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

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www.mhsa.org.au

Military Historical Society of Australia
PO Box 5030, Garran, ACT 2605.
email: webmaster@mhsa.org.au

THE PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY SMALL ARMS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, 1839-1901

Anthony F Harris1

Before considering the procurement of the arms of the volunteers and militia of South Australia, it may be helpful to look briefly at the forces that were raised in the colony. The military movement in South Australia waxed and waned in four distinct phases; phases which were further divided by several re-organisations. As would be expected, the procurement of arms, and to some extent the type of arms bought, was largely though not always influenced by these fluctuations. The first phase covered the period 1840 to about 1842 or 3, the second from 1854-56; the third phase from 1859 to about 70, then 1877 to 1903. Major re-organisations and re-structuring took place in 1866, 1886, and 1896, with smaller changes in the early 1880's and early 1890's. A favourite exercise of bureaucracy is to change names whenever the rules are changed. Consequently with practically all major and minor legislative or organisational changes, invariably the names of the forces or parts thereof were changed. An extreme example perhaps was the South Australian National Rifle Association, formed in 1878, which became the Rifle Volunteer Force in 1881, then the Volunteer Force in 1886 (when the SA National Rifle Association was reformed as a separate entity), then to become the Volunteer Militia Reserve Force in 1891 - which for the pedantic may seem to be a bit of a contradiction in itself; was it a volunteer or a militia unit? It was finally disbanded in 1896!

Following the formal white settlement of SA in 1836 it was not long before the subject of local defence reared its troublesome head. No organisation or legislation existed to provide for the defence of the province, while the small detachment of Royal Marines which accompanied Governor John Hindmarsh was sent primarily as a vice-regal guard, not for the defence of the territory.

The initial step in creating a local defence mechanism was initiated not from within the colony but through the South Australian Colonisation Commissioners in London. This was the organisation that was formed to supervise the non-government aspects of getting the province on its feet; sales of land, investment and the migration of a selected labour force. The Commissioners explained in 1839 to Governor George Gawler, successor to Governor Hindmarsh:

> The unsettled aspect of affairs between this country and certain foreign powers, especially the United States of America, tho' not in the opinion of the Commissioners likely to lead to a war, is such as to render the defence of the Colony a matter requiring serious attention.2

This concern about America doesn't seem to have been a major issue. The War of 1812 between America and British interests in Canada was long over and the war between the American states was many years away. Apart from a few on-going arguments across the border of America and Canada (not infrequently inspired by Fenian sympathisers to the American cause) there appears to have been little reason for the Commissioner's concern. Nevertheless, the Board proceeded to purchase from the London trade 1,000 light percussion (muzzle loading) carbines together with bayonets and a reasonable quantity of ammunition and accessories.3 The arrival of these arms in several separate shipments over the 1839-40 period gave Governor Gawler the opportunity to create the province's first local military force, the South Australian Volunteer Militia Brigade.4 This rather loosely structured

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1 This paper was originally presented as a lecture to the Historical Group of the Naval, Military and Air Force Club of SA Inc. in Adelaide, 27 May 1997. The author is a retired public servant and Secretary of the MHSA's South Australian Branch.
2 State Records SA GRG48/1 p.288
3 Ibid, p.308
4 SA Govenment Gazette, 27 Feb. 1840

little force of enthusiasts, for whom drills were cancelled during the rainy winter and which appears to have survived for barely two years before fading into oblivion, is believed to have been the first Australian corps to be granted the prefix 'Royal' although at the time of the Grant the unit had virtually ceased to exist.5 This was certainly the first procurement of arms made as a specific means of defence for the province, and it should be noted here that 'about two hundred swords' promised at the time, plus some 'heavy and light artillery' were not forthcoming.

In 1846, during the early part of Governor Frederick Robe's term of office, and at a time when the Imperial government appears to have had some pangs of conscience concerning its colonial responsibilities (as well as having a huge post-Napoleonic wars arms surplus), the Secretary of State for the Colonies offered each of the Australian colonies 500 flintlock muskets with accoutrements and ammunition.6 These would be available ex-Sydney on application and at no cost on the proviso that suitable storage facilities were available 'to ensure their correct preservation'. An exchange of correspondence between Adelaide and London ensued, discussing details of suitable storage (which Adelaide did not have at the time but was investigating); while a letter to Sydney expressing an interest in taking up the offer resulted in the immediate supply of 500 muskets long before formal approval from London was given.7 This issue of the 'Brown Bess' smoothbore musket was one of those instances where the colony received obsolete and possibly second-hand arms. Although it has proved impossible to determine exactly what model of Brown Bess was received in the colony (there had been several variations produced over the preceding 40 or 50 years), they were probably those designated the 'India Pattern', modelled on a musket used by the armies of the East India Company and of which huge quantities were made for the British army when Napoleon Bonaparte was creating havoc across Europe at the turn of the 18th & 19th centuries. When eventually issued to the local volunteers several years later the muskets were apparently regarded 'with little veneration'!8

An unusual set of circumstances resulted in these old flintlocks, technically the property of the Imperial government, becoming the sole property of the local government. In 1845 the then Governor of SA, George Grey, was transferred to New Zealand as Lt Governor and was replaced by Major Robe. Although the reasons are apparently not documented, Grey sought Robe's authority to take with him to New Zealand:

> 350 carbines and other military stores belonging to this colony, being a portion of arms sent out by the Colonisation Commissioners for Militia Service in 1839.9

Robe approved the request but was concerned that the cost of the stores should be reimbursed by the New Zealand authorities. He advised Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies of the situation and in reply was advised that Lt Governor Grey had been instructed that payment should be made to South Australia or that the arms were to be returned. The value of the shipment complete was given as a little over £560, but for some obscure reason neither costs nor stores were ever refunded. Several years later, in 1852 Robe was still complaining to England that New Zealand's debt had not been cleared.10 The Secretary of State for the Colonies, recognising that the arms and accoutrements taken to New Zealand were the bona fide property of South Australia, proposed:

> these arms - I mean the musquets which were sent to the colony in 1846 - be considered as a compensation for the arms and stores which were removed by the Governor of New Zealand.11

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5 SAGG, 27 May 1841
6 SRSA GRG2/1/6, Mil. No.1
7 GRG24/6/1846 No.1544
8 Register newspaper, 8 March 1855
9 GRG2/6/3 p.344
10 GRG24/6/1843 No.768
11 ibid

Thus it becomes clear that South Australia procured by default 500 long-obsolete and virtually useless flintlock muskets in exchange for considerably more modern, albeit only moderate quality, percussion arms. The flintlock muskets were disposed of in their entirety in 1861-62, and at least 200 of them were sold to the Fijian Company for trade with the native islanders.12 They are one of the few types of weapons that came into the colony of which no specimens of confirmed provenance are known to exist.

A request was made for a further supply of arms shortly before the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. The local authorities were well aware of the obsolete nature of the arms held in store (at this time there were no locally raised corps - only a small detachment of British troops of the 11th Regiment stationed in the colony). The war in the Crimea was the spark needed to bring the defence of the colony again to the fore. This time formal legislation was introduced and regulations drafted, leading to the raising of the Volunteer Military Force (VMF) which existed in its first stage from November 1854 until disbandment around March 1856. The local administration appealed to the Imperial government for the supply of a considerable quantity of rifles, swords and artillery to replace the obsolete mixture then on hand.13 Although the request was approved it was to be 1857 before the arms arrived - in fact about 12 months after the VMF had been disbanded. On this occasion 2,000 muzzle-loading Enfield rifles, nearly 1,000 cavalry trooper's swords and several pieces of artillery were received at no cost as a Grant of Arms by the crown. Consequently when the VMF was re-raised in 1859 due to concern about French expansion in the pacific, the colony had enough up-to-date arms to equip quite a substantial corps of volunteers. Shortly after this New Zealand, hard pressed fighting the Maori, sent an urgent request for arms to the Australian colonies in 1860, trying to 'shortcut' the many months required to get delivery from England.14 South Australia was able to supply 400 rifles and accoutrements immediately in response then, as New Zealand's arms shortages were probably seen to be essentially the problem of the Imperial government, applied to London for the supply of replacement arms.15 This resulted in the receipt of a further 1,000 Enfield rifles in 1861; 400 to replace those sent to New Zealand plus another 600 to enable expansion of the VMF.16 These Enfield rifles were the last arms to be supplied at no cost to the colony. From here on if the colony wanted any small arms, be it for military, survey, police, exploration or any other purpose, they had to be bought through the colony's own budgets.

Early in 1860 a group of Adelaide residents applied to form a cavalry unit within the structure of the VMF. Approval was given and ultimately the 'Reedbeds Cavalry' came into existence.17 However, with no cavalry-style arms on hand other than the trooper's swords that were received in 1857, the corps had to gain their 'marksmanship' qualifications necessary under the Act by using the long infantry rifle.18 Following pressure on the government the colony's Agent General in London was instructed to arrange for the purchase of suitable breech loading carbines for the cavalry volunteers. An application to the British War Office was refused as such arms were still in the experimental and evaluation stages, thus the Agent General was forced to go to the commercial gun trade.19 A subsequent comedy of errors and misunderstandings meant that it was something like two years before the carbines were finally received in the colony. Although from a reputable maker, William Westley Richards of Birmingham, the 50 carbines were very expensive at over £8 each. Compare this with the

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12 GRG24/6/1862 No.192
13 GRG2/6/7 No.15
14 GRG2/6/9 No.392
15 ibid
16 GRG2/1/20 No.41
17 Robert Grey, The Reedbeds Mounted Volunteers (Typescript) nd Mortlock Library of South Australiana
18 GRG2/1/4 Mil. No.4
19 GRG45/1/1861 No.153

cost of the Enfield infantry rifle which at the time was around £3. Despite the subsequent increase in the cavalry from 1 troop to 4 troops over the next few years, not surprisingly perhaps no more such carbines were bought.

Another instance of weapons becoming military stores by default rather than design occurred in 1865 when a batch of arms was ordered from the War Office:

> for the contingent requirements of Exploration parties, Northern Territory, Police etc.20

Among the arms was a group of 60 Enfield muzzle loading artillery carbines, simply a shortened version of the infantry rifle. Reviewing the new stores on their arrival in the colony the Colonial Storekeeper advised the Chief Secretary that the artillery carbines

> appear to me to be too bulky and heavy a weapon for bush work, but is admirably adapted as a small arm for Artillery.21

It is perhaps not unreasonable to imagine that a carbine initially designed specifically for the use of artillery corps would indeed be 'admirably adapted for the artillery'! The result was that the carbines were taken out of the 'contingent use' basket and were held in store for issue to the artillery volunteers. However, judging by the excellent condition of the majority of surviving examples, of which there are quite a few, it would appear that the carbines saw very little, if any, military service.

A costly mistake was made during 1866-67 when the government bought two rifling machines with the idea of re-rifling and possibly converting their now worn Enfield rifles to breechloaders, only to discover (after purchase) that the machines were only suitable to rifle new barrel blanks, not to re-rifle old barrels. The machines were subsequently sold back to the supplier, unused, at a considerable loss.

A similar costly purchase was made shortly afterwards in 1867-68 in the form of a breech loading infantry rifle. Wanting to be as up to date as possible with the latest British military technology, in 1866 the local authorities tried to buy a quantity of the new Snider Enfield conversions of the muzzle loading Enfield rifle, a program that was being widely discussed in the press of the day. The procurement was to be overseen by the Agent General in London, Francis Stacker Dutton, who approached the task with much enthusiasm but with, it seems, little technical expertise.22 Many and varied were the different types of breech loading methods being designed, marketed and trialled at this time. After being advised that the Snider system had not been adopted and was still regarded as experimental, the War Office suggested that, if the matter was regarded as urgent, enquiries should be made from the arms trade.23 In approaching the commercial suppliers Dutton in fact he became largely reliant on those sources and press statements, most of whom obviously had rather a vested interest in the matter. Dutton's investigations into finding what breech loading alternatives were available (and the subsequent decisions made in South Australia) became a long and protracted episode that resulted in the purchase of 500 rifles that were relatively expensive, unsuitable for the rigors of military service and for which no drill manuals had been written. There was no 'after-sales service' contracted and spare parts were not readily available. Needless to say, these Braendlin-Albini rifles were never issued to the VMF. In fact they were delivered at a time when interest in volunteering was seriously on the wane and was to be abandoned within about 12 months. From then on these unused breech loaders mostly sat in store as there was no volunteer activity in the colony between about 1870 and the re-raising of the volunteer force in 1877. A few were subsequently issued to the SA Foot Police and the prisons service, where some robust drill soon uncovered some of the weaknesses

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20 GRG24/6/1864 No.1698
21 GRG24/6/1865 No.1195
22 GRG45/1/1866 No.497
23 GRG45/1/1867 No.210

of the rifle.24 One interesting aspect of this purchase was that the Agent General, thoroughly confused with the wide variety of breechloaders being offered by the trade, bought one each of several different types deemed to be more practical for the local authorities to evaluate for themselves.25 Although these local trials are well documented, it becomes obvious that Mr Dutton was not given clear and precise instructions or recommendations following the trials, and this was compounded by an inordinately long delay in waiting for a reply to an important query, so any criticism of the eventual purchase should not rest on his shoulders alone.

When defence again became a matter of urgency in 1876-77 the VMF was resurrected yet again and the subject of suitable arms and equipments came under review once more. After seven years in the military wilderness there had been considerable changes in military technology, but by now the local authorities seemed determined to ensure that they looked only to Britain's War Office for military small arms. Procurement of arms and other stores was also made much easier now, due to the widespread use of the telegraph, allowing communication between London and Australia in a matter of days rather than the minimum four month return sea voyage. Also, from now on South Australia engaged the use of military experts in London to liaise and give advice to the Agent General on defence materials and to oversee purchases and contracts. These advisors were generally senior British Army officers, usually retired or on half pay, who worked on a commission basis.

An order for 1,000 of the latest type of breechloading infantry rifle - the Martini-Henry - was sent to the War Office via the Agent General in 1877.26 This was the first arms order placed by telegraph and, from placement of the order in mid-May it was only barely 3 months before the arms were landed in Adelaide.27 Compare this with the two year nonsense that took place in 1860-62 and again 1866-68. Nearly all subsequent military small arms purchases were sought from the War Office, with orders going to the Agent General who would then liaise with and through the colony's military advisor. Through this system the colony bought in excess of 4,000 Martini- Henry rifles and carbines over about a 10 year period.

In the early 1890's, following advice received from the colony's military advisor in London, South Australia upgraded 500 of its old .450 inch calibre Martini-Henry rifles by having them converted to the new military calibre of .303 inch.28 These were designated the Martini-Metford rifle and rather interestingly perhaps, are a model that is totally unique to South Australia. A similar conversion/upgrade program was undertaken during 1897-99 when a further 1,000 rifles were modified to yet another pattern, the .303 Martini-Enfield. An interesting process took place with these Martini-Enfields. About half of them were, as the earlier Martini-Metfords, converted to British specifications from South Australia's own existing stocks of worn .450 Martini-Henry rifles. However, in 1897 the Imperial government through its Colonial Defence Committee devised a plan whereby any colonial government could upgrade its old .450 rifles by simply ordering a required quantity of already converted .303 Martini Enfields now available from store, and then submitting in exchange any quantity of .450 M-H rifles for ongoing conversion to .303. The submitted obsolete rifles would then be evaluated on the basis of condition and conversion suitability, with the calculated value deducted from the relatively cheap cost of the .303 arms supplied. Converted bayonets were also available on similar terms. The purpose of the proposal was to allow the colonies to economically upgrade their arms, albeit single shot weapons, to the same calibre as that then in general British service with the Lee Metford and Lee Enfield magazine rifles.29

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24 Max Slee, Service Arms of the South Australian Police 1838-1988, AHAASA, Adelaide 1988
25 GRG45/1/1867 No.399
26 GRG24/4/54 p.343
27 Ibid, p.1086
28 Anthony F Harris, The Military Small Arms of South Australia 1839-1901, Mitcham SA, 997, Ch.10
29 Ibid, Ch.11

It is perhaps of interest to note that the colonial government never bought any magazine breech loading rifles such as the Lee Metford or Lee Enfield except for 50 Lee Metford carbines which appear listed as on issue to the South Australian Navy in 1901 (no other details are recorded or known).30 Although there was some discussion and even a requisition made after the turn of the century (only to be subsequently cancelled) at the last minute the government finally decided to leave the whole question of magazine rifles for the incoming Commonwealth government to consider when it took over responsibility for defence in March 1901.31 It was not until 1902 or 1903, after the close of the colonial era, that the Lee Enfield rifle was first issued to South Australian units

Some arms were bought direct from government contractors (probably on referral of the War Office) but only from those makers who had in-house government inspectorates. These companies included John Adams and Co. and Philip Webley & Sons, both of whom supplied considerable quantities of large calibre revolvers to the British and other governments. In fact there were only three purchases of pistols bought for military service by the colonial government, all of them either Adams (in 1878) or Webley (in 1891-2 and 1901).

Although by the 1890's the sourcing and procurement of arms was quite a sophisticated process, occasionally the wheels did fall off, but this was usually the result of a misunderstanding or the inexperience of temporarily appointed officers of the local forces. The occasional part supply of fairly substantial orders seems to have been one such instance when problems occurred, probably because there appears to have been no accompanying documentation with the goods to say that such and such an item was still in the course of manufacture and would not be supplied for X weeks. Instances such as this often resulted in some sharp correspondence between the local authorities and the War Office, respectively complaining of and explaining the lack of supply; but these instances were usually quite minor.

Very few rankers or troopers swords were bought from the Imperial government through the War Office, largely because there were so many on hand following the supply of the cavalry trooper's swords in 1857 referred to earlier. Also among the edged weapons was a quantity of lances, ordered in the mid to late 1880's and early 1890's after the cavalry component of the South Australian Militia was restructured as squadrons of Lancers. Delivery of these was considerably delayed as bamboo staves were demanded but the premium type of bamboo was very difficult to obtain.32 As with most arms bought during this period, they were supplied by the War Office with the purchase being overseen by the Agent General and his Military Advisor. Many of the lances bought during this period remained in store after the Adelaide Lancers were disbanded in 1896 and were later used ceremonially by the post-Federation Australian Light Horse regiments.

In excess of 300 officer's swords were bought commercially between 1855 and about 1890. A batch of 42 was bought in 1855 supplied by a sword cutler named John Lilly of London,33 but all other orders over a period of about 25 years were supplied by the Wilkinson Sword company. These were supplied for all branches of the service although no references have been found concerning the supply of any for officers of the SA Navy and HMCS Protector. Indeed, the procurement of any arms for the local navy is very poorly served with archival references. These purchases from Wilkinson were made in batches as large as 84 down to about half a dozen. Although the colony's first contract with Wilkinson was handled by the Agent General alone (in 1866), all subsequent orders appear to have been overseen in conjunction with the colony's military advisor. There was no War Office involvement in these contracts for officer's swords except that the colony specified that they should follow the regulation

30 SA Parliamentary Papers, Statistical Register, Defences, Naval, 1900
31 GRG45/3 Vol.20 p.25
32 GRG55/1/31 pp.633-4
33 GRG24/6/1855-6 No.222

patterns as laid down by the War Office. It has proved fortuitous for collectors and historians that the colony chose Wilkinson's products because the company is still in business and, although the company is now owned by other interests, they are still very proud of their heritage. The company still retains its sales records, which go back to around 1805, and is generally responsive to enquiries from collectors and researchers tracing details of their firearms and swords.

