Stalag XVIII at Spittal in Austria.[9]

After a few weeks at the Stalag Stokes was sent out to a working commando at Bruck-Muir where he was employed on the staff at the camp until March 1944. He was taken to Berlin and a location called Zehlendorf. He was interviewed by a soldier in a field gray uniform. He identified himself by the surname of Courlander. According to Stokes he stated that he was a member of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force and a member of the British Free Corps.

Courlander said that the BFC was being led by a British Officer, Major Stranders and that it would sabotage German lines of communications under the guise of fighting against the Russians on the Eastern Front. Stokes asked for a few days to think over Coulander's offer but subsequently agreed to enlist in the BFC.[10]10

Then in March 1944 Stokes with four other recruits from the camp were transferred to BFC which was stationed at the SS Nordic Study Center in Hildesheim, Germany. Stokes along with his fellow traitors assumed false names. Stokes assumed the name of Gordon. The use of false names does cast doubt on Stokes suggested rationale for joining the BFC. It suggests that all the members of the BFC were aware of the possible ramifications if Germany did not win the war and their respective parts in the Waffen SS were revealed.

For the next few months the members of the BFC spent their days learning German and listening to lectures on ideology. The lectures were intended to supply the members of the BFC with persuasive arguments to recruit other POW's to the unit. The recruitment exercise continued at a pace across German controlled territory.

BFC as a combat unit

The BFC had grown to 27 members when the unit was moved to Dresden-Neusstadt to under go combat engineer training in September 1944. Given the small number of recruits when considered against the energy expended in recruiting it can only be concluded that the recruitment campaign was ultimately a failure. A training schedule was drawn up which included: language lessons, ideological lectures, infantry and pioneer training.

Infantry and pioneer training followed the standard German pattern, with theoretical and practical instructions imparted by German instructors. The infantry training included lectures on the standard German rifle and machine- gun. The unit also undertook their share of sentry duty during this period.[11]

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7 Seth, pp. 62–64.
8 World War Two Nominal Roll at www.ww2roll.gov.au
9 NAA B883 WX1839 has a digital copy of the WW2 service record of Albert James Stokes.
10 naal2.naa.gov.au/scripts
11 Seth, pp. 104–106

In October 1944, the commander of the BFC, Hauptsturmfuhrer Johannes Roggenfeld was replaced by Captain Dr Wenzel Rebus formerly of the Propaganda Ministry. However, the daily running of the unit fell to his deputy, Lt Willy Kumcarre, a veteran of the Eastern Front. The BFC under went pioneer training at Dresdan until the Allied firebombing of the city in February 1945. The unit was then transferred out of the city and some members used it as a chance to escape. On 8 March the remaining members of the unit were offered the option to either fight at the front or be sent to a disciplinary camp at Droennewitz. The members of the unit who chose the front were issued with a MP 44 and a magazine with thirty six rounds. Albert Stokes elected to go to the front but he stated with the intention of escaping.[12]

The BFC was transferred to Stettin and assigned to the III SS-Germanische Panzerkorps 11, SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland. On 22 March the BFC reported to SS Major General Joachim Ziegler at Angermuende, 35 kilometres south of Stettin. They were placed with a armoured reconnaissance battalion in the village of Schoeneberg. The unit were issued with shovels and proceeded to dig themselves in. They came under Soviet mortar and artillery fire but sustained no casualties.

The BFC had been split into two groups with Stokes in one group with four others (Nixon, Nicholls, Russler and Cameron).[13] The command of the unit passed to an NCO Archie Webster who received orders to report to the Third Armoured Corps at Steinhoefel. Webster sort an interview with Obergruppenfuhrer Felix Steiner. Steiner did not trust the BFC in the line so he immediately reassigned them to various duties, including as medical orderlies at Templin. Templin was 44 kilometres to the west of Stettin.

