Military Historical Society of Australia
Sabretache



Sabretache policy is that the submission of material gives the Society permission to print your material, to allow the material to be included in digital databases such as the MHSA website, Australian Public Affairs-Full Text, INFORMIT and EBSCO. Reprints to non-profit historical and other societies will be approved provided suitable attribution is included and a copy of the reprint is sent to the author. Copyright remains with the author who may reprint his or her article or material from the article without seeking permission from the Society.

The Society encourages the download and distribution of *Sabretache* for personal use only and *Sabretache* can not be reproduced without the written consent of the Society.

www.mhsa.org.au

Military Historical Society of Australia
PO Box 5030, Garran, ACT 2605.
email: webmaster@mhsa.org.au

Journal and Proceedings of the
Military Historical Society of Australia

SABRETACHE



Vol XXII April–June 1981 Number 2

Registered for posting as a publication. Category B.
Price $3.50

SABRETACHE

Journal and Proceedings of the
MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA
(founded 1957)

Vol XXII April – June 1981 Number 2

CONTENTS

Published by authority of the Federal Council of the Military Historical Society of Australia. The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are those of the contributors and not necessarily those of the Society.

The late Sir John Wilton, KBE, CB, DSO.

Obituary

Sir John Wilton, KBE, CB, DSO

Members of the Military Historical Society of Australia will be saddened to hear of the death of our Patron, General Sir John Wilton, KBE, CB, DSO. Sir John died at his home in Canberra on Sunday 10 May at the age of 70.

Sir John, born in Sydney on 22 November 1910, entered the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1927 and graduated in 1930. He served with the British Army in India, Burma and the United Kingdom, but returned to Australia before the outbreak of the Second World War and joined the Second AIF in 1940. Rising from the command of a battery in the 7th Division to undertake various staff positions, Wilton served in the Middle East, gaining distinction at Merdjayoun in Syria in 1941.

A Lieutenant Colonel in New Guinea in 1942 and 1943, he participated in the gruelling Salamaua campaign with Major General Stanley Savige's 3rd Division, winning admiration for his skill and courage. Wilton was then sent to Washington as a member of the Australian Military Mission, returning to Advanced Land Headquarters as General Staff Officer in 1945. Following a post-war appointment as Director of Military Operations and Plans at Army Headquarters, Wilton was given command of the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade in Korea, commanding the Brigade in the battle of The Hook in 1953.

After Korea Wilton occupied some of the most significant positions in the Australian Army, including Commandant of Duntroon, Chief of the General Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, retiring in 1970. He was appointed a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1964, and in 1968 became the fourth Australian, after Chauvel, Monash and Blamey, to become a full General.

In retirement, Sir John maintained an active interest in military and social affairs and accepted the invitation to become Patron of the Military Historical Society of Australia in 1977.

He was accorded a full military funeral and a salute of seventeen guns at a ceremony at the Anzac Chapel, Duntroon, on Wednesday 13 May.

Sir John Wilton, KBE, CB, DSO

The Editor is eager to receive contributions to the Journal, which should be addressed to
The Editor,
Sabretache
P.O. Box 30,
Garren, A.C.T. 2605.

I would like to remind members that any interesting piece of information, too short for an article, can be included in the Notes and Queries section of the Journal. Interesting photographs are especially welcome, and can be returned to the contributor unmarked after publication.

Peter Stanley.

South Australia's Army Part Two

Hans Zwillenberg

This is the tenth instalment in a series of articles on the history of South Australia's defence forces, taken from a major work submitted by the author to the University of Adelaide some years ago as part fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

The Volunteer Movement. 1854-1901

Five years after the establishment of the volunteer movement in South Australia in 1854 Queen Victoria authorised the formation of volunteer bodies in England (31). Supporters of the volunteer movement in South Australia were fond of pointing to a similarity of conditions in England. Yet there were fundamental differences.

In England the volunteers were considered as an auxiliary force, created to supplement the regular army. In South Australia, till 1895 at least, the volunteers were the first line of military defence, to be supplemented in an emergency by embodying the militia or by raising semi-permanent bodies, like the South Australian Guard. In England, too, the volunteers represented a class of people which had but recently assumed a distinct identity in a society with a much wider social spectrum than the relative uniformity to be found among South Australian colonists. *Punch* showed the militia men always 'undersized, cleanshaven boys of somewhat tough countenance; the volunteers were always middle-aged, bewhiskered and obviously the height of Victorian respectability' (32). The volunteer movement in England was a facet of a class conflict which ended in victory for the middle classes. It was bound to be popular. In South Australia, there was little evidence of such conflict, and this might explain why the very classes which supported the movement in England were not particularly interested in making it a success in South Australia.