An extension of the procurement of stores is of course the disposal of them, and there were various ways in which the arms used over the years were disposed out of service. Of the first carbines that came into the colony on 1840, we have seen that 350 were sent to New Zealand with Governor Grey in 1845. Prior to this 150 had been sold to the Tasmanian government for the use of the police force,34 while yet another 150 carbines were sold to the Victorian government in 1852 for service on the Mt Alexander goldfields.35 By the early 1860's those carbines still in the hands of the government were sold by public auction. As mentioned earlier, the flintlock muskets of 1846 were disposed of by public auction in the early 1860's, with 200 of them being bought by the Fijian Company for trade with the native islanders. At the height of the volunteering phase of the 1860's those riflemen who had completed two continuous three-year periods of service were allowed to keep their issue Enfield rifles and cavalry carbines. From the late 1860's rifle clubs were allowed to apply for the issue of used Enfield rifles held in store on payment of a bond and there is no evidence to suggest that many of those so allocated were returned to government store. Similarly, many Martini-Henry rifles passed into the hands of the rifle club movement, although by the time the .303 calibre Martini's had entered service in the 1890's there appears to have been a distinct lessening of public disposal. In fact, the British government, when supplying .303 Martini-Enfields in 1897, issued the proviso that:

> They should not be disposed of by sale which might result in their being used against Her Majesty or Her Majesty's allies, but that they and their component parts should be completely broken up.36

Britain's problems in Ireland were largely responsible for some of this concern, although Ireland had also been cited as a reason for caution when the colony was considering disposal of the Braendlin-Albini rifles in the early 1880's. In that particular instance attempts to sell the rifles to the trade in London were unsuccessful and they remained in the colony until they were transferred to the new Commonwealth government in 1901. It seems the last public disposal of any of South Australia's pre-Federation military firearms took place in 1970 when a number of antique military rifles and carbines that had at some time been allocated to the prisons service were sold through the old Supply and Tender Board of the SA government.37

For many years it was the opinion of a high percentage of collectors and enthusiasts that the Australian colonies (and no doubt others) only received second hand, obsolete, poor quality or otherwise unsatisfactory arm s for their local forces. As seen, research has shown that this was generally not the case. Although there were a few instances where the colonial authorities acted unwisely or were ill-used or less than well advised in their arms purchases, the small arms acquired for the use of the Volunteer, Militia and Permanent forces of South Australia were, more often than not, new, up-to-date, substantial and ideally suited to their purpose.

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34 GRG24/6/1843 No.768
35 GRG24/6/1852 No.1470
36 GRG2/13/1897-8 No.129
37 Author's records.

'THE DONKEY VOTE' – OOPS!

Graham Wilson

I have received, via the editor, some very good feedback on my paper 'The Donkey Vote A VC for Simpson - The Case Against', which appeared in the December 2006 edition of *Sabretache*. However, I would like to make a couple of statements about the article as it appeared.

First of all, yes, I got my Prime Ministers wrong. For some reason I wrote Sir Robert Menzies instead of Harold Holt as the Prime Minister who was involved in the abortive 1967 attempt to have a posthumous VC awarded to Simpson.

Second, unfortunately the article comes across (to me at least) as very much a piece of 'Simpson bashing' and this has never been my intent. I do not blame Simpson himself for the ridiculous myth that has grown up around him. Rather, my paper is aimed at those who continue with the ridiculous claims for the award of a posthumous VC for Simpson.

The paper as it appeared in the December 2006 edition of the journal was very much a 'first cut', and I really should have either tidied it up prior to publication or withdrawn it. Our editor, Anthony Staunton, provided me with an advanced copy of the published paper prior to publication and provided me with an opportunity to amend the paper prior to it going to print. The fact that I did not take this opportunity is entirely my own fault and not having heard from me, Anthony went ahead and published.

Having said all of the above, the basic thrust of the paper has not changed

The paper has progressed quite a bit from the version that was published in December and is reaching a size where I have to start seriously thinking the word 'book'. I am, in fact, giving this some serious thought.

For any reader who felt that I was being unduly harsh to Simpson, please understand that this was never my intention. I would like to make it quite clear, also, that any comments referring to a particular author should not be taken personally. As I do not know, for example, Mr Curran, personally, then any comments made are directed specifically at the information provided or the interpretation of that information by an individual, not at the individual himself.

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SUVLA - A STUDY OF COMMAND & STAFF FAILURES

Tom Johnstone

> [Hopefully]... the reasons for the failure [at Suvla], which affected the fate of the Australian and New Zealand forces more profoundly than any other episode in the campaign, may be laid bare by future historians, probing unflinchingly for the causes.
>
> Dr C.E.W. Bean.1

Introduction

In a table of historical lost opportunities the failure of the Allied campaign to force the passage of the Dardanelles in 1915 is outstanding. Success might have changed the course of world history. The consequences of its failure were far reaching. Each in itself is reasonable food for fascination, but its close geographical proximity to classical Greek triumph, tragedy and heroic failure adds to its potential for mythmaking and revisionist theories. The chief myth spread in Australia was that when the British landed at Suvla they sat down and made tea. The revisionists argue that the whole campaign was predestined to failure. Since, it is claimed; even if the Dardanelles had been lost Turkey could have continued the war from Asia Minor.

This article aims to show that there was a window of opportunity for success at Gallipoli but that in the first crucial 48 hours after the Suvla landing, poor planning by staff and ineffectual direction by senior commanders allowed the Turkish command to seal off the beachhead. It will also show that the selection of commanders for the expedition was known to be flawed from the outset, and proved one of the chief contributors to failure at Suvla and ultimate defeat at Gallipoli. Although outlining events at Anzac over the period 7–28 August 1915, focus will be concentrated on events at Suvla during the same period.

The article will explore the relationship between senior commanders during the South African War, where all senior commanders at Gallipoli had served together. Prejudices engendered in South Africa had dire consequences at Gallipoli. Finally, a comparison with other amphibious landings in the 20th century will show that history invariably repeats itself.

Background to the August Battles at Gallipoli

Following the landings on 25 April 1915 at Ari Burnu (hereafter called Anzac), and Cape Helles, heavy fighting followed at both places for a month before stalemating into attritional warfare. As on the Western Front, fighting at Gallipoli became dominated by machine-guns and artillery. Finally, Lord Kitchener asked General Sir Ian Hamilton, commander-in-chief (CinC), Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), for what he wanted to achieve success and then despatched fifty percent more than was requested.2 The main body of reinforcements was IX Corps commanded by Lt Gen Hon Sir Frederick Stopford, consisting of three New Army divisions, 10th Irish, 11th Northern and 13th Western. The first division to arrived, 13th Western, was 'blooded' by an attachment at Cape Helles, and then transferred to Anzac, together with 29 Brigade from 10th Division.

By 5 August preparations were completed for a renewed offensive to capture vital ground at Anzac. To coincide with this, a landing at Suvla of two divisions shortly to be reinforced by a further two divisions was to outflank the Turkish positions and cut their landward lines of communication.

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1 C.E.W. Bean. Australia in the War of 1914-18: The story of Anzac, vol. 2; Sydney 1941; p. 715.
2 Sir George Arthur. Life of Lord Kitchener, vol. 3, London, 1920; p. 145.

Outline of Operations

Hamilton's concept of operations was for diversionary attacks at Helles and the right at Anzac on 6th August, to be followed at dawn on the 7th by major attacks on the left at Anzac by the equivalent of two divisions aimed at capturing Koja Chemen Tepe (Pt 971), Hill Q and Chunuk Bair. At the same time 11th Northern Division was to land at Suvla on the night of 6/7 August, capture Hill 10 and Chocolate Hill in darkness and Scimitar Hill and W Hills after dawn. Birdwood considered the W Hills were of crucial importance. 10th Irish Division was to land shortly after dawn on the 7th and capture Kiretch Tepe. The dominating Anafarta heights would then be outflanked by 10th Division. 53rd Welsh and 54th Eastern Divisions would land on 10–12 August, go through 10th and 11th Divisions and break the Turkish L of C.

Cape Helles and Anzac 6 - 11 August

On the afternoon of 6th August a feint by elements of 29th Division on the afternoon of 6 August was followed by frontal attacks by 42nd Lancashire and 52nd Lowland Divisions over the next four days. Bravely delivered against well prepared Turkish defences this suffered the same fate as similar attacks there in the April and May battles at that place. At the same time 1 Australian Brigade captured Lone Pine. Both attacks succeeded in attracting part of the Turkish reserves. That evening a New Zealand unit captured Bauchop's Hill as darkness fell. General Birdwood, having got the Turks attention, then launched the left attack.

Major-Gen Alex Godley commanding the Anzac assault had the New Zealand Brigade, 4 Australian Brigade, 13th British Division, and 29 Indian Brigade, with 29 Irish Brigade in reserve. To escape observation the approach march was made in darkness and involved a long trek northwards along the shore before cutting inland through the great Deres, or gully's, leading towards the dominating heights.

The New Zealanders, on the shortest axis, captured Table Top and Rhododendron Hill just as dawn broke. Two Arab platoons on Chunuk Bair seeing the advance of the New Zealanders broke and fled, only a handful of Turks remained. However, just then Colonel Hans Kanengiesser, commanding 9th Turkish Division, arrived on Chunuk Bair on personal reconnaissance. He immediately took command of the situation, rallied some Arabs, and with the few Turks manned Chunuk Bair. When the New Zealanders renewed the attack after a rest, were stopped just 200 metres from the crest.3

The legendry attack of the Australian Light Horse at The Nek, Quinn's Post and Pope's Hill, was ordered in the knowledge that that the Sari Bair objectives had not been taken. In successive waves approximately 1000 troopers charged the three objectives. It was a forlorn hope. Within ten minutes some 800 troopers were casualties; only at Pope's was the objective taken. But when the Light Horsemen ran out of bombs defending the position against Turkish counterattacks, the commander withdrew.4

For two blazing days and stifling nights Godley's force climbed over broken, arid, and shadeless scrubland. Weighed down with arms, ammunition and equipment while being scourged by enemy small arms and artillery fire, they dragged their tired, dehydrated bodies towards the skyline. On 8 August the attack due to begin at 0300 in darkness was late; and delivered in daylight failed everywhere. Part of Monash's brigade was repulsed at Abdel Rahman Ridge, two brigades of 13th Division were lost and scattered. Yet somehow, 6th Gurkhas, hillmen, got to

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3 Hans Kannengiesser. The Campaign in Gallipoli, London; p. 224. See also CEW Bean. Anzac to Amiens, p158-159.

4 C.E.W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens, Melbourne 1993; p. 156-7.

within 90 metres of the summit of Hill Q before being halted. Furthest forward was the Wellington Battalion of the New Zealand Brigade on the heights of Rhododendron Ridge; and two companies reached the shoulder of the Chunuk Bair 'without meeting a shot'.5 But their success was short lived; enfilade fire from Turkish machine-guns and gun-batteries blasted the New Zealanders off the crest. Such was the volume of Turkish fire that the supporting battalions could not get through to assist the Wellingtons. Although faced with elements of two enemy divisions, the New Zealanders held on just a few metres from the crest.

At dawn on 9 August 6th Gurkhas with a few companies of South Lancashires won the summit of Hill Q. As they stood on the crest they saw below the straits of the Dardanelles; but their success was fleeting. Through a tragic error, the assault troops were blasted off the summit by 'friendly fire' from either the guns of the Fleet or army howitzers; which guns fired those fatal rounds was never established. On 10 August a counterattack by a Turkish reserve division led personally by its commander, Mustafa Kemal, annihilated advance elements of 13th Division and was only stopped by the massed machine-guns of the New Zealand Brigade, the guns of the Fleet, and 6th Leinsters at the Apex of Rhododendron Ridge. When the battle died down, although a vast area had been captured, and the beachhead of Anzac more than doubled, the dominating heights remained in Turkish hands. The Anzac offensive had failed, with 12,000 casualties.6 Success or failure of Hamilton's offensive would depend on what occurred at Suvla.

The Suvla Landing 6–7 August 1915

Three brigades of 11th Division were to land at night, at good shingle beaches designated B and C in the area south of Suvla Bay, move around the southern side of the Salt Lake and capture the semi-circular commanding heights, or at least vital points - Chocolate Hill, Scimitar Hill and W Hill. Two brigades of 10th Division were to land at dawn on 7 August, their objective was Kiretch Tepe.

However, General Stopford switched the landing place of one brigade of 11th Division from B beach to one inside Suvla Bay. That brigade was to advance across the plain north of the Salt Lake and take Chocolate Hill. Following this decision, the naval officer in charge of the landing requested permission to reconnoitre inside the bay to check the accuracy of old Admiralty charts; his request was denied on security grounds. That was just the beginning of Stopford's fatal tinkering.

Two brigades of 11th Division landed at B and C Beach's on time at 2130 on 6 August with no casualties, and Lala Baba, a hill near the shore, was carried with the bayonet in darkness. One battalion lost heavily especially in officers, including the commanding officer. Total casualties in the division were 15 officers and 250 other ranks. Apart from these, losses in both brigades were insignificant; the southern side of the bay was won. Six battalions then concentrated around Lala Baba, and made no further movement for over forty-eight precious hours.

Inside the bay the touchdown of the third brigade was chaotic. Instead of finding A Beach, near the northern shoulder, the landing craft steered deep into the bay to a point 200 yards from 'The Cut', ran into shoals and beached a long way offshore. Fire from Lala Baba before it was captured caused casualties in the crowded landing craft, men dropped overboard and, neck deep in water struggled to land; some out of depth had to be rescued. It was after midnight before three battalions were ashore. One battalion, the 11th Manchesters well and confidently led, acted boldly. Forming a defensive flank, they then struck at Suvla Point, Gazi Baba and Karakol Dagh clearing them of Turkish defenders. Meanwhile, the two battalions near The Cut lost their way,

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5 Bean A to A; p. 160.
6 Bean A to A; p. 165.

split up and loosing contact lay down only yards from the beach. Throughout the night, stay-behind Turkish snipers shot obvious British leaders and confused their men. The brigade commander landed at 0300 hours with his fourth battalion, but it was not until after dawn that his brigade was sorted out. By which time all hope of an advance on Chocolate Hill under cover of darkness was gone.

After dawn Turkish guns opened fire, virtually unopposed. A Highland Mountain Battery and a Field Battery landed early on 7 August and two mountain guns were positioned behind Lala Baba opened fire but their counter-battery fire was ineffectual. No effective naval gunfire supported the landing. Indeed, such was the lack of land/sea coordination that when the naval officer in command of the landing craft suggested to a supporting Monitor to fire blind at Turkish positions, the Monitors captain refused to do so without an order from the Headquarters ship which never came.7

Full light showed that all 11th Division was concentrated in a narrow beachhead. Two battalions formed a stop line from the south-west corner of the Salt Lake to the sea; and 11th Manchesters were on Karakol Dagh holding the northern flank. The Manchester battalion had done its work well, but the CO was wounded and 2i/c killed; in all 15 officers and 200 men were casualties. The other nine battalions remained massed between Lala Baba and Hill 10.

Fatal decisions and indecision

The command post of 11th division had been established on Lala Baba shortly after its capture and General Hammersley was quickly in telephone communications with his brigade commanders.8 Crucially, he failed to impose his will on his brigadiers and lost control of his division. A tactical Corps headquarters was established on the beachhead and a Corps Signal Office opened at midnight on 6/7 August. Telephone and telegraph communications were established between the major units at Suvla, and GHQ Imbros at 0200 hours; and with Anzac at 0800 hours on the 7th. However these communications remained unused by the Corps staff throughout the initial landing.9 Against Hamilton's advice, General Stopford established his headquarters on the sloop Jonkil, there he remained isolated from his command until long after the landing had descended into disorder. General Hammersley, the senior commander on the spot at Suvla during the fateful night of 6/7 August exerted no influence on the course of events. He lost sight of the commanders aim and allowed his division to drift into inertia at a critical time. The only battalion he could get to advance was that which was under his personal command, the pioneer battalion, the 6th East Yorks which ought to have been detailed for beach duties.

After dawn on 7 August, Hill 10 was taken; the majority of 11th Division made no further advance for thirty-six hours. Within twelve hours of landing, because of his lack of control Hammersley's division lost its offensive spirit. Stopford and Hamilton failed to intervene quickly to galvanise units and formations. Precious time was granted for the enemy commander to hurry reinforcements forward to threatened places.

As 11th Division was 'settling in' instead of advancing, elements of two brigades of 10th Division arrived off Suvla; the complete 31 Brigade and two battalions of 30 Brigade all under Brig Gen F.F. Hill. Their arrival caused a flurry of messages between Stopford and Hammersley

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7 Brig Gen C.F. Aspinall-Oglander. Military Operations: Gallipoli, vol. 2, London; p. 246.
8 Lieut O.L.D. Gill, RE., 11th Div. Sig. Coy., undated letter of 1915 from a hospital in Egypt, courtesy of his son, Col. M.N. Gill, Irish Army, Retd.
9 Maj-Gen. R.F.H. Nalder. The Royal Corps of Signals, a history of its antecedents and development, London, 1956; p. 161.

as to what Brig Gen Hill's battalions should do. The Navy had located a new landing area close to Suvla Point, A West; near 10th Division's given objective, Kiretch Tepe. Tactically, it was the obvious landing place, for an immediate attack on that vital ridge. Instead all six battalions under Hill were diverted from A West to C Beach. Then having landed, Hill was ordered to pass his battalions through 11th Division and capture Chocolate and Green Hills 'with the cooperation of 11th Division'. The arrival of Sir Bryan Mahon with the remaining two battalions of 30 Brigade and the pioneer battalion failed to change or modify Stopford's order. Instead of being given 'quick orders' verbally, Hill had to wait for written orders, When eventually the operation order was drafted, typed, and distributed by HQ 11th Division, Hill received orders at midday, and five battalions began an advance that should have made twelve hours earlier by 11th Division. The sixth battalion, 5th Inniskillings, was ordered to relieve 6th Manchesters on Karakol Dagh. The Commanders plan was being drastically revised without his knowledge or consent.

Chocolate and Green Hills

Hill's battalions were committed to move around three quarters of the Salt Lake in full view of Turkish artillery observers. The Irish battalions crossed the Cut and with shells busting in the massed ranks marched steadily across the narrow spit and 'cut' through which the flow of sea water to the salt lake could be controlled. The GSO1, 11th Division, had personally taken the operation order from Hammersley to commander 34 Brigade, Brig Gen Sitwell, ordering him to support Hill's advance. Struck by the bearing of Hill's battalions as they passed, the GSO1 turned and said to Sitwell 'you cannot stay here and refuse to support that advance'.10 But Sitwell refused.

