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

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200711771

AUSTRALIA'S MILITARY HORSE TRADE DURING THE NEW ZEALAND WARS OF THE 1860s

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This article is designed to both compliment, and show a deficiency in, the expansive history undertaken by A.T. Yarwood, *Walers: Australian Horses Abroad*.[2] Yarwood's seminal treatment of this subject, and its detail in showing the importance of Australian horse stock in meeting the military and other needs of the British Empire in locations such as India, South Africa, and the Middle East, is admirable to say the least. Unfortunately, one area of Australia's military horse trade is totally unexplored – New Zealand. Here Yarwood makes only a very brief reference to a horse trade with New Zealand, which he viewed as part of Australia's domestic market. Yarwood does infer that thousands of horses were exported from Australia to New Zealand, but provides little evidence. He does indicate that if "New Zealand had been included in our study of horse exports ... we should have had the opportunity of noticing what was probably the first export of a horse from New South Wales". This was to supply the Reverend Samuel Marsden and his mission in the Bay of Islands, with several horses and cattle, in December 1814.[3] Indeed, Australia's first live animal exports were horses.[4]

The horse trade which took place during the New Zealand wars of the 1860s, though nowhere as extensive and long-run as that which took place with India, was nonetheless, still highly significant. Here the Australian export trade in horses for a variety of military purposes – from cavalry mounts to commissariat pack-horses – was one element in Australia's overall vital involvement in the New Zealand campaigns during the 1860s.[5] This article does not pretend to be a detailed study of this horse trade with New Zealand, as this still remains to be completed, but provides a tantalising insight into this particular aspect of Australia's crucial role in these wars across the Tasman. This is nonetheless an important addendum to our understanding of the overall size and complexity of the Australian horse trade of the nineteenth century.

Military Horse Trade with New Zealand, 1860-61

The year 1860 marked the resumption of significant Australian military involvement in New Zealand, not seen since 1845-47. Although much has been written on the wars, the available historiography has not only tended to overlook the scale of Australia's contribution, but also its importance in determining a final outcome in favour of New Zealand's 'pakeha' settlers. It was these events, supported by majority public sentiment in the Australian colonies, as well as by both the colonial and imperial authorities, which aided in the outcome. As the *Sydney Morning Herald* recorded in 1860:

> We are defending ourselves in consolidating the possession of New Zealand. The British power there is a bulwark to our own safety ... We are not only Colonists: we are more, we are Britons. Our interest is more than the defence of the city in which we live. We belong to a glorious empire ... To defend its outposts is to

1 This article is derived from research gathered for this author's Master of Philosophy history thesis: Jeff Hopkins-Weise, 'Australian Involvement in the New Zealand Wars of the 1840s & 1860s', Master of Philosophy, awarded by the School of History, Philosophy, Religion, and Classics, the University of Queensland, 29 July 2004.

2 A.T. Yarwood, Walers: Australian Horses Abroad (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1989).

3 Ibid., pp.16 & 207 (Chapter 2, Note No. 3).

4 Ian M. Parsonson, Vets at War (Canberra, ACT: Army History Unit, 2005), p.4.

5 Also refer to this author's recent related article dealing with Australian commissariat & logistical contributions to the New Zealand wars of the 1860s: Jeff Hopkins-Weise, "Australia's Logistical and Commissariat Support in the New Zealand Wars, 1863-66", Sabretache, Vol. 47, No. 4, (December 2006), pp. 5-24.

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> protect its heart, and every man who contributes in any way to this great task has the consciousness of higher patriotism than a mere attachment to a petty community. 6

During the Taranaki War of 1860-61, Britain became an arsenal from which New Zealand received all manner of military stores, weapons, equipment, as well as soldiers and sailors. This was especially important, as the demands of the Taranaki campaign required a massive influx of imperial military might.7 Despite this, there existed the problem of distance and time involved in voyages to and from Britain or other far-flung ports and garrisons of the Empire such as India and Mauritius. This determined that the geographical and practical importance of the Australian colonies, and the material and manpower potential existing there, could be despatched across the Tasman with relative ease and promptitude. New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania at this time all contributed war material for New Zealand's immediate military needs. This ability to quickly obtain quantities of arms, ammunition, commissariat stores, equipment and horses from Australia was vital in allowing the imperial and colonial forces in Taranaki to maintain and then expand defences around the township of New Plymouth and neighbouring districts.

The demands of the Taranaki campaign of 1860-61 would also see the Australian colonies quickly emerge as a place from which suitable horses could be promptly and easily procured for New Zealand war service. Here one of the earliest examples was to re-supply horses to 3/4 Battery, Royal Artillery, commanded by Captain Henry Mercer, which had been despatched from England. After arrival in New Zealand, this unit was redesignated as C/4 Battery. Due to the lengthy nature of the journey this battery had to leave its original horse establishment in England.8 To assist in the replacement of horses, Veterinary Surgeon Anderson of the Royal Artillery sailed in advance so as to purchase the appropriate horses and have them forwarded from Australia to be ready for the battery once it landed in New Zealand.9 This unit was equipped with the new 12-pounder rifled breech loading Armstrong field guns, plus two 10-inch and two 8-inch mortars. This unit arrived at Auckland on 4 March 1861, and it took a week to unload the 700 tons of guns, equipment, munitions and other stores. On 12 March, half of the Armstrong battery was embarked aboard HMCS *Victoria* for immediate despatch to the war at Taranaki, where they were landed at the mouth of the Waitara River the following day, and bullock teams were provided as an interim means of transportation.10

Back in Auckland, Lieutenant Hunter was left in command of the other half battery, where it was planned to follow on once another artillery officer, Captain Watson, with 180 horses from Australia had arrived. In the meantime hostilities ceased at Taranaki, and the half battery under Captain Mercer returned to Auckland where they found "that 'walers' had arrived for them, and were kept busy breaking them in".11 The personnel of C/4 Battery were then utilised in assisting with road making, such as the Great South Road, directed at the heart of the Maori Waikato region. Here the horses of this unit were used to carry supplies for all the troops involved in this work. In early 1863, General Cameron ordered Captain Mercer to mount 100 of his men and to train them as a cavalry force. Placed

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6 Sydney Morning Herald, 26 July 1860, p.4.
7 For examples of press news on this military build up from England, refer to: Argus, 14 January 1861, p.5; 19 January 1861, p.7; & 15 April 1861, p.5; & Sydney Morning Herald, 16 July 1861, p.8.
8 The vessel Norwood took 99 days from Woolwich, to reach Auckland, New Zealand, with this unit of Royal Artillery. James E. Alexander, Incidents of the Maori War: New Zealand: In 1860–61 (London: Richard Bentley, 1863), pp.416-417; & John Headlam, The History of the Royal Artillery: From the Indian Mutiny to the Great War: Volume III - Campaigns. (1860-1914) (Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution, 1940), p.167.
8 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March 1861, pp.5 & 6
9 Argus, 14 January 1861, p.5; & 19 January 1861, p.7; & Mercury, 28 January 1861.
10 Captain Mercer commanded this half battery at Taranaki. This half battery arrived at the Waitara River on 13 March, and after landing all the equipment, supplies and personnel, were able to be underway to the front by 15 March 1861.
11 Headlam, op.cit., p.168; & also refer to, Alexander, op.cit., pp.416-417.

under the command of Lieutenant A.J. Rait, these mounted Royal Artillery personnel and horses saw service initially at Taranaki, before later employment in the Waikato during 1863 and 1864.[12]

During February and early March 1861, 200 horses were specially selected and shipped to New Zealand aboard the vessel *Light of the Age* on 8 March.[13] The *Sydney Morning Herald* recounted that this consignment was one of the finest that has been made for a long time. "[W]ell-bred powerful, upstanding horses, for the most part under four years old, and measuring from fourteen to sixteen hands all round. They have been purchased chiefly in the southern country, and if landed ... in their present condition", cannot fail to produce a favourable impression of the quality of New South Wales stock.[14]

Despite the cessation of hostilities in Taranaki in early 1861, military authorities continued to obtain horses to perform logistical needs associated with the increasing imperial presence. On 8 July, the *Sydney Morning Herald* announced a contract for the supply of pack-horses "for the conveyance of munitions of war, and of human provender, across the dreary mountain, where the heavy waggon and 'the sluggish car' so often come to a stand-still".[15] A contract for 100 horses was granted to J.W. Cheesbrough, the son-in-law of Sydney veterinary surgeon, Mr Armstrong of Pitt Street. In a letter to the editor, Cheesbrough referred to himself as "Contractor to her Majesty's Government" for this consignment of pack-horses. He also used this as an opportunity to reply to comments made Messrs. Burt & Co. on the state of the Sydney horse market, as well as directing attention that he was paying "£5 for one horse, and £16 each for more than one; others at prices between the two sums".[16] The first draft of this consignment departed shortly after aboard the *City of Melbourne*. The *Herald* aptly concluded that it "is pleasant, even in her difficulties, to see that New South Wales should be found, whether in animals or in minerals, the mother of the materials of locomotion for the sister colonies".[17]

The New Zealand Campaigns of 1863-64

The inconclusive outcome of the Taranaki War of 1860-61 merely allowed for a short breathing space during which both Maori and British began preparations for further clashes. In this interregnum, the imperial authorities asserted their determination to force their domination into the Maori-controlled interior of the North Island by constructing the Great South Road as a communications and supply line. In Taranaki Province on 4 May 1863 violence once again flared when a party of imperial troops were ambushed and killed. Events quickly escalated and on 11 July Governor Grey issued a poorly veiled ultimatum to the "Chiefs of the Waikato".[18] The next day the first elements of General Cameron's force to invade the Waikato crossed the Mangatawhiri, a tributary of the Waikato marking the northern Kingite Maori border. In the words of one historian, B.J. Dalton, this campaign was to be "the largest and most ambitious campaign" of the New Zealand wars.[19]

The year 1863 marked the high-water mark in Australian military involvement in New Zealand. The events of 1863, though less so in 1864, particularly when looking at reactions to the second military settler recruiting mission, were supported by majority public sentiment in the Australian colonies, as well as by both the colonial and imperial authorities. The co-operation New Zealand received from

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12 Headlam, op.cit., pp.168-171.
13 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March 1861, pp.5 & 6.
14 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 March 1861, p.4. This activity was conducted by a Mr Burt, though the actual selection & purchase carried out by a Mr M'Kenzie. Also refer to, 7 March 1861, p.6; & 9 March 1861, p.5.
15 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1861, p.4; & Argus, 10 July 1861, p.5.
16 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1861, p.5.
17 Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1861, p.4.
18 New Zealand Gazette, No.29, 15 July 1863, pp.277-278.
19 B.J. Dalton, "A New Look at the Maori Wars of the Sixties", Historical Studies, Vol.12, No.46, (April 1966), p.238; & also refer, James Belich, The New Zealand Wars: and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland, NZ: 1988), p.133.

Australia's imperial military and civil representatives enabled the scale and success of the campaigns that took place during 1863-64. This willingness, though again sometimes grudging and with an eye to colonial self interest saw Australian colonial governments once more interact with the imperial authorities and New Zealand government, ensuring a diverse array of military, commissariat and logistical support.[20]

During 1863-64, Australia made its greatest contribution in manpower, war material and supplies for New Zealand's wars. This allowed the enormous imperial and colonial war machine amassed by Grey to attempt to conquer the regions of the Waikato and Taranaki. During this period, the Australian colonies again showed their geographical and practical importance by being able to supply quantities of arms, ammunitions, and a vast array of commissariat and logistical material to satisfy New Zealand's war needs. This was vital in the early stages of the developing conflict when taking into account the distance and time involved in seeking sources of manpower and military paraphernalia from Britain or other far flung points in the Empire. The enormous scale of the military operations also resulted in an ever-increasing demand for imported foodstuffs into 1864. The Australian colonies were therefore in the fortunate geographic and economic position to benefit from the vast commercial demands of New Zealand's wars. This diverse and conveniently located Australian support also allowed the war effort to proceed at a faster pace – something not possible if New Zealand had solely relied on Britain or other outposts of Empire.

During this process of rapid militarisation in 1863, the New Zealand government was to find itself deficient in a whole range of military materials such as uniforms, equipment, tentage, weaponry, accoutrements and ammunitions. Australia became the convenient locale from which to obtain the requisite military materials to supply the newly created and expanded Colonial Defence Force (cavalry)[21] and military settler units.

> Among the difficulties which embarrassed the Government ... [was] the want of arms for upwards of three thousand men, of suitable clothing, – such as boots, trousers, great coats, and other necessaries – for the Militia and Volunteers on active service, was especially felt. It was impossible to procure these supplies by the ordinary means of purchase. All that could be got, in Auckland, were procured; and additional supplies of the best available substitutes were obtained from Dunedin and the Australian Colonies.[22]

William Fox's *The War in New Zealand* (1866) commented upon this situation:

> large fortunes [are] made in England by contracts for ... Her Majesty's forces ... but military expenditure is to the bulk of the population of New Zealand a thing never thought of, or wished for. Indeed if the colonists had been more anxious for it ... they would have been much disappointed; for great part of the supplies were got direct from other countries ... flour from Adelaide, horses from Sydney, hay ... and corn from England, while the meat contract was held for a long time by a [Victorian] grazier ...[23]

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20 New Zealand: Parliamentary Debates: 1861 to 1863 (Wellington: G. Didsbury, Government Printer, 1886), pp.733-734, 738, & 754; & also refer to, G.W. Rusden, History of New Zealand: Volume II (Melbourne: Melville, Mullen & Slade, 1895), p.245.

21 For more detailed information on this unit, refer to this author's article, "A History of the Colonial Defence Force (Cavalry): and the Australian Context", The Volunteers: The Journal of the New Zealand Military Historical Society, Vol.26, No.1, (July 2000), pp.5-25; & also republished in an edited version as: "New Zealand's Colonial Defence Force (Cavalry) and its Australian Context, 1863-66", Sabretache, Vol.43, No.3, (Sept.2002), pp.23-39.

22 "A.-No.6: Further Papers Relating to the Military Defence of NZ: Memorandum on Measures of Defence in Northern Island", Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand: 1863 (Auckland), p.1 of A.-No.6; & also refer to, F. Glen, For Glory and a Farm: The Story of Australia's Involvement in the New Zealand Wars of 1860-66 (Whakatane: Whakatane & District Historical Society, 1985), p.38.

23 W. Fox, The War in New Zealand (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1866), p.13.

Nonetheless, Britain did become an important arsenal from which New Zealand received military logistical and manpower assistance.[24] Yet as before, the Australian colonies were vital in the overall expansion of military capability, especially evident in the initial stages of campaigning. The sheer volume of military stores flooding into New Zealand during 1863-64 necessitated a vast commissariat network to deal effectively with the requirements of the expanding Imperial and Colonial war machine. Depicting some of this complex infrastructure, the Mercury on 26 March 1864 reported upon the "Magnitude of the Auckland Military Stores":

> We believe that there are few persons here who are aware of the magnitude of the Military Store Department in Auckland; more especially since the present war has been going on. The large reinforcements of troops that have been received have of course necessitated a commensurate supply of munitions of war, and the Military Store becoming inconveniently crowded, it was found necessary to erect new buildings both for present, and future requirements. Britomart Barracks, or more properly Fort Britomart, is the grand depot for these supplies from which they are distributed over the country, as the exigencies of the war may demand. It may well be imagined that the duty of issuing these stores is a very onerous and important one; and as the strict military routine and discipline by which this is effected will perhaps interest our readers ...[25]

In assessing this logistical component of New Zealand's commissariat organisation, it is important to remember the contribution of many of the men who enlisted for service as military settlers, both in New Zealand and the Australian colonies. Many of these were to provide a vital, yet generally unrecognised and unsung service to the overall war effort as volunteer personnel in the Imperial Commissariat.