The Russian offensive over the Oder River obliged the remaining members of the BFC including Stokes to flee in a convoy towards Schwerin. The Americans were reported to be 30 kilometres from Schwerin so Stokes and Cameron changed into civilian clothing and proceeded to walk towards the American lines. They were met be a British officer outside Schwerin and they identified themselves as escaped POWs. They stopped in the camp for five days and later transported to Luneberg. They were repatriated on 9 May 1945.[14]

After the War

The members of the BFC received a variety of penalties from British justice after the war. In the case of John Amery, he was sentenced to death by hanging. In the case of Albert Stokes, he was court-martialled on 17 August 1945 and found guilty of having been made a prisoner of war voluntarily aiding the enemy. Stokes received the relative light sentence of to be reduced to the ranks and to be imprisoned with hard labour for one year. The maximum sentence available to the military court in Stokes case was life imprisonment.[15]

Conclusion

The modest sentences issued to the majority of members of the BFC indicates that British authorities were keen to deal with the matter as quickly as possible with the least publicity possible. As it did not make for a pleasant story that 27 Commonwealth POWs had fought for the enemy. The irony is that the power of the BFC as a propaganda tool was felt after the war as evidenced by the speed of the British cover-up, but the German's had failed to utilise the BFC as a propaganda tool during the war.

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12 NAA
13 NAA
14 NAA
15 NAA

Medal of Honor for Iraq

Anthony Staunton

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, March 3, 1863, has awarded in the name of Congress the Medal of Honor to

Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith
United States Army

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty:

Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with an armed enemy near Baghdad International Airport, Baghdad, Iraq on 4 April 2003. On that day, Sergeant First Class Smith was engaged in the construction of a prisoner of war holding area when his Task Force was violently attacked by a company-sized enemy force. Realizing the vulnerability of over 100 fellow soldiers, Sergeant First Class Smith quickly organized a hasty defence consisting of two platoons of soldiers, one Bradley Fighting Vehicle and three armored personnel carriers. As the fight developed, Sergeant First Class Smith braved hostile enemy fire to personally engage the enemy with hand grenades and anti-tank weapons, and organized the evacuation of three wounded soldiers from an armored personnel carrier struck by a rocket propelled grenade and a 60 mm mortar round. Fearing the enemy would overrun their defenses, Sergeant First Class Smith moved under withering enemy fire to man a .50 caliber machine gun mounted on a damaged armored personnel carrier. In total disregard for his own life, he maintained his exposed position in order to engage the attacking enemy force. During this action, he was mortally wounded. His courageous actions helped defeat the enemy attack, and resulted in as many as 50 enemy soldiers killed, while allowing the safe withdrawal of numerous wounded soldiers. Sergeant First Class Smith's extraordinary heroism and uncommon valor are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, the Third Infantry Division "Rock of the Marne," and the United States Army.

On Monday, 4 April 2005, two years to the day after Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith, US Army, was killed defending his unit from an enemy attack near the Baghdad airport, President George W. Bush presented the Medal of Honor to Smith's 11-year-old son, David in the presence of his widow Birgit who had asked that their son accept his father's medal. Also present at the White House ceremony was Jessica, Birgit's 18-year-old daughter. Smith, 33, was a career soldier, joining the US Army after graduating from high school in Tampa, Florida in 1989. He met Bridget while stationed in Germany in 1990. Smith was born in El Paso, Texas, was raised in Tampa, Florida and served in the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq.

On 4 April 2003, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, seized Baghdad International Airport. Task Force 2-7 Infantry established a blocking position against a counterattack on the main entrance to the airfield. The Task Force 2-7 Forward Aid Station, mortars, scouts and portions of B Company, 11th Engineer Battalion were in the median strip behind the forward most blocking positions. 2nd Platoon, B Company, 11th Engineer Battalion commanded by Sgt. 1st Class Smith was ordered to construct an enemy prisoner of war holding area. A site was selected and work to clear debris had just started when the lead elements of a company-sized force staging to attack the flank of Task Force 2-7 was observed.