The resolute advance of Hill's battalions is confirmed by the German commander who noted how they advanced 'bolt upright as though on parade without using cover'.11 Near Hill 10, as his battalions paused to strip their webbing equipment from 'field service marching order' into 'battle order', Hill received fresh instructions from Hammersley. The attack was postponed until 1730 hours when it would be supported by two battalions of 33 Brigade on the right flank. Hill's battalions attacked at sunset with considerable élan and captured Chocolate Hill and Green Hill; coinciding with an attack by two battalions which crossed the Salt Lake and attacked from the west. That night, Hill's battalions rested, water was available at captured wells, but 'stay-behind' Turkish snipers were active and claimed many 'hits'.

When Mahon's pioneer battalion, 5th Royal Irish, were detailed for beach duties only two battalions, 5th and 6th Munsters were available to capture the divisional objective; Kiretch Tepe, one of the vital objectives. They disembarked at noon, their orders were simple climb Karokol Dagh, pass through the 11th Manchesters and capture Kiretch Tepe. At 1330, the two battalions leap-frog the exhausted Manchester and began climbing the long whale backed ridge before them. Defending the ridge was one Turkish battalion supported by two guns; they knew the ground and defended well. The Munsters suffered casualties but by nightfall had reached a position 100 metres from the crest. Two guns were sent to support the Munsters attack on Kiretch Tepe, but they were commandeered by Brig Gen Sitwell, whose 34th Brigade was still not in action.12 At first light on Sunday 8 August, with no artillery support, 6th Munsters led by its second-in-command, Major Jephson, charged and broke the brave Turks who defended their positions to the last. It became known as Jephson's Post. This was the moment when a second wave should have gone through the Munsters to capture the remainder of Kiretch Tepe. But there was no second wave; and the exhausted Munsters battalions were short or out of ammunition, rations and water. Water and ammunition re-supply arrangements broke down on the beach and no water ammunition was sent to any of the forward battalions.

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10 Aspinall-Oglander ,v.2, p. 256.
11 Aspinall-Oglander, v.2, p. 266.
12 Aspinall-Oglander, v.2, p. 274.



Kiretch Tepe - 7 - 8 August

Without supplies or support the attack on Kiretch Tepe stalled. With four of his battalions at Anzac (where none of them would be engaged until 10 August)) and Hill with five battalions had taken and was holding Chocolate and Green Hills, Mahon, had no battalions to support or relieve those on the ridge. Behind Kiretch Tepe was Ak Bashi, the main Turkish ammunition dump for the Gallipoli Peninsula, and springs from which water gushed in plenty. Both prizes went begging on 8 August.

Chaos on the beach

The provision of water in the torrid heat of summer is critical to the success of any operation in the Middle East. At the twin battles of Gaza/Beersheba Allenby employed some thirty thousand camels with Egyptian drivers to carry water from the watering points to forward areas, where two infantry battalions controlled watering points. The battle of Beersheba was fought primarily to gain its precious wells. Even in temperate climes water is a vital consideration in military planning. In June 1917 at the taking of Messines Ridge in Flanders, General Plumer's operation order stipulated that every man in the assault divisions would carry two full water-bottles.13 The battalions at Suvla were ill-equipped to deal with the improvident water supply they found there. Acting on operational orders all battalion water carts had been left in Egypt with the transport echelons. Moreover, the CinCs orders instructed units to return collective cooking utensils to Ordnance depots in Egypt before re-embarkation.14 The navy had expected the army to find wells ashore, and little provision had been made for bulk watering on the beachhead. Well drilling equipment as well as bulk water containers and field watering troughs were with the engineering stores on SS *Prah*, but this ship had low level priority and was not to be unloaded for several days. Adding to the shortage was the grounding on shoals within the bay of a water-lighter. When hoses were eventually run between lighter and shore, it was found there were no bulk water containers. Thirsty men were expected to queue and fill their water-bottles at a hose-point. The erection of piers by the Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train, without which heavy equipment could not be unloaded, was delayed because the landing-craft carrying the pier parts couldn't use A Beach. When the navy discovered a suitable place they neglected to inform the Commander Royal Engineers.15 No Corps administrative staff was on the spot to short-circuit staff unloading tables, pass information, and disseminate orders rapidly to mitigate the developing confusion. Equally critically was the lack of Corps general staff liaison officers on the spot to inform the corps commander of developments.

By evening on 7 August the situation on the open beaches at Suvla had descended into chaos. Crazed with thirst, some soldiers pierced the hoses with bayonets, much water was wasted;16 while men in the forward positions suffered badly for lack of water.

Lack of transport was another problem. Fifty mules were landed to supply five brigades. In succeeding days an estimated twenty-five per cent of every unit was engaged in supply-carrying duties to maintain a continuous flow to the front. This drained fighting units of essential personnel at critical times.17

The paucity of watering arrangements had the added effect of preventing horses being landed, which further exacerbated the transport situation and delayed the landing of artillery. One battery commander asked his Commander Royal Artillery the reason for the disembarkation delays,

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13 16th Division Administrative Order. Hobday Papers, Liddle Collection, Leeds University.
14 Sir Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, vol. 2, London, 1920; p. 332.
15 Aspinall-Oglander, v.2 p. 262.
16 Aspinall-Oglander, v.2, pp. 262-3. See also, Maj B. Cooper. 10th Division at Gallipoli, London, 1918; p84. & Gen Sir I Hamilton Final Despatch, London, 1917; p96; & Hamilton, Diary, v.2, p. 329.
17 Major B. Cooper, 10th Division at Gallipoli, London, 1918; p. 146.

received the sardonic reply 'We are waiting for Turkish reinforcements'.18 The pioneer battalion of 11th Division, instead of being used as labour at the landing beaches, was inland misemployed as a line battalion in the absence of battle infantry which would not advance. However, some experienced battalion quartermasters had disobeyed orders and retained cooking Dixie's. These, together with large biscuit tins were pressed into service to carry water to Hill's battalions. Although wells near Chocolate Hill were captured and were brought into service, naturally Turkish gunners and snipers zeroed in on those places and inflicted significant casualties.

Sunday 8 August - The Wasted Day.

Success in amphibious offensive operations depends upon the landing force wresting the initiative from the enemy by unremitting offensive action. At Suvla on 8 August 1915, the absence of this was never more evident. Throughout that Sunday the units of IX Corps did little except consolidate their positions, while the logistic chaos remained unresolved. Meanwhile, three battalions on Kiretch Tepe had not been supplied with water since landing and men were literally dying of thirst. A party of desperate men finally attracted the attention of a supporting destroyer, HMS *Grampus*, and explained their plight; the navy rushed water to them at once.19

Meanwhile, 31 Brigade dug in on Chocolate and Green Hills where Irish officers chaffed impatiently waiting for orders to return to their division. The Corps commander congratulated his troops on having landed successfully. Misunderstanding the concept of operations, Stopford appears to have envisaged creating a secure base area around the beachhead from which to launch an orthodox in-line offensive, rather that using the beach as a springboard for immediate offensive action. Later in the day battalions from two of 11th Divisions brigades slowly moved forward. One battalion protected the right flank of the Irish on Kiretch Tepe; the other three came up into line with Hill's force facing Anafarta Ridge. That evening two battalions at last began climbing the vital high ground. 6th East Yorks (Pioneers) occupied Scimitar Hill, while 9th West Yorks began climbing Anafarta Ridge. The West Yorks had almost reached the top when the arrival of Turkish reinforcements brought furiously resistance. The commander of 32 Brigade, Br-Gen. Haggard, the most active of the three brigade commanders in 11th Division, was severely wounded by shellfire, he had a leg amputated and was evacuated. His wounding delayed orders to reinforce the units on Scimitar and Anafarta ridge.

On the right of the Lake, 33 Brigade extended the line southwards towards Anzac, and although within striking distance of W Hill, no attempt was initiated to capture that vital position. Brig Gen Sitwell obdurately refused to advance 31 Brigade and the divisional and corps commanders failed to remove him at once. Some of Sitwell's men swam to cool off; this was seen by some observers at Anzac.

While commander IX Corps reposed on Jonkil, Liman von Sanders and Mustafa Kemal urged their troops to the scene with energy lacking in either Hamilton or Stopford. When Sir Ian, arrived at Suvla on the evening of the 8th he intervened too late, and his orders for an immediate attack on the heights did more harm. Hammersley, instead of ordering Sitwell's 34 Brigade to do this, sent orders to HQ 32 Brigade to concentrate and 6th East Yorks, named particularly by Hammersley, obviously so out of touch he had no idea of its position; withdrew from Scimitar Hill. It was instantly reoccupied by the Turks. Failure to hold that vital hill was to prove costly for the British.

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18 Aspinal-Oglander, v.2, p.275.
19 Aspinal-Oglander, v.2, p. 295; & Major Terence Vershoyle, 5th Inniskillings, Memoirs, Liddle Collection, Leeds University.

The Battles for Suvla Heights

The assault on Anafarta heights demanded by General Hamilton took place on 9 August, after Turkish reinforcements had arrived. 11th Division support by Hill's Force attacked disjointedly and without cohesion. The battalions were hopelessly mixed across the Suvla Plain. Despite the bravery of the troops the attack failed to carry the heights against determined resistance. Two fresh Territorial divisions, 53rd Welsh and 54th Eastern were landed and committed piecemeal on 10, 11 and 12 August, with no better results. The Suvla Force, in piecemeal attacks, battered against the stubborn defenders on Anafarta ridges, Scimitar Hill and W Hills which were growing stronger from reinforcements hurried forward from Asia.

Kiretch Tepe 15–16 August.

At last responding to Mahon's pleas, on 13 August, having allowed von Sanders seven days to strength the defences on Kiretch Tepe, Stopford ordered the return of Hill's force to 10th Division. After a day's rest and reorganisation, two depleted brigades of 10th Division attacked at dawn on 15 August. The next forty-eight hours saw some of the fiercest fighting of the Gallipoli campaign. The whole northern side of the ridge, where naval gunfire support was provided, was captured. However, on the southern side a single battery of light mountain guns, was unable to suppress the Turkish machine-gunners and two Inniskilling battalions were cut to pieces. The battle then raged from each side of half the ridge. Towards the end of the battle their ammunition having ran out, and the Irish were reduced to rolling boulders over the edge of the crest at the Turks on the other side, in the words of the official British historian, 'for want of anything more deadly'.20 Officers wounded there might later reflect while recovering that Hamilton's operational order had assured them that the Turks 'stock of ammunition is low'.21

There are few British accounts of the battle for that vital ridge, except that by the official historian and regimental histories. Well might Winston Churchill state: 'This action does not bulk large in British accounts and its critical character seems scarcely to have been appreciated'.22 Ian Hamilton, for reasons never disclosed made no mention of the battle for Kiretch Tepe in his despatches. Either he was unaware of it, or wished to avoid drawing attention to what Churchill called 'its critical character'. Thereby exposing his failure to identify and support the most promising attack made at Suvla.

On the other hand, the Turkish commander was very alive to the danger. Hans Kannengiesser, wrote: 'These were again days of the heaviest fighting on which the balance of success seemed to tremble to and fro. Liman von Sanders was again personally on the spot.'23 The German ADC to von Sanders, Major Prigge, was also explicit about the critical nature of the battle when he confided to Kanngiesser: 'The chief danger lies at present on our right wing, by Edje Liman [Ejelmer] The English have suffered enormous losses and the battles were far more bitter than any we have had so far.24 Conscious of the need to hold this vital ground, von Sanders was again on the scene, hurrying reinforcements from the Gulf of Saros and Asia side. Dr Bean wrote:

> Its most important effect was that, in order to concentrate the troops which resisted it, von Sanders had been forced to leave the sea border nearer the head of the Gulf of Saros completely bare of

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20 Aspinall-Oglander, v.2, p. 323.
21 Hamilton, Diary, v.2, p. 329.
22 Sir Winston Churchill, World Crisis. London, 1942; p. 874.
23 Kannengiesser, p. 224.
24 Kannengiesser, p. 225.

> defence, while on the southern side of the Dardanelles 'there were left to protect the coast only three battalions and a few batteries.25

Liman von Sanders personally supervised their immediate deployment at Kiretch Tepe. After the war he declared: 'If during the attacks on 15 and 16 August the British had captured Kiretch Tepe, the whole position of the 5th Army would have been outflanked. The British might have then achieved a decisive and final victory.'26

Fortunately for him, his opponent, Sir Ian Hamilton, apparently out of touch with the situation, was disrupting the command structure of IX Corps at this critical time. Their actions epitomize the relative grasp of situation, and style of each commander.

On the very day the attack began, 15 August, by Hamilton's orders, Stopford, Hammersley and Stillwell were relieved of command. Pending the arrival of General Byng from France, Maj-Gen H de B. de Lisle, GOC 29th Division, was transferred from Helles to Suvla as temporary corps commander. There is something of a mystery surrounding what happened to Mahon which will be explored later. One account has it that, on being told of de Lisle's appointment, Mahon resigned, handed over to Nichol and went to Imbros. Another makes out that he was also sacked but later reinstated on orders from Kitchener.27 What is certain is that Mahon went to Imbros and Maj-Gen W.E. Peyton commanded 10th Division between 19–23 August. In the middle of this command shake-up, an appeal for reinforcements for Kiretch Tepe arrived at Corps Headquarters. But, de Lisle, unfamiliar with the battle situation, delayed making a decision. Nichol and Hill, their exhausted and shattered brigades, out of ammunition and almost completely without officers, withdrew their surviving men to the start line.

Like Churchill, Dr Bean pondered the situation and concluded:

> What would have been Hamilton's action had he been thoroughly aware of all this [the battle for Kiretch Tepe], is idle to conjecture. But it is improbable that, during the days when de Lisle was reorganising at Suvla, any other effective action would have been taken.28

In other words, it was already too late to retrieve the situation. The fleeting moment that separates defeat from victory had not been grasped, and the end a foregone conclusion, was just a matter of time.

The Final Attack.

The final phase of the August battles at Gallipoli began on 21 August, on the left at Anzac for Hill 60 and on the right at Suvla for Scimitar Hill and W Hills. It was intended that the attacks should commence simultaneously, however limited artillery dictated that both attacks were mounted separately.

For this operation Hamilton belatedly switched the veteran regular 29th Division from Helles to Suvla, this with 11th Division attacked in line, 11th on the right opposite W Hills and 29th on the left opposite Scimitar Hill. A dismounted Yeomanry division fresh from Egypt, was in reserve. Both infantry divisions were under-strength due to battle casualties. In total the assault troops numbered 14,300, but by this time the Turkish strength at Suvla had increased to 20,000. The attack began in the afternoon and in fierce fighting units of 29th Division gained the crest of Scimitar Hill; but once again misfortune dogged the luckless 11th Division; loosing direction in

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25 ean Story of Anzac v.2, p722. Bean was quoting von Sanders Fünf Jahre Türkei p. 116.
26 Field-Marshal Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, Norfolk Va 1927; p. 67. See also Bean Story of Anzac v.2, p. 722.
27 Papers of Colonel the 8th Earl Granard. Public Record Office of Northern Ireland
28 Bean, Story, p. 722.

thick smoke from burning scrub, its left brigade moved obliquely across the path of the right brigade of 29th Division creating confusion and delaying their attack. The unit which won the crest, 1st Inniskillings, unsupported by the right attack and deluged by a concentration of artillery and machine-gun fire was forced back. The last reserve, five brigades of Yeomanry went forward. Their left brigade, led personally by its brigadier, Lord Longford, stormed the hill at sunset and with extraordinary bravery gained the crest. For a time it seemed they might win, but like 29th Division, the Yeomanry on the crest were subjected to a storm of fire and practically annihilated. The brigadier and his brigade major were among the dead of 5,300 casualties more that one third of the total assault troops. Elsewhere the Yeomanry fared little better than 11th Division.

The Anzac attack on 21 August consisted of elements of four brigades, 4 Australian, 29 Indian, 29 Irish, and the New Zealand Brigade, all commanded by Maj-Gen A.J. Godley. The attack won considerable ground including the precious wells at Kabak Kuyu, but the heavily fortified crest of Hill 60 defied all efforts to storm it. Reinforced by the newly arrived 18th Australian Battalion, a fresh assault was made by the same units on 28 August, and it nearly succeeded, but the troops that won the crest, 5th Connaught Rangers, were overwhelmed by successive Turkish counterattacks and the late arrival of reinforcements.29

Although the connecting strip between Anzac and Suvla was considerably widened, the crest of Hill 60 remained firmly in Turkish control until the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac. The last throw of Hamilton's dice had failed. From this time until the evacuation of Suvla on 19–20 December, the front line there remained virtually the same as it had been on the evening of 7 August; following the advances made by two brigades of 10th Division and two battalions of 11th Division.

The Commanders Backgrounds

The war in South Africa had exposed many weaknesses in the British Army most of which were rectified following an inquiry and report by Lord Esher. All the British senior commanders of WWI came to prominence in South Africa. Ian Hamilton, a substantive colonel at the beginning of the war, was appointed acting lieutenant-general by Lord Roberts. This was despite his having contributed to the early defeats of the British in Natal, by neglecting fundamental principles of war at Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill; where he was surprised by a Boer night attack and almost lost a vital ridge. Subsequent to his promotion as divisional commander Hamilton erred repeatedly. At Doornkop, while French's mounted force was actually outflanking the Boer positions, Hamilton ordered an unnecessary infantry frontal assault which led to heavy loss of life.30 At Diamond Hill, when Roberts ordered an outflanking move, Hamilton again directed a frontal attack. Only the spirited dash of mounted infantry under de Lisle saved Hamilton's division from defeat. That debt to de Lisle was repaid at Suvla. During the great Boer raid by Christian de Wet, Hamilton's division was ordered to seal an escape route at Olifant's Nek but moved so dilatorily that de Wet escaped Kitchener's trap. Failure to capture de Wet's force, prolonged the war in South Africa. Only Lord Roberts' loyalty to his protégé saved Ian Hamilton from dismissal by Kitchener.31

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Kitchener, CinC Indian Army, dispatched General Hamilton to the Japanese side as an observer. Present at the siege of Port Arthur and the battle of

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29 Aspinal-Oglander, v2, p. 360-2.
30 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, London, 1979; p. 307.
31 Pakenham, pp. 450-1. Rawlinson, on Lord Robert's staff, wrote in his diary, 'Johnny [Hamilton] was ordered to go to Oliphants Nek but he did not go there and in consequence De Wet has eluded us. This will prolong the war considerably...' Pakenham, p. 451.

Mukden, Hamilton witnessed the first battlefields of the 20th Century where the power of heavy artillery and machine-guns was clearly demonstrated for the first time in siege conditions not unlike the Western Front ten years later. Notwithstanding the lessons of Port Arthur, when the Gallipoli landings took place, Hamilton went for 'the thickest part of the fence'. At V Beach during the Cape Helles landings, the sea was 'dyed red with blood'.