In order to try and see early action or to escape the mundane routine of redoubt life and the garrison duty most military settlers found they faced upon arrival in New Zealand, some Australian recruited military settlers applied to join the Colonial Defence Force (cavalry).[26] Similarly, small numbers transferred to the Forest Rangers, while the largest number volunteered for service with the Imperial Commissariat Transport Corps.[27] Volunteering for service in the Imperial Commissariat Transport Corps was a common option for men of the four Waikato Regiments. This was especially the case with the 3rd Waikato Regiment, which had at least 616 officers, non-commissioned officers and men from its total compliment volunteering their services for duty with the Imperial Commissariat. From assessment of New Zealand Government papers it seems that a total of 1942 colonials (excluding British Army or Royal Navy personnel) served in some role as part of the Imperial Commissariat Transport Corps, and of these approximately 1397 came from the four Waikato Regiments.[28] The logistical aspect of the wars was of crucial importance to military operations, for without the exertions of this Corps, the combat troops and the various garrisons and redoubts could not have been effectively armed, clothed and fed under some of the most trying physical conditions. Men here served in a role usually not glamorous, sometimes monotonous or arduous and often not seeing combat, but nonetheless were extremely important to the overall success of the various campaigns.[29] An important

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24 For examples of press accounts of the military build up derived from England, refer to, Sydney Morning Herald, 28 January 1864, p.8; & 4 March 1864, p.5.

25 Mercury, 26 March 1864.

26 For an assessment of the Australian context to the Colonial Defence Force, refer to, J.E. Hopkins-Weise, "A History of the Colonial Defence Force (Cavalry): and the Australian Context", The Volunteers, Vol.26, No.1, (July 2000), pp.5-25.

27 Glen, op.cit., p.39; & Barton, op.cit., p.25.

28 "G.-No.1: Papers Relative To The Issue Of The New Zealand War Medal: Enclosure 4 in No.3: List of Officers and Men of the Local Forces, and Civilians, in New Zealand, who were employed in the Imperial Transport Corps, and paid from Imperial funds, entitled to the New Zealand Medal", Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand: Vol.II: 1871, pp.11-20 of G.-No.1; & also in, New Zealand Gazette, No.31, 31 May 1871, pp.247-256.

29 This force was sometimes referred to as the "Commissariat Transport Corps", the "Colonial Transport Corps", or simply as "C.T.C.", as well as earning the nickname of the "Mokes". N. Morris, ed., The

logistic and commissariat tool allowing these Imperial Commissariat volunteers to perform their tasks efficiently, was the ongoing procurement of a variety of good quality horse types and numbers from the Australian colonies.

Military Horse Trade with New Zealand, 1863-64

In relation to the Colonial Defence Force and the Imperial Commissariat Transport Corps especially, the Australian colonies were the place where draught and cavalry horses were procured. This particular military horse trade may not have been as large and long-lived as that which took place with India, but nonetheless was a significant market. The arrival of the New Zealand government party headed by the Hon. Mr Dillon Bell to Sydney in August 1863, to seek to enlist military settlers and gather other military assistance, also heralded the beginnings of the New Zealand military horse trade in this period. Among this government party were "several gentlemen who have come ... to purchase horses for the military defence corps."[30] In late 1863 a contract was also let to a Sydney saddlery firm to supply saddles and other associated mounted troop equipment to compliment this.[31]

The New Zealand government selected Edward Mayne to be their remount agent in Sydney. He appears to have been a member of Dillon Bell's party.[32] Mayne commenced this work in August by attending the "Burt & Co's Horse Bazaar" on Thursdays and Saturdays. The initial advertisement in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 20 August sought "Troop Horses", noting Mayne's job to select for purchase horses suited for "cavalry work" with "Geldings preferred; must be quiet to ride, sound, not under fifteen hands high, or over seven years old".[33] Further advertisements over the ensuing days continued to seek "Troop Horses" but at the same time also sought "horses adapted for cavalry purposes. They must be broken to saddle, up to weight, with good action, sound, and ages ranging from 4 to 6 years."[34] Here Mayne directed attention that he would inspect such horses when attending the Martyn's Horse Bazaar at 246 Pitt Street, Sydney, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays until further notice. Another advertisement appeared at this time seeking "100 Horses" for the New Zealand Government. Requirements here were: "They must be well bred, active and compact, sound, and quiet to ride, 15 hands to 15 hands 2 inches high, and from 5 to 7 years old." Persons with such horses were invited to apply daily to "Mr. Armstrong, veterinary surgeon, 260, Pitt-street", Sydney.[35]

On 15 September 1863 the *Claud Hamilton* departed Sydney for Auckland with eighty horses in its cargo exported under the name of "F.D. Bell".[36] The *Sydney Morning Herald* in early October was able to relay news of this voyage and the reputation this vessel had in its transport of horses to New Zealand: "The *Claud Hamilton* brings eighty horses for the Commissariat Department, that being the number shipped in Sydney. The 'luck' this vessel has in the transport of horseflesh is something wonderful. Out of between three and four hundred shipped on board this vessel only one has been

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Journal of William Morgan: Pioneer Settler and Maori War Correspondent (Auckland: Libraries Department, Auckland City Council, 1963), for references to "Mokes", see pp.129, 135, & 138.

30 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 August 1863, p.9; also refer to, 15 August 1863, p.6.

31 Glen, op.cit., p.24.

32 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 August 1863, p.6.

33 Sydney Morning Herald, 20 August 1863, p.1.

34 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 August 1863, p.1; & also see continuation of advertisements for "Troop Horses" & "Cavalry Horses for New Zealand" in Sydney: Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August, p.1; 26 August, p.1; & 27 August 1863, p.1. References to "Cavalry Horses for New Zealand" also found in, South Australian Register, 9 September 1863.

35 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 August, p.8; & 25 August 1863, p.8.

36 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 September 1863, p.5. This trip by the Claud Hamilton is also thought to have included 25 Sydney enlisted Military Settlers. Forbes Eadie, Troopships Engaged in the Maori Wars ... 1840-1865, South African War ... 1899-1902, The Great War ... 1914-1918 (New Zealand: Auckland Historical Centennial Research Committee, [1940?], p.2.

lost".[37] Such horses were presumably made available for the Colonial Defence Force or the Commissariat Transport Corps. William Morgan's journal entry dated Drury, Saturday night, 31 October 1863, for instance recounts:

> A long procession of horses and drays arrived this evening. On enquiry I found it was No. 5 company of the Transport Corps on the march from Penrose with commissariat stores. There were 131 men, 140 horses, 43 drays, and they were in command of Lieut. Lawry of the 2nd, and Lieut. Hay of the 3rd Waikato Regiment. Most of the horses seemed first class, many of them being those lately imported from Sydney.[38]

To assist in the purchase of suitable horses for the requirements of the Imperial government in New Zealand, Royal Artillery Veterinary Surgeon Anderson once more arrived in Sydney from Auckland aboard the *Claud Hamilton* in October 1863.[39] Such an arrival did not sit well with certain Sydney residents already accredited and engaged in such work. In a letter to the *Sydney Morning Herald* entitled "Horses for New Zealand", "S. Wooller" addressed fraudulent horse selling practices:

> It must be patent to the employers of these gentlemen that our Government are large purchasers of horses for their own requirements, ... enquiry should have satisfied them that the individual at present thus serving acquits himself to the satisfaction of his superiors ... [and] the veterinary surgeon of our police is the gentleman on whose shoulders should have devolved the nice task of procuring suitable animals for the New Zealand Government ...
>
> If the Government concerned are anxious to expend their money to the best advantage, let them take the hint now offered in all sincerity, ... [and] employ our police veterinary surgeon to supply the war demands, and in lieu of the halt, the lame, and the blind, so craftily prepared and so unsuspiciously purchased of late ... a sort of animal will be forwarded that cannot fail to give unbounded satisfaction.[40]

In early 1864 the Commissariat Department in Melbourne, Sydney and Hobart Town were notified of the requirements for "Sound Horses" for both draught and lighter types for riding or pack animals.[41] The extent of the trade which emerged out of Tasmania is not clear but it may have been effected by the stipulation that horse "purchases would be made in New Zealand, the owners shipping at their own risk, the Department not being bound to purchase".[42] It was reported though that the barque Chrishna at Hobart had been "rapidly fitted up for the conveyance of horses &c., to New Zealand."[43]

In February-March 1864 advertisements in the *Sydney Morning Herald* again sought horses, this time specifically for the Colonial Defence Force cavalry:

> TROOP HORSES FOR NEW ZEALAND. - The Inspector of Horses for the Colonial Defence Force at Auckland, New Zealand, begs to notify that he will be prepared to purchase animals suitable for the above service, viz.:- Geldings, not under 4 or over 7 years old, over 15 hands high, sound, quiet to ride, and with good action, and will attend at Messrs. BURT and CO.'S stables, 272, Pitt-street, every day after Monday, the 15th instant, to inspect horses as may be offered.
>
> Parties having suitable horses may communicate with Messrs. BURT and CO., Mr. CHARLES MARTYN, 240, Pitt-street; or, Mr. ARMSTRONG, V.S., Pitt-street. EDWARD MAYNE.[44]

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37 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 October 1863, p.4.
38 Morris, op.cit., p.108.
39 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 October 1863, pp. 4 & 5; & also see, Glen, op.cit., p.24.
40 Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1863, p.4.
41 Argus, 15 January 1864, p.7, & 30 January 1864, p.7; Sydney Morning Herald, 1 February 1864, p.2; & Mercury, 22 February 1864.
42 Mercury, 22 February 1864.
43 Mercury, 30 January 1864.
44 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 February 1864, p.12. These advertisements for horses for the Colonial Defence Force continued in Sydney Morning Herald, on 15 February, p.8; 18 February, p.2; 19 February, p.6; 22 February, p.2; 4 March, p.6; 7 March, p.6; & 14 March 1864, p.6.

As evident here, the trade and supply of various types of horses from the Australian colonies was obviously of enormous value to the scale of military operations being undertaken during 1863-64. The size of this trade out of Sydney alone can be ascertained from a summary of the "Sydney Horse Market" in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 23 May 1864:

> MESSRS. BURT and CO. notice that with the approach of winter the supply of broken-in horses is fast decreasing below the demand, and fresh lots in good condition readily bring top market rates. At present there are numerous orders for horse teams to go north ... It is, however, difficult to meet these requirements, nearly all our available cart stock having been cleared off to meet the New Zealand demand in the summer months, and our own carriers who were tempted by prices then to sell out have a difficulty to replenish their teams. We estimate that one thousand horses were shipped to New Zealand in the first four months of the present year, of which 800 were cart stock, and would leave £30 per head here. The other 200 would cost about £20; adding freight and forage, not less in round numbers than £30,000 for horse stock alone.[45]

Conclusions

The support New Zealand received from the Australian colonies during 1860-61 was far from insignificant, and in fact was vital in stemming the potential military and social crisis faced at Taranaki during 1860. In replication to the conflicts of 1845-47, Australia became a major source for New Zealand's immediate logistic and commissariat needs. Geographical proximity and ease of supply enabled Australian commissariat stores and arsenals to supply camp equipment, modern rifles, revolvers, artillery and an array of munitions and other military accoutrements. Such war material included stores and foodstuffs to fill the larders of the military forces being assembled in Taranaki, as well as the military horses on which to carry such supplies and draw the artillery.

During 1863-64, the Australian colonies were again especially vital in supplying an extensive array of commissariat and logistic material contributing to the scale of the New Zealand war effort. This period truly marks the high water mark in Australian military involvement in New Zealand. As in previous years, Australian commissariat stores and arsenals contributed quantities of rifles and carbines, ammunitions, accoutrements, artillery and associated ordnance material. This now extended with a considerable military horse trade, manufactured river gunboats (as well as a place to purchase existing riverboats), naval coal and chandlery supplies and services, shipping for a variety of military or commissariat purposes, successful tenderers for meat and cattle contracts, and a great variety of foodstuffs, military clothing and other equipment.

The military horse trade to New Zealand is one aspect of Australia's significant involvement in the New Zealand wars, which warrants more in-depth research. Such a study should determine the size of the trade across the Tasman, and the types and numbers of horses involved throughout the decade of the 1860s. Such an assessment should determine whether there was any continuation of a military horse trade through to the early 1870s, when the last shots of New Zealand's many wars ended. Similarly, it should also consider investigations to judge if any similar trade took place during the span of the 1845-47 conflicts, and even in the intermediate period 1848-59, when New Zealand's ongoing imperial military presence no doubt required horse stocks for assisting with carrying out its garrison duties. This excursion into Australia's 1860s horse trade to New Zealand, therefore provides indications of an important cross-Tasman trade not generally recognised, and until a detailed study determines the true scale and worth of this horse trade, this shall suffice as an addendum to Yarwood's seminal study on Australian horses abroad.

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45 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1864, p.3.


200711772

THE WRONG PLACE

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Was the original landing at Anzac Cove on 25 April 1915 made in the wrong place? Since the day itself most people have thought so. Various explanations have been offered for landing too far north. But almost always they explain how and why the landing went wrong, not of claiming otherwise. Now however a new breed of historian says we are wrong. A forthright expression of the new view is given by Peter Stanley in his book, *Quinn's Post*:

> It has been an article of faith in Australia that the landings were made in the 'wrong place'. Recent research by Denis Winter, Tim Travers and Tom Frame conclusively refutes this idea.1

Following this lead, more recent works on Gallipoli are now starting to repeat the new orthodoxy.2 And yet this new perspective seems based on a rather limited set of studies. It is time to re-examine whether the Anzac landing was in the wrong place. This paper examines the research by Winter and Frame referred to by Stanley, concluding that it doesn't stand up to close scrutiny. Furthermore, evidence that they largely ignore – much of it first aired over thirty years ago by Eric Bush3 – still makes better sense of an event confusing both at the time and in the surviving documents.

An Outline of the Landing

The received doctrine supposedly exhibits and explains the landing. Its basics are that the covering force was to land from a point about a mile north of Gaba Tepe on a front of about a mile (an area later known as Brighton Beach), but that they (and especially the first wave) landed in a bunch north of the proposed landing zone around the promontory of Ari Burnu at the northern end of Anzac Cove.

The Navy were to land the troops. At Anzac the task fell to Rear Admiral Thursby's Second Squadron, Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. The old battleship, *Triumph*, was to be guide, and to be in position by 2300 the evening before the landing. Positioning was critical as the rest of the Squadron would take position from *Triumph* when preparing to land the troops. The covering force was to be landed in two waves. The first wave of 1500 men contained half of each of 9 Bn, 10 Bn and 11 Bn, and these men were carried to within about 2½ miles of the beach in three battleships, *Queen, Prince of Wales* and *London*, arrayed from south to north. They were then transferred to 'tows': a ship's steam pinnace or picket boat towing three boats filled with troops. Their immediate task was to secure the landing site. Birdwood was fearful of Turkish artillery behind Gaba Tepe so the first two companies of 9 Bn were to move south to clear that area. The second wave was the balance of these battalions plus 12 Bn (Brigade reserve), attached troops, 3 Brigade headquarters and the Brigade commander, Colonel MacLagan. The second wave troops were in destroyers, which passed between the battleships. They were to land from boats assembled separately from the first wave's tows. The second wave was to follow in the footsteps of the first, and together they were to seize what was known as the third ridge. The covering force was to establish a position through bold action: it was impressed on them that they must push on to their objective – they must push on. The Second Brigade was to land next, seemingly

1 Peter Stanley *Quinn's Post* Allen & Unwin (2005) p. 16.
2 For example, Peter Pedersen *The Anzacs Viking* (2007) p. 43 and Kevin Fewster (ed) *Bean's Gallipoli* Allen & Unwin (2007) p. 78. David Cameron *25 April 1915* Allen & Unwin (2007) pp. xxv-xxvi resists it.
3 Eric Bush *Gallipoli* George Allen & Unwin 1975.

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a bit north of the Third, and occupy Hill 971, securing the left flank of the position.[4] It didn't work out that way. The first wave landed at about 0430 on a much reduced front, mixed together and further north than envisaged in the plan. The second wave of the covering force landed on a wider front, but also were out of position.

From the beginning there was a theory that an unknown current pushed the tows to the north. The idea seemed sufficiently plausible that in the absence of better explanations Bean adopted it for the official history. It appears that the first to query it in print was HV Howe, a survivor of that first wave who, in 1962, wondered whether the shift to the north was intentional;[5] following his lead, Robert Rhodes James expressed reservations: 'The notorious "northerly current" to which so much blame was attached, does not seem to have affected the other "tows" to anything like the same extent as it did Waterlow's [*ie* the southernmost tow]'.[6] Eric Bush – who had been a midshipman in charge of one of those tows – in 1975 gave substance to the challenge. The idea seems finally to have been laid to rest by Tom Frame. He pointed out that the pilotage information and well-documented knowledge of the currents in the area do not support the notion of a current of sufficient strength to account for any significant movement by the tows. He was at the Gallipoli commemoration in 1990 and was able then to make empirical tests while he was off Anzac Cove early on Anzac Day morning. Their small boat drifted not at all, and, when dawn broke, the many craft about the cove were riding at anchor in all sorts of orientations. When he returned to Australia he checked 'photographs taken on 25 April 1915 and noted that the ships stationed off the coast were similarly headed in a multitude of directions. In other words ... the water off Ari Burnu was slack'.[7] (The choice of the word 'slack' is unfortunate as there is virtually no tide around Ari Burnu.) Howe reported one snippet of contemporary evidence that there was not much of a current: when *Triumph* was sunk, her wine casks floated direct to the Cove.[8] With hindsight, the theory that an unknown current moved the landing northward was not ever a good one. It cannot account for the tows bunching up, for example, so from the outset it needed supplementing.