The Crimean War scare created the climate for the formation of volunteer bodies in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. The New South Wales and Victorian bodies, like their earlier British counterparts, received no pay. The South Australian Volunteers were paid for their service. Indeed, the notion of truly voluntary service was fashionable in South Australia only briefly, in the sixties and seventies. Before An Act to Organise and Establish a Volunteer Force in South Australia (33) was passed in September, 1854, public debate produced a number of recommendations for the future force. These ranged from rates of pay (34) (35) (36), to selection of uniform (37). The only district which suggested that volunteers should serve without pay, except for forage allowance, was Port Adelaide (38). To most people in South Australia volunteer service did not mean *gratis* service.

The South Australian volunteer force of 1854 was to consist of not less than 850 and not more than 2,000 men, enrolled for a term not exceeding three years, during which time they were exempt from all other military duties. A volunteer could retire at any time, provided that a substitute was enrolled. Daily pay was to be 10/- for the artillery, 6/- for infantry and cavalry, with an additional 4/- per day marching money to be paid to troops away from normal headquarters. The training period for artillery and other arms was not to exceed 48 and 36 days respectively. In the case of absence without leave when the force was called out, the fine was £50, or 42 days imprisonment. Company commanders had the right to inflict punishments of confinement for one day, or stoppage of one day's pay (39).

As the Crimean scare faded, so did enthusiasm for soldiering, and when war clouds again appeared on the horizon, in 1858, the Second Finniss

Commission sought to revitalise the movement with the quaint idea of requiring the volunteers to pay an entrance fee of £5, to be refunded after three years of service, subject to the complete return of all the equipment with which the soldier had been issued. The ranking Imperial officer in the Colony at the time commented that the entrance fee would be a bar to otherwise highly eligible personnel, and at the same time raised the problem which was to bedevil the South Australian Army till 1895, that the force could not be efficient since it was not normally subject to the Mutiny Act and, therefore, discipline could not be enforced (40).

The First Hart Commission introduced, in 1858, one variation of the concept of the concept of the true, that is the unpaid, volunteer by recommending the formation of volunteer rifle clubs (41). Subsequently, the Volunteer Amendment Act 1859 (42) reduced pay for all ranks to 3/6 per day, substituted the right of officer election by the privilege of nominating candidates for commissioned rank and officer promotion and permitted, under clause 15, the enrolment of volunteers without pay. The Act proved a two-edged sword: the drastic reduction in pay almost converted the force into a truly voluntary, unpaid organisation, but it took away the volunteers' most highly prized possession, the right to elect their own officers. The debate in the House of Assembly showed that the legislators were somewhat confused about the issues involved (43). A few tended towards a voluntarily enrolled militia, by which they understood an organisation subject to relatively strict military control. Other members still clung tenaciously to the conventional militia concept. The government, however, had quite clearly intended to prepare the way for two forces, one paid and one unpaid, with the latter closely resembling English volunteers. Officer selection by the paid component could not be permitted, lest those aspiring to a commission should curry favour with the troops. Yet, if there was to be a completely unpaid force, then the right of officer election should not have been removed.

Although by late 1859, little was known about the effectiveness of the English volunteer movement, two distinct schools of thought began to emerge in the Colony: one favoured a voluntary, paid force, with militia-like service conditions, and relatively strict military control. The other advocated a truly voluntary force, unpaid, with all the normal privileges associated with volunteering. Both sides appeared to argue on grounds of military efficiency, but it seems highly probable that the debate had political undertones, reinforced by old world prejudice. The two most out-spoken critics of the voluntary principle were Strangways and Bagot.

H.B.T. Strangways was a well-known figure in South Australian politics. Between 1858 and 1870 he had served as Attorney-General, Commissioner of Crown Lands and finally as Premier. A descendant of the landed gentry in Somerset, he was, not surprisingly, a strong supporter of the militia system and critical of volunteers. Captain C.G. Bagot, was a member of the Irish landed gentry, and thus held similar views. In August, 1859, Strangways unsuccessfully moved in the House of Assembly for the withdrawal of arms from the volunteers, suggesting that, being kept in private homes, the weapons might be put to improper use (44). The press, on the other hand, attacked Strangways for equating South Australia with Tasmania or Western Australia, where authorities would understandably have been reluctant to entrust arms to a population of ex-convicts (45). The inference seems to have been that, whereas the paid militia would be a reliable aid to civil authoirty, the unpaid volunteers would not. Some eighteen months later Strangways may have thought otherwise, because the Victoria volunteers had proved effective in quelling the disturbances caused by agitation for more liberal land laws (46).

There is insufficient evidence to determine whether fear of riots did play a part in the argument for and against a paid volunteer force, but the argument did illustrate the effort by South Australians to define what they understood to be the citizen soldier. It see-sawed like the debate for fixed versus mobile defences; it was more bitter, because it involved people and their principles, rather than bricks and mortar.