Following the landings at Gallipoli on 25 April, by tight press censorship, and carefully worded despatches and letters, Hamilton and his staff kept the War office in ignorance of the true state of affairs within the MEF. With the normal channels closed to them officers and war correspondents took circuitous routes to get word home. Colonel the Earl of Granard commanding a battalion with 10th Division, was, until he departed for active service, Master of the Horse at the Court of St James. Sure in the knowledge it would be repeated in the highest possible circles, he wrote on 13 August, before the battle for Kiretch Tepe to his countess.

> This campaign is going as badly as it can. You have doubtless seen our losses in the papers. 10th Division has lost over 114 officers and c.3,000 men killed and wounded. Ian Hamilton is entirely responsible ... and the sooner he is recalled the better. He has run the whole show like a madman. He will take no advice, and unless he is soon recalled it is difficult to know what will happen ... Owing to General Hamilton's action we have not the number necessary for an advance. I believe that the 11th Division have lost about 205 officers and 5,000 men. This could have been avoided by proper generalship.32

The casualty list of 10th Division during the battle for Kiretch Tepe on 15–16 August, was published as the letter was received in London, it would only add to Granard's contention.

Veteran war correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph*, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, also circumvented censorship by having a letter carried to London by Keith Murdoch for distribution there.33 That these devious means succeeded in getting something of the truth back to London was made clear when Maj-Gen C.E. Callwell, Director of Military Operations, briefed Maj-Gen Lynden-Bell, Major-General General Staff, before his departure with Field-Marshal Kitchener for Gallipoli on a fact-finding mission for the government.

> We don't think Ian Hamilton and his crowd are telling us the truth about the situation in the Dardanelles - and we are confirmed in this by a letter from an Australian War Correspondent called Murdoch.34

Lord Kitchener toured Gallipoli in September and his subsequent report spelled the end of Hamilton's army career.

Commander IX Corps and GOC 10th (Irish) Division were both Lieutenant-Generals, but with very different backgrounds and temperaments. The Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford, a younger son of the Irish Earl of Courtown, was introduced early to Court life where he became a page to Queen Victoria. A Grenadier, after regimental service he was appointed to General Sir Garnet Wolseley's staff as ADC during the Egyptian campaign of 1882 and in the Sudan in 1885. His only command in action was a composite half-battalion in the Ashanti war. After service in South Africa as Military Secretary to Sir Redvers Buller, he became chief of staff at Aldershot. Later, following several appointments at the War Office, he was GOC London District before retiring as Lieutenant of the Tower of London.35

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32 Granard Papers.
33 Alan Moorhead, Gallipoli, London, 1956: p308.
34 Maj-Gen. Sir Arthur Lynden Bell, Memoirs. L.C. Leeds Uni.
35 DNB.

A Connaughtman, Sir Bryan Mahon was commissioned into the 8th Irish Hussars, and seconded to the Anglo-Egyptian Army, served in the Sudan, South Africa and India. He was essentially a 'colonial soldier'. One of that band of professionals, who raised, trained, and officered the reconstructed Egyptian army for the re-conquest of the Sudan. After the battle of Omdurman, Mahon led the cavalry in Reginald Wingate's force which finally destroyed the Kalifha's following. Shortly after the disasters of 'black week' in South Africa when the British were defeated in quick succession, at Colenso, Magersfontein and Stomberg, Mahon moved to South Africa and commanded the mounted force which relieved Mafeking. His force achieved this by out riding the no-slouch Boers, illustrating the reason for his army nickname, 'Mahout' - driver. Afterwards he commanded a flying column in Archibald Hunter's highly successful 10th Division operating in the Brandwater basin. Mahon declined command of a cavalry brigade to return to the Sudan as Military Governor of Kordofan. It was a very turbulent province, and in 1903 only his prompt action speedily put down a rebellion. Service in India followed. There, Mahon's last appointment was GOC organizing and training the Lucknow Division for the Indian corps Kitchener was preparing for the European war he knew was coming.36

Mahon, described as 'the soul of frankness',37 , was a hard-riding cavalryman, in his element hunting or on the polo field, pig-sticking or steeple-chasing. He was aged 53 when he raised and trained the 10th Division so well that Kitchener told Hamilton 'it would be impossible to leave him behind'.38 The service career of Bryan Mahon, following his return to duty, hardly fits the description of the stereotype 'dugout general' of 1914. After Suvla, as British CinC Macedonia, Mahon created the Entrenched Camp around Salonika and skilfully handled French General Sarrail and the tense politico/military situation he found in Greece. Moreover, when the overwhelming Bulgarian attack at Kosturino threatened to cut off an Allied force deep in Serbia, Mahon supported well both the French and his own 10th Division, still under command of Nichol, in their fighting withdrawal to Salonika in the depth of winter 1915-1916. A known Arabist, in 1916 Mahon was moved to Egypt in an attempt to head-off the Senussi rebellion in the Western Desert. He suffered a heart attack before taking up the appointment and returned to the United Kingdom.

In the aftermath of the Easter Rebellion in Dublin, Mahon became CinC Ireland, and was winning the hearts and minds campaign when the imposition of conscription in Ireland during 1918, contrary to his advice, forced him out. His last wartime appointment was military governor of Lille following its capture in September 1918. Following Irish independence, Mahon became a senator in the first Dáil Éireann.

Selection of Commanders.

Few subjects are more important to a military commander than the selection of subordinates Field-Marshal Montgomery, who insisted on the personal selection of all officers down to lieutenant-colonel, estimated that while commanding 8th Army one third of his working time was occupied by the study of personalities.39

During 1914-1915 the British army expanded from a total of twelve divisions' worldwide, to eighty. Compared to the huge conscripted peacetime armies of continental Europe, the British and Dominion armies possessed only a small reservoir of reserve officers, and an even smaller number of trained staff officers. It was a shortage exacerbated by the heavy officer casualties suffered during the BEFs encounter battles of 1914, the German Spring offensive of 1915 and

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36 DNB. & Robert Hill, Slatin Pasha, Oxford, 1964; pp. 65, 70-71,78. & Cooper 10th Division
37 Cyril Falls, Military Operations: Macedonia, vol. 1, London; p. 99.
38 DNB. See also Falls Macedonia, and Cooper .10th. Division.
39 F-M Montgomery, Memoirs of. London, 1958; p. 80

the subsequent British counteroffensive at Aubers Ridge and Festubert. The loss of so many highly trained professional officers was never made good until those of the New Armies had undergone in human terms highly expensive 'on the job training' during 1915-1917. Meanwhile, finding commanders and staff officers for the new formations placed severe strains on the regular officer corps. The BEF in France had first priority, while those formations selected for 'out of theatre operations' had to make do with commanders from the retired list, or inexperienced reserve officers. Some were good, some were to prove inadequate.

Command of an expeditionary force and its formations requires qualities easily defined, and well known. Indeed, Hamilton had stipulated the postulant for IX Corps should have 'stiff constitution and nerve'.40 When the choice of commander for the IX Corps in the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was being considered, Hamilton applied to the War Office for Generals Byng or Rawlinson, both then commanding army corps with the BEF; his request was denied. Kitchener refused because Field-Marshal Sir John French could spare neither, adding a rider that they were both junior to Mahon; who Hamilton maintained 'would not be up to running a Corps out here'.41 Kitchener then suggested Ewart or Stopford; Hamilton, while admitting Ewart's good qualities (he was Hamilton's successor as Adjutant-General), rejected him on grounds of 'his constitutional habit' whatever that meant.42 Stopford was therefore selected for a demanding operational role by negative criteria; seniority. Stopford had been devoted to Redvers Buller,43 and would have known of Hamilton's part in having Buller sent home from South Africa and dismissal from the Army.44 It is hardly likely that Stopford and Hamilton were on friendly terms.

Hamilton, described by a modern historian as 'brilliant, excitable, vindictive',45 reveals in his diary that Mahon was unwelcome; chiefly because he barred the appointment of Byng or Rawlinson, who Hamilton had requested. They, in addition to being excellent commanders had, like Hamilton, been members of the Roberts 'ring' in South Africa. Curiously, Allenby and Plumer, not members of the 'ring', were not considered. Either, as their subsequent careers prove, would have been a better choice. Both had successfully commanded Australian and New Zealand troops in South Africa, and therefore could be relied upon to fit better into the MEF.

Comparing their respective careers leads to the conjecture that a possibly reason for the lack of welcome given by Hamilton to Mahon at Gallipoli was jealousy. Hamilton's repeated failures on the veldt were in marked contrast with the acclaim Mahon received throughout the British Empire for his relief of Mafeking. The question must be asked whether it for this reason that Mahon's wings were clipped by the detachment of his 29 Brigade to Anzac, where it was not in action until 10 August. Mahon's frustration can be imagined, and when he complained directly to Hamilton, there is an element of satisfaction in Hamilton's Diary as he recorded, 'He besought me to get Hill and his battalions back to their own command'.46 The obvious tactical necessity for concentrating 10th Division on Kiretch Tepe should not have necessitated Mahon's appeal.

Failures of Command

Hamilton made five fatal mistakes at Gallipoli; the first was in choosing a heavily defended area and a natural fortress capable of being held by few troops as his landing places on 25 April. Hans Kannengiesser described them as, 'A better example of a coast for defence than I have ever seen

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40 Hamilton, Diary v.2, p. 307.
41 Hamilton, Diary v.2, p. 307.
42 Hamilton, Diary v.2, p. 307.
43 Pakenham, p. 368.
44 Pakenham, p. 369.
45 Pakenham, p. 369.
46 Hamilton, Diary, v.2, p. 75.

explained in the military academy by teachers of tactics.'47 Suvla, which was 'off the target' was lightly defended and had better 'going' for a rapid advance. The advances made on 7th August by inexperience troops fresh out of UK demonstrate the possibilities.

The other mistakes were separating operations and logistics staffs of his HQ in different locations with little liaison between; intervening too late at Suvla; and reorganising the command structure of IX Corps in the middle of the battle for Kiretch Tepe; weakening 10th Division by detaching 29 Brigade to Anzac. This denied Mahon the men needed to capture Kiretch Tepe on 7 August.

The command structure at Suvla broke down during the first forty-eight fateful hours, when the outcome of the campaign was irrevocably decided. The shortcomings in 11th Division's performance on 7 August must be attributed to its GOC, General Hammersley. Clearly ill from the beginning of the campaign he was medically evacuated at the same time as Hamilton's dismissal order arrived on 15 August. But why was his dismissal delayed so long? The failure of 11th Division to maintain the offensive momentum after landing lost the initiative. Hammersley's senior brigadier, Sitwell, must surely rank as the evil genius of IX Corps, his shortcomings ought to have been identified early during divisional training. But he certainly warranted sacking early on 7 August. Other failures of senior commanders which cannot be attributed to illness bear examination. Stopford changed the Commanders concept of operations without reference to Hamilton, broke up 10th Division at a vital time, and sidelined its commander.

When Hamilton detached 29 Brigade to an already overcrowded Anzac on the morning of 6 August, there was already a water shortage there. As Birdwood reported to Kitchener. 'On the 5th [August] I was almost on the point of wiring to say not only could I not receive reinforcements, but must contemplate sending off some of my troops.'48 The British official historian remarked, 'it can be no matter for surprise if he [Mahon] felt that neither he nor his division had been given a fair chance'.49 But the affect of this break-up was more than just hurting the feelings of a divisional commander. It was a disaster for the success of the campaign.

Staff Failures

The August temperatures in the eastern Mediterranean made it imperative that essential bulk watering equipment should have had high priority in loading tables, and its use prearranged. Neglecting this fundamental requirement was a contributing factor to the day one inertia of 11th Division. Moreover, artillery and transport animals could not be landed until water was available. This delayed the deployment of artillery. With little artillery at Suvla to support the infantry attacks and suppress enemy fire the obvious necessity for land-based observers with ship-shore communications to the fleet was overlooked or neglected.

No time was allowed for battalions arriving from the British Isles to acclimatise and become battle fit. They were thrown in the dark against an enemy of proven courage and tenacity, fighting on home ground and known to react with vigour to the unexpected. Unit commanders were not briefed on their operational role before or even during embarkation; which was without security risk. Security, although necessary, was so obsessive, that only General Stopford and his GOCs were briefed on the commander's plan, and then separately and late, with no time for 'massaging' difficulties. Privates and brigadiers were equally poorly-informed about their role.

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47 Kannengeisser, p. 185.
48 Moorhead, p. 256.
49 Aspinall-Oglander, v.2, p. 275

Small wonder that 11th Division seemed to be subdued as it sailed from Imbros.[50] They were sailing into the unknown.

Military Politics

Personality clashes between commanders are as old as war; especially between Napoleon's marshals. During the South African war, only 15 years previous, the dispute between the Buller and Roberts factions was deep, bitter and public. The Ulster crisis forming the backdrop to the outbreak of the First World War also caused deep schism between senior British officers, exemplified by Field-Marshal Lord Roberts 'cutting' the CIGS, Sir John French for his alleged lack of support for Ulster Unionists.

General Hamilton's courage and intellectual ability are beyond question, but his record in South Africa shows him to have been dilatory in making vital decisions at crucial times. He was also something of partisan intriguer, His whispering campaign in South Africa brought down Sir Redvers Buller to Lord Roberts advantage.[51] Certainly, in his letters from Imbros, Sir Ian informed Kitchener that Mahon with five battalions had failed to take Kiretch Tepe which was held only by 500 Turks.[52] Mahon of course had three battalions, and even in the days before machine-guns and repeating rifles it was considered that the attack should be three to one of the defence - on a level battlefield. When Mahon had tea with Hamilton at GHQ shortly after joining, Mahon told him 'either he should be given a Corps or his Lieut-General's rank should be reverted to that of Major-General', and Hamilton agreed.[53] Among Irish officers it was rumoured that Mahon was to be given a Corps.[54] It would appear that Sir Ian while decrying Mahon's potential privately to Kitchener, and undermining Mahon's position by sending inaccurate reports to London, was, over tea, promising promotion to Mahon. It was a dishonest dodge for 'getting the best out of the fellow'. Hamilton lacked moral integrity which is essential to high command.

The conjunction of such incompatible personalities in senior command appointments at Gallipoli, was highly unfortunate. In the heat and battle-tension of that Eastern Mediterranean summer, the situation was ripe for old enmities to surface. History rarely affords second chances to leading players. Kitchener, despite his knowledge of Ian Hamilton's moral and military frailties, approved his appointment to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force; from that point, Stopford's selection as commander IX Corps, was inevitable.

When Stopford visited Anzac before the Suvla operation, Birdwood urged him, 'his one chance was to follow our tactics on landing, viz. To hurl people forward as fast as he possibly could throughout the night ...'[55] That Sir Frederick Stopford was incapable of doing this is manifestly clear. However, giving different circumstances, it is possible to visualise 'Mahout' Mahon at Suvla on 7 August, riding a favourite hunter, goading on brigades and battalions towards the objective heights in a way both Hamilton and Stopford would regard as distasteful. But, given his nature, this may have been precisely what Hamilton didn't want Mahon to be seen doing. Yet, it was the only way success could have been achieved at Suvla in August 1915; and with it the probability of victory at the Dardanelles.

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50 Arthur, v.3, p. 168.
51 Pakenham, p. 369.
52 Hamilton, Diary, v.2 p. 313. Hamilton's account also mislead Dr Bean, who repeated 'Mahon's five battalions'; see Story v.2, p. 715. 54.
53 Hamilton, Diary, v2, p. 333.
54 Granard Papers.
55 Arthur, v.3, p.168.

The revisionist theory

The theory that Turkey could have continued the war after the capture of the Dardanelles is undermined by Liman von Saunders assertion to Berlin that without German assistance Turkey would be defeated. Rumania was conquered in 1916 to protect the supply route to Turkey. Without the German and Austrian artillery, machine-gun units and flying squadrons supplied in this way, it is highly doubtful that the prolonged Turkish resistance in the Palestine campaigns of 1917–18 could have been continued. Without commanding the Dardanelles, supplying and maintaining these units would have been impossible.

The Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, who being very close to the leading players in the Gallipoli drama, failed to examine them incisively and objectively. Lord Haldane, the previous holder of that office and one of the greatest reformers in the British Army's history, would probably have done so. On the outbreak of war in 1914, Prime Minister H.H. Asquith had wanted to retain Haldane in office, however, like the First Sea, Lord Louis of Battenberg, Haldane, was forced from office by public hysteria against anyone with German connections. It was with deep misgivings that Asquith appointed Kitchener. Asquith was right to have his doubts. Haldane at the War Office and Battenberg at the Admiralty, could have countered Churchill's intemperate schemes more effectively than Kitchener and Fisher. The roots of the Gallipoli failure lie very deep indeed. Well might the French premier quote to Lloyd George Talleyrand's dictum that 'war is much too serious to be left to military men'.

The fundamental military lesson of Gallipoli is to avoid mounting an operation prematurely. Had the premature attacks not been made on the Dardanelles in November 1914, then February and March 1915; a well planned naval attack, with army support, in April 1915 would probably have succeeded. A joint force under a vigorous commander such as Admiral David Beatty, who had commanded the naval flotilla on the Nile during the reconquest of the Sudan, could have suppressed and occupied the forts. The vulnerability of Constantinople and the destruction of nearby munitions factories - the only ones in Turkey, by the guns of the fleet would probably have forced the Turks into suing for peace. Certainly, without these factories and German supplies, Turkey would have been incapable of maintaining effective armies in the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and Arabia for as long as she did.

Historical repetition

The lessons of the heroic failure at Gallipoli are clear. Yet, notwithstanding their clarity, since Gallipoli, without the enormous overwhelming military might marshalled by the United States in the Pacific during 1944-45 against isolated island objectives, successful amphibious operations have been few. At Dieppe in 1942 a joint task force again going for 'the thickest part of the fence' was decisively repulsed with heavy loss. Most rewarding of all in a study of international military conservatism, is a comparison between the Suvla operation and Anzio in Italy during 1944. This reveals extraordinary similarities in command ineptitude.

The Anzio landing was intended to break the deadlock on the Gustav Line and open the road to Rome. With their complete sea and air domination the Allied landing was virtually unopposed, and complete tactical and strategic surprised was achieved. The initial assault was accomplished by a corps consisting of two regular divisions, one American one British, a parachute brigade, a commando brigade and several Ranger battalions. In all over 30,000 troops and 3,000 armoured and other vehicles were landed in the first 22 hours.[56] Good radio communications with an overlay of reasonably secure landlines gave headquarters staff battle situation reports in real

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56 Sir Winston Churchill, The Second World War, closing the ring, vol. 5, London, 1972; p426.

time. Commanders therefore had the means of communications to impose their will on subordinates. The road to Rome was open, and a glorious opportunity presented to sever German land communications in Italy west of the Apennines. Yet, the Allied force contained itself within a beachhead ten by six kilometres for two weeks. Precious time thus lost allowed the Germans time to recover balance, and seal off a dangerous insertion behind their lines. Towns and villages which could easily have been taken on day one or two, were belatedly attacked and captured only after heavy losses. The wildcat 'hurled on to the shore' had transmogrified into a pussycat; or in Prime Minister Churchill's words 'a stranded whale'.[57] Corps commander, American General Lucas, was as ineffectual as Stopford at Suvla. The Allied Commander-in-Chief Italy, General Sir Harold Alexander, watched the growing stalemate, and called the senior American commander, General Mark Clark to the beachhead, without intervening himself. Just like Hamilton at Gallipoli, over a quarter of a century before.[58] Winston Churchill must have endured his Dardanelles agony all over again; while General Sir Ian Hamilton, then a spry eight-six year old, may well have enjoyed listening to the BBC war bulletins. Thankfully, planners for the Normandy landings drew heavily on Gallipoli for lessons of failure, and avoided them. Yet even there, the commander, Field-Marshal Montgomery, was criticised at the time for slowness in breaking out from the beachhead.