'Recent research by Denis Winter, Tim Travers and Tom Frame ...'

If the current was not responsible, then Howe's suggestion that the landing wasn't in the wrong place may appear attractive – as it did to Winter and to Frame. However, Peter Stanley's quoted statement may suggest rather more systematic development than is the case. In fact the three works he refers to argue for quite different conclusions. These works are Winter's *25 April 1915*[9], Travers' *Gallipoli 1915*[10] and Frame's *The Shores of Gallipoli*. Winter argues that successive plans moved the landing to the north. Frame argues that Naval technology, including charts, was simply unequal to the precision required. Travers does not argue against the wrong place thesis at all. Winter's and Frame's arguments are dissected below.

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4 See *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918* (ed CEW Bean) Angus & Robertson 1921, Vol 1 (hereafter Official History) Map 7.
5 HV Howe 'The Anzac landing – a belated query' *Stand-To* 7(5) Sept-Oct 1962.
6 Robert Rhodes James *Gallipoli* Batsford (1965). Sourced from Pan Books edition (1974) pp. 105-6.
7 Tom Frame *The Shores of Gallipoli* Hale & Iremonger (2000) p199.
8 Letter, Howe to AW Bazley, 7 October 1962, held at the Australian War Memorial (hereafter AWM) 3DRL/3520 folder 117.
9 Denis Winter *25 April 1915* University of Queensland Press (1994) (hereafter 'Winter's book').
10 Tim Travers *Gallipoli 1915* Tempus 2001.

Winter

Winter first wrote about the landing in a paper ten years before his book was published.[11] He concluded on rather slender evidence that Birdwood probably planned the landing to be where it actually was. In his book, he maintains the same conclusion from a more elaborate argument (chapter 9) but also seeks to make plausible that changes to plans for the landing show Birdwood creating his secret and not generally disclosed plan (chapter 11). The latter, for all its detail, is really just supporting evidence for the main argument, and may be considered summarily.

Briefly, in chapter 11 Winter sees three quite different sets of orders: those issued on 13 April, on 18 April, and a set he conjectures were issued about 23 April. The change from the first to the second is overstated. Rather than 'a completely new set of divisional orders' it is probably better described as an elaboration of the earlier orders, designed to give them practical effect. Of more interest is the conjectural third set of orders, supposedly directing the landing to Ari Burnu. Winter conjures these orders from the loss of half an hour of darkness resulting from postponing the landing from 23 to 25 April. The boats would no longer have time to land troops in the dark, he writes, so concentrating them around Ari Burnu was preferable. The evidence adduced is unconvincing: senior officers were working on orders on or after 23 April, and Winter sees significance in the dates of meetings among senior officers. He added that two post-war accounts supported his case. The first was a comment from the Mitchell Report, describing the landing place chosen as 'a rugged and difficult part of the coast'.[12] But in its next sentence the Report reads: 'the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which had been selected', so Winter's quote from the Mitchell Report is explicitly not describing Anzac Cove.[13] The second was a comment written in 1964 by Sydney Callaghan, who had been employed making maps before the landing. He created his own map[14] and carried it when he landed on 25 April. He wrote that he marked the map faintly in pencil at 'the intended landing spot'.[15] Winter assumed that he marked the south face of Ari Burnu as the intended place but none of Callaghan's letters, nor his map, even hint at this. Accordingly, there is no evidence in support of the conjectured third set of plans.

As Winter's argument is that changes to the plans meant that the troops landed pretty much where they were supposed to, his approach in chapter 9 is to seek evidence in what the senior officers said. To begin, he describes the changes of direction made by the tows, concluding that it was both planned and guided in some way. There were two course changes recorded but, asks Winter, 'how had the first change been carried out in the dark?' and hypothesizes that it was made possible by a beacon which some of the troops had noticed. His supporting argument is hard to take seriously: he suggests that the beacon was mounted on a submarine. He writes:

> What hard evidence is there for a submarine as the source? The papers of Lieutenant Stan Watson, Birdwood's signaller, mention that submarines with white lights were to have guided the flotilla and convoy but that Thursby had cancelled the order "for no apparent reason". Given the intense secrecy

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11 Denis Winter 'The Anzac landing: the great gamble' *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* 4, 1984 pp. 13-21.

12 Sourced in Winter's book, p. 266 thus: 'Quotation taken from the version in Rayfield Papers, Imperial War Museum.'

13 Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Attacks Delivered on and the Enemy Defences of the Dardanelles Straits Admiralty C.B.1550 (1919), p. 164. Commodore FH Mitchell chaired the Committee. When Birdwood first went to Gallipoli in February 1915 the then Captain Mitchell had been attached as Navy liaison officer to his staff.

14 AWM Map G7432.G1 S65 I.1, currently accessible on the Memorial's website.

15 Letter SM Callaghan to Director, AWM, dated 24 March 1964; see also letters 4 July 1964 and 22 September 1971. AWM315/419/16/10.

> surrounding the landing, a secret issue of counter orders cannot be ruled out. And the orders Watson saw countermanded could well have been ones relating to a superseded landing plan.[16]

But this means only that it is not inconceivable that submarines were used, not that it is plausible let alone probable.

The rest of the chapter selects statements about the position of the landing from participants with the explicit aim of showing that key officers were conspirators: 'the suspect statements of Birdwood and Waterlow among many others suggest that their and Dix's accounts were all falsifications, concocted to shore up an agreed cover story'.[17] The cases against the credibility of these three and of MacLagan are examined next.

Birdwood: It is easy to pick variant statements from the senior commanders. The issue is clouded by their having to play many roles: political to their masters, psychological for their troops, and self-preserving – especially for Gallipoli generals, in view of the Dardanelles Commission. It is easy to show Birdwood saying many different things about the landing – in different contexts – but immediately after the landing he noted in his diary for 25 April that 'Boats missed their bearings in the dark'[18] and he told Bean the next day that they had landed in the wrong place.[19] He said the same in a letter dated 29 April[20], and in his formal report to Hamilton.[21] At the time that he was on the spot he was consistent and stated – in ways difficult later to repudiate – that the landing was in the wrong place.

MacLagan: Commander of the covering force, he landed from the destroyer *Colne* with the second wave. Winter quotes from Bean's notes: 'MacLagan became convinced of the mistake when he reached the top of Camp (later MacLagan's) Ridge'.[22] In the *Official History* Bean parallelled these words[23] despite, as Winter points out, MacLagan having been able to see the ground for some time beforehand. Here Winter stops, seemingly satisfied that the oddness of the account supports the idea of a conspiracy of senior officers. Indeed, it is very odd because Bean continued that the officers on *Colne* were aware that they were too far north. Yet apparently they didn't care to tell the military commander! Bean adds nothing in the preface to later editions of the *Official History* (wherein he corrected many small points) but by the time he writes *Anzac to Amiens* the matter seems to have clarified. There he wrote that before landing MacLagan 'realised that his brigade had been disembarked too far north'.[24]

Dix: Commander Charles Dix was Senior Naval Officer with the first wave and located in tow no 12. He was an Assistant Beach Master thereafter.[25] His account follows:

> We gradually drew clear of the ships, and at first all seemed to be going well, but when three quarters of the way ashore the right wing was seen to be steering across the bows of the centre, who were conforming to the movement, thus crowding the left wing away to port. By this time some of us were awake to the fact that we were already some way to port of our objective and so, in order to save as

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16 Winter's book p107. Watson's account was written following a visit to Anzac Cove in 1977. See AWM MSS 1035.
17 Winter's book p. 115.
18 AWM 3DRL/3376 Series 1 folder 1. Diary entry for 25 April 1915.
19 Kevin Fewster's edited version of Bean's diaries, Gallipoli Correspondent (1983) p. 75.
20 AWM 3DRL/3376 Series 9 folder 6.
21 AWM 3DRL/3376 Series 11 folder 1. Report dated 8 May 1915.
22 Winter's book p. 111.
23 Official History p. 275.
24 CEW Bean *Anzac to Amiens* Australian War Memorial 5th ed (1968) p91. Miles Beevor landed with the second wave and was aware that MacLagan knew of the error on the beach. Beevor ts 'My Landing on Gallipoli' p12. AWM MSS 761.
25 'Second Squadron – Beach Orders' AWM4/1/28/5

much ground as possible, the left wing went at full speed and held their course, only altering to starboard to avoid collision.26

The landing had taken place just about the frontage (5½ cables) to the north of where it had been intended. This was caused by an unexpected northern set of considerable strength and by the fact that it was extremely difficult to make out any shore marks during the approach.27

He is also supposed to be the Naval officer who called out near the beach: 'Tell the Colonel that the dam' fools have landed us one mile too far north.'

Winter says that Dix's 'claim on behalf of the current can be discounted as pure fabrication. All existing evidence discounts any current and Dix, as a seasoned naval man, would have been well aware of that fact.'28 The problem is that many people believed it. It is in every edition of the *Official History* – and, despite Bean's supposed reservations, also in *Anzac to Amiens* – and in Corbett's official Naval history29; Roger Keyes and Birdwood said it and so far as I know, no Naval officer recorded at the time that the current was not the problem. The case is not improved when Winter recruits HV Howe to respond to Dix's call. Howe was in tow no 9 and, says Winter, 'on hearing Dix call out, told Drake-Brockman ... that he didn't believe it because the Sphinx, a prominent landmark on shore, had been unmistakable for the past ten minutes'.30 But Howe's statement is to the effect that, as a matter of personal conviction – no more, no less – he couldn't believe the Navy to have made so gross an error of navigation; that should never have been taken as evidence of anything else without independent support. And Winter does not mention Howe's recantation:

After seven years of research into the landing and correspondence with many of the living participants, Howe finally accepted the explanation produced by Bush and discounted his own earlier belief of a deliberate change (see Bush, papers Box 75/65/2, file 'H.V. Howe', letter from Howe [c. 20 December 1969]).31

The unjustified discrediting of Dix together with Howe's reconsidered views destroys Winter's attack upon Dix.

Waterlow: An important account is that by Lieutenant Commander JB Waterlow. He was appointed to tow no 1 to be guide to all other tows and then a Beach Officer under Dix. He died in the battle of Jutland. He wrote the following account of his journey to the beach in his diary, rediscovered by his nephew in 1969.

April 23. – I'm rather glad that the Flag Commander, who knows the beach, is coming to lend a helping hand for finding the way in.

May 3. – Shortly after midnight on the 24th. April we manned our boats ... All the 11 other steamboats were to keep station on me, and we started off about 2 points on the starboard bow of 'Queen', trying to make Gaba Tepe. It was now so dark that we could see but little, but Lambart (Flag Commander 'Queen') who had been there before, assured me we were right, and it did seem as if a prominent headland, such as I had been given to understand Gaba Tepe was, loomed ahead of us, – so we went gaily on. As we approached the shore it became clear that there was a very prominent headland to the northward of us and we began to vacillate – our faith in our course was more shaken by the fact that all the other boats were steering more to the northward. At last I altered course to the northward also and steered for the high land we could clearly see.

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26 CC Dix 'Efficient Navy: How Troops Were Landed' *Reveille* 31 March 1932 p. 63.
27 Dix p. 64.
28 Winter's book p. 114.
29 J Corbett *Official History of the War: Naval Operations vol II* Longmans (1921) p. 321.
30 Winter p. 114. Letter Howe to CF Churchill 30 Nov 1962 AWM38/6673/477; see also Howe p. 2.
31 N Steel & P Hart *Defeat at Gallipoli* Macmillan (1994) p426. See also letter Howe to Bazley 20 February 1970, AWM 3DRL/3520 folder 40.

> We had to assume that the 'Queen' was in her correct billet, and working on that assumption this prominent headland *could not be* Gaba Tepe. So my uncertainty increased – but still the boats steered to the northward. At last I altered course and went down the line astern trying to draw them to the southward with me. This failed and I was now convinced that my prominent headland was not Gaba Tepe. It was too high, and also on the summit there was not visible the ruined building which surmounts Gaba Tepe. I then tried to urge the boats to the northward where a good beach was visible – then again to the southward – but efforts in every direction failed. I became miserable and nonplussed, feeling that the whole plan was doomed to failure. The dawn began to glow and our prominent headland loomed larger and larger against the pale saffron light, – the *one* place on the whole coast on which we would have decided *not* to land. However we were approaching the shore and the dawn was growing so that at last, in despair, I dashed straight for the frowning cliffs now straight ahead.[32]

Winter seeks to discredit Waterlow's account, first by claiming that 'Waterlow's own reconnaissance, and profiles that could hardly be mistaken, throw doubt on some passages'.[33] But there is no evidence that Waterlow had made such reconnaissance[34], and he disclaims special knowledge of the area in the quoted extract. Second, there may be doubt as to whether Waterlow was in tow no 1.[35] The midshipman in that tow was Mansergh who, as Vice-Admiral Sir Aubrey Mansergh apparently wrote to Howe stating 'very definitely' that Waterlow did not travel in his tow and that he was not the guide boat – the senior officer in Mansergh's picket boat was Commander Lambart – the admiral's observer who later reported to Thursby that the right flank had landed within 100 yards of where it was intended to land.[36]

Howe had reservations about Mansergh's statement, tellingly pointing out that if Waterlow had been in another tow he would have been able to prevent any bunching up on his port side. It is far from clear just what happened to tow no 1, but not very important as it in fact did not guide the tows in.

Thursby stationed his ships in the dark. Once it was light enough to see the coast clearly, some of the destroyer captains noted that they were out of position. Commander Dick of *Chelmer* claimed that they 'were pushed about 1 mile too far north'[37] as did the captain of *Colne*.[38] According to Major Miles Beevor, on *Foxhound*, the destroyer captain, 'after studying the shore for a few moments through his night glasses, then handed them to me, saying in a very disturbed voice, "Major, we are going to land you in the wrong place."'[39] The destroyer captains were recording their surprise after looking at the shore. The implication is that the destroyer captains expected to land troops at Brighton Beach. The same seems to apply to at least one battleship: '"When daylight came", Captain R.N. Bax of the *Prince of Wales* wrote in his private log, "we

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32 Extracts from Waterlow's diary; ts in letter Howe to Bazley, 20 February 1970; for the discovery, letter Howe to Bazley, 28 October 1969. AWM 3DRL/3520 Folder 40.

33 Winter's book p. 113.

34 Howe, in commenting on proofs of James' book, replied: 'It seems quite absurd to think that Waterlow – who had on two or three occasions reconnoitred the coast from close range aboard "Queen" and destroyers could have mistaken Ari Burnu backed by the heights of Plugges Plateau, Russells Top and the outstanding Sphinx for the low point of Gaba Tepe.' (copy of letter Howe to James 28 October 1964, AWM 3DRL/3520 folder 118). Waterlow's diary had not at that time been discovered. James' book states that 'He [Waterlow] and Dix had made a very careful study of the coast only a few days before' (p105); presumably phrased to accommodate Howe's remark. Perhaps Winter drew on the same remark. On the other hand, Steel & Hart note that Waterlow had been engaged on minesweeping operations and, with an eye to Waterlow's diary, say that he 'was entirely unfamiliar with the coastline around Gaba Tepe' (p56). No-one gives sources for any of this.

35 Winter adds another complication, claiming that Lieutenant V. Making commanded the first tow. Winter's book p. 113.

36 Letter Howe to Bazley, 12 March 1965 AWM 3DRL/3520 Folder 19.

37 AWM38 3DRL/606/25.

38 Official History pp. 264 and 275.

39 Beevor p. 5.

found we had anchored one mile too far to the north"'.[40] Thus, not only senior soldiers, but senior sailors as well were confused about what was going on. The foolhardiness of Thursby were he so to mislead his senior commanders hardly needs emphasis.

Perhaps the most startling aspect of Winter's presentation is his omission of most of Metcalf's account. Insofar as Metcalf's description of his actions provided Bush, Howe and Steel & Hart with an answer to the question of how the landing was misplaced, something more may have been expected. It is examined later.