The early sixties saw a clearer trend towards the true (unpaid) volunteer movement. The press, at first, supported it and dubbed enrolling activity under the Militia Act a farce, implying that the government had no real intention of embodying the force (47). The formation of new volunteer units was always warmly welcomed and wide publicity given to the social club manner in which candidates for both commissioned and non-commissioned ranks were nominated. For instance, the 1st Adelaide Rifles nominated their own non-commissioned officers candidates in the Hamburg Hotel in February, 1860, after a pleasurable dinner (48). But the mushroom growth of little individual

A member of the Adelaide Rifles, possibly Private George Dalton, 1868. AWM A3858

corps throughout the Colony soon got out of hand. Each wished to differ from the others. 'The general effect [was] so bizarre that it [could] be compared with nothing else than an army in motley' (49). The honeymoon of volunteers and press support was shortlived. The press began to realise that volunteering was becoming merely a device to circumvent the provisions of the Militia Act. 'As soon as the militia roll is complete they [the volunteers] may begin to dissolve – like Falstaff's men in buckram, they become altogether imaginary soldiers' said the *Observer* in 1860 (50). The volunteer rolls were large but ineffective and the force was 'as imaginary as Potemkin villages' (51).

By the end of the first quarter of 1860 the Colony had about 2130 volunteers on strength, fragmented into variously sized companies (52), not one of which produced more than six marksmen (53).

Despite the obvious shortcomings of the true volunteer system, the government proceeded to bring down the Auxiliary Volunteer Act 1860, later often referred to as the Free Rifles Act (54). The government's reason for this measure was ostensibly the fact that, apart from increasing the military force of the Colony at no expense to the government – and this argument was denied by the press (55) – the new legislation was designed

> *to make it easier for volunteers to enroll at their own expense and to make their own regulations, because they found it* **inconvenient to serve under the existing act*** (56).

The term 'inconvenient' implied that members of units raised under the provisions of the new act did not wish to be associated in any way with the volunteers, enrolled under the Volunteer Amendment Act of 1859, which had denied volunteers the absolute right of officer election. The 1860 legislation which re-introduced the right of officer selection was to divide the volunteers for the next 30 years, and this conflict was to be largely responsible for the military inefficiency of the Colony in the second half of the 19th century.

The faults lay in the provisions of the Free Rifles Act themselves. The force was to arm and equip itself at its own expense; the government, therefore, had little say in the type of equipment and uniforms chosen. Since the members elected their own officers and made their own regulations the units became so independent of overall governmental control that they assumed the nature, not so much of military bodies, as of uniformed rifle clubs, exempt from military obligations under any of the existing acts. The government did have the right to disband a unit, but this was a fictitious power. In a parliamentary system which held elections almost once a year a measure of this nature would have cost vital votes.

However, despite the attractive provisions of the Auxiliary Volunteer Act 1860 there was no great rush to join the auxiliary colours. The cost of arms and equipment must have been prohibitive for the man in the street, while the gentlemen of the Colony, unlike their counterparts in England, were scarcely interested in supporting, let alone sponsoring, their own units. The period 1860/61 saw only 39 men enrolled as auxiliaries (57).

By September, 1860, the government was forced to review the force enrolled under the original Volunteer Act of 1854 and its amending legislation of 1859. The press clamoured for weeding out the ineffectives. 'Rifles which are now rusting in the houses of their present owners should be in better hands' (58), and the implementation of

*Author's emphasis.

the Militia Act was again strongly recommended (59). The press blamed the lack of discipline on the difficulty of combining the voluntary with the compulsory principles which governed the force. As volunteers, members could not be readily compelled to attend parades; for an officer to enforce a fine might well cost him his local popularity, or worse. Two months' continuous absence from a volunteer unit could have landed a man's name on the militia roll, but after the passing of the Auxiliary Volunteer Act, 1860, especially, such a measure would have been considered an infringement of a man's personal liberty: once exempted from compulsory service by virtue of his volunteering, he should never again be subject to potential conscription (60).

In an effort to facilitate administrative procedures and enforce discipline, the government brought down the Volunteer Amendment Act, 1860 (61). Unfortunately, the provisions of this act also failed to achieve the desired improvement in the discipline of the force. The problem did not merely concern poor attendance. There was the habit among the troops to call meetings for the purpose of censuring their officers. Such an incident happened at Kapunda, where the members censured their captain for not fixing the date of a parade (62). Similarly, the Reedbeds at Mile End criticised their captain for his disregard of men and horses when the troop had been on lengthy duty (63).

When the alleged Russian schemes for attacking Australian colonies became public late in 1864, the press demanded a general re-orientation in military thinking: the