Smith instructed a squad leader to get a nearby Bradley Fighting Vehicle for support and while waiting for the Bradley had the 2nd platoon retrieve AT-4 weapons and form a skirmish line. As the Bradley arrived on site and moved forward, Smith ran forward and threw a fragmentation grenade at the enemy. He then directed his men to engage with small arms the enemy who were firing rifles, RPGs, and 60 mm mortars. Smith called for an armoured personnel carrier to move forward to provide additional fire support and then fired an AT-4 at the enemy while directing his fire team assembled near the front line of the engagement area.

Running low on ammunition and having taken RPG hits, the Bradley withdrew to reload. The lead armoured personnel carrier in the area received a direct hit from a mortar, wounding the three occupants. The enemy attack was at its strongest point and threatened B Company, the Task Force Aid Station, and the mortar platoon. Smith ordered a soldier to move the damaged carrier forward after the wounded had been evacuated and assumed the track commander's position behind the .50 calibre machine-gun. He told the driver to "feed me ammunition whenever you hear the gun get quiet." Smith fired on the advancing enemy from the unprotected position atop the armoured personnel carrier and expended at least three boxes of ammunition before being mortally wounded by enemy fire. The enemy attack was defeated. Smith's actions saved the lives of at least 100 soldiers, caused the failure of a deliberate enemy attack hours after 1st Brigade seized the Baghdad Airport, and resulted in an estimated 20-50 enemy soldiers killed. His actions prevented the penetration in the Task Force 2-7 sector, defended the aid station, mortars, and scouts and allowed the evacuation of soldiers wounded by enemy fire.

Thirty–nine belated awards since Somalia

The award to Smith was the first Medal of Honor action since Somalia when President Clinton presented posthumous awards to the widows of Randall D Shughart and Gary I. Gordon for the October 1993 "Black Hawk Down" incident. However the award to Smith was in fact the 40th award since Somalia. Following Somalia President Clinton presented 35 belated awards from the Civil War to Vietnam although most were for the Second World War. And President George W Bush presented one belated Second World War award and three belated Vietnam War awards prior to the presentation to Paul Smith.

The quest for a belated Medal of Honor for a heroic father, uncle, or fellow veteran is a feature of the Medal of Honor. Of the 1199 Army Civil War awards only 374 had been awarded by the end of 1865. In the following ten years another 44 awards were issued. However, 780 further

awards were presented between 1876 and 1917, the majority in the 1890s. The final eight awards were issued in 1917 until the rolls were reopened by President Clinton who presented the Medal of Honor to a descendent of a Civil War veteran in 2001.

In an attempt to protect the integrity of the Medal of Honor a time limit requiring nominations to be submitted within one year of the action being commended was enacted. This was extended in 1963 to two years for Army and Air Force awards and three years for Navy and Marine Corps awards. However, the time limits are regularly extended by Congress which has acquiesced to pleas of family members or veteran groups to upgrade earlier awards to the Medal of Honor. Sadly, it leaves open the suggestion that belated awards are not based upon merit but the political clout of the legislator who moved the provision.

The 39 belated awards between Somalia and Iraq included seven black Americans and 22 Asian-Americans Second World War veterans and ten awards from the Civil War to Vietnam.

African American recipients

President William Clinton on 13 January 1997 presented Medals of Honor to First Lieutenant Vernon Baker of St. Maries, Idaho, and family members of the six deceased soldiers in a White House ceremony. The seven African American veterans of the Second World War received their awards following a study by Shaw University in Raleigh, North Carolina to find out why no black received the Medal of Honor in that war. Shaw University which was contracted by the US Army to research the matter reviewed archives and interviewed veterans. Nine blacks received the second-highest honor, the Distinguished Service Cross. The 272-page study found no evidence that any black soldier in World War II was ever nominated for the Medal of Honor, although commanders, comrades and archival records indicate that at least four of the seven nominees had been recommended. The study did not find official evidence suggesting racial bias in the Army's award policy at the time. The study's authors say the political climate and common Army practices during the war guaranteed that no black soldier would ever receive the military's top award. The seven veterans decorated were:

92nd Division

Baker, Vernon J., 1st Lt, 5 and 6 April 1945, Viareggio, Italy. (living)

Fox, John R., 1st Lt., 26 Dec 1944, Sommocolonia, Italy (KIA)

103rd Division

Thomas, Charles L, 1st Lt, 14 Dec 1944, Climbach, France (died 1980)

104th Division

James, Willy F. Jr, Pfc.. 7 April 1945, Lippoldsberg, Germany (KIA)

12th Armored Division

Carter, Edward A. Jr, SSgt., 23March, 1945, Speyer, Germany (died 1962)

761st Tank Battalion

Rivers, Ruben, SSgt. 15-19 Nov 1944, Guebling, France (KIA)

29th Quartermaster Regiment

Watson, George, Pvt. 8 March 8, 1943, Porloch Harbor, Papua (KIA)

Asian Pacific American upgrades

Following the African-American review the Army examined the records of Asian Pacific American Second World War veterans. While 1.2 million black Americans served in the Second World War the number Asian Pacific American was much smaller. Japanese Americans of the celebrated 100th Battalion/442nd Regimental Combat Team were the most highly decorated unit in the history of the U.S. armed forces. The unit earned over 18,000 individual decorations, including 9,486 Purple Hearts

and seven Presidential Unit Citations, the nation's top award for combat units. The 100th/442nd's famous motto, "Go for Broke," reflects its reputation for accomplishing its mission despite all costs. Many of the Japanese Americans who served in the 100th/442nd volunteered from internment camps where their families had been relocated to after the outbreak of war.

The 100th/442nd fought in eight major campaigns in Italy, France and Germany, including Monte Cassino, Anzio, and Biffontaine. At Biffontaine the 100th/442nd fought perhaps its most famous battle, the epic "Rescue of the Lost Battalion," in which the Japanese American unit sustained over 800 casualties to rescue 211 members of the Texan 1st Battalion of the 141st Regiment.

Of the 22 Medal of Honor recipients, ten were killed in action or died of wounds. Another five passed away after the war but before the presentation leaving seven still living to receive their awards. Since 2001 three of the seven have died leaving four survivors among the 123 living Medal of Honor recipients as at 31 July 2005.

100th Infantry Battalion

Hasemoto, Mikio, Private., 29 Nov 1943, Cerasuolo, Italy (KIA)
Hayashi, Shizuya, Private., 29 Nov 1943, Cerasuolo, Italy. (living)
Kobashigawa, Yeiki, Tech. Sgt., 2 Jun 1944, Lanuvio, Italy. (died 2005)
Moto, Kaoru, Pfc., 7 Jul 1944, Castellina, Italy. (died 1992)
Nakae, Masato, Private., 19 Aug 1944, Pisa, Italy (died 1998)
Nakamine, Shinyei, Private., 2 Jun 1944, La Torreto, Italy (KIA).
Ohata, Allan M., Sgt. 29/30 Nov 1943, Cerasuolo, Italy. (died 1977)
Okubo, James, Tech 5, 28 Oct/4 Nov 1944, Biffontaine, France. (died 1967)