Frame

Frame reviews Naval technology relevant to the landing and, as a separate element of his argument, the charts available in 1915. He concludes that the charts and other technology of the day did not allow the Navy to be anywhere near as precise as 'the wrong place' hypothesis requires.

He first claims that the Navy had very limited navigational tools. In particular the old battleship *Triumph,* which was to be the marker ship for the Anzac landing, could not have been expected to determine her position sufficiently accurately. His argument is briefly that (1a) the Navy only had magnetic compasses to ensure that *Triumph* was in position and (1b) the compasses available were unreliable; (2a) the ship positioned itself in the dark and (2b) there were no lights or other objects then visible for *Triumph* to fix upon. He concludes: 'It was, then, largely a matter of good fortune if *Triumph* did manage to get within 500 yards of the rendezvous in any direction'.[41]

This last statement follows Bush very closely: 'If it [her position] was obtained after dark, which is probable, it could be just a matter of luck if the *Triumph* anchored within say 500 yards of the rendezvous in any direction'.[42] Bush here too thinks that *Triumph* positioned herself after dark. Both Bush and Frame then suggest that there is no evidence that *Triumph* reported her position to *Queen*; both then conclude that we cannot know because *Triumph* was sunk, with her records, shortly thereafter. Why 500 yards? Bush appears to have used it as a gross approximation (*within say 500 yards*) to indicate that a small but not insignificant error may have been possible in positioning *Triumph.* Frame offers no defence of a more specific measure (*within 500 yards*). Roughly put, their argument is that the difficulties under which *Triumph* laboured to be in position justified an allowance for error of several hundred yards. Actually, the allowance for any such error should be shared: not just *Triumph* relative to Gaba Tepe, but *Queen* and the rest of the squadron relative to *Triumph.* But Frame wants more.

The first part of his main argument is that: 'Other than a magnetic compass ... the Navy did not have any other aids to ensure *Triumph* was in the intended position off Gaba Tepe'.[43] Even allowing that it was night-time, there was a great deal more available. There were various means of determining the speed of the ship through the water: 'dead reckoning' was not without technical support. There were night-vision glasses. Taking compass bearings of fixed visible points would at least at times have been possible. Also available from 1906 were the nine-foot base Barr and Stroud rangefinders – their specifications included a maximum error of 1 per cent at 7000 yards 'and beyond up to 10,000 yards with proportionate error'.[44] While *Triumph* may not have been equipped with this particular appliance, rangefinders were standard equipment.[45]

40 Bush p. 114.
41 Frame p. 204.
42 Bush p. 111.
43 Frame p. 203.
44 JT Sumida, *In Defence of Naval Supremacy* Unwin Hyman (1989) p. 74.
45 Mitchell Report p. 77.

Finally, the area had been visited frequently by *Triumph* so the navigators had some immediate experience of where they were to go and could use their knowledge of land profiles in visual observations. Even Thursby assumed that there was more available than a compass, as his orders to *Triumph* included the direction that 'After anchoring you are to verify it [your position] by every possible means in your power.'[46]

As to the reliability of compasses, Frame says: 'The magnetic compasses fitted to warships of pre-World War I were less reliable than the gyroscopic compasses which are in use today'.[47] How much less reliable he does not say; on whether it mattered he is silent. In any event, modern ships are still fitted with magnetic compasses. For example the River class OPV (Offshore Patrol Vessel) that entered service with the Royal Navy progressively from January 2003 is equipped with GPS, a gyrocompass and a magnetic compass.

Frame had earlier used Bush's words to emphasise the technical incapacity of the Navy to land at a precise point. Bush had written: 'Picket boat compasses were notoriously inaccurate and Admiral Thursby was expecting too much. Picket boats were not capable of making such a delicate adjustment to their landfall'.[48] Frame quoted this passage but asked too much of it, for Bush was talking of a *change* of bearing, which he thought beyond the picket boats' capacity. This is important because he also believed that the Navy was responsible for landing the first wave troops in the wrong place, which implies that he thought that an accurate due east dash was not beyond their capability. 'Notoriously inaccurate' neither means nor implies 'very inaccurate.'

The second part of Frame's main argument seeks to downplay visual cues that may have been used. Thus, *Triumph* took up her position about 2300. Frame wrote: 'More than likely, it [a fix of her position] was obtained in the dark and without confident reference to any reliable physical feature on either Imbros Island or the Gallipoli Peninsula'.[49] There was limited visibility up to moonrise at 0211, but that does not mean that features on the peninsula were unavailable to the navigators. Frame continues that there were 'neither lights nor clearly distinguishable landmarks from which to fix the ship's position between Imbros and Ari Burnu.' His evidence here is a passage in Bean's diary where Bean talks of passing Imbros but makes no mention of seeing a light.[50] But this is not adequate. Just because Bean didn't mention seeing a light means neither that there wasn't one, nor that he didn't see it. As it happens, he did see one. In *Anzac to Amiens* he wrote: 'High on some land to starboard – presumably Imbros Island – a single light swam by. Presently another appeared low ahead. It was on a stationary warship.'[51] Dix also reported the light: the second wave of the covering force arrived at 2300 'at Kephalos, where, luckily, there was a light'.[52] Frame himself reports of the Cape Kephalo area of Imbros that 'The 1915 chart shows two lights within a range of ten miles, but the more easterly of the lights had been turned off the previous month ...'[53] so it was presumably the other that Bean and Dix both saw, and which was available to *Triumph* if she wanted it.

Frame claims to be the first to compare modern charts of the Anzac Cove area, prepared using advanced technology capable of amazing precision, with those used at the time of the landing. Combining the two so that 'the coastline as charted in 1915 has been block-shifted to coincide

46 Mitchell Report p. 131.
47 Frame p. 203
48 Frame p. 191 quoting Bush p. 98.
49 Frame p. 203
50 Fewster Gallipoli Correspondent p. 59.
51 Bean p. 80.
52 Dix p. 20.
53 Frame p. 203.

with the modern coastline in the vicinity of Cape Kephalo'[54] revealed that Gaba Tepe was actually 0.24 nautical miles *south* of its 1915 map position. What this means is that, if you travelled from Cape Kephalo towards Gaba Tepe on a constant bearing using the 1915 map, you would end up 485 yards north of the place you intended to reach, because of errors in the chart. Our problem is that we do not know to what extent such course-based positioning was supplemented by location-based information. To what extent would the dead reckoning position be modified by what could be seen of the coast? Compliance with Thursby's 'every possible means' exhortation suggests that position-based knowledge was used, although whether and to what effect cannot be determined.

But the charting discrepancy doesn't matter much, because Anzac Cove is also displaced in the 1915 maps north of its actual position (but not by as much – just how much cannot be determined adequately from Frame's *Fig. 12*). The relativities of Gaba Tepe and Anzac Cove and thus broadly of all areas between, were more or less preserved. The work on contemporary charts begun by Frame is important but it has limited bearing on the problem of displacement of the landing, contributing perhaps two or three hundred yards.

From these considerations it seems that there is scope to suppose that *Triumph* (or *Queen* or indeed both ships) were out of position by an amount sufficient to contribute to the northward displacement of the landing, but as suggested above Frame wants more. The effect on *Triumph*, in Frame's view, was that 'Given the distances involved, the likely margin of error across a track of twenty miles was around three miles or 1.5 miles either to port or starboard of the intended track.'[55] Why three miles? Frame just says so, offering neither argument nor other basis for the claim.

The upshot is that Frame does not prove his point – but what point is that? For there seem to be two, which may be described as a weak and a strong conclusion. The weak conclusion is that the technology and charts could not deliver a better result than landing within 1.5 miles of the expected place. Both Navy and military chiefs may have planned it otherwise but they were likely to be thwarted by large amounts of error of which they would have been ignorant. This conclusion would follow directly from Frame's arguments were they sound. It is a common style of conclusion, based on our knowing things not known to the original participants. The strong conclusion substitutes that the chiefs did know of the inadequacy of naval technology to the proposed task. Whether they planned (or hoped) for greater precision than justified, they would not have been deceived, just optimistic or simply tight lipped.

The weak conclusion would explain why the landing was in the wrong place. It would show why expectations held by planners, reasonable to them at the time, were unlikely to be fulfilled. The strong conclusion alone could establish that there was no wrong place. To achieve this, Frame presumably needs to show that the Navy knew its nocturnal navigation was grossly inadequate, but must show that the Army was aware of that. He seems to slip between the two conclusions, but without arguing for the stronger outcome. For example, when he delivers his own conclusion, it moves unselfconsciously from the weak to the strong formulation:

> Given the vagaries of relying solely on dead-reckoning for track prediction, the Navy was going to land the troops somewhere on a three-mile front. This was the most that could be offered and achieved in difficult circumstances. Birdwood, therefore, had to accept the consequences ...[56]

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54 Frame p. 240-41.
55 Frame p. 209.
56 Frame p. 209.

This statement misses the point: did the Navy know; did they tell the Army? Where is the evidence?

In brief, Frame's arguments are at best only partial explanations that the landing was in the wrong place, and he does not establish his stronger thesis, that there was no wrong place. Winter's attempts to establish that there was a conspiracy among select senior and middle-level officers in two services is without foundation, and his supposition of secret orders is equally unconvincing.[57]

A fresh start

So it seems the landing was made in the wrong place. The need to explain how and why remains. The traditional explanation of an unknown current is inadequate, and the idea of a guiding light is unsupported. Talk of a buoy placed by a destroyer has only ever been raised to be dismissed. A fresh start is needed.

As the primary material on Gallipoli expands it becomes possible to quote from several sources to the same effect on a particular point. The selection must be made carefully to avoid taking statements out of context, but when done with due care it can be quite illuminating. Thus, Travers provides a selection of senior officers' views on how far wrong the landing was:

> One or two officers, such as the Anzac GSO1, Braithwaite, believed the landing was up to two miles north of the proper spot. Major General Godley believed that the landing was one and a half miles too far north. Major General Bridges considered the landing was one and three quarter miles too far north. ... Later, Thursby argued that the landing did actually occur within a few hundred yards of the assigned position.[58]

Travers' conclusion was that 'the choice of landing place was actually quite flexible, especially as far as Birdwood was concerned'. He seems to be arguing that because different participants had different views on how far wrong the landing was, they had different views on where it was supposed to have been. But this is an insecure deduction because there are formal difficulties in specifying just how much north of any intended place the landing did occur.

The problem of measuring the northward drift is that there are two aspects to consider, first an overall shift to the north, and second the bunching up of the tows, again with a northerly tendency. To show the difficulty these present, consider a simple example: a group of people running 100 metres in lanes. If instead of sticking to their own lanes, they all congregated in the left hand lanes by the end of the race, we would wonder why they had 'moved to the left'. But by how much? Because different runners had moved by different amounts, no clear answer is obvious. I do not accept that any statistical measure is useful here, because the specific drifts are individually important (if my right hand is in very hot water and my left in freezing water, on average my hands are pleasantly warm). If, however, the runners were in addition all blown off course 100 metres to the left, that component of the movement swamps the bunching and we would be comfortable saying that they were about 100 metres off course. When, as at Anzac Cove, the two components become more nearly comparable it is increasingly difficult to ignore

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57 Before moving on, it should be made clear that Frame and Winter propose theses which are in fact logical contraries; that is, as a matter of logic, if one is right, the other is wrong. Frame's (strong) thesis is that the Navy could only offer a wide landing front, so a 'right place' within that made no sense, while Winter's is that substantially smaller adjustments to plans were made and achieved, leading to the landing being made pretty well precisely where it was supposed to be. Frame's depends on the chiefs knowing that the technology was inadequate to the task, Winter's that at the very least they did not know that the technology was inadequate. Rescuing one will thereby vitiate the other and you can't have them both without entertaining a contradiction.

58 Travers p. 68.

the component of the displacement due to the bunching up. There is genuinely no straightforward numerical answer to the question of how far north the landing had moved. It is hardly surprising that there are different answers from different observers, as they each try to make sense of the two different kinds of factor using just one number.

Unsurprising it may be, but distinguishing two separate components to the one result of landing in the wrong place is useful. Each component can be examined separately for its contribution and for evidence supporting it.

Bunching up

One distraction regarding the bunching up of the tows is the supposition that visibility was so poor that the tows tended to move closer together simply to maintain visual contact. The idea appears in the *Official History* and has attracted many writers. It is only a distraction: in bunching up the tows moved to port, yet their instructions were that they take direction and speed from their starboard neighbour. If there were any bunching up due to poor visibility it would be to starboard and it was overwhelmed by some other factor that drove the tows north.

The most important account of the bunching up is that provided by the then midshipman JS Metcalf, here reported from Steel & Hart:

> It was very dark by this time [0320 on 25 April]. My sternsheetmen secured the towing rope of the pulling boats to our towing slip, and I eased the boats away from the *Queen's* side. *Queen* was moving slowly eastwards all this time, and my engines were going slow ahead to keep abreast of her. I took station, with the troop-filled boats in tow, about fifty yards south of *Queen's* bridge, and could just see No. 1 Tow about fifty yards south of me, on the beam. ...
>
> About 3.40 a.m. the order was called from *Queen's* bridge 'Go ahead picket boat.' I warned my engineroom 'Stand by for full speed,' and watched No. 1 Tow for the first sign of her increase in speed but could not see any. An angry hail came from *Queen's* bridge, 'Will you go ahead, picket boat.' Realizing that it was imperative, and I might be accused of cowardice if I did not comply, I rang full speed on the engine room bell, and away we went. A few minutes later I looked astern and could just see No. 1 Tow off my starboard quarter. I was too occupied looking ahead to look astern again, as it was very dark and I had no idea how far we were from rocks or sand. About a quarter of an hour later I realized we were heading very close to the north side of Gaba Tepe which, because of its height, is very conspicuous. Knowing that there were Turkish troops there, and we would get an enfilading fire all along the starboard side as well as from ahead, I was confident that we must be heading for a wrong place. There was no one to consult and I felt the lives of the men I was towing were my responsibility. Without any delay I altered course two points to port to get away from Gaba Tepe. After a quarter of an hour, finding the tows to port of me had conformed, I again altered course a point and a half to port.[59]

Metcalf steamed away at full speed in response to the order from *Queen's* bridge. But it was not necessarily Metcalf who was being hailed as the relevant picket boat was not identified[60] (the pulling boats for tows 1 & 2 were both 'picket boats'). Tow no 1 was the guide for all others; its movement was more important than Metcalf's no 2 tow. It would seem more likely to have been the intended recipient of the message from *Queen*. What if anything delayed tow no 1 remains a

59 Steel & Hart pp. 54, 55-6, citing IWM DOCS, Captain J.S. Metcalf DSC RD RNR, ts account of the landing. Another version is a letter written by Metcalf to Howe on 4 March 1965, wherein he wrote: 'It must be remembered I had no instructions as to where the troops should be put ashore, and the tow I had been told would guide [us] was not giving me any lead.' A third version was prepared for Bush, appearing in his book at p. 112.

60 In the account for Bush, but not elsewhere, Metcalf does say that it was he who was hailed. There is no reason given for this belief, and it would be near impossible to determine from the tows just who was being hailed. The Navy should have done better, perhaps directing that: 'Tow no 1 go ahead'.

mystery. Metcalf's moving off is to avoid a charge of cowardice. Even if he thought tow no 1 was not responding, his action was precipitate. Better to take orders from tow no 1, either by hailing or by sailing nearer to her. Furthermore, once under way, Metcalf compounded the misjudgement: he 'was too occupied looking ahead to look astern again' and made no further effort to take position from tow no 1.

Perhaps the next question to ask is what happened to no 1 tow. What it did was recorded by Major Salisbury who was in that tow:

> The naval officer guiding the tows was in the picket boat of my tow. Apparently he was steering the right course for Gaba Tepe, for somewhat more than half way in to the shore the rest of the tows had sagged away to the north and were out of sight. Some of the picket boats were smaller than the others and perhaps could not keep their loads up against the current setting north. Our tow was behind a large picket boat, and when the rest of the tows got out of sight to the north we turned north until we steamed across the sterns of the other tows with the naval officer apparently counting them; we then turned south to get back to our place on the right, but very soon the shore could be seen so the picket boat drew up in position as third tow instead of first, sandwiching half of 'B' Company into 'A'.[61]

Salisbury's account validates Metcalf's to the extent that as no 1 tow was wandering about at the rear of the tows it was not available to Metcalf to keep station from. It also helps to confirm Waterlow's account.