Slowness in mounting the Suez landings in 1956, although a tactical success, was a political disaster caused by the intervention of the President of the United States, a retired general. Indeed, since 1915, only the well integrated and professional British task force at the Falklands in May-June 1982 demonstrated what could have been achieved at Suvla, with decisive command and determined execution. But even that required a driving political will to achieve success. Perhaps this is the real lesson for military operations in a democracy. Firm political will, good planning, and incisive leadership of well trained and highly motivated troops. But all must be underpinned by the support of the people in whose name they are acting.

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57 Churchill, p. 432.
58 Churchill, p. 428.

VICTORIA CROSS FOR CANADA VIMY CONTROVERSY

Anthony Staunton

In 1991, the Queen approval the creation of the 'Victoria Cross for Australia' (VCA) as the highest operational gallantry award in the Australian Honours System. Two years later, the Queen approved the creation of the 'Victoria Cross for Canada' (CVC) as the highest operational gallantry award in the Canadian Honours System.1 Both the VCA and CVC are awarded to service personnel as recognition of the highest acts of bravery during wartime. No awards of either the VCA or CVC have been approved but 91 members of the Australian forces and 79 members of the Canadian forces have been awarded the VC created by Queen Victoria.2

At the time of writing, news from Canada is that the Canadian Government is considering awarding the CVC to the Canadian Unknown Soldier. The remains of an unidentified soldier were buried in a stately tomb in Ottawa in 2000 to represent all Canadians who gave their life in war and who have no known grave. It is being proposed that Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper will receive the medal from the Queen in April during the 90th anniversary ceremony at Vimy in France, the site of the Canadian National Memorial and scene of one of the great Canadian victories of World War I.

Unlike the VCA or the 'Victoria Cross for New Zealand' the CVC is not identical to the VC. Instead of the English words 'For Valour' on the obverse of the medal, the CVC has the Latin words 'Pro Valore'. No specimen of the CVC has been produced until this year which may have led to the idea of presenting the medal to the Canadian Unknown Soldier.

Many Canadian veterans and others are outraged by the proposal. Opponents argue that awarding the CVC to someone that we know nothing about robs the CVC of its true meaning; a medal that is awarded for exceptional bravery on the battlefield. If the Canadian Unknown Soldier represents the common soldier then awarding the CVC to him is the same as awarding the medal to all soldiers and any notion of excellence or exceptional bravery has been lost. Royal Canadian Legion spokesman Bob Butt expresses the view that the Legion does not want the value of the medal to be undermined. 'The Unknown Soldier was brought back to Canada to be a reminder of why we serve, not to be given any award' he said. 'Do we need to give a medal of that level to an unknown soldier who was brought back for a totally different reason?'

The Prime Minister Stephen Harper reacted to the criticism by not rejecting the proposal outright but simply saying that his government has not made any final decision on the matter. A final decision will be made in the next few weeks.

First Canadian Gallantry Awards

The first Canadian operational gallantry awards were announced in Ottawa on 27 October 2006 by the Canadian Governor General, the Right Honourable Michaelle Jean. Canadian gallantry

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1 The approved post nominal is VC in both Australia and Canada. However VCA and CVC are used to avoid ambiguity and to be both informative and honest that while inspired by the Victoria Cross created by Queen Victoria both the VCA and CVC are new awards created in the 1990s by the Australian and Canadian Governments of the day.

2 When quoting Australian and Canadian recipients as distinct from Australian and Canadian forces recipients the numbers are usually stated as 96 Australian and 94 Canadian recipients. Both Canadian figures include one award to Newfoundland in World War I.

awards consist of the CVC, the Star of Military Valour and the Medal of Military Valour. One Star of Military Valour and three Medals of Military Valour were announced.

Star of Military Valour

Sergeant Patrick Tower, CD

Sergeant Tower is recognized for valiant actions taken on August 3, 2006, in the Pashmul region of Afghanistan. Following an enemy strike against an outlying friendly position that resulted in numerous casualties, Sergeant Tower assembled the platoon medic and a third soldier and led them across 150 metres of open terrain, under heavy enemy fire, to render assistance. On learning that the acting platoon commander had perished, Sergeant Tower assumed command and led the successful extraction of the force under continuous small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire. Sergeant Tower's courage and selfless devotion to duty contributed directly to the survival of the remaining platoon members.

Medal of Military Valour

Sergeant Michael Thomas Victor Denine CD

Sergeant Denine deployed with 8 Platoon, C Company, 1 PPCLI during Operation ARCHER in Afghanistan. On May 17, 2006, while sustaining concentrated rocket-propelled grenade, machine gun and small arms fire, the main cannon and the machine gun on his light armoured vehicle malfunctioned. Under intense enemy fire, he recognized the immediate need to suppress the enemy fire and exited the air sentry hatch to man the pintle-mounted machine gun. Completely exposed to enemy fire, he laid down a high volume of suppressive fire, forcing the enemy to withdraw. Sergeant Denine's valiant action ensured mission success and likely saved the lives of his crew.

Master Corporal Collin Ryan Fitzgerald

Master Corporal Fitzgerald deployed with 5 Platoon, B Company, 1 PPCLI Battle Group in Afghanistan. He is recognized for outstanding selfless and valiant actions carried out on May 24, 2006, during an ongoing enemy ambush involving intense, accurate enemy fire. Master Corporal Fitzgerald repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire by entering and re-entering a burning platoon vehicle and successfully driving it off the roadway, permitting the remaining vehicles trapped in the enemy zone to break free. Master Corporal Fitzgerald's courageous and completely selfless actions were instrumental to his platoon's successful egress and undoubtedly contributed to saving the lives of his fellow platoon members.

Private Jason Lamont

Private Lamont deployed with the Health Support Services Company, 1 PPCLI Battle Group during Operation ARCHER. On July 13, 2006, an element of the reconnaissance platoon came under heavy enemy fire from a compound located in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, and was isolated from the rest of the platoon. During the firefight, another soldier was shot while attempting to withdraw back to the firing line and was unable to continue. Without regard for his personal safety, Private Lamont, under concentrated enemy fire and with no organized suppression by friendly forces, sprinted through open terrain to administer first aid. Private Lamont's actions demonstrated tremendous courage, selflessness and devotion to duty.

Recommendations are made through the member's chain of command for consideration by the Military Valour Decorations Advisory Committee. A person is eligible to be awarded a Military Valour Decoration if that person, on or after 1 January 1993, was a member of the Canadian Forces, or a member of an allied armed force that was serving with or in conjunction with the Canadian Forces. see http://www.gg.ca/honours/decorations/mv/index_e.asp

In 1990, the mention in despatches (MID) was re-introduced in the Canadian Forces and nearly 100 have been awarded to date. A certificate accompanies the award of the MID.

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THE 'ATMOSPHERE OF THE PLACE AND THE SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE': WHY HISTORIANS VISIT BATTLEFIELDS WHEN WRITING OPERATIONAL HISTORY

Karl James[1]

Tired from the long and difficult climb, Dudley McCarthy and his companions made camp at Isurava. Excited about walking the Kokoda Trail and crossing the Owen Stanley's, he had twelve days to complete the track from Ower's Corner to Sanananda; it was November 1953, eleven years after the Kokoda campaign.[2] During the war, Isurava had been the scene of bitter fighting. It was here that the 39th and 2/14th Battalions had briefly stopped the Japanese advance and where Private Bruce Kingsbury was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his part in the battle. Camped on the same site, McCarthy wrote that 'we could feel about us ... the long-departed life force of the many brave men' who had fought there. Yet, although he knew the details of the battle, McCarthy 'could see nothing' of what had happened.[3]

A former patrol officer in New Guinea, McCarthy served in the Middle East, Syria and the Pacific during the war. He briefly served as an observer during the Kokoda campaign and had subsequently held staff appointments in the Northern Territory and Bougainville. In 1946 he was appointed as an author for the official history of Australia in the War of 1939-1945.[4]

McCarthy's volume, *South West Pacific Area – First Year*, dealt with Kokoda, Milne Bay, and the battle of the beachheads at Buna, Gona and Sanananda. To write his volume, McCarthy used unit war dairies, official reports and accessed the interviews, notes and correspondence gathered by Gavin Long, the history's General Editor, as well as his own research.[5] With such authoritative sources, one would have expected McCarthy to feel able to write about the Papuan campaigns with confidence. But McCarthy believed he needed more; he needed to see the area for himself. Completing the book's manuscript, McCarthy left for Papua so he could, as he put it, 'test the correctness of his narrative against the ground'.[6]

Why do historians visit battlefields? Is it to just see the ground for themselves, or are other issues playing in a historian's psyche? When writing an operational history, is it really necessary to visit the ground?

Some have argued that it is not necessary for historians to see the ground. John Robertson, for example, head of the Australian War Memorial's History and Publications Section in the early

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1 Dr Karl James is a historian at the Australian War Memorial working on the unit profiles database. Karl completed his PhD thesis, 'The Final Campaigns: Bougainville 1944-1945', at the University of Wollongong in 2005. A version of this paper was presented at the Genres of History: Australian Historical Association 2006 Biennial Conference, Australian National University, Canberra, 3-7 July 2006. The author would like to thank his colleagues, Dr John Connor and Mr Brad Manera, for their commenting on successive drafts of the paper.

2 Letter Dudley McCarthy to Gavin Long, 26 November 1953, Australian War Memorial [AWM], AWM93, item 50/9/3/4B.

3 'Kokoda Re-visited', pp 10-11, AWM, AWM67, item 13/73.

4 Official War History, press statement, 23 January 1946, AWM, AMW93, item 50/9/3/4.

5 Dudley McCarthy, South West Pacific Area – First Year, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p xi.

6 McCarthy's account was broadcast on the ABC on 12 November 1954. Dudley McCarthy, 'Kokoda Re-visited', Stand-To, vol 4, no 6, November-December 1954, p 11.

1980s, would dismiss funding applications by staff members who wanted to battlefields visits and not archives. 'What are they going to do?' he would ask, 'sniff the ground?'7

Historians visit battlefields for a variety of reasons. Certainly, notions of pilgrimage apply,8 and of course there is Richard Tawney's injunction: 'What historians need is not more documents but stronger boots!'9 Historians also go to see the ground to 'inform' their writing, to create a sense of place and environment. Two works that do this well are Chester Wilmot's *The Struggle for Europe* and Philip Bradley's *On Shaggy Ridge*.10

This article will discus three reasons why historians visit battlefields when writing operational histories: firstly, to conduct field research; secondly, to 'see what it was like'; and, thirdly, to gain the confidence to write with authority. To do this I will concentrate on the literature dealing with the Second World War and consider these notions when writing about the Bougainville campaign of 1944-1945.

I will not discuss the First World War, because much has already been written on historians returning to those battlefields.11 This, of course, is particularly true of Gallipoli. It seems that just seeing the ground at Gallipoli is sufficient for most historians to appreciate just how difficult, if not impossible, the campaign must have been.12

A discussion of the Second World War literature also reflects my own interests and experience. Last year I submitted my thesis, 'The Final Campaigns: Bougainville 1944-1945' and I am now converting the manuscript into a book for the Australian Army History Series.

I have not been to Bougainville. When I tell people this, I am often met with a dismissive look, as if to say, 'Well, what can you know then?' Today, there is an assumption that authors need to visit the ground in order to write a credible history, so Peter FitzSimons is happy to tell people in *Kokoda* that while he is 'not an historian', he and a group of 'mates' did the trail – 'the hardest physical ordeal of [his] life'.13 This, presumably, restores his credibility as an author.

The idea that historians should have some firsthand knowledge of their battlefield is not new. In Australian military historiography it goes back to C E W Bean when he returned to Gallipoli.

Returning to Gallipoli in 1919 with the Australian Historical Mission, Bean was hoping to solve the 'riddles of Anzac'. Bean wanted to know how far the Australians had pushed inland on the first day of the campaign and wondered about the 'secrets' of the Turkish positions. 'What could they see of us?' The only way he could answer these questions was to visit the ground and follow

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7 Peter Stanley, ''Sniffing the ground': Australians and Borneo', Journal of the Australian War Memorial, no 25, October 1994, p 37.

8 David W Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism: Pilgrimage and the Commemoration of the Great War in Britain, Australia and Canada, 1919-1939, Berg, Oxford, 1998; Bruce Scates, Return to Gallipoli: Walking the Battlefields of the Great War, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2006.

9 Gerald Walsh, History & Historians, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1997 [reprint 1996], p 177.

10 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, Collins, Sydney, 1952; Phillip Bradley, On Shaggy Ridge: the Australian Seventh Division in the Ramu Valley from Kaiapit to the Finisterres, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004, p ix.

11 Peter Pederson, 'The Battlefields of Yesterday Today', Defence Force Journal, no 6, September1977, pp 39-48; John Laffin, The Battle of Hamel: The Australians' Finest Victory, Kangeroo Press, East Roseville, 1999.

12 Peter Pedersen, 'The Ghosts of Anzac', Journal of the Australian War Memorial, no 2, April 1983, p. 40.

13 Peter FitzSimons, Kokoda, Hodder Headline Australia, Sydney, 2004, pp xii-xiii.

'whatever traces' remained. Going back also allowed him the opportunity to talk to the 'enemy.' Zeki Bey, a Turkish battalion commander, explored the battlefields with Bean, and the two stayed up into the night talking about the campaign.14 The trip proved to be very informative for Bean, and other historians have conducted similar field trips.

But what would I get from going to Bougainville? The participants have long departed, returning to either Australia or Japan. Although the Bougainville Islanders were vital to the conduct of the campaign, interviewing Solomon Islanders has proven to be problematic.15 Would seeing the ground, the battle scars and war relics, help me 'see what it was like'? Would this physical connection help me understand the campaign? Would I be better able to write about it? What remains of a battle years after an event?

Australia's battlefields in the Middle East seemed to have survived well. Although Tobruk township is larger now than in 1941, Garth Pratten found that evidence of the siege still remained in 1999, as did the town's main form of defence. The Red Line, the semi-circlular series of concrete posts that was Tobruk's main fortification, still bore the 'scars of war'. Rusty metal littered the area; as did jerry cans, barbed wire, and ammunition. Even temporary structures, such as stone shelters built where the ground was too hard to dig, still dotted the desert. It was almost possible, Pratten felt, to 'step into the siege'.16

This experience was mirrored by Peter Stanley and Mark Johnston when they visited Egypt while writing about Alamein. Although there were few signs of fighting at Tel el Eisa in 1997, at the Blockhouse they saw shards of shrapnel, barbed wire and spent shell cases on the ground. The threat from unexploded landmines heightened their experience. It 'was still possible', Stanley wrote, 'to glimpse something of the ordeal of the Blockhouse' that had occurred on that spot years before.17

The Australian battlefields in the southwest Pacific have not survived so well. On Singapore Island and Borneo, urbanisation now covers much of the ground on which Australians fought, while the jungle quickly reclaimed the battlefields in New Guinea.18

Flying over the Ramu and Markham valleys in 1949, Osmar White, a former war correspondent, could still see the layout of the airfields and base installations clearly, although the runways were 'misted with green'. Returning the following year, White found that kunai grass had grown through the Marsden matting, and the aluminium of the wrecked aircraft had now oxidised. White was surprised and disappointed at how little remained, writing, 'You'd never recognise the old spots now Digger'.19 McCarthy described similar conditions along the Kokoda Trail. The golden stairs to Eoribaiwa Ridge had rotted away; he saw a rusting grenade and helmet at Imita Ridge, cartridge cases and 'crumbling weapon pits' at Brigade Hill and old telephone wire at Templeton's Crossing – 'but that was all.'20

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14 C E W Bean, Gallipoli Mission, ABC Books, Crows Nest, 1991 [reprint 1948], pp 2-4 and pp 125-128.

15 See Bikfala faet: olketa Solomon Aelanda rimembarem Wol Wo Tu [The Big Death: Solomon Islanders Remember World War II], University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1988.

16 Garth Pratten, 'In the Rats' footsteps', Wartime, no 15, Spring 2001, p 36.

17 Peter Stanley, 'Getting our Knees Brown: Exploring the El Alamein Battlefield', Wartime, no 8, Summer 1999, p 24.

18 Email John Kwok to author, 7 June 2006; Stanley, 'Sniffing the Ground', pp 37-43; Peter Stanley, Tarakan: An Australian Tragedy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997, pp 206-211.

19 Osmar White, 'Jungle Forgets – But Men Don't', Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April 1950.

20 'Kokoda Re-visited', pp 2-8, AWM, AWM67, item 13/73.

A similar situation reportedly exists on Bougainville today. Bougainville was one of the largest campaigns conducted by the Australians during the war, yet few visible signs of the campaign remain. In the island's north, there is the skeleton of a rusted landing craft at Porton, signs of the airstrips at Torokina still exist, as does a sole Matilda tank in the south. Abandoned Japanese fortifications and other war relics dot the island. One can also see the Japanese bomber in which Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto was killed.21 Also, much of the fighting on Bougainville was fought by small scale patrolling actions and little evidence of these would remain.

What would seeing the ground tell me that documents and interviews with the veterans would not – apart from yes, the jungle is hot and humid, and yes, it does rain a lot? The Bougainville campaign of 1945 may now only survive in the archives.

Historians do not 'sniff the ground' to see what it was like – this is impossible. What actually occurs is more subtle. Consider the following statement by Chester Wilmot to Gavin Long. Wilmot had just been commissioned to write the volume of the official history dealing with Tobruk and Alamein. Wilmot had been with the Australians during the siege of Tobruk in 1941 as a war correspondent, but he returned to Australia in 1942 before Alamein. Wilmot was not sure that he could 'tackle' writing about Alamein without first seeing the ground.

> If I am to write convincingly about Alamein I must think myself into the very atmosphere of the place and spirit of the people who were there, and I do not think I can do that merely from records and reports, no matter how comprehensive they are.22

Historians visit battlefields in order to feel the 'atmosphere' and the 'spirit' of what it was like, to develop the confidence to write about their topic with authority. This is clearly evident in Long's treatment of the Syrian campaign.