442nd Infantry Regiment

Hajiro, Barney F, Private, October 1944, Bruyeres and Biffontaine, France. (living)
Hayashi, Joe, Private, 20/22 April 1945, Tendola, Italy. (KIA)
Inouye, Daniel K., 2nd Lt, 21 April 1945, San Terenzo, Italy. (living)
Kuroda, Robert T, SSgt, 20 October 1944, Bruyeres, France. (KIA)
Muranaga, Kiyoshi K., Pfc., 26 June 1944, Suvereto, Italy. (KIA)
Nakamura, William K., Pfc., 4 July 1944, Castellina, Italy. (KIA)
Nishimoto, Joe M., Pfc., 7 November 1944, La Houssiere, France. (DOW)
Okutsu, Yukio, Tech. Sgt., 7 April 1945, Mount Belvedere, Italy. (died 2003)
Ono, Frank Hl, Pfc., 4 July 1944, Castellina, Italy. (died 1980)
Otani, Kazuo, SSgt., 15 July 15, 1944, Pieve di S. Luce, Italy (KIA).
Sakato, George T., Private., 29 October 29, 1944, in Biffointaine, France. (living)
Tanouye, Ted T., Tech. Sgt., 7 July 1944, Molina A Ventoabbto, Italy. (DOW)

7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division

Davila, Rudolph B., SSgt., for actions on May 28, 1944, Artena, Italy.(died 2002)

34th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division

Wai, Francis B., Capt., 20 October 1944, Leyte, Philippine Islands (KIA)

One of thee 22 recipients was Senator Daniel K. Inouye (Democrat-Hawaii) who lost his right arm in combat in 1945 and who served in the Hawaii Territorial House of Representatives and Senate from 1954. He was the first Hawaii member of the US House of Representatives when Hawaii gained statehood in 1959 and has been a member of the US Senate from 1963 being re-elected in 1968, 1974, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998 and in 2004 for the term ending 3 January 2011

Other belated awards

Ten further bealted awards have been presente by Presidents Clinton and Buch. The first two are are extraordinary for the delay of 137 years and 103 years respectively. Andrew Jackson Smith, a former slave who joined the Union Army during the Civil War, earned his medal for saving his unit's colors after the flag-bearer went down during a

charge in the Battle of Honey Hill in South Carolina. He held the flag high throughout the battle despite heavy Confederate fire. Smith was a member of the 55th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment, one of 166 regiments made up of freed African Americans. The recipient from the Spanish American War was Theodore Roosevelt,, 26th President of the United States between 1901 and 1909. He led the Rough Riders in the assault on San Juan Hill. The movie *Rough Riders* which is reasonably good military history which gives a good account of the battle may still be at your video store is well recommended.

American Civil War

Smith, Andrew Jackson, Honey Hill, South Carolina, 30 Nov 1864, (died 1932)

Spanish American War

Roosevelt, Theodore, San Juan Hill, 1 Jul 1898, (died 1919)

Second World War

Day, James L, , Okinawa, 14 to 17 May 1945, (died 1998)
Salomon, Ben Louis, Saipan, 7 Jul 1944, (KIA

Vietnam War

Freeman, Ed W., South Vietnam, 14 Nov 1965, (living)
Ingram, Robert R. , South Vietnam, 28 Mar 1966, (living)
Pitsenbarger, William H., South Vietnam, 11 Apr 1966, (KIA)
Rascon, Alfred V. , South Vietnam, 16 Mar 1966, (living)
Swanson, Jon E., Cambodia, 26 Feb 1971, (KIA)
Versace, Humbert R., South Vietnam, 29 Oct 1963 to 26 Sep 1965, (died as POW)

Jewish American review

On 23 September 2005, President George W Bush is scheduled to present a belated Medal of Honor to Tibor Rubin, a 76-year old Holocaust survivor and Korean War veteran.

Rubin, known as "Ted" to his army buddies, was born in Paszto, a Hungarian "stetl" or enclosed village of 120 Jewish families, one of six children of a shoemaker. At age 13, Rubin was transported to the Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria, where he was liberated two years later by US troops. His parents and two sisters perished in the Holocaust. He came to the United States in 1948, settled in New York and worked first as a shoemaker and then as a butcher. In 1949 Rubin tried to enlist in the U.S. Army, both as a shortcut to American citizenship and, he hoped, to attend the army's butcher school in Chicago. He first flunked the English language test but tried again in 1950 and passed, with some help from two fellow test-takers.