With tow no 1 ignored by Metcalf, tow no 2 was unexpectedly 'father'. Where was he to go? He had direct knowledge of the strength of Gaba Tepe's defences so he sought to shield the troops from the fire likely from there by pushing the whole first wave to the north. Inevitably his pressure forced the tows together.

From Metcalf's account it is possible to re-create his course.[62] The relevant features of his account for determining his course are:

1. About 0340 the order was called to go ahead (after hesitating, he did).
2. After about a quarter of an hour, altered course two points to port.
3. After another quarter of an hour, altered course a point and a half to port.

He gives no time estimate for reaching the beach: traditionally it is put at 4:30am; the distance to the beach is also uncertain. Bean thought it was 2½ miles.[63]

From these statements the path of Metcalf's tow can be reconstructed. To do so requires a few calculations. These are set out in the appendix. The results are presented with the precision that the calculations allow. Precision of the calculations should not be taken for accuracy in describing the event. Here the precise results are given, not because they are claimed to be accurate but because they are the outcome of the calculations. The further step, of determining appropriate levels of confidence, is not attempted and readers are invited to make their own estimates.

On these figures the total northward displacement of the southernmost tows, due to Metcalf's action, is 1400 yards. (Bush recorded a variation in his diary, that the second change of direction occurred at 0420 and was two points to port,[64] which yields a displacement of 1350 yards. This is used here but other outcomes, from varying the inputs, are readily calculable.) As the spread of

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61 Norman K Harvey *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line* (1941) p. 40; Salisbury provided a diagram for Bean – see AWM38 3DRL/606/25/2.

62 Steel & Hart pp. 425-6 note that Metcalf included a chart of the supposed course of the tows with his account in the Imperial War Museum, the accuracy of parts of which they dispute. I have not seen it.

63 Bean p. 81.

64 Bush p. 114.

the tows arrayed about the battleships was ordered to be around 2070 yards (see below), on these figures Metcalf's action is sufficient by itself to account for the bunching up of the tows.

Now we have an explanation of the *why* and of the *how* of Metcalf's manoeuvrings. He had initially waited for tow no1 to move ahead, but that, he thought, did not take place. He felt that he had to move forward, so he did, on his own initiative. Metcalf – indeed the entire covering force – now had no guide, and Metcalf was fully conscious of that, and of his responsibility to make good the deficiency. Steel & Hart point out that Metcalf was a more mature and much more experienced officer than most midshipmen, well able to exercise discretion. He was aged 19, a career merchant navy officer who had been at sea since 1910. In the absence of any reference to higher authority, he did what he thought was best.

The overall northward drift

Thursby had ordered the three battleships carrying the first wave of the covering force be positioned so that

> *Queen's* boats to land on beach about 1 mile N. of Gaba Tepe.
> *Prince of Wales's* boats 4 cables N. of *Queen's*.
> *London's* boats 4 cables N. of *Prince of Wales's*.
>
> Lieut.-Cdr. Waterlow in No. 1 Boat to be guide and all boats to regulate their course and speed by No. 1 Boat, distance apart of tows being about 150 yards.Commander Dix, in No. 12 Boat, Senior Naval Officer in charge.65

There were to be twelve tows, numbered from south to north: 1 to 4 from *Queen,* 5 to 8 from *Prince of Wales* and 9 to 12 from *London.*

In the *Official History* Bean was openly critical of the Naval planning:

The Naval Staff had had no such training as the Military Staff. The paragraphs in some of their important orders were not even numbered. Lack of grammar sometimes rendered the meaning ambiguous.66

Bean's concern is fully justified in the excerpt from Thursby's orders.67 The orders do not actually state that the battleships are to be four cables apart, just that their boats are to land at four cable distances. Taken literally this is almost incomprehensible: are tows 4&5, 8&9 to be four cables apart? or are tows 1, 5 and 9 to be four cables apart, and how would that be achieved? how can they be cables apart when they are to be 150 yards apart? and anyway, how are the tows to achieve any result without knowing where they start from?

The issue is resolved (*eg* by Steel & Hart) by supposing that Thursby's orders actually do refer to the battleships. Even so, there is still a problem, deriving from the nautical measure of a cable. It is a tenth of a nautical mile, which in the Royal Navy at that time was 2025 yards, so a cable was 202.5 yards. Of the four tows managed by each battleship, two were placed on each side. The tows were to be positioned about the battleship as shown below (in the following diagrams, 'B' represents a battleship and 't' a tow; distances in yards are given below the line).



65 Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations Gallipoli Maps and Appendices Vol I* (1929) p. 32.
66 Official History p. 234.
67 Two small points: If Waterlow was not in tow no1, is it then he, or tow no 1 who is the guide? and with Waterlow and Dix as 'book-ends' of the line of tows, Dix was powerless to intervene.

The outlying tows of adjoining battleships would then have had a separation of about 360 yards – an excess of 210 yards – so they were 2½ times their ordered distance apart: see diagram.



total 4 cables or 810 yards

The result is that the spacing of the battleships was ordered to be some 420 yards greater than required for the spread of the tows, so that tows 1 and 12 were 2070 yards apart. How the excess separation was overcome is not known but it was, as the tows bunched up. So even if the battleships were in position precisely as ordered, there is a 420 yard extension to the north built in – which will be called the *placement* component of the error.

One of the peculiarities with sorting out the wrong place is that Admiral Thursby claimed that the landing took place where it was supposed to be. Thursby reported to Hamilton: 'The landing had taken place practically as arranged, our right flank being only a hundred yards or so to the north of its assigned position.'[68] In a post-war article Thursby weakened the latter part of his statement to: 'our right flank being only a few hundred yards to the north of the assigned position'.[69] Steel & Hart point out that Thursby should be taken at his word – as a Naval officer:

> Thursby's orders were couched in naval terminology, spacing each of the three battleships four cables apart. Assuming a consistency of terminology, although not specified as such, the mile given in his orders would have been a nautical mile of 2,025 yards, considerably longer than a statute mile.[70]

Thus Thursby might claim to be in position 'about 1 mile N of Gaba Tepe' but further north of Gaba Tepe than soldiers expected. This contribution to the error will be called the *measurement* component.

Using the *Official History* Map 10 (attached), Steel & Hart measure *Queen* to be 2700 yards north of Gaba Tepe. If tow no 1 were positioned 225 yards to starboard of *Queen* (see diagrams above), it would have been 2475 yards north of Gaba Tepe, compared to a nautical mile of 2025 yards – a difference of 450 yards, which may justify Thursby's claim. But at best it only provides him with a defence for the position of the southernmost battleship. As the other two battleships were displaced even further to the north, his defence is of limited application. This 450-yard error will be called the *navigation* component. It and the measurement component will also be some justification for Bush's sense that some error in positioning the ships was to be expected. They will be combined into a *positional* component.

Synthesis

These are the identified reasons for the landing being out of place, and estimates of what they may have contributed:

Navigational error	450 yards	
Measurement (statute vs nautical mile)	<u>265 yards</u>	
Positional component		715 yards
Placement (of battleships) component		420 yards
Bunching-up component		1350 yards

68 Quoted in Wester-Wemyss, R *The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign* Hodder & Stoughton (?1924) p. 91.

69 C F Thursby 'Power of the Navy: Made Landing Possible' *Reveille* 31 March 1932, p53b.

70 Steel & Hart p. 421. A statute mile is 1760 yards, 265 yards short of a nautical mile.

These figures yield a northward displacement of the southernmost tow, due to the positional and bunching-up components, of 2065 yards. Displacement of the northernmost tow, due to the positional and placement components, would be 1135 yards. Checking the map shows that the southernmost tow was displaced about 2000 yards and the northernmost tow about 900 yards. That is, there is sufficient scope for explaining the northerly shift solely using the factors developed above.

One factor not quantified is that the most northerly tows may have veered southward a few degrees when their commanders realised where they were (see Dix above). Such a move would intensify the bunching-up while moderating the overall northerly shift. A complete account of the landing would reckon with this too.

The location of the second wave's landing provides an independent, but only partial, check on the appropriateness of the error components. The second wave landed on a wider front, from just north of the first wave, to well south of it. Bean described it thus: 'The southernmost destroyer was three-quarters of a mile south of Ari Burnu, the point where the earlier flotilla had landed; the northernmost was 500 yards north of that point'.[71] The southern end of the second wave landing would have been subject only to the positional error, so would be calculated to be 715 yards to the north of its intended landing spot. On the other hand, three-quarters of a mile south of Ari Burnu is about 1000 yards north of the intended spot. Allowing for tows from *Beagle*, the southernmost destroyer, to be a little further south than the destroyer itself, the calculated landing spot of the southernmost second-wave tow is within 200 yards of the spot Bean indicated.

Map 10 from Volume I – *The Story of ANZAC from the outbreak of war to the end of the first* phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915 (11th edition, 1941) by C E W Bean



SHIPS OFF ARI BURNU AT THE TIME OF LANDING OF THE 1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION, 4.30 A.M., 25TH APRIL, 1915

71 Official History p. 265.

The usefulness of the calculations is not yet exhausted. Because we know where Metcalf's boats landed, we can apply the appendix formulae to determine where his starting point was – that is, where *Queen* was when Metcalf moved off. In the diagram the position is 2½ miles W of his landing place, and 1350 yards S. We should expect *Queen* to have been 75 yards N of this point, or 1275 yards S of Metcalf's landing. Turning again to the attached map, the position of *Queen* is shown as only about 1100 yards S of Metcalf's boats' landing. She would have been expected to be about 175 yards further south. Such a relocation, were it so, would make Thursby's claim a little more reasonable. But many other alternatives are possible: perhaps Metcalf's pressure pushed the boats less far north.

Calculations based on the diagram can be used to derive other indexes. A useful one is speed of the boats to the shore – a combination of the speed of the steam pinnaces and of the boats when rowed the last stretch. If either the supposed time to land or the expected distance covered seriously diverges from reality, the calculated speed of the tows will be improbably fast or slow. For the figures used above, the speed is around 3.1 miles an hour, which seems to be rather too slow. But adjusting the speed (hence distance or time) will affect other figures – explicit or merely implicit in the calculations – potentially affecting anything from the supposed positions of the capital ships to their distance from the shore.

Those explorations are for another time. Here, to conclude: by separating the error in the first wave landing into two parts, the overall shift north and the bunching up, it has been easier to see what sorts of factors are needed to explain how the landing was indeed in the wrong place. The overall northward shift is explicable as a consequence of the difference between a nautical and a statute mile, the placement of the battleships four cables apart and the uncertainty about the exact position of *Triumph* relative to Gaba Tepe, and of *Queen* relative to *Triumph* (*ie* Thursby's acknowledged error). The bunching up is a result of a midshipman who made a decision without due reference to his leader. These factors when quantified are sufficient to account for the landing of the covering force being made at the wrong place.

The claims depend only on the mundane: poorly drafted Naval orders; unwonted initiative by a midshipman; imperfect navigation by the battleships. They are also mostly not new. In particular, the work of Eric Bush on why the landing went wrong deserves greater recognition. Accordingly, he shall have the last word:

> It is beyond my understanding why the Army High Commands, both British and Australian, took pains to shield the Royal Navy from its responsibility for putting the Anzacs down in the wrong place ...72

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72 Bush p. 110.

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NX3395 GUNNER B S WARN, 2/1st FIELD REGT

An example of non-standard naming of World War II Australian medals

Graham Wilson

I recently came into possession of two World War II medals, namely a Defence Medal and War Medal 1939-45, named to NX3395 Gunner B.S. Warn of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). Unfortunately, the medals are only part of Warn's group, missing are the 1939-45 Star, Africa Star and Australia Service Medal 1939-45. The medals in themselves are not overly interesting, except for the fact that the naming is totally incorrect for the period.

Bryan Sinclair Warn was born in Adelaide, South Australia on 20 October 1917. A mining engineer by profession and single, he enlisted in AIF on 8 October 1939, just over two weeks short of his 21st birthday. Although a South Australian by birth and residence, Warn's records show that he enlisted in New South Wales. On enlistment he was allotted number NX3395, a New South Wales number, and was allocated to the 2/1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, a unit of the 6th Australian Division, being taken on strength on 3 November 1939. The 6th Division was Australia's original expeditionary formation raised for overseas service in World War II and Warn's number makes him what is known as a 'Four Figure Man', i.e. an original volunteer for the AIF allotted a number between 1 and 9999.

Trained as a gun-layer, Warn embarked for overseas service on 10 January 1940, disembarking in Egypt on 13 February 1940. In April 1940, along with a number of other members of 2/1st Field Regiment, Warn was transferred to 'X' Anti-Aircraft Regiment for service as an AA gunner in defence of Egypt. From 20 July to 4 August 1940 he was detached to 20th AA Battery, Royal Artillery at Alexandria, possibly for on the job training. Two days after he rejoined 'X' AA Regiment. Warn was transferred to 61st General Hospital in Nazareth, where he was diagnosed with bronchial asthma. Discharged from hospital on 13 August 1940 he was transferred back to 2/1st Field Regiment four days later. Just over a month later, however, on 20 September 1940, he was evacuated to the 4th New Zealand General Hospital where he would eventually (4 October 1940) be assessed by a medical board as 'permanently unfit for service'. Although the record does not record the reason for this, presumably it resulted from a worsening of Warn's asthma. Transferred to the AIF Transit Unit on 23 October 1940 he was evacuated to Gaza to await repatriation to Australia. On 14 November 1940 Warn embarked on the 2/1st Australian Hospital Ship and disembarked in Sydney on 16 December 1940. Transferred to the Eastern Command General Details Depot to await disposal, he was discharged 'medically unfit for service not occasioned by his own fault' on 11 February 1941.

For his service in Australia and overseas, Gunner B.S. Warn earned entitlement to:

1939-45 Star
Africa Star
Defence Medal
War Medal 1939-45
Australia Service Medal 1939-45

This entitlement is reflected in his medal card. Warn's surname on his medal card is misspelled as 'Warne'. Some or all of his medals are listed as 'Returned Unclaimed' on 16 November 1945 but this appears to have been rectified as his medals (less Australia Service Medal - ASM) are noted as having been posted on 28 August 1950, with no record that they were returned. Warn's ASM was despatched to him on 20 June 1957 and again, there is no record that it was returned and thus it can be said with a fair amount of certainty that Bryan Sinclair Warn received his

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entire medal entitlement. Unfortunately, the only two of Warn's medals in my possession are his Defence Medal and War Medal. The whereabouts of the two stars and the ASM are unknown.

Turning now to the naming of the two medals, which is totally incorrect for the period. The error in the naming at first led me to suspect that the medals were faked and no such person as NX3395 B S Warn had entitlement to them. It took very little effort to find out that Bryan Sinclair Warn had indeed enlisted in the AIF in 1939, had been allotted the number NX3395 and had earned entitlement to both of the medals in my possession, as well as others. The medals themselves are obviously genuine issue items, not replicas, copies or fakes. My suspicions had been aroused originally by two things. Firstly, the naming was via engraving (and not particularly good engraving at that). Secondly, the naming included the unit name ('2/1 Field Regt.').

Unlike the United Kingdom (also Canada and New Zealand), Australian veterans of World War II had their stars and medals officially named by the government. Official naming was by impressing in block capitals. Naming consisted of number (except for RAN officers and members of the Merchant Navy who did not have numbers), initials and name, unlike World War 1 where naming had also included rank and unit. Warn's medals have his initials and name engraved in cursive script, a mixture of upper and lower case, followed by his number, followed by his unit.

The fact that Warn's medals are engraved and include his unit title, however, does not automatically make them fake. Although the Australian government eventually agreed to name veteran's stars and medals at public expense, the first medals were originally sent out un-named. Given the fact that Warn had been discharged for almost five years at the time of the surrender of Japan, it is highly likely that he would have been one of the first veterans issued with medals when these became available and would have received un-named versions.

In 1952 the Australian government announced that medals would be issued named and advised that veterans who had received un-named specimens could return them to the relevant service medals office for naming or alternatively, could have the medals privately engraved at their own expense. It is almost certain the Warn took advantage of the latter option and had his medals privately engraved.

Why the unit name was added is a mystery, however, it is possible that either the engraver was a World War I veteran who simply followed the naming convention on his own medals or that Warn had been advised to add the unit name by a relative or friend who was also a World War I veteran. While neither of these suppositions can be proved in the absence of any other information, both certainly fit the bill. Either way, I feel quite safe in saying the two medals I hold are in fact genuine medals issued to former NX3395 Gunner Bryan Sinclair Warn in recognition of his World War II service.