In January 1943, Long was appointed the general editor of the official histories. After taking up the appointment, Long spent time with Australian units in action during the New Guinea campaign, on Bougainville and during the Oboe operations on Borneo. As a war correspondent, he had covered the British Expedition Force in France in 1940 before going on to report on the Australian Imperial Force in the Middle East. He saw the Australians in action in Greece and also spent several days on Crete.23 However, Long had not been to Syria – something that caused him to hesitate when he realised that he had to write about the campaign. This was compounded by his close relationship with Bean; Bean was Long's mentor but Bean's reputation as a war historian was intimidating. He had made it a rule to be present during all of the major Australian battles at Gallipoli and on the Western Front during the First World War.24

Aware that he would be following the approach to war writing established by Bean, Long wanted to revisit the battlefields in Libya, Greece and Crete. He also wanted to see the battlefields in Syria.25 Realising that this was impractical, but still hesitant, Long wrote the narrative of the

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21 Audrey Davidson, Porton: A Deadly Trap, Boolarong Press, Brisbane, 2005, pp 150-153; 'Bougainville Province, Pacific Wreck Database', http://www.pacificwrecks.com/provinces/bougainville.html <accessed 30 June 2006>.

22 Letter Chester Wilmot to Long, 19 June 1946, AWM, AWM93, item 50/9/3/4.

23 Zelie McLeod, 'Long: he Writes our Second War History', Daily Telegraph, 19 June 1948, p 10.

24 The only exception to this was the battle of Fromelles in 1916 which Bean only reached when the troops were being withdrawn and the battle of Hermies in 1917 while he was absent in England. A W Bazley, 'Australia's Official History of World War 1', Stand-to, vol 6, no 7, February-August 1959, p. 25.

25 Gavin Long diary no 2, 18 June 1943, p 85, AWM, AWM67, item 1/2.

Syrian campaign first – to see if he could do so without having seen the ground.[26] His doubts lingered, even after his history was written. In the final paragraph of the preface to *Greece, Crete and Syria*, Long stated that some of the 'description' was based on 'personal observation' while with the forces in Greece and Crete, he was recalled to Australia 'before the operations in Syria began'.[27] Long is telling the reader that if his treatment of the Syrian campaign is not as good as the rest, it is because he was not there. This feeling is not limited to official historians. Stanley, for example, had once been sceptical of those who needed to visit battlefields, but gradually he felt that he too needed to 'sniff the ground'. Stanley wrote, 'I did not want to play false by those who knew these places from life and not from maps, photographs and documents consulted in the cool and quiet of the [Australian War] Memorial's Research Centre.' He felt it was necessary 'to get [his] knees brown', by getting a grasp for the ground by exploring it.[28]

The real reason why historians need to see battlefields for themselves – whether they consciously know it or not – is to get the confidence to write with authority about their topic. This is why Wilmot felt he had to see Alamein and what motivated McCarthy to trek the Kokoda Trail. This is why Long was hesitant about Syria.

Confidence comes from seeing or experiencing the small details which are only gained from seeing the ground firsthand. For Brad Manera, writing about the battle of Retimo, it was seeing the small earth walls that divide gardens on Crete, behind which soldiers would have crouched when under fire, that do not appear on contour maps.[29] For John Kwoke, a doctorial student, it was moving through the mangroves on Singapore Island where the 2/20th Battalion's C Company tried to defend the Johore Straits against the invading Japanese in 1942. 'The mud gradually sucks you in', flies dance all around and water eventually gets into everything. The high water table would have made it impossible to dig trenches.[30] For Paul Ham, author of *Kokoda*, one of the reasons he walked the trail was so he could write with confidence about its vegetation and terrain – these things are 'timeless'; it was seeing that the sand at Buna and Gona is grey, even black, 'not the classic white tropical beach.'[31]

Is it necessary to visit the battlefields in order to write operational history? No. Is it beneficial? Yes, it often is – although this depends on the battle. There seems to be little to gain by visiting an area where ground has changed or when its context is lost. There the scent is lost. However, the confidence that imbibes historians who visit the ground is common, and particularly important for people when they have no firsthand knowledge of it themselves. These details may appear minor, but in war, and when writing operational history, minor details matter. It is these minor details upon which men's lives depend.

I had thought that seeing the ground was a cathartic experience for historians, and that going to Bougainville would not tell me anything I could not learn from archival sources or interviewing veterans. But I have learned that there is more to writing operational history than just spending time in the archives. It is time for me to 'sniff the ground' and 'get my knees brown' on Bougainville. As for what I will find there, that will be the topic for a future article.

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26 Long started working on the Syrian campaign in March 1944 and had a narrative finished by November. Gavin Long diary no 4, 8 March 1944, AWM, AWM67, item 1/4.

27 Gavin Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1953, p xiii.

28 Stanley, 'Sniffing the Ground', p 37; Stanley, 'Getting our Knees Brown', p 22.

29 Interview Brad Manera with author, 30 June 2006.

30 John Kwok field journal, 7 September to 9 September 2005, loaned to author.

31 Email Paul Ham to author, 21 June 2006.

RADIO IN WORLD WAR II

Keith Richmond

By 1939, radio was recognised as a dependable medium for news and entertainment – there was an international audience of around 300 million people with some 100 million wireless sets in existence.1 Radio, that is the sending and receival of electromagnetic signals through telegraphic, telephonic or wireless means, was an integral part of life for many.2 Radio was also capable of informing and comforting large numbers of people - a feature that wartime leaders, especially Roosevelt, Churchill and Hitler, used to great effect.

This paper seeks to examine some applications of radio technology in World War II, mostly away from the heat of battle.3

Background

While radio was developed from the late nineteenth century, in the Great War its use was limited and sometimes not too sophisticated. Newspapers, telegraph and telephones remained the most trusted communications forms: radio was nonetheless significant where resources permitted, with widespread interception and general communication.4 Vessels of the German merchant marine were all sent radio messages through a chain of radio stations advising of the declaration of hostilities in August 1914. The German victory in the battle of Tannenberg in the opening days of the war followed indiscreet Russian radio operators providing full and uncoded details of Russian military intentions. Yet there remained a feeling that radio could not be trusted under battle conditions, which meant that its full potential was not realised.5

The years leading up to World War II saw major developments in radio and associated fields such as radio direction finding and monitoring, weather forecasting using radiosonde, and radar. Radio transmission towers became a feature of the landscape, many nations began short wave transmissions for an international audience from the mid 1930s, while radio navigation offered a valuable boost to transport safety.

Radio's importance in any future conflict was recognised in some countries. 6 To take a few examples, the Japanese spent great sums of money and time on determining the effect of transmission in tropical areas by bouncing signals off the ionised layer in the atmosphere, as well

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1 Charles Rolo, Radio Goes to War, Faber and Faber, London, 1943, page 17

2 Kenneth Macksey, The Searchers: Radio Intercept in Two World Wars, Cassell, London, 2004, page 9

3 Many topics have been excluded, such as radar, code breaking, search and rescue, as well as standard battle communications methods. For an example of the radio equipment used during the war, see GR Thompson et al, The Signal Corps: The Test, US Army in World War II, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1957, pages 63-102 and Chapter VIII; US War Department, Handbook on German Military Forces, War Department, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1945, Chapter VIII; and US War Department, Handbook on Japanese Forces, War Department, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1995, pages 303-316

4 See Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, Chapters 2 and 3. Also John Keegan, The First World War, Vintage Books, New York, 1999, page 22, and his Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda, Hutchinson, London, 2003, Chapter 4 on the use of wireless in the naval battles of the Great War.

5 http://earlyradiohistory.us/sec013.htm and Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, pages 28, 30 and 34

6 A German agent in Britain suggested to the British Union of Fascists in 1936 that four secret transmitters be acquired so they could be used when hostilities began – JC Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, ANU Press, Canberra, 1972, page 38. Also see Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, pages 64-65 and 140 for cable operations

as improving their radio navigation, communication and interception facilities.7 In Germany, many miles of cable were laid to thwart future radio interception attempts. To ensure that the German propaganda message was received by its citizens, affordable radio sets for the masses were promoted - the number of sets held in Germany grew from 4 million in 1933 to 9 million in 1938. 8 In Italy there was also a campaign to produce a people's radio although the total number produced was less than two million by 1939.9

Some nations also recognised the dangers should private radio sets detect future enemy radio transmissions. In Japan, short wave radios were banned from 1932, and in the Soviet Union the declaration of war saw all private radio sets confiscated. In Germany, as the war fortunes turned against them it was reluctantly agreed to allow radio sets to remain in private hands - the German propaganda message still needed to be told.10

Wartime Use of Radio

For the purposes of this paper we can classify the use of radio arbitrarily into four main areas: the transmission of propaganda including 'white' and 'black' radio; news and entertainment; the detection of foreign signals or signals intelligence; and miscellaneous applications. It must be emphasised that there is no clear demarcation between news and entertainment and that of propaganda as clearly, they were mixed to make them more appealing. 11 To quote Joseph Goebbels, 'News is a weapon of war. Its purpose is to wage war and not to give out information'.12 In consequence, the categorisation below is indicative at best.

1. Propaganda

All protagonists engaged in some form of radio propaganda activities which built on extensive short wave transmissions begun prior to the war: 'overseas broadcasting became one of the principal means by which one state sought to influence the behaviour of another'.13 Open sending of such material is known as 'white' as it makes no attempt to deceive listeners as to its place of origin. Radio stations often used factual information (including battle statistics) in their broadcasts to improve credibility.14

The Japanese Broadcasting Corporation or Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) produced national and international broadcasts via short wave from 1935. When war began, they utilised newly acquired transmitters in occupied countries to reach the vast new empire. As at October 1941, some 45 stations were providing seven different programs to markets including Europe, US, Mexico, China, Australia, the Philippines and Dutch East Indies, Hong Kong and Singapore, and

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7 US Army, Japanese Monograph No 118, 'Operational History of Naval Communications December 1941-August 1945', pages 5, 7, 17, 44, 49, 55-62

8 Horst Bergmeir and Rainer Lotz, Hitler's Airwaves: The Inside Story of Nazi Radio Broadcasting and Swing, Yale University Press, New Haven CONN, 1997, page 8

9 Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II, Angus and Robertson, London, 1984, page 80

10 Rhodes, Propaganda, ibid, pages 38 and 254, and Julian Hale, Radio Power: Propaganda and International Broadcasting, Temple University Press, Philadelphia PA, 1975, page 132

11 Bergmeir and Lotz, Hitler's Airwaves, op cit, page 194

12 Hale, Radio Power, op cit, page 10

13 Jane Robbins, Tokyo Calling: Japanese Overseas Radio Broadcasting 1937-1945, European Press Academic Publishing, Firenze Italy, 2001, page i

14 The short wave Voice of America followed this path in news broadcasts and included accurate totals of Allied casualties – Clayton Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors: America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KA, 1996, page 214

India. By November 1944 they offered transmissions to 15 different world sectors and provided 33 hours of material a day in 20 languages.[15]

Similarly, the German short wave broadcasts expanded from 1938. [16] By 1943 they were offering 147 hours of foreign language broadcasting each week in 53 languages. This was sent through 30 short wave transmitters sited at Zeesen near Berlin in addition to stations in occupied territory.[17] The Germans scored a publicity coup in using English and American citizens to speak over German radio – personalities including Lord Haw-Haw broadcast on medium wave[18] while Douglas Chandler, Constance Drexel and others utilised the short wave network.[19]

The BBC European Service had begun in 1938 and their programs broadened until they offered a second service that allowed every European language to be broadcast.[20] A Morse presentation of news was undertaken by the BBC after midnight, to evade jamming and to facilitate the delivery of news material to underground newspapers in occupied Europe.[21] The American Broadcasting System in Europe provided broadcasts in 22 languages with 280 minutes of German programming each week. For short wave operations the Voice of America was established and by the end of the war it operated 36 short wave transmitters in the US and 14 overseas. The BBC and the Voice of America were also well known for broadcasts of coded information to the resistance movement, with the call to arms prior to D Day in Europe perhaps the best known announcements.[22]

The Italians used over a dozen transmitters with five allocated to overseas use: its Rome North America service offered Italian and English programs of over two and a half hours a week to Britain and the USA. One well known commentator was the American poet Ezra Pound who broadcast twice weekly over Radio Roma.[23] The Soviets were enthusiastic about propaganda broadcasts, building the world's largest transmitter (RWL outside Moscow), in addition to its existing bank of 150 transmitters.[24]

Propaganda merged with the provision of news in programs providing information on POWs. Perhaps best known to Australians were the Japanese broadcasts via short wave. As NHK needed to appeal to the Allies in their own countries, they recruited POWs as announcers to produce a mix of news and entertainment in programs such as 'Zero Hour' and 'Red Sun', and also gave information on the welfare of POWs from November 1942 onward. [25] Items of local news drawn from newspapers and radio stations in the Allied countries were added to provide verisimilitude to the broadcast information, and to attract foreign listeners.[26] Details of the programs from

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15 Robbins, Tokyo Calling, op cit, pages 14, 175, 182, 183
16 Ernest Kries and Hans Speier, German Radio Propaganda: Report on Home Broadcasts During the War, Oxford University Press, London, 1944, page 54
17 Bergmeir and Lotz, Hitler's Airwaves, op cit, page 38
18 Bergmeir and Lotz, Hitler's Airwaves, ibid, page 84 lists the transmitters and the areas covered.
19 Bergmeir and Lotz, Hitler's Airwaves, ibid, pages 50-118. Also Sean Murphy, Letting the Side Down: British Traitors of the Second World War, Sutton Publishing, Stroud Gloucestershire, 2003 and Adrian Weale, Renegades, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1994.
20 Rolo, Radio Goes to War, op cit, pages 124 and 125. Also see Asa Briggs, The War of Words: The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III, Oxford University Press, London, 1970, passim, which offers a history of the BBC at war.
21 Rolo, Radio Goes to War, op cit, page 123
22 See Gordon Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, US Army in World War II, US Army, Washington DC, 1950, pages 205, 275, 276 and Richard Collier, Ten Thousand Eyes, Collins, London, 1958, pages 221, 243, 254, and 286-288
23 Rhodes, Propaganda, op cit, page 88
24 Rolo, Radio Goes to War, op cit, pages 105, 106, 124, 125, 160, 164, 174
25 LD Meo, Japan's Radio War on Australia 1941-1945, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1968, page 46
26 Meo, Japan's Radio War on Australia 1941-1945, ibid, pages 38-41

Radio Tokyo were published in Australian radio journals.[27] After the battle for Stalingrad, the Soviets used a method similar to the approach taken in the Japanese 'Zero Hour' program in their broadcasts to Germany, providing details of individual prisoners – some POWs were brought into the studio to speak to their families.[28] Also, the British used the strong signal of Radio Calais to broadcast lists of POWs back to the German lines.[29]

A feature common to a number of the protagonists was the use of radio stations in their own country but which conveyed the impression that the station was actually in the enemy country ('black radio'). Some of these efforts were quite crude: a station in Bandoeng in the Dutch East Indies transmitted under the call-sign of ABC, that is Radio Australia, and proceeded to mimic the Australian station from 1942.[30] 'Freedom' radio outlets were established to foment independence in India while other stations served the cause of the resistance.[31]

Germany's operation was far more sophisticated. Goebbels' Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, or the Ministry for Propaganda (ProMi), was established to handle both black and white propaganda. ProMi included a section known as the Buro Concordia[32] that provided black broadcasting outlets. The best known was the 'New British Broadcasting Station' which, under the direction of a Dr Erich Hetzler, transmitted from February 1940 and focussed particularly on the likely invasion of Britain.[33] As well, 'Radio Caledonia' looked at Scottish issues, 'Workers Challenge' the shop floor worker, while the Hamburg-based 'Christian Peace Movement' was directed to churchgoers. There was also a Welsh freedom station and a station in Northern Ireland run by the IRA with possible assistance from Germany.[34] The Germans used stations purportedly based in France, including 'Radio Humanitie' and 'Radio Corse-Libre', in the Soviet Union (known as 'Lenin's Old Guard' and 'For Russia'), the Balkans and in Arabia.[35]

The Soviets used black radio extensively, including one station designed to appeal to Christians called 'La Voce Christiana' that transmitted in Italian and four other languages. The Italians also had a number of stations including one claiming to be in Arabia. [36]

The British were using 'black radio' from May 1940 and by 1943 there were some 45 stations in existence. Three of the main stations were 'Sender de Europaischen Revolution', 'Gustav Siegfried Eins' and 'Soldatensender Calais'. As with the German stations, the British aimed at different audiences and sought to undermine confidence in the enemy governments. The British

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27 http://www181.pair.com/otsw/Wavescan/wavescan322.html
28 Rhodes, Propaganda, op cit, pages 222 and 224
29 Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944, Michael Joseph, London, 1984, page 205. German radio also broadcast lists of Allied POWs – see Max Hastings, Bomber Command, Michael Joseph, London, 1979, page 35
30 http://radiodx.com/spdxr/Jap_Indonesia.htm
31 http://radiodx.com/spdxr/ww2_propaganda.htm while still others combined black transmissions with freedom stations – see Lawrence Soley and John Nichols, Clandestine Radio Broadcasting: A Study of Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Electronic Communication, Praeger, New York, 1987, page 3
32 Also cited as the Concordia Bureau
33 See Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason, revised edition, Pan Books, London, 1956, at pages 117-118 and passim
34 Nigel West, MI5: British Security Service Operations, 1900-1945, Triad, London, 1981, pages 148-150 and Murphy, Letting the Side Down, op cit, pages 85-86
35 For a list of the German black stations see the table in Bergmeier and Lotz, Hitler's Airwaves, op cit, page 197
36 Soley and Nichols, Clandestine Radio Broadcasting, op cit, page 38. This book offers a good summary of black stations. Also see Ellic Howe, The Black Game: British Subversive Operations Against the Germans During the Second World War, Michael Joseph, London, 1982, passim, and L Washington, 'Between Strategy and Diplomacy: British Subversive Warfare Against Fascist Italy, June 1940-September 1943', dissertation submitted to University of Lancaster, March 1987

created a special channel for submariners, 'Atlantiksender', using the powerful transmitter 'Aspidistra'. As the Allies moved forward, the black stations went with them including for example, a station in Paris claiming to be broadcasting from a town in Germany in the path of the Allied invader.

The Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) looked at beginning black broadcasting against Japan but it was agreed that with the ban on short wave radios, there was little purpose. Two OSS stations purporting to be operating in Sumatra began transmitting to Japan in early 1945. 37 When Saipan was taken, black broadcasting in medium wave began from there.38 For their part the Japanese had little need of black radio – their white short wave radio operations initially enjoyed untrammelled penetration of the Asia Pacific region.