In July 1950, Pfc. Rubin found himself fighting on the frontlines of Korea with I Company, 8th Regiment, First Cavalry Division. Toward the end of October 1950, massive Chinese troop concentrations crossed the border into North Korea and attacked the Americans. After most of his regiment had been wiped out, the severely wounded Rubin was captured and spent the next 30 months in a prisoner-of-war camp. For some 30 years after his discharge, Rubin lived quietly in a small house in Garden Grove, Calif. with his wife Yvonne, a Dutch Holocaust survivor. The couple reared two children: Frank, an Air Force veteran, and a daughter, Rosalyn. It wasn't until the 1980s that Rubin's old army buddies started a campaign to get Rubin the Medal of Honor. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) first moved a bill in 1988 to waive the time limit. The Jewish War Veterans have championed Rubin's cause for many years and at one point collected 42,000 signatures on a petition presented to President Reagan.

Congress passed a bill in 2001 providing for a review of selected Jewish veterans and a list containing the names and wartime records of 138 Jewish veterans was sent to the Pentagon. All the men listed had received the been decorated for gallantry with the exception of Rubin.

Although the Jewish American Review follows the Back American and Asian Pacific American reviews the conclusions and follow up was completely different. In the first two reviews no case of actual discrimination was found but institution discrimination was assumed. The records of the soldiers were examined and 28 of the 29 had either the Distinguished Service Cross or Silver Star upgraded to the Medal of Honor.

According to lengthy affidavits submitted by nearly a dozen men, mostly self-described "country boys" from the South and Midwest, Rubin platoon sergeant, First Sgt. Artice Watson was a vicious anti-Semite who consistently "volunteered" Rubin for the most dangerous patrols and missions. Rubin's bravery during such missions so impressed two of his commanding officers that they recommended him three times for the Medal of Honor. Both officers were later killed in action, but not before telling Watson to initiate the necessary paper work to secure the medals for Rubin. Some of the men in Rubin's company were present when Watson was ordered to put in for the medals, and all are convinced that he deliberately ignored the orders. "I believe in my heart that First Sgt. Watson would have jeopardized his own safety rather than assist in any way whatsoever in the awarding of the medal to a person of Jewish descent," wrote Cpl. Harold Speakman in a notarized affidavit.

As a prisoner of war Rubin, would sneak out of the camp to steal food from the Chinese and North Korean supply depots, realizing that he would be shot if caught. "He shared the food evenly among the GIs," a former prisoner wrote "He also took care of us, nursed us, carried us to the latrine . . . He did many good deeds, which he told us were 'mitzvahs' in the Jewish tradition . . . He was a very religious Jew, and helping his fellow men was the most important thing to him." Survivors of the camp credited Rubin with keeping 35 to 40 people alive, and recommended him for the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star. Sgt. Carl McClendon, a soldier saved by Rubin, wrote: "He had more courage, guts and fellowship than I ever knew anyone had. He is the most outstanding man I ever met, with a heart of gold. Tibor Rubin committed everyday bravery that boggles the mind. How he ever came home alive is a mystery to me."

Rubin is the 15th Jewish recipient of the Medal of Honor since it was instituted during the Civil War by an Act of Congress signed by President Lincoln, according to archivist Pamela Elbe of the National Museum of American Jewish Military History.

Rubin is allowed to invite 200 guests for the White House ceremony, and among them will be the survivors of his old company and their families. There also will be relatives, but Rubin doubts that his cousins in Israel will be able to make it. When Rubin was interviewed three years ago, he told this reporter, "I want this recognition for my Jewish brothers and sisters. I want the goyim to know that there were Jews over there, that there was a little greenhorn, a little shmuck from Hungary, who fought for their beloved country." "Now," Rubin said with a self-deprecating laugh, "It's Mister Shmuck, the hero."

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