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DEEP INTO HISTORY

Ruhanie Perera[1]

Shipwreck detectives, a World War II documentary on the "Battle of Ceylon", brings four veterans on a personal odyssey back to the shores of Sri Lanka, 60 years on.

"From the moment I got off the plane and got into my first tuk-tuk – I was hooked." Julia Redwood, director of the documentary on the Battle of Ceylon which was filmed in Sri Lanka in 2004 and one of the producers for the series *Shipwreck Detectives* sits on the terrace by the sea at the Galle Face Hotel. Her work in Sri Lanka complete, she finally has a moment to recount her experiences. The cinematic journey she describes is one that tells the story of a significant moment in Sri Lanka's modern history – a moment that has been recorded as the "most dangerous moment" of the Second World War, the Battle of Ceylon.

Perhaps it is poetic justice that this interview should have taken place so close to the sea for the focus of the film crew's work here has been to uncover the stories of the sea... For the *Shipwreck Detectives*, their quests for wrecks lay emphasis on the idea that "shipwrecks are not about treasure, but about history". The overall theme of the second series of *Shipwreck Detectives*, a three-part documentary on the maritime archaeology of Sri Lanka specifically centred on Galle and the Dutch colonial past in Sri Lanka, a 2000 BC shipwreck off Turkey and the Battle of Ceylon made for ABC Television and Discovery Canada, is thus about making people aware of history through shipwrecks, underscoring the significance of maritime heritage and the importance of protecting it.

Julia Redwood and Ed Punchard, the principal players in the Fremantle, Western Australia-based documentary production company Prospero Productions established in 1991 have always had "a passion for telling stories and a passion for history, maritime history in particular". Ed, a North Sea diver was involved in what was considered the world's worst off-shore oil disaster in 1988 in the North Sea and has an understanding of being shipwrecked and of "losing mates at sea". The natural progression of which is the great affinity the team shares for "shipwreck stories", for the stories of "people who have survived shipwrecks and for the families and friends who have lost people at sea".

Three strands make up the Battle of Ceylon film, the working title of which is "the most dangerous moment" – the search for two shipwrecks the HMS Hermes and the HMAS Vampire, the personal journeys of remembrance made by four war veterans and the historical analysis which involved researching the question 'why did Churchill call this the most dangerous moment' and the exploration of the many Sri Lankan perspectives on the event through the stories of veterans and civilians who lived through the air raids of April 5 and 9, in 1942.

This story of the Battle of Ceylon is thus linked to the two shipwrecks, the HMS *Hermes*, an aircraft carrier that was a significant British vessel and the accompanying Australian destroyer, the HMAS *Vampire*, which were sunk on 9 April 1942 during the Japanese air raids over Colombo and Trincomalee. Says Julia, "We discovered the story and loved it. It was tragic, dramatic and significant in terms of history, WWII history in particular and barely discussed." Curiosity aroused, it was decided that through the Shipwreck Detectives a search would be carried out for the *Hermes* and the *Vampire*, the quest being to find the *Vampire* which had never been located and to relocate the *Hermes* which had been located off Batticaloa. Taking the lead in this adventure were maritime archaeologists from the Western Australian

1 This article is submitted by Society member Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe who features in the article. Permission to use the article was kindly granted by *The Sunday Times*, Sri Lanka, Online Edition. Sergei is on the lookout for information on the Battle of Ceylon, by way of articles, film footage, letters, memoirs and photographs etc. He is also interested in finding out more about the role of the Ceylon Naval Volunteer Force (CNVF) and the Ceylon Garrison Artillery (CGA) that had featured prominently in the air raids. Sergei can be contacted at sergei.desilva@optusnet.com.au or PO Box 251, Batman Victoria 3058.

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Maritime Museum; Jeremy Green, the head of Maritime Archaeology at the museum and Corioli Souter were no strangers to Sri Lankan maritime archaeology because of their work in the field of exploring the underwater archaeological potential of Sri Lanka with Somasiri Devendra, retired Lieutenant Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, today a naval historian and maritime archaeologist.

This project carried out under his supervision (which involves the film being released with his authorisation) saw the diving expedition in Batticaloa make the discovery that the *Hermes* was not located where it was on the admiralty charts. The *Vampire*, unfortunately, could not be found. Says Devendra, "Off the coast of Sri Lanka the continental shelf is very narrow and off Batticaloa there is a deep trench which comes very close to the shore and we think the *Vampire* may be there. The area is about 900 metres deep and locating it is impossible – unless we had the equipment used in the search for the Titanic."

The Battle of Ceylon story, running for the duration of one television hour, approximately 52 minutes, traces also the intensely personal journeys of four war veterans who were survivors from the vessels. Stan Curtis and Alex Rusk (HMS *Hermes*) and Vince Cesari and Bill Price (HMAS *Vampire*), returned to Sri Lanka after 63 years, having never returned after the war. For these veterans, says Julia, who are in "the twilight of their years, the autumn of their years, this could be the last time they'll get to tell their stories".

Retracing their steps from Colombo through Kandy to Trincomalee, the journey was for most of them a moment to relive events, points out Consultant Historian for the documentary Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe who worked closely with the veterans. This experience, he feels, also brought about some sense of conclusion at the latter stages of their lives and it perhaps may have even raised more questions – "questions which are unanswered to this day and perhaps never will be". At the core of the historical strand of the documentary is one haunting question, 'why would Churchill call this the most dangerous moment'. Presenting the many perspectives on the subject is Sergei, an individual with – as Julia points out – a passion for Sri Lanka. A Sri Lankan-born Australian, Sergei brings into the film a "unique perspective because he's an outsider but he's from this place and he has an absolute passion and commitment to Sri Lanka".

In Colombo and Trincomalee, Sergei was brought in to explain the sequence of the tactical air raids and explain the overall strategic situation that faced Ceylon before and after the battle. "The Japanese air raid over Colombo and Trincomalee was a strategic and tactical success but the Japanese failed in their main objective, which was to locate and destroy the British Eastern fleet. The Battle of Ceylon was considered by Winston Churchill to be the 'most dangerous moment' of the Second World War for the British. Why? Until the first half of 1942, Germany and Japan were making steady territorial gains from North Africa, the Caucasus and the Indian Ocean. Ceylon was the weakest link in the defence perimeter. Most importantly, if the British lost control of Ceylon, they essentially lost control of the Indian Ocean, with the potential loss of India. For the British at that time everything in the East hinged on retaining the naval bases in Ceylon."

Introduced to Prospero Productions through Devendra, Sergei's primary role was to research the Japanese air raids of April 1942. In the documentary his was an interactive role that saw him cast as an on-screen character. The research on the Battle of Ceylon, is as Sergei describes it, a "work in progress. It's like trying to fit a jigsaw puzzle together with sections still missing. With limited historical information on Japanese perspectives of the operation".

This documentary sets out to do more than simply document historical fact. It tries to bring about some resolution to an intensely personal moment that climaxes with the memorial mass at sea in Trincomalee when the Sri Lanka Navy took the veterans to pay their respects to their shipmates. The moment is a conclusion of sorts, emphasising the significance of journeys, both personal and political, remembrances and the silent promise that veteran and historian make to those who were lost in this historical moment that "they shall not grow old…"

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

KINDLY SHOW CAUSE

Col Adamson

Command Secretary
Northern Command
1960

Finance Representative
Murray Barracks
Port Moresby
come to my notice ... flight unauthorized ... high expenditure ... no excuse ... Lieutenant Adamson ... recover costs ... system ... not to be repeated.

G O C
Northern Command
1960

Commanding Officer
Pacific Islands Regiment
Port Moresby
read with much interest ... passed to CGS ... valuable experience ... Lieutenant Adamson ... highly delighted

So where did I stand I thought as I read the messages again and again. Away in the scrub for weeks, almost master of my own destiny, no communications and rotten food, pleased to see the lights of Port Moresby again and collect two letters like this before my feet are dry. The one I was delighted to receive. I had much respect for the general. The other one worried me. It came from a person involved in book keeping and controls and who seemed to have no concept of our job. Bokata brought me another Fosters and being distracted, I took it. How was I going to get out of this mess and how did I get into it in the first place?

It went back three months. I was watching cricket and the intelligence officer nabbed me. He had been working on a series of patrols into the hinterland for some time and I was the fortunate one marked to get the ball rolling. We agreed to meet in the Commanding Officer's office the next day for a preliminary briefing. Our Commanding Officer then was Jim Norrie[1]; a most knowledgeable gentleman and one who recognized young officers as hard workers. We enjoyed working for him. We discussed the job and then headed for the Department of Native Affairs for another briefing. This was in quite some detail concerning the first and last 50 miles of my trek but the knowledge gap in between was appalling, though I felt quite excited at being given the opportunity once again of going "where no white man had gone before".

The route lay across the island in a dog-leg. Kerema in the Gulf, north to Menyamya in the Morobe District but really in the Highlands and then east to Lae on the coast. The walk itself held little concern for me; 500 kilometres or so, a bit of swamp and secondary growth; miles of open grassland called kunai and the usual up and down stuff. The big concern lay with the people I would encounter, talk to, bargain with and disrupt. Kukukuku (pronounced "cooker-cooker") was their generic tribal name. Think of an adjective and you have the Kukukuku. Fierce, proud, murderous, conniving, paranoid, suicidal and treacherous come quickly to mind. In PNG the very mention of their name promoted stories without end. They kill because they like to kill; they eat human flesh because they like it and they vendetta without remorse. So be it I thought. I will have ten trusty soldiers and a compass. "To Find a Path" is our regimental motto and so we shall.

1 Ed. It is sad to note that Jim Norrie died in Sydney aged 85 on 28 July 2007.

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The first was not to be. Some six months earlier I had been moved to the command of the recruit training company and thus had no trained soldiers of my own from which I could select. But inspiration came to me. It was approaching Queens Birthday parade and so I decided that I would select those young men who were lacking the necessary parade ground agility. And so I did. Lucky for me. The team I gathered and nurtured needed other skills. Strength, agility, fortitude, calmness and docility. They needed to be bush people, aware of the dangers and the differences, and a caring for people who lived in darkness. Such a team I found. Individually they were unsure of their ability to challenge the Kukukuku; they had been nurtured on stories of these people. Discipline of the nature practiced in PIR won through; encouragement, explanation and example. All those who went with me I had trained over the years as recruits. None came from my platoon of previous years, which was now working in far-away Manus Island.

Sgt Saila of Morobe; young, stolid and highly dependable. Cpl Rawalo of Marshall Lagoon and medical assistant. Pikae and Mopa of Manus Island and Hevovo from Kerema, Test, Omas and Meva of the Sepik; Torokin from Rabaul and Hisimitavi of Mt Hagen. They were a mixed bag but all good. Omas carried the A510 radio but Hisimitavi was the operator. Saila I had known for two years on and off since the first NCO course I had run. Rawalo I had known for three years, he had been on two patrols with me earlier. Pikae had sold me a carved bowl 18 months earlier on Mockerang Peninsular, lived with my platoon for a week and demanded to be enlisted. We went off together along the Kokoda Trail for a week to strengthen up, get to know each other and rehearse our drills. On return from that, I flew an air recce to get an idea of the terrain and route and cached food at Menyamya for the second leg to Lae.

Day 1 30 May 60

We set off from Port Moresby aboard the regiment's patrol boat, AV *Fern*, 60 feet, two grey marine diesels and a crew of three commanded by Sergeant 'Pappy Doig'. The following morning we were off the sandbar guarding Kerema and by lunch we had been ferried ashore and met up with Kingsley Jackson who was the District Commissioner and the team he had put together to give us a flying start.

Day 2 31 May 60

The main problem here was that nobody, especially myself, had much of an idea as to how long it would take us to get to Menyamya where the next real feast awaited us. We settled on three weeks. The patrol members would carry 10 days food each and eat it up; we needed carriers for the following ten days for us together with carriers to carry food for the carriers! Organizing the food was easy as the ration scale was not elaborate. Per man per day; one pound of brown rice, half a tin of bully beef, a packet of dog biscuits and a bit of tea and sugar. To conclude this lot, the system also provided a shilling per day per man to buy guides and carriers plus whatever was available in the way of fresh fruit and vegetables, fish, pig and snake and wild tobacco. The QM also came good with a bundle of old shirts and shorts to use as trade on the way and I converted the cash to trade goods such as small knives, beads and salt.

Kingsley settled on 20 carriers from gut feeling and told me that when their task was over, that "it's all down hill on their way home and if they're hungry they'll run a bit faster". Gathering the volunteer carriers at a shilling a day was an easy task for him. Kingsley had a road gang of convicted adulterers, murderers and tax evaders "eating their heads off". He gave me two nervous young cops as well to beat them along. Kingsley was a great fellow who was passionate about the Gulf and the people. The Gulf is swamp, sago and fish are the staples with little else to recommend it except for masses of oil and natural gas discovered in the 1950's and 1960's. Kingsley and I had a long discussion that afternoon and night over rum and curry. He advised me to be particularly careful in our dealings with the people we would meet. Ken Chester who had

briefed me in Port Moresby had been through a little of the same general area years earlier. Nobody had been there since, and the Kukukukus paid scant attention to law and order. The area was his parish; he was responsible for the whole and he didn't want to have to spend months repairing damage caused by lead-footed soldiers. I think that I reassured him. An event several days later showed me how right he was.

Day 3 1 June 1960

We had a friendly parting the next day. The motors on the assault boat were working with unbelievable efficiency and we headed up the Mamaru River towards dry land and the start of our little venture. Late afternoon brought us to our destination, the tiny hamlet of Mamara, well within the orbit of Kerema but really bushy. The locals were friendly, sold us taro and wild sugar cane and told us dreadful stories of the people in the hinterland.

Brown rice, bully beef and black tea made up the inevitable breakfast and we left Mamara in good spirits. The track we followed seemed to go generally to the north and this bolstered my spirits considerably, as my map was a wartime edition and not particularly accurate. It was well defined to start with and on the steep side, so we were quickly out of the swampy bits. Rain started early as is common, but it was warm and we were used to being wet. The hamlet of Iaveneni was reached around mid-day. Black tea, dog biscuits and sugar cane for lunch and then off again; just climbing up, up and up again all afternoon until we came upon an abandoned and disused garden site that seemed to make a reasonable place to camp for the evening. Saila organized the piquet roster, Omas and Hisimitavi set up the A510 for the sked we had agreed on. Voice failed, but pleasantly, Morse code did the trick. From then on, we had no success at all with voice comms and Morse was about 50/50. Rawalo did the first aid rounds. A few blisters were all he had to report.

Day 4 2 June 1960

Our first contact with the Kukukuku occurred the next afternoon at the hamlet of Didekitegawa. We had had a dreadful day of crossing rivers, climbing up and down ever-steeper ridgelines in rain and fog. My diary says "a bloody long day and pleased to see the end of it". Didekitegawa is not much to look at. The Kukukuku live in separate generic groups about a series of ridgelines. It has about 40 houses mainly of sago leaf construction spread over a couple of square miles interspersed with many gardens. The population appeared to be about 100 all up. They seemed to be friendly enough and wanted to trade sago, sugar cane and taro in return for the glass beads we had. They also produced a young buck by name Oanim who had some knowledge of the area to the north and wanted to join us, in return for stick tobacco and a dry bed. Hevovo was able to hold a simple conversation with him so I agreed to take him. We settled on a teaspoon of beads a day. The Kukukuku people number between 35,000 and 40,000 and they live in that area stretching from just north of Kerema to Menyamya and beyond and then east to Bulolo. In the Menyamya Sub-District they speak at least six languages and forty dialects.

Physically, and in the manner of clothing and accessories they differ little. They are mostly short and solid. The men wear a short grass skirt in front and cover their buttocks with a small piece of beaten bark cloth. Their hair is shaved with a piece of bamboo to a point well above the ears leaving a small crop of hair on the crown of the head. In wet or cold weather they wear a long beaten bark cloak and this is attached to the crop of hair by a small drawstring and allowed to fall below the knees. It was quite common to see the men also wearing a girdle of cassowary bones around their waist, and it is to this girdle that they owe their general name of Kukukuku, the word kokokoko meaning cassowary in the Motuan language. To complete their accessories, "bandoliers" of plaited reeds are worn diagonally across the body along with small cowrie shells

and pieces of yellow cane. Few items of steel were seen during the patrol; most men carrying short bows and arrows, stone adzes and clubs, these being shaped like a cogwheel.