The Americans used black radio in Europe, notably 'Radio 1212' or 'Operation Annie', with others known as 'Operation Capricorn', 'Radio Italo Balbo', 'Operation Pancake', 'Westdeutscher Volkssender', 'Volkssender Drei', and 'Operation Joker'. Soley and Nichols suggest that such stations 'were principally tactical', or in other words they were established to achieve a purpose and then terminated.39

Black radio used two particular methods to deceive listeners: both were likely to work best when listeners twiddled the dial looking for a suitable station. 'Snuggling' required a black transmission to be lodged on a wavelength adjacent to a white transmission and offering the same blend of entertainment except that the news and information provided were suitably amended. Germany used this effectively with 'Radio Arnhem' which provided normal entertainment programs except it offered its own news. The other trick was called 'ghost voicing', often practised by the Soviets but used by most black stations. This involved an announcer interrupting a broadcast from a rival station. Thus Soviet announcers cut in on Hitler's speeches 'with laughter, derisive comments or boos', or overlaid the white announcer with a news story of their own, deceiving or perplexing those who heard the program.40

As a good example of the impact of ghost voicing, American troops on the western front following the Battle of the Bulge heard a British news program say that the British under Montgomery had saved the Americans. In turn the New York 'Daily Mirror' picked this up and criticised American direction of the war under a headline 'Monty Gets the Glory, Yanks Get the Brushoff'.41 In truth, a German announcer had cut in on a British news broadcast and had deceived probably thousands of listeners including the newspaper correspondent. It is claimed that an American intelligence officer woke up General Hodges one night in September 1944 to tell him that the Germans were ready to sue for peace, when the officer had actually intercepted a black radio message.42 The Allies operated a program known as 'Intruder' from 1945 that required an announcer to cut into a German station and deliver defeatist messages.43 The high powered Aspidistra transmitter in England hunted over the wavebands and switched frequencies quickly (a '200th of a second gap'), so that if a German radio station closed down for a short

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37 Ian Dear, Sabotage and Subversion: The SOE and OSS at War, Cassell, London, 1996, Chapter 7
38 Soley and Nichols, Clandestine Radio Broadcasting, op cit, page 12.
39 Soley and Nichols, Clandestine Radio Broadcasting, ibid, page 42. The Americans continued to use black radio for tactical purposes, such as CIA's Radio Swan in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs
40 Lawrence Soley, Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda, Praeger, New York, 1989, pages 199-200
41 Soley and Nichols, Clandestine Radio Broadcasting, op cit, pages 31-32, 303-304. The story was reported in Time on 22 January 1945.
42 Charles Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, Mandarin, London, 1989, page 193
43 The British wanted to use it earlier than 1945 but were worried that the same technology would be used against them: Soley, Radio Warfare, op cit, pages 31-32

period, say while Allied bombers were approaching, Aspidistra could tune in to that frequency and a message could be broadcast almost immediately either giving wrong information or urging the German people to flee the coming attack.[44] It was most unnerving to the citizens who found it increasingly difficult to trust the radio stations or their government.

2. News and Entertainment

German forces first received special entertainment programs in 1917 and the practice was commenced again for the next conflict. From mid-1941 they utilised Radio Sender in Belgrade; it was from there that forces in North Africa first heard the recording of 'Lily Marlene' via short wave. Mobile stations were widely used, including in North Africa and at Rovianamemi in Finland, with the latter station providing service programs for three years.[45] The Germans took over stations in their occupied territories and these continued on air usually until they retreated.[46]

The BBC and American Forces Network Europe broadcast news and music to the many thousands of personnel serving overseas.[47] The BBC also provided specialised programs to the resistance and to those in occupied countries, such as Radio Orange transmitting to the Netherlands.[48] As the Allied forces moved through Europe they liberated countries including Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy, and as they went they harnessed the capabilities of their large radio stations.[49] As an example, when the Allied troops freed Radio Luxembourg this was taken over as a psy-war transmitter.[50] The Japanese took over existing stations in the countries they occupied and programs broadcast via short wave reached Australia from numerous transmitters including Singapore, Penang, Bangkok and Rangoon.[51]

Service personnel demanded entertainment. The first Australian radio unit was a mobile station shipped to the Middle East in June 1942. The Armed Forces Radio Service network (AFRS) was established by the US War Department in May 1942 to generate programming for troops serving overseas. By the end of the war the network had formed over 600 radio stations.

Some smaller networks were established to fill local needs. A network of eight independent stations was formed in the South Pacific, offering news and music.[52] This collection was known as the Mosquito Network, and it focussed on the Solomons, Fiji and New Caledonia. The first station was established on Guadalcanal in early 1944. Another network of seven independent stations was called the Jungle Network. It focussed on the island of New Guinea and the island

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44 http://clutch.open.ac.uk/schools/emerson00/pwe_page8.html Sometimes the alert Germans would make an announcement that the enemy was broadcasting counterfeit instructions - so in turn the British often used exactly the same words against the German transmissions

45 http://radiodx.com/spdxr/german_army_r.htm

46 http://radiodx.com/spdxr/German-WW2.htm and Mark Aarons, Sanctuary: Nazi Fugitives in Australia, William Heinemann Australia, Melbourne, 1989, page 22 for Ljubljana Radio.

47 http://radiodx.com/spdxr/afn_eto.htm

48 Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1975, page 31

49 The large transmitters were seen as significant prizes – see Charles MacDonald, The Battle of the Bulge, Phoenix, London, 1984, page 153 for Radio Luxembourg. The Japanese surrender ceremony on the USS 'Missouri' was broadcast by short wave over Radio Tokyo – http://radiodx.com/spdxr/wvlc.htm

50 Daniel Lerner, Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany: The Sykewar Campaign D Day to VE Day, MIT Press, Cambridge MASS, 1971, pages 51, 57, 59, and Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors, op cit, pages i, 123, 210

51 http://radiodx.com/spdxr/jap_SE_Asia.htm

52 http://radiodx.com/spdxr/Wartime_Radio.htm The US Counter Intelligence Corps instituted a series of dramatic spot announcements on Jungle Radio focussing on security matters. Begun in September 1944 the spots continued until the end of the war – The Intelligence Series, G-2 USAFFE-SWPA-AFPAC-FEC-SCAP, 'Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA', page 55

chains to the north of it, eventually establishing stations all the way to Tokyo. The first station in the Jungle Network was RAAF Radio 'Voice of the Islands' which transmitted from Milne Bay in January 1944. Stations were also set up in the central Pacific on islands such as Guam and Midway, and this was known as the Pacific Ocean Network. There were many other stations including the 50 or so stationary and mobile transmitters set up by the Australian Army Administrative Service (AAAS), the Pineapple Network of stations in the Hawaii area, and stations set up in Burma and China. The total number of AFRS and AAAS stations in the Pacific was well over 100.[53]

There was a great demand for breaking news and the war allowed newspaper reporters to provide 'on the spot' coverage of many of the main battles. Beginning with the invasion of Leyte, the RAN vessel 'Apache' served as a mobile base for war correspondents who were able to broadcast their messages to the US and Australia: the vessel later served as a short wave transmission centre.[54] At the battle for Tarakan according to Lt Commander Swan, General MacArthur utilised a 'press yacht' which broadcast the results of the successful landing to the world.[55]

In the Pacific the Japanese transmitted extensively on short wave providing entertainment to both Japanese servicemen in rear bases such as Rabaul, and to the Allied troops.[56] However, there was very little exposure to radio for many Japanese enlisted men while at the front: almost all soldiers captured in New Guinea reported that they had not heard a radio news broadcast since leaving their bases.[57] Prior to Christmas 1942, Radio Batavia sent a message to the ABC in Australia asking the ABC 'to transmit messages to prisoners in Japanese hands from their relatives in Australia'. This was done but a decision was made by an Australian government committee to end the practice in January 1943. In mid-August 1943 Radio Batavia requested that the practice recommence and after support from the Red Cross, messages were again sent from the ABC through Radio Batavia.[58]

There was a tendency on all sides to exaggerate good news, or in some cases, no news. One good example comes from the reports made by Japanese radio of Allied Task Force 78 that sailed for the invasion of Leyte in October 1944. With invasion day (A Day) set for October 20, on October 16th Radio Tokyo and Radio Saigon reported a massive naval engagement off Formosa with great loss of Allied ships, on the 17th Radio Tokyo and other outlets advised that there had been a big battle to the east of the Philippines and off Formosa, on the 19th Radio Tokyo described a big naval battle, and on the 20th, invasion day, Radio Tokyo claimed that all ships in the invasion force had been annihilated.[59] Yet there were few incidents of note on the entire journey. The claimed loss of eleven carriers, two battleships and three cruisers as well as damage to a variety of other vessels led to Admiral Halsey's famous cable on the 16th which said that he

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53 www.radioheritage.net/Story69.asp and www.181.pair.com/otsw/Wavescan/wavescan280.html
54 William J Dunn, Pacific Microphone, A & M University Press, College Station, TX, 1988, pages 4, 11, and 236-243, and http://radiodx.com/spdxr/wvlc.htm
55 WN Swan, Spearheads of Invasion, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1954, page 242
56 See Geoffrey Ballard, On Ultra Active Service: The Story of Australia's Signals Intelligence Operations During World War II, Spectrum, Richmond, 1991, pages 168 and 211 where Tokyo Rose broadcast confidential locations of the 55 Special Wireless Section.
57 AWM 55 12/92, 'Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces', pages 23-24
58 Meo, Japan's Radio War on Australia, op cit, pages 161-162
59 Swan, Spearheads of Invasion, op cit, pages 136-139 and 144. Also see Ronald Lewin, The Other Ultra, Hutchinson, London, 1982, page 260.

was 'retiring toward the enemy following the salvage of all the Third Fleet ships recently reported sunk by Radio Tokyo'.60

3. Interception

The third arm of radio activity was that of interception and signals intelligence (sigint), sometimes referred to as Y. Monitoring was widespread - someone listened in, whether at the official government level such as stations near Melbourne or at Silver Hills in Maryland, or at the private level by international radio monitors who set themselves the task of listening to every possible enemy transmission.61 Interception units were based on ships, such as on HMS 'Bulolo', and in Japanese craft used prior to the war.62 Military signalmen in the course of their daily activity often sent dozens of messages ranging from the mundane to the highly secure, many of which could be overheard and an intelligence picture established: the success of sigint in battles as diverse as the Coral Sea and the Mortain counter attack in August 1944 in Normandy, is well known.63

In Germany, numerous government agencies were involved with interception of foreign radio transmissions. In 1940 the Sonderdienst Seehaus was formed to cover less common languages in Europe such as Chinese, Arabic and Hindustani. In late 1941 the Seehaus was amalgamated into the German Foreign Broadcast Company Interradio Inc that operated in all the major cities in Europe and in occupied countries. By 1942 some 37 languages were being monitored in 33 or more countries using some 700 staff.64

In Britain, a Radio Security Service was set up from August 1941 under the cover of MI8(c) to search for German transmissions from within Britain, then to listen to overseas signals. 65 By listening to radio traffic and using direction-finding equipment, they were able to locate stay-behind agents in France and facilitated their removal.66 The renowned Bletchley Park station received signal intercepts from stations including Flowerdon and Scarborough for naval intercepts, Chatham in Kent, Chicksands near Bedford, and Shefford for the military, Denmark Hill for the Foreign Office, and for the Air Force, Waddington, Forest Moor, Knockholt and others in Scotland and the west country, totalling about 20.67 RAF countermeasure transmitters were at Kidsgrove, Hagley, Birdlip, and Windlesham.68 During the early part of the war the British found themselves able to monitor wireless messages from German aircraft, thus providing

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60 Samuel Morison, Leyte: June 1944-January 1945, Castle Books, Edison NJ, 2001, pages 108-109. For the management of news, see Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker, Pan Books, London, 1989, passim but especially pages 218, 276, 305-6, and 309. One reason for the heavy censorship was the fear that with short wave radio, news could not be controlled – ibid, page 218.

61 HL Childs and JB Whitton, Propaganda by Short Wave, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1942, page vii, http://radiodx.com/spdxr/ww2_propaganda.htm and http://radiodx.com/spdxr/pow_monitoring,htm that discusses the way the New Zealand security service sought the help of the DXers (i e distance radio enthusiasts) to 'monitor enemy short wave broadcasting stations' and listen for messages relating to POWs.

62 Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, page 168. The German Abwehr intelligence service used a ship in the North Sea to transmit to agents in the Netherlands – Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, Pimlico, London, 1992, page 47

63 Lewin, The Other Ultra, op cit, pages 91-96 and John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy, Pimlico, London, 1992, pages 245-248

64 David Kahn, Hitler's Spies, Arrow Books, London, 1978, pages 152-156

65 http://clutch.open.ac.uk/schools/emerson00/rss_page1.html

66 Nigel West, A Matter of Trust: MI5 1945-72, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982, page 20

67 Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle for the Codes, Phoenix, London, 2002, pages 102-103 and www.codesandciphers.org.uk/virtualbp/bphist/sigint.htm

68 Nigel West, The Sigint Secrets: The Signals Intelligence War, 1900 to Today, William Morrow, New York, 1988, page 180

early warning of air raids. They also intercepted 'plain language and low grade code transmissions by radio telephony on VHF'. Very late in the war the British were able to monitor German VHF using signals intelligence.[69] There were reported to be about 40 special wireless sections engaged in interception in the British Army.[70]

Interception was widely practised. An Australian security specialist said that soon after war began with Germany, it was realised that 'all Australian broadcasting stations' were being monitored in Japan[71] and that stations in South America were performing a similar service.[72] An Italian operative working out of Shanghai intercepted messages from all Allied nations throughout the war.[73] The Japanese wanted to establish posts in Europe to pick up US medium wave traffic,[74] while they managed to establish stations in places including Rabaul, Truk, Wewak, Hansa and also in Mexico to listen to important bands.[75] The Japanese Owada intercepting stations boasted 195 receivers and 80 monitors while their main signals intercept sites were at Jaluit in the Marshalls and at Owada.[76]

For the Americans, listening posts to monitor Japanese diplomatic messages were set up by OP-20, the Navy communications intelligence organisation. The first such sites in 1926 were at Guam, the Philippines and Shanghai, while ships were added from that year including some in the South China Sea. Other stations were in California and Mexico. Allied decryption centres were established at the Naval Communications Centre in Washington, FRUPac in Hawaii, at CAST in the Philippines,[77] and later at FRUMel in Melbourne while Central Bureau also monitored communications from that city.[78] Subsequently listening stations were established at locations including Darwin, Townsville and Brisbane, as well as in battlegrounds on the way to Japan.[79]

One reason that such stations could detect so many radio messages was the vast number being sent – Drea suggests that 'Japanese forces in the Southwest Pacific likely transmitted fourteen hundred messages a day, excluding army, air and Imperial Navy communications'.[80] As the geographical spread of the forces required frequent and strong signals to reach the dispersed units, then the chances of detecting important messages was relatively high.[81] Similarly, while the German forces remained within their own boundaries many of their messages were sent by

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69 FH Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, abridged edition, HMSO, London, 1993, pages 40, 76, 141, 610-611

70 Hugh Skillen, Spies of the Airwaves: A History of the Y Sections During the Second World War, Hugh Skillen, Pinner Middlesex, 1989, page i

71 Austin Laughlin, Boots and All: The Inside Story of the Secret War, Colorgravure, Melbourne, 1951, page 69

72 William Breuer, MacArthur's Undercover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas and Secret Missions, John Wiley, New York, 1995, page 100

73 John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II, Random House, New York, 1992, page 591

74 Tony Matthews, Shadows Dancing: Japanese Espionage Against the West 1939-1945, Robert Hale, London, 1993, page 114

75 Edward Drea, 'Reading Each Other's Mail: Japanese Communications Intelligence 1920-1941', The Journal of Military History, Vol 55, No 2, pp 185-205 at page 189

76 Edward Drea, MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan 1942-1945, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KA, 1992, page 13. The Owada site monitored stations in America, Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union

77 Matthews, Shadows Dancing, op cit, pages 54-56

78 Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, op cit, pages 5, 9, 11,

79 See Edward Drea, In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln NEB, 1998, Chapter 8; Jack Bleakley, The Eavesdroppers, AGPS, Canberra, 1992; and Ballard, On Ultra Active Service, op cit, Chapter 25

80 Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, op cit, page 53

81 Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, op cit, pages 34 and 53

cable laid for the purpose as noted above, and therefore unable to be monitored. Once they invaded Norway, France and the Netherlands, radio transmissions became necessary, allowing detection and eventually analysis.[82]

The German Navy's B-Dienst network intercepted the British intention to invade Narvik in Iceland but is best known for messages relating to the Atlantic convoys including communications to submarines advising of likely targets. It is claimed that in 1943, B-Dienst intercepted 3,101,831 messages.[83] German army radio reconnaissance battalions were established in areas adjacent to the Allied lines. A unit near Bonn monitored US Army messages relating to training formations sent within the US in plain language yet often audible to the monitoring team. By following the progress of training units the Germans deduced where postings would be made.[84]

Bleakley provides a neat description of the problems associated with intercepting Japanese signals in New Guinea. Operators searched the airwaves for new enemy transmitters, which were always hard to detect: 'The enemy signals to be intercepted were always hidden beneath signals emanating from friendly or neutral sources, including radio stations broadcasting in foreign languages, and more often than not, from the local United States Armed Forces Radio'.[85] Once found, new stations were passed on to the direction finders for verification then eventual elimination.

Radio interception was the province of a limited group of communication receivers, with a number based on American National HRO equipment. The Allies mainly used AWA (Amalgamated Wireless of Australia) Kingsley AR7 or the American Army HRO type. The AR7 was said to be a copy of the American HRO machine, while the Germans used among others the KST (Korting) set that was also based on the HRO design.[86] In Britain over 1000 National HRO receivers were imported for interception work, and the same sets were used in many US Navy ships while Kingsley manufactured some 3500 AR7 receivers.[87]

It was found in 1904 that the position of radio transmitters could be detected by the use of radio direction finding equipment (RDF).[88] Among those in danger were secret agents sending messages from behind enemy lines. As Foot describes, intercept units in the Gestapo headquarters in Paris kept a 24 hour vigil across the airwaves then passed their findings by telephone to direction finders at Brest, Augsburg and Nuremburg that took cross bearings and within 15 minutes, detector vans would be scouring the countryside looking for the operators.[89] In another sphere, the Japanese developed a reliable RDF system by the early 1930s that allowed them to pinpoint the location of US ships, all this at a time when the Americans had not established their own RDF systems.[90] Later the Japanese used this system 'with more skill than any warring nation'.[91] At Owada, for example, the Japanese had 115 direction finders, on Iwo Jima there were three, at Kwajalein ten, at Truk thirteen, at Rabaul there were six, and there were

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82 Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, op cit, pages 14 and 15
83 http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/espionage.html
84 Kahn, Hitler's Spies, op cit, pages 473-475
85 Bleakley, The Eavesdroppers, op cit, page 71
86 Bleakley, The Eavesdroppers, ibid, page 71 and Skillen, Spies of the Airwaves, op cit, photo plates. The Germans also used the Siemens R-IV. Also http://shlrc.mq.edu.au/~robinson/museum/AR7.html
87 ER Hall, A Saga of Achievement: A Story of the Men and Women Who Maintained and Operated Radio and Radar Systems of the RAAF Over 50 Years, Bonall Publishing, Box Hill, 1978, page 127
88 Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, page 26
89 MRD Foot, SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940-46, University Publications of America, New York, 1984, page 106
90 Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The US Submarine War Against Japan, Bantam, New York, 1985, page 63
91 Dan van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign: The US –Japanese Naval War 1941-1945, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1991, page 268

81 others scattered throughout the Pacific.92 From 1942 the British developed and later the Americans improved high frequency direction finding equipment (Huff Duff) which they used to great effect against enemy submarines.93

4. Other Uses of Radio

Dummy radio traffic and other deception measures were used by all: they accompanied major battles as well as deceptive feints.94 Transmitters sending dummy traffic were established in many places including Hay and Newcastle NSW, while in Europe the most successful deception was that for the D Day operations including the creation of a non-existent US 1st Army Group. Prior to the battle of Midway two American ships cruised the Pacific sending out deceptive traffic to convince the Japanese that the area was free of Allied forces.95 The Japanese were considered good at using English speakers on Allied radio channels and there was at least one instance during the battle for Leyte where American pilots followed fake signals in pursuit of a non-existent Japanese convoy.96 During the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, an American officer on Admiral Mitscher's flagship was able to detect the signals of the Japanese master pilot and advise Mitscher of every move the Japanese made.97 Also, a Polish unit convinced a Luftwaffe flight to return to Crete and not attack Allied positions in North Africa.98

Jamming was one counter to the use of radio by the enemy. The Soviets were among the most active in using this device, while for the Germans, what was known as Broadcast Defence was an important tool. Indeed, the Deutschland-sender occasionally 'interrupted its own programs to use a transmitter to jam the BBC.'99 Conversely, we have noted above the use of Morse by the BBC in early morning broadcasting to counter jamming. The RAF also utilised what was known as ABC in 101 Squadron bombers to jam the frequencies of the ground controllers of the German fighters.100 In preliminaries to the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Japanese succeeded in jamming radio messages from the US submarine 'Seahorse' so that she could not warn the US task force that the Japanese fleet was steaming north.101

Information on weather patterns was invaluable for planning military action. Radiosonde, or the use of balloons to test upper air conditions, utilised radio transmission.102 Ships sent details of weather patterns back to base and at peak, the Allies had 22 weather ships in the Atlantic and 24 in the Pacific.103 The Germans resorted to using automatic weather stations on land and sea. 104

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92 Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East 1930-1945, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1997, page 591

93 Kathleen Williams, Secret Weapon: US High Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, 1996, pages xvi, xvii and passim

94 See for example, JW Bennett, WA Hobart and JB Spitzer, Intelligence and Cryptanalytic Activities of the Japanese During World War II, Aegean Park Press, Laguna Hills CA, 1986, page 51, and Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, op cit, pages 33, 34, 163 and passim

95 www.ozatwar.com/sigint/41heavywireless.htm

96 Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, op cit, page 169 and John Kries, 'Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II', in John Kries (ed) The Pacific and the Far East 1942-1945, Air Force History and Museums Program, Washington DC, 1996, pages 293-296.

97 Lewin, The Other Ultra, op cit, page 256

98 Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, page 119

99 Halè, Radio Power, op cit, pages 126 and 127. Also Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, page 197

100 Ross Pearson, 'The Forgotten Men of the RAAF', Despatch, Vol 41 No 1, 2006, pages 3-10 at pages 5-6

101 Samuel Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, Castle Books, Edison NJ, 2001, page 241

102 See Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, op cit, pages 160 and ff

103 'Alpha, Bravo, Charlie.., Ocean Weather Ships 1940-1980', www.whoi.edu/oceanus/viewArticle.do

104 For a discussion of radio and weather, see Douglas Liversidge, The Third Front: The Strange Story of the Secret War in the Arctic, Souvenir Press, London, 1960, pages 9-11 and passim; Carl Schuster, 'Weather War', www.srh.noaa.gov/ohx/educate/atc/wwl.htm; 'Alpha, Bravo, Charlie.., Ocean Weather Ships 1940-1980, www.whoi.edu/oceanus/viewArticle.do; and Thomas Haldane, 'War

Where stations were not available, submarines at sea or aircraft in flight could report the current weather situation.[105] The Japanese had a strong network of reporting stations and their tactical use of subsequent weather reports was most impressive.[106] However, during the battle for the Solomons the Japanese requested the German Navy to monitor weather signal transmissions from the Australian station at Belconnen - the Germans considered this reflected very poorly on the Japanese listening abilities.[107]

In special operations, radio was an imperative, offering 'indispensable links between base and circuits in the field by wireless telegraphy. Every circuit of any size included a wireless operator; almost every parachute drop was preceded by wireless arrangements for it; without wireless, circuits were out of touch with arms supply, ammunition supply, and in some desolate areas, food supply as well'.[108] Spies inserted behind enemy lines or agents in left-behind units needed radio to communicate information back to base[109] - such radio posts received messages on a 24 hour a day basis.[110] Secret agencies had their own radio networks, and the SOE for example, had two home stations near Bletchley Park.[111] The Germans began by dropping large radios attached to their own parachutes in the company of the agent but as the size of the radio was reduced (to about the size of a small suitcase) the agent carried the set when he or she jumped. Other radios were taken to Britain by fishing boats and in one case an agent purchased parts from radio stores and made a radio set to his own specifications.[112] In the efforts to turn the German agents dropped on Britain, a constant difficulty was the location of the radio sets and the importance of convincing the Germans using RDF on the other end that the agent was in the city he claimed to be at the time – one radio was installed in a prison cell for a period.[113]

Use of secret radios by spies was a problem for all protagonists. In Britain, there were alarms and widespread allegations of secret radios. In addition to agents carrying transmitters, the Germans dropped about 80 parachutes containing maps, radios and target lists in the Midlands on 13 August 1940.[114] In Australia, groups in the far north were considered likely to be sending information to either Germany or Japan, and some aboriginal missions, Italian canecutters and shearers were accused of this. It is claimed that in February 1942, 'several secret fifth column

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History of the Australian Meteorological Service in the RAAF April 1941 to July 1946', www.austehc.unimelb.edu.au/fam/contents.html .

105 For U-boats see Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, page 108; for American submarines see Blair, Silent Victory, op cit, pp. 508 and 526; and for the Japanese policy see Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida, The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1995, p. 195. For aircraft in flight see www.austehc.unimelb.edu.au/ at Chaps 2 and 6 and www.srh.noaa.gov/ohx/educate/atc/ww1.htm 'Weather War' relating to German Weather Station 5.

106 www.austehc.unimelb.edu.au/ at Chapters 2 and 3.

107 JWM Chapman, 'Japanese Intelligence 1918-1945: A Suitable Case for Treatment' , in C Andrew and J Noakes (eds) Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1987, page 152

108 Foot, SOE, op cit, page 105

109 For an example of the use of radios by agents, see David Kahn, Clandestine Operations: The Arms and Techniques of the Resistance 1941-1944, Macmillan, New York, 1983, especially Chapter 3 and Matthews, Shadows Dancing, op cit, passim but especially pages 13, 17-18, 114 and 209. Also see Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File, op cit, page 418 for the use of radios by agents prior to the Hollandia landing, and Breuer, MacArthur's Undercover War, op cit, pages 180-181 for the network of 126 radio stations and 27 weather reporting posts operating in occupied Philippines.

110 Kahn, Hitler's Spies, op cit, pages 279-282

111 Foot, SOE, op cit, page 110

112 Kahn, Hitler's Spies, op cit, page 20

113 Masterman, The Double-Cross System, op cit, page 39

114 Nigel West, MI5, op cit, page 164

radio transmitters were being used'.115 In November 1942 three members of the Dutch Air Force based in Canberra were discovered in a room in the Hotel Queanbeyan attempting to make contact with the Japanese.116 Similarly in the US, spies were tracked and in some cases, radio transmitters found.117

Both Japanese and Allied coast watchers depended on radios, and established a sizeable number of watching posts. The Japanese were active on the north coast of New Guinea and on New Britain, with some of their listening posts set up months before the war began.118 For the Allied coast watchers, AWA manufactured the 3A (in 1940), 3B (in 1941), and 3C (in 1942) transmitter receivers. The cumbersome Type 3B radio as an example, needed twelve to sixteen carriers.119 Before the ART4 radio was developed using a dry cell battery, petrol driven battery chargers for the 3B radio were a problem and on one Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) mission at Idenberg in Papua New Guinea, twelve chargers were dropped by parachute before one was found to work.120

Deception also featured in some sad tales of agents being dropped behind enemy lines, captured, and being forced to radio back for more men and equipment – without their controller realising anything was amiss. Two clear examples come from Australia and Britain. In Z Special Operations on Portuguese Timor in late 1943, the Japanese captured members of the Lagarto team and then transmitted messages back to Melbourne saying that all was well. In 1944 the Cobra party was similarly captured and again the Japanese used the radio to make contact with Melbourne. Supply drops were made on a regular basis to the now-captured agents. New parties in Adder and Suncob were then inserted leading not surprisingly, to their immediate arrest, and to the capture of men sent in to rescue them, including men from the Sunlag party.121 Ironically one of the men in charge of the Timor operations was also involved in the disastrous British operation, known as 'Englandspiel' to the Abwehr. In November 1941 two SOE agents had been parachuted into Holland where they were captured by the Germans and forced to send messages back to London. As with Timor, it was assumed by the captured men that sufficient safeguards were in place to prevent the controllers being deceived – but deceived they were.122 Some 50 agents were lured to their deaths by the Germans in the year or more that the communications remained open.123

We are familiar with the clandestine radios used by resistance members during the war, with the radio sets disguised in some odd and interesting ways – including as vacuum flasks, an aviary, or as chair legs.124 Even more amazing is the manufacture and use of radio in POW camps. One officer smuggled his receiver into Oflag IXA by hiding it in a suitcase, some camps were able to purchase sets, one very friendly Senior British Officer inveigled a receiver from the Germans for

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115 Matthews, Shadows Dancing, op cit, page 224 and Margaret Bevage, Beyond Barbed Wire: Internment in Australia During World War II, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993, p. 156
116 Doug Hurst, The Fourth Ally: The Dutch Forces in Australia in WW II, privately printed, Canberra, 2001, page 76
117 Kahn, Hitler's Spies, op cit, page 20 and Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front, Lyons Press, Guilford CONN, 2004, pages 86 and 127-128
118 Laughlin, Boots and All, op cit, page 52
119 Eric Feldt, The Coast Watchers, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1991, page 21. One Japanese wireless set captured at Buna took eight men to carry – see Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, US Army in World War II, US Army, Washington DC, 1989, page 193
120 Private letter from Les Baillie to Guy Black MC, used with permission of the Black family.
121 GB Courtney, Silent Feet: The History of Z Special Operations 1942-1945, Slouch Hat, McCrae, 1993, Chapter 10 and Alan Powell, War by Stealth: Australians and the Allied Intelligence Bureau 1942-1945, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1996, Chapter 4
122 David Mountfield, The Partisans, Hamlyn, London, 1979, pages 89-91
123 Powell, War by Stealth, op cit, page 145. Also see Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, op cit, page 391
124 William Breuer, Daring Missions of World War II, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 2001, page 81

his camp's use, while in Stalag IVA in Saxony, the guards could be bribed for five cigarettes to provide a wireless receiver for an evening. A Norwegian dental technician while prisoner in a camp near Breslau in Poland, created a radio that was secreted in the dental plate of another POW.125 In England MI9 spent considerable funds ($20,000 in 1944 by a very conservative estimate) on manufacturing pocket radios. MI9 and MIS-X then sent these radios and radio parts by mail disguised among innocuous parcels, or sent money that was used to bribe guards in order to procure parts such as radio valves. By early 1942, MI9 stopped sending information newsletters to the camps as 'many – indeed most – Oflags and many Stalags had secured a wireless receiver'.126 In the Japanese POW camps, for the most part mail was not allowed to POWs and so contraband such as radio parts was effectively stopped. Nonetheless some clandestine radios were made, and secreted for years.

Comment

By the end of the war the face of battle had been transformed. Among the many products using radio technology in some form were radar in its various guises, radar jamming devices, guided missiles, high frequency direction finders (Huff Duff), radio controlled glide bombs, proximity fuses, aerial navigation devices such as LORAN, Lorenz beams, H_2S, Gee and Oboe, narrow beam microwave transmitters, radio sonobuoys, VHF radio telephony, identification friend or foe, wireless in tanks, radio decoys and the rest. It was an impressive list.127

Radio was impartial in battle – it favoured neither side. It could be used to call up artillery barrages or medical assistance. It was a crucial ingredient in propaganda as well as in entertaining troops. As Macksey summed it up in his book title, radio interception changed the course of both world wars,128 although the 1939-45 conflict saw the flowering of this claim. The ever-present capacity to detect transmissions led equally to the success of the German U boat massacres and the Ultra program. From an invention with limited utility in the Great War, by the time of the next international conflict radio and radio technology were dominant tools of warfare.

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125 Breuer, Daring Missions of World War II, ibid

126 MRD Foot and JM Langley, MI9: Escape and Evasion 1939-1945, Futura Publications, London, 1980, pages 114, 124, 249 and passim

127 See Kenneth Macksey, Technology in War: The Impact of Science in Weapons Development in Modern Battle, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1986, page 134; and Guy Hartcup, The Challenge of War: Scientific and Engineering Contributions to World War Two, David and Charles, Newton Abbot, 1970, pages 67, 70, 95, 108, 110, 128, 131, 143, 147, 173, 182 and 187

128 The original subtitle of Macksey, The Searchers, op cit, in its 2003 edition was 'How Radio Interception Changed the Course of Both World Wars'. In the Cassell 2004 paperback edition the subtitle changed to 'Radio Intercept in Two World Wars'.

THE 17TH (LEICESTERSHIRE) REGIMENT IN NEW SOUTH WALES AND VAN DIEMEN'S LAND 1830 TO 1836

David Murphy

The 17th (Leicestershire) Regiment spent 18 years in India from 1804 until 1822 when it returned to Britain. There it served in England and Ireland until 1828 when orders were received for the regiment to proceed to New South Wales as guard detachments on convict transports.[1] On 25 June 1835, King George IV had approved the regiment to bear on its colours and appurtenances of the figure of the 'Royal Tiger' with the word 'Hindoostan' superscribed in recognition of its services in India.[2]

The first detachment of the 17th Regiment embarked at Deptford, on the Thames, on 12 November 1829. The headquarters embarked on 17 August 1830, arriving in Sydney on 8 February 1831. The last detachment arrived at Hobart on 23 March 1831. The guard detachments were usually made up of one or two officers, a sergeant and the remainder rank and file making about 30 all ranks. The detachments were accompanied by their dependents, wives and children of officers and of those men who had drawn the entitlement to take their families with them. The administration and discipline of the convicts were the responsibility of a surgeon superintendent, who also provided medical support for the guard detachments and dependents. The convicts could be embarked at London, Portsmouth, and Cork or at other ports, where they had been assembled. The soldiers were paid as marines during the voyage.

The detachments that arrived in Hobart in 1830 were detained by Governor George Arthur who mounted the ill-conceived 'Black Line' to force aboriginals into the Tasman Peninsula. The 'Black Line' was a disaster costing 30,000 pounds and from six to ten lives including some soldiers. Just two aboriginals, a boy and an old man, were captured and both escaped the same night.[3]

Some of the detachments that arrived in Sydney stayed in Sydney while others joined garrisons at Goulburn Plains, Hunter Valley, Newcastle, Port Macquarie, Bathurst, Parramatta, Windsor, Wiseman's and Mt Vittoria (later Mt Victoria) Pass, Cox's River and Moreton Bay. A number were attached to the NSW Mounted Police.[4]

In 1834, the 17th received notification to proceed to India but the regiment was detained in NSW until the 28th Regiment arrived. In March 1836, the advance party of the regiment embarked for India on board two ships bound for Bombay. Some troops remained in NSW until October 1836 before leaving for Bombay. Some men returned to England for discharge while Lieutenant Colonel Despard returned to England to take charge of the regimental recruiting depot.

The regiment left a significant number of discharged soldiers and officers behind in NSW. The

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1 See http://www.militarybadges.org.uk/mimage/leicregto%201914.htm for a year by year listing of their location by David Stevens. The 17th Regiment of Foot (Leicestershire Regiment): Their deployment – 1798-1914.

2 Webb, Lt E A H. A history of the services of the 17th (the Leicestershire) Regiment, London, 1911.

3 Colour Sergeant John Clarke, in his memoirs, Rank and file, describes his adventures as a private and new recruit on the Line.

4 Some of these men were still attached to the Mounted Police when a significant reduction in this corps was made in 1848. The Mounted Police disbanded at the end of 1850 after 25 years service.

surgeon of the regiment, J. W. Martindale, and about 20 soldiers, wives and children died and are buried in NSW and VDL.

In 1840, when the ship carrying the regiment to Karachi, was stranded in the Indus River, regimental records and silver was lost. The regimental colour which had been used in Australia was saved by Major Pennycuick. He retained the colours but after his death they were returned to the regimental headquarters in Leicester. They were hung in Leicester Cathedral.

The regiment saw service in the 1st Afghan war at Ghuznee from 21-23 July 1839 and Khelat on 13 November 1839 where both citadels were captured after hard fighting. The regiment remained in India for 12 years until 1848. With the 18 years between 1804 and 1822, the regiment served in India for a total of 30 years in the first half of the 19th Century.

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NEW RELEASES

Roost, Cheryl. *Mary in the morning*, Brolga Publishing, Melb., 2007, ISBN 978-1-921221-03-3, 192 p., ill., ports., 21 cm. $24.95

Mary in the Morning is a unique story of a Vietnam soldier who was killed in action on his wedding anniversary. It is the true story of the life of Pte C W Roost. The book tackles the horrors of war and in particular the supreme sacrifice of losing a loved one in the duty of service to his country. It is an exceptional love story written from a woman's perspective. The purpose of this book is to put a human face to the Vietnam War.

Chris Roost was a typical young Australian man who loved life. He had a passion for sport and was involved in local football, cricket and tennis. He was a loved and active member of IOOF (Independent Order of Odd Fellows) lodge. At the age of twenty years Chris, like so many Australian young men was conscripted into the army as a National Serviceman.

Chris married his childhood sweetheart, Mary on 23 December 1967. After intense training in jungle warfare, he was posted to Vietnam in June 1968 with the 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (4RAR). He enjoyed army life, particularly the mate ship he developed with other soldiers. He was appointed batman to Lieutenant Tom Cootes; a position he held with great pride. This book follows Chris's adventures through training, marriage and eventually war. It gives you the unique opportunity to share his thoughts through his precious letters to his family. It tells the incredible story of the impact of war on our young Aussies. Chris was killed in action on 23 December 1968, his first wedding anniversary.

Cheryl Roost went to hell and back after her son, an accomplished jockey, was involved in a horrific car accident which killed his best friend on Mothers Day 1996. Phillip lost his career as a jockey. But out of the horrors some good has come. Cheryl used Phillip as the basis for her first book *Swinging on a Star* about an injured jockey recovering and riding in the Melbourne Cup. Cheryl derives her inspiration for her second book *Mary in the Morning* from years of experience living with a family's heartache at losing a loved one in the Vietnam War. Her husband's brother, Chris Roost, was killed in Vietnam on his first wedding anniversary. His widow Mary still mourns the loss of her young husband, who was taken from her in such tragic circumstances.

Mary in the Morning has a fine foreword by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Avery (retd)

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

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Military Historical Society of Australia
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

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