The Kukukuku is not a great traveller, and it was with difficulty that I managed to persuade guides to accompany us for more than a days walk from their hamlet. It was very likely of course that they were fearful of moving into another tribes area, but I was too inexperienced at the time to think of it at the time. While it is apparently not a general practice of these people; a large percentage of those we passed through, namely from Wunop, six days north from Kerema to Kadsiago; four days south of Menyamya manufacture their own salt by burning a mixture of pitpit (wild sugar cane) and karaooka vine. The residue undergoes a number of processes and the final result is salt of a nature.

In common with other peoples of the Territory, the Kukukuku believe in the spiritual powers and properties of the root of the kawawar this being a type of wild ginger. I witnessed several instances of local sorcery. One of our guides was suffering an extreme bout of dysentery and refused our help. He called on some locals instead, six of whom daubed their bodies with clay, beat sticks and danced around him for no less than six hours. The following morning he was fit and well. No actual burial grounds were seen, but it was quite common to find bodies in various stages of decomposition propped in a sitting position on small cane tables scattered throughout the gardens. Closer to Menyamya ,the people smoke the bodies and place them in caves on top of Red Mountain which is about two hours walk from the patrol post.

Day 5 3 June 1960

Moving on from Didekitegawa, we began climbing again through thick moss forest, crossing small creeks on the way and being drenched with heavy rainfalls and thick mist. We continued to climb all day; following creeks to their source; moving along a ridgeline and then continuing to climb again. This concluded 6 ½ hours of walking; camp was made in a small clearing; the rain continued to bucket down and we were enveloped in cloud/mist again.

Day 6 4 June 1960

The following morning we set off again; down hill this time through rain forest which made for reasonable going though this was not to last for long for another ridge appeared and the climb commenced again and we finally reached the gardens of Agaminia and met the locals. There were about sixty of them and seven communal houses. They claimed that a patrol officer had not visited them before but several of them had seen him at Didekitegawa. We did not delay here but moved on and upwards again and being impeded by numerous fallen trees. This continued until very late in the afternoon when we came upon the hamlet and gardens of Tambu. We were met by the people, and there were three women among the group who offered us vegetables for trade, which we accepted. Heavy rain began to fall again as we made camp at the garden edge. This was accompanied by a strong wind making the night most uncomfortable.

This morning we woke to a bundle of trouble. Pikae was screaming with pain and could not be calmed. It turned out that he had been caught stealing wild ginger from the gardens and the chief had put " puri puri " on him. This is a form of powerful magic invoked against wrongdoers and vitually irreversible. But it was not just Pikae in trouble....we were all under threat with the men crowding in on us with arrows notched on tight strings and not a cop to be seen! Hevovo's language skills came to the rescue; he explained that Pikae was just a young man from far away across the salt water with no sense of shame. This and a bit more, eased the matter. I passed over Pikae's tobacco and blanket in payment, the puri puri was reversed and we went our way with Pikae carrying the radio and two spare batteries. I was angry with him and upset, and determined that I would not let him forget.

Moving off, we moved downhill to the Tambu River; followed this upstream for some time and then climbed a ridge line which went roughly north east. The going here was quite easy through rain forest and near midday we came upon the hamlet of Wombiu. This had three houses and about 25 people. After a short break, we moved off and down to the Wewier River; forded this and then climbed another ridge to bring us to an old DNA camp site. Saila sent Pikae down with 10 water bottles to refill. The spur line from here was very steep and enclosed in thick rain forest making difficult going. We finally stopped in mid afternoon and was visited by a number of people from the hamlet of Wuno, who had vegetables to trade. Among them was a young man by name Titi who spoke reasonable Police Motu so I enlisted him as a guide and interpreter. This was quite handy as the police interpreter was soon to return to Kerema.

Day 8 6 June 1960

The following morning we broke camp and headed off along the We River but it was not long before we came upon Wuno. This had about 60 people and was one of a group of six other hamlets we could see on ridge lines to the east. We continued on, following the We and passing through kunai grass some 7 or 8 feet tall. This made for very uncomfortable conditions as though the sun was not yet out in force, the atmosphere was very close and sticky. Around mid-day we came upon the hamlet of Metwari 1 and shortly later Metwari 2. Both had extensive gardens with a total of eleven huts and about 40-50 people. We continued to climb a ridgeline from here for about an hour and came upon rain forest again. Heavy rain was falling by now but the going was reasonably easy and dropped away to the Baiwo River which we forded. We climbed this to its apex; located a reasonable place to set up camp and settled in. Pikae was selected to fill our water bottles and gather firewood sufficient for the night.

Day 9 7 June 1960

The following morning was fine and sunny so I announced a day off to rest up; wash our clothes and have a decent meal. The carriers were dispatched back to Kerema under police escort and their food load was distributed about the patrol. About mid-morning, the camp was visited by locals with vegetables to sell and this was welcome. We put out "tambu" signs when this was finished and saw no more of them. Titi remained with us.

Day 10 8 June 1960

Moving on the next day, the rain forest remained with us and we continued to follow a series of ridgelines roughly northwards. We saw six small hamlets on this day but it was not until late that people appeared. They came from behind us; about 60 of them; shouting abuse and notching arrows to bowstrings that were not tight. All the time they remained about 200 hundred yards from us and continued with their abuse. We finally stopped for lunch in the unoccupied hamlet of Pelangau and a steep climb after this brought us to Imbeibongga in the early afternoon. This was most welcome as the people had forced us to slow down considerably and I was concerned with their attitude.

I decided to take some positive action and so Saila and I walked back towards them and returned their abuse. We took Pikae with us and he was not happy at being exposed to them. They took this for maybe 3 minutes and then vanished. We saw nothing of them again but their calls continued for the next 2 days so we knew they were still around. By late afternoon we came to the hamlet of Ibaiu having 7 houses and about 60 people. The people appeared to be quite friendly, but mindful of the last few days, we traded across "tambu" signs but had no problems with them.

Day 11 9 June 1960

Breaking camp in the early morning, we moved off downhill, fording a small river and then up, up and up a ridgeline to the north east. The rain was bucketing down; the rain forest was thick and numerous fallen trees made it even more difficult. We came to the hamlet of Ibaiu 2 mid morning and received a less than friendly greeting. From here, a small trail lead on roughly to the north and we followed this until early in the afternoon when we came upon a series of large waterfalls; some being as high as 150 feet. This made for most difficult going, as we were forced to alternatively wade and rock up for the rest of the day; but it did lead us in the right direction. By late afternoon we moved in to the small hamlet of Ipau 1 at the start of another ridge moving to the north so fortune remained with us. We saw another 5 hamlets in the same area, all separated by ridgelines, and guessed the total numbers being about the 150 mark. By 4.30 PM we were enveloped by cloud and visibility was nil.

Day 12 10 June 1960

Titi the interpreter proved to be difficult this morning. He claimed that he had been dreaming that night and that an enemy had been making bad magic against him. He certainly didn't look too well, but we eventually persuaded him to move on and food won him over. Moving on we climbed a series of ridgelines that ran between north east and north west; the rain was bucketing down and heavy cloud sat on us. We were impeded heavily by fallen greasy logs and going was not easy. On this day we forded seven small rivers and passed through 9 small hamlets. Late afternoon we came to the hamlet of Pewabangga and set up camp. The rain continued to bucket down all night and was accompanied by strong winds making us all quite miserable.

Day 13 11 June 1960

From here we moved on after breakfast generally to the north along a spur line holding stands of both rain forest and kunai grass. This led us to Aiewa Creek which was forded and led us to a hamlet of the Kadsiago people. They spoke a mixture of poor pidgin english and police motu, and told me that there was an appointed luluai here. He agreed to guide us to Menyamya from here so we set off again down a ridge to the east after an early lunch break. We crossed Hangima Creek and moved up another spur to the north. Here the luluai declared that he was lost though the track we had followed from Kadsiago was well defined. I decided to break bush and moved up a ridge to the north. The going was through rain forest and fairly easy though steep. We broke out into open kunai in the early afternoon and continued to move to the north. This was not easy as the ridge was steep and greasy. We were much rewarded however, as late in the afternoon we saw from a distance what had to be the Tauri River, for it was large, rocky and swiftly flowing. I just knew then that it would lead us to Menyamya. Our spirits revived considerably and we set up camp with a lot of pleasant chatter.

Day 14 12 June 1960

Moving off after an early breakfast and being guided by the luluai, we picked our way up the right bank of the Tauri. This proved to be quite dangerous as it was very sheer out of the water to the ridgeline above and the rocks did not give a safe footing. By mid morning the track had still not been discovered and on questioning, the luluai told me that the previous day he had been chasing a cassowary instead of searching for the track. This left me speechless, so I ignored him from there on and decided to break bush and attempt to reach the ridgeline. After a steep and most arduous climb, we reached the top, though heavy rain was falling. Here we broke out into a large kunai patch through which a well-defined foot pad ran. This we followed, eventually reaching the Tauri about lunch time. Here the Tauri runs through a gorge some 60 feet wide with the water flowing about 80 feet below. There was no sign as to how the locals managed to cross but we could clearly see the track continuing on the other side.

In anticipation of its need we had a 30 metre length of nylon rope and Saila clambered down the gorge, swam it across and looped it around a large boulder. We looped our equipment onto it to swing it across and then most carefully followed two at a time. Hevovo was the last across. He untied the nylon and swam over at a steep angle imitating Saila. The whole affair took about 2 hours and of course our equipment was well and truly soaked. Pikae gathered firewood to assist in the drying process. Spirits remained high however despite the steep going and the greasy track. We made good time; the kunai was short and the sun was hot so this was most helpful. In mid afternoon we came upon a dry water course with a number of trees in it so decided to make the nights camp there. Good water was found about four feet down and this was a real bonus. A little later, a young boy aged about ten arrived and volunteered to guide us through to the village of Katanga the next day. We fed him and gave a shirt. He had received some education at the Catholic Mission at Menyamya and was the first Pidgin English speaker we had come across. I estimated that we had crossed over from Papua into the Mandated Territory of New Guinea about lunchtime.

Day 15 13 June 1960

We broke camp early in the morning and moved off through alternate patches of kunai and rain forest. A steep ascent was encountered shortly afterwards and this continued until near lunch when we moved in to Katanga, a quite large place having some 27 houses and about 150 people. The people were very friendly, gave us sugar cane and taro in return for stick tobacco and beads. About 20-25 accompanied us from then on. From here, an almost vertical ascent was made, proving most difficult due to heavy rain. We descended in to Pipi village after reaching the top and at 12 noon sighted Menyamya in the distance on a bearing of 21 degrees. It appeared to be quite close. Alas, it seems that we were lead astray by a mirage for by the end of the day we seemed to be no closer! Heavy rain fell again that night and it was bitterly cold.

Day 16 14 June 1960

We broke camp the next morning and followed the track through short kunai, it again being in sections of short and steep ascents and descents. At midday, kunai some 7-8 feet high was encountered and we remained in this until reaching the Tauri River ford near the Menyamya mission station. This was crossed and we then moved on, arriving at the patrol post at 1.30 PM and being met by the PO Terry Mitchell, CPO Warren Smith and EMA Aldo Petros. The patrol was quartered in the police barracks and Mr. Mitchell invited me to stay in his house.

Day 17 15 June 1960

A well deserved rest day. Pikae washed all of our clothes, rations were allotted sufficient to get us to Lae and there was time to relax a little. Terry had ordered in extra rum for me!

Menyamya had been established as a patrol post by Lloyd Hurrell in 1951 because it had the only flat ground for many miles around suitable for development of a light aircraft strip. It is however, situated almost in the geographical centre of the Kukukuku country making it ideal for controlling the surrounding country. Although 9 years have passed since the post establishment, murders are still not an uncommon occurrence and at the time of our presence, a third of the prisoners in the compound were convicted murderers.

Day 18 16 June 1960

The patrol moved out of Menyamya after an early breakfast. A well-developed track up to 4 feet wide was followed; the surrounding country being short kunai and gently undulating in nature. The Wapi River was forded in the late morning and the village of Sikwong was reached at noon. From here, an extremely steep ascent was made through rain forest. The going was made particularly difficult by heavy rain which turned the track into a quagmire. The troops, not

wearing footwear, were able to get a certain amount of traction but my boot studs picked up the clay making walking quite strenuous.

We had been strengthened by the addition of two police from the station together with 7 prisoners all destined for the station at Slate Creek some 6 or 7 days away. This was to do us no good in the coming days. In the early afternoon, Hisimitavi and Torokin both complained of being unwell and their rifles and packs were taken from them. Heavy rain fell all afternoon and a bitterly cold wind was blowing. A campsite was selected about 3.30 PM and by comparing known heights I estimated that we were about 9000-10,000 feet ASL. By this time both men were feverish and their temperatures were on the rise. All had a particularly miserable night and little sleep was gained. Saila and I shared blankets; Hisimitavi and Torokin slept with the rest of the troops but it did them little good.

Day 19 17 June 1960

We broke camp at 8.30 AM. Heavy rain was still falling, the wind was screaming around us and Hisa and Toro were still sick. All their equipment was carried for them and I assigned Pikae and Meva to help them along. We started with a steep climb but after about half an hour the track leveled out and it was much easier. It was still quite wide though a quagmire, and short, steep ascents and descents were made until we reached the Oiwa area about noon. Large well kept gardens were scattered about the area and we were impeded heavily by fallen greasy logs. All this time we were getting calls from the locals. They were crowding in on us and declaring their intention to release the prisoners. The cops were nervous and so was I. Men would jump onto the track in front of us; make threatening advances with axes and bows and arrows and then leap away again. They were in my rear as well and I was starting to feel a little ill. I sent Saila to the rear with one of the cops. They both had shotguns loaded with bird shot and I told him that legs were the targets. I had faith in his ability to get control.

In mid afternoon we stopped to brew up and I joined Saila. The locals were still there and yelling at us. I decided to be a bit more positive so I faced up to them and they scarpered off. We never saw them again that day, but they were still around for the next few hours as we could hear their abuse. By about 4 PM the storm clouds were growing. And then fortune showed; a small government rest house appeared; we crowded into it, ate a miserable meal and set guards. I tossed around with worry all night and was relieved when Saila offered me a cup of tea.

Day 20 18 June 1960

Saila woke me about 4 am. He was concerned with Hisa who had had a really bad night. Hisa was distinctly unhappy. He was refusing food and was burning away. Now it looked as if Toro was in a bad way as well. I checked out Toro and felt that he had pneumonia. I fed him tea and aspro and held his hand and spoke to him about old times, for I had trained him as a recruit soldier. Daylight came to the Watut Divide, which means that you can see the rain and the mist and the mud. Saila and I ate rice and drank tea and discussed a plan of action. There was little choice. We knew that some distance ahead of us was the Aseki Mission Station which had a small airstrip but I was worried that I did not have the means to get the pair of them to safety. Commonsense told me that I should keep the team together but I was short on resources. Clearly I could not leave them behind. The decision was quick. We had passed through a hamlet the previous afternoon. I gathered Omas and Pikae and we set off to cajole assistance from the locals. Omas because he was big and strong and Pikae because I was determined to get my pound of flesh out of him before I asked the CO to discharge him. The three of us hurried off carrying a rifle, water bottle and a blanket each with a pocketful of boiled rice. Speed to get help was foremost in my mind. Unimpeded with much gear, we made fair speed.

Fear for my soldiers drove me on but the howling wind and rain added to my problems. We ran into Peiwopo about 3 pm. I sought out the head man and attempted to explain my problem and seek his help. He remained unmoved, folded his arms and spat at me. I was cold, wet and very weary; I had two soldiers dying and here was this bugger laughing at my distress. I blew. I grabbed him by the ear, put him in the mud and in my worst Kukukuku told him that I was on government business and that he should heed me. A mug of tea and a handful of rice and we were ready to go ... jog-trotting on the down slopes and wearily plodding up and sliding down the uphill sections. He was less than happy being loaded him up with a woman's string bag full of vegetables together with a bundle of firewood. Sensing that he was ready to recant, I put him and his three wives at point and used Omas to prod them along.

Day 21 19 June 1960

We got away about 7 am the next morning. I tied my unwilling carriers together with parachute cord. It was not easy. The wind howled around us, the mud slowed us down and the rain was freezing. The locals kept up with their calls as well. I walked beside Hisa and Toro when it was possible ... they were not well at all and I was worrying very deeply for them. The trail remained foul. The red mud sucked away at us and the prisoners kept calling out to their friends in the scrub. We stopped several times to brew up, stuff the sick with aspros and meet the people. They were not friendly. I had little doubt that my prisoners would have knocked us on the head and run for it given a small chance. And then in the late afternoon one of the cops came back to me with great news. One more massive climb to make and Aseki was in the valley on the other side of it.

We all felt good. The climb was dreadful and we slipped backwards frequently, but progress was made and the top was finally reached. We had a breather and set off again. The track was in fair condition but greasy and we fell a lot, but forward we went. The mission airstrip appeared out of the gloom, fog, and rain. Pretty much the same as most strips in PNG; almost inaccessible; rough, short and handmade and finishing at the foot of a mountain. Finally we straggled into Aseki, for I fear we were most unsoldierly. By mission standards Aseki was pretty comfortable. Airstrip, trade store and small hospital (though really a get-well shelter) and a small group of ordained and lay missionaries who ran the school and dispensary, provided weather reports, tended weary soldiers and spread the word of God. They were good people; they fed us and gave us shelter and we needed nothing else. I spoke to Mr Travers about Hisa and Toro; he had better pills than aspro for them and was due on the daily radio sked the next morning. He would call in the first available mission plane the next morning. I slept well that night.

Day 22 20 June 1960

The day started with a good omen; nothing but a light rain shower so I set the troops to cleaning themselves up. Pikae was tasked with rifle cleaning and blanket drying. The sun was doing its best to come through as well. And then about lunch time in came the mission plane ... a four-seater Cessna and just what we wanted. I spoke to the pilot ... get the fellows into hospital in Lae; send a telegram to Taurama Barracks in Port Moresby for me and I'll see him in a week's time.

Day 23 21 June 1960

All feeling very relaxed, we set off again in the late morning. Our clothes were dry, we were relieved of the worry concerning Hisa and Toro and we had left the Kukukuku people behind. For some reason, the prisoners were in a happy mood as well. The track remained well defined though muddy and there was no let up from the steepness.

Day 24 22 June 1960

The main aim from here on was to get to Slate Creek. Here we were to make contact with Bert Jaensch who was a long-term gold miner, coast watcher and labour contractor. Bert was to give us quarters of some description until transport arrived from Lae for us. The trail to Slate Creek was well defined and passed through gently undulating country; very much a relief for us. Bert was waiting for us and turned out to be a real bird. He had been in New Guinea since pre-war days; exploring for gold around Wau and Bulolo, running a trade store and "blackbirding" labour. Bert also worked around the Markham Valley, Lae and the hills to the east of Scarlet Beach prior to the assault there. He had a great recipe for rum eggnog. Slate Creek is an old gold mining centre but present day results are not huge. Not much later a 3 tonner arrived from A Coy PNGVR and carried us to Bulolo. Here we washed and had a meal; I spoke to the local Assistant District Officer and passed over the prisoners and we set off for Lae, finally arriving there around midnight. We settled down in the Drill hall for the remainder of the night.

Day 25 23 June 1960

I called on the District Commissioner, Mr Horrie Niall during the afternoon and briefed him on our journey; many years later he was to become the Speaker in the PNG Parliament. He introduced me to Brigadier Stan Eskell who was Commander, 14th Infantry Brigade, and director of the local newspaper. The remainder of the day was spent in local administration. The troops scrubbed clothes and cleaned weapons and I took several of them with me to Lae Hospital to satisfy myself that Hisa and Toro were on the mend. I was relieved to find them in fair spirits and made arrangements to have them flown to Moresby.

Day 26 24 June 1960

I was advised that the generator on *Fern* had broken down so our departure was delayed.

Days 27–31 25 June–1 July 1960

Fern complete with the patrol departed for Lae at 0730. A strong SE wind was blowing and this continued all the way to Milne Bay and Samarai. *Fern* anchored at Tufi and Samarai because of the poor weather and Port Moresby was finally reached at 1540 hrs 30 June 1960. And this is when I was advised that there was a letter waiting for me. Was it worth it all? Without a doubt, and I waited to be called upon again!

Our regimental motto was 'To Find A Path' and so we did.

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
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NEW ZEALAND AWARDS FIRST "PUP" VICTORIA CROSS

Anthony Staunton

Four servicemen from three countries have been honoured in the last twelve months with their country's highest gallantry awards. Great Britain has awarded a Victoria Cross and a George Cross, both posthumously, to two British soldiers and the United States has posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor to a United States marine. New Zealand, which in 1867 saw the first colonial soldier awarded the Victoria Cross has again created history by the being the first Commonwealth country to award a Victoria Cross within its own honours system. Thankfully, the first "Victoria Cross for New Zealand" has been bestowed on a living recipient.

Victoria Cross for New Zealand

On 2 July 2007, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark announced the award of the first Victoria Cross for New Zealand to Corporal Willy Apiata, 35, who carried his wounded commander for 70 metres under heavy fire in 2004. The wounded soldier would have died from loss of blood without medical treatment. Corporal Apiata was born Waikato and joined the New Zealand Territorials in 1989. He served in East Timor before joining the SAS is 2002. He is father to a four-year-old son. Three of Corporal Apiata's fellow soldiers were also decorated.

Corporal (then Lance Corporal) Apiata was part of a patrol in Afghanistan which laid up in defensive formation for the night. At approximately 0315 hours, 20 enemy soldiers attacked the New Zealand patrol, which had been approached by stealth using the cover of undulating ground in pitch darkness. Rocket-propelled grenades struck two of the vehicles, destroying one and immobilising the other. The opening strike was followed by dense and persistent machine gun and automatic rifle fire from close range. The attack then continued using further rocket-propelled grenades and machine gun and rifle fire. The initial attack was directed at the vehicle where Corporal Apiata was stationed. He was blown off the bonnet by the impact of rocket propelled grenades striking the vehicle. He was dazed, but was not physically injured. The two other vehicle crew members had been wounded by shrapnel; his superior in a serious condition. Corporal Apiata assumed command and determined his commander would die without urgent medical attention. In total disregard of his own safety, Corporal Apiata stood up and carried his commander across 70 metres of broken, rocky and fire swept ground, fully exposed in the glare of battle to heavy enemy fire and into the face of returning fire from the main patrol position. Corporal Apiata carrying his commander reached the remainder of the patrol with neither he or the commander being wounded. Corporal Apiata re-armed himself and rejoined the fight in counter-attack. After approximately 20 minutes, the assault was routed with significant enemy casualties.

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"There is no doubt that this was an action worthy of a Victoria Cross," Dr Glyn Harper of Massey University said. "In fact it mirrors the very first two VCs awarded to New Zealand servicemen. Captain Charles Heaphy was the first New Zealand serviceman to win the Victoria Cross during the New Zealand Wars. Like Apiata, he was awarded the decoration for rescuing comrades under fire. During the Boer War, Farrier Sergeant Major William Hardham carried out a similar act rescuing a wounded trooper while under fire." The mana the Victoria Cross carries throughout the British Commonwealth and among the military community in general is incredible, Dr Harper said. "This is why a small piece of bronze worth only a few dollars sells

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for millions on the collector's market. The award of the Victoria Cross for New Zealand to Corporal Willy Apiata ... is an immensely positive development for the New Zealand Defence Force and for the award itself." Dr Harper and Colonel Colin Richardson co-authored a book on the Victoria Cross last year, *In the face of the enemy: The complete history of the Victoria Cross.*

In 1995 the New Zealand Prime Minister's Honours Advisory Committee recommended the discontinuance of Imperial awards for gallantry and bravery and the institution of a series of distinctive New Zealand awards. Following the Australian example in 1991 and the Canadian example in 1993, New Zealand in 1995 created the "Victoria Cross for New Zealand" as the country's highest operational gallantry award. The Imperial, Australian and New Zealand versions of the Victoria Cross are identical with the Canadian version slightly different in the use of the Latin "Pro Valore" for "For Valour". All medals are supplied by Hancocks and all are approved by the Queen. The official names are Victoria Cross, Victoria Cross for Australia, Victoria Cross for Canada and Victoria Cross for New Zealand but all are known as the Victoria Cross with the same post nominal's "VC". However, the four awards are governed by the regulations of each country's honours system. While the media release refers to the Victoria Cross the official *New Zealand Gazette* refers to the Victoria Cross for New Zealand, an award of the New Zealand Honours system.[1]

The citation is for an incident in 2004 but no date has been specified, the reason why it is still secret three years later has not been explained. Without knowing the date of the VC action it means that the award was announced between two years and six months and three years and six months are the VC action.[2] The two recent Victoria Cross awards to the British Army were nine months and six months after the VC actions. Fourteen of 22 NZ and 56 of 91 Australian VCs were awarded within three months of the VC action, three NZ and 31 Australian VCs were awarded within six months and two Australian and two New Zealand VCs within nine months of the action. The two remaining Australian awards, the first Australian award to Captain Neville Howse was ten months after the VC action and the first Australian award for Vietnam to Warrant Officer Kevin Wheatley was 13 months after the VC action. However three New Zealand awards were nearly three years after the VC action. Two were to Squadron Leader Leonard Trent RNZAF and the bar to the Victoria Cross to Captain Charles Upham VC 2nd NZEF. These were two of a number of late World War 2 awards that followed the release of both recipients and witnesses from POW camps after the war ended. The third late award was the first award to a New Zealand soldier, Major Charles Heaphy of the Auckland Militia, nearly three years after the VC action but only a month after the VC Warrant was amended to extend eligibility to New Zealand and other colonial forces.

Victoria Cross and George Cross to 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment

On 14 December 2006, The British Ministry of Defence announced that two soldiers from the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment were to be posthumously honoured with Britain's highest gallantry awards for their exceptional valour whilst deployed on operations in Southern Afghanistan this summer.

Corporal Bryan Budd, who died leading an assault against the Taliban was awarded the Victoria Cross. He was cited for two separate acts of exceptional valour whilst deployed in Sangin

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1 For the gazette notice enter Victoria Cross in "Search for" box at New Zealand Gazette On-Lines. see: http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-New-Zealand-Gazette-New-Zealand-Gazette-On-Line

2 Since at least two New Zealand soldiers were wounded in the action it should be possible from New Zealand Defence media releases in 2004 to determine the probable date of the action. If anyone has details please contact editor@mhsa.org.au

District Centre, Helmand Province, in July and August 2006. In the first incident, on 27 July, Corporal Budd's section was on a patrol when they identified and engaged two enemy gunmen on the roof of a building in the centre of Sangin. Without regard for his own safety, Corporal Budd led an assault where the enemy fire was heaviest. His gallant action allowed a wounded soldier to be evacuated to safety where he subsequently received life-saving treatment.

A few weeks later, on 20 August, Corporal Budd's section was again engaged in heavy fighting near Sangin District Centre. With withering fire pinning down his section and two of his men wounded, Corporal Budd decided to assault forward on his own. Although wounded himself, he rushed the enemy position, firing his weapon and killing a number of enemy fighters. Inspired by his example, the rest of the platoon pushed forward. Tragically, Corporal Budd's body was later found surrounded by the bodies of three enemy fighters.

Corporal Budd's citation reads: "Throughout his service in Afghanistan, Cpl Budd led his section from the front and was always where the action was fiercest. Twice he behaved with extraordinary gallantry but his single-handed action on the second occasion and his determination, though wounded, to push on against a superior enemy force stands out as a premeditated act of inspirational leadership and supreme valour."

Corporal Mark Wright was honoured with a posthumous George Cross for his outstanding gallantry in Helmand Province on 6 September 2006. After witnessing a fellow soldier step on a landmine, Corporal Wright gathered together a small team and rushed to give assistance, entering the minefield despite the risk to himself. Whilst giving assistance to the wounded soldier and attempting to clear a landing site for a helicopter evacuation, further landmines were detonated, causing very severe injuries to a number of personnel. Faced with an increasingly horrific situation, Cpl Wright ordered all non-essential personnel out of the minefield as he sought to take control. Then, in a further blast, Corporal Wright himself sustained serious injuries while making his way to a helicopter which had been called in to assist.

Despite his mortal injuries and the precarious situation of the others in the minefield, Corporal Wright strove to control the situation and gave extraordinary encouragement to those around him. Several survivors subsequently paid tribute to the contribution he made to maintaining morale and calm amongst the wounded personnel. Corporal Wright died of his wounds during the flight to the field dressing station and his citation read: "His complete disregard for his own safety while doing everything possible to retain control of the situation and to save lives constitutes an act of outstanding gallantry."

The Victoria Cross and the George Cross headed a list of 134 servicemen and women who were honoured with operational awards for their services around the world, principally in Iraq and Afghanistan.[3]

The British Defence Secretary Des Browne said: "It is with a deep sense of pride and some sadness that we reflect on the truly extraordinary achievements of our Armed Forces today. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and across the world, our brave men and women continue to put their lives on the line in the pursuit of security and stability. They are an inspiration to us all." Paying specific tribute to Corporals Budd and Wright, Mr Browne said: "The reports of their actions are truly humbling, the very definition of selflessness and gallantry. These men made the ultimate sacrifice for their country. They shall not be forgotten."

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3 The citations for the Victoria Cross are published in full in London Gazette supplement 58182 of 15 December 2006. The names of the other 132 decorated appear in London Gazette supplement 58182 of 15 December 2006. "Search all supplements" for December 2006 for "Honours" at http://www.gazettes-online.co.uk/supplementView.asp?webType=0

British Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, said: "The past year has been one of great challenge for the people of our Armed Forces, and they have consistently delivered above and beyond our already high expectation. I am immensely proud of them all; and these honours reflect the nation's pride, and its recognition of some quite extraordinary achievements. But the full extent of that recognition must reflect the deep sadness we feel over those of our colleagues we have lost; at the injuries that some have sustained; and of course at the grief of families and loved ones. Corporals Budd and Wright not only gave their lives in the line of duty, they demonstrated supreme courage and selfless devotion on behalf of others. Their example is a lasting inspiration to those of us still serving, and to those who will serve in the years ahead."

Medal of Honor to United States Marine

On Thursday, 11 January 2007, President George W Bush presented the Medal of Honor to the family of Corporal Jason Dunham, United States Marine Corps during a ceremony at the White House. The President spoke of Cpl. Dunham, "In April 2004, during an attack near Iraq's Syrian border, Corporal Dunham was assaulted by an insurgent who jumped out of a vehicle that was about to be searched. As Corporal Dunham wrestled the man to the ground, the insurgent rolled out a grenade he had been hiding. Corporal Dunham did not hesitate. He jumped on the grenade, using his helmet and body to absorb the blast. Although he survived the initial explosion, he did not survive his wounds. But by his selflessness, Corporal Dunham saved the lives of two of his men, and showed the world what it means to be a Marine."

The presentation was made in the East Room of the White House before a packed crowd that included Dunham's family and dozens of his fellow Marines in dress uniforms. Dunham's father and mother said after the ceremony that the honour should be shared with their son's fellow Marines. "They're all courageous. It's as much theirs as it is Jason's," said Dan Dunham. "I've lost my son but he became a part of history," said Dunham's mother, Deb. "It still hurts as a parent, but the pride that you have from knowing he did the right thing makes it easier." She said Jason's "second family," the Marine Corps, had done everything that could be asked, but acknowledged they still do not have what they all want most. "I wanted him here, and I didn't have him," said Deb Dunham.

Jason Dunham grew up a popular athlete in the small town of Scio in Alleghany County, where his mother, a home economics teacher, helped teach him spelling by using different words in the basketball game of "horse." On 14 April 2004, Dunham was serving with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines in Iraq. Dunham's squad was conducting a reconnaissance mission in Karabilah when it received a report that a Marine convoy had been ambushed. Dunham led his men to the site near Husaybah, halting a convoy of departing cars. An insurgent in one of the vehicles grabbed him by the throat when he went to search the car and the two fought. A grenade was dropped, and Dunham covered the explosive with his Kevlar helmet, which, along with his chest armour plate, absorbed some of the blast. He lived long enough to be transferred to a Bethesda, Maryland, hospital, where he died with his parents beside him.

The Medal of Honor award to Jason Dunham is the 50th award since 1979. However, 46 of the awards were belated awards from the Civil War to Vietnam. Of the four awards for conflicts since Vietnam, two were Somalia in 1993 and the award to Jason Dunham is the second for Iraq. All four awards have been posthumous and three earlier other awards were to the US Army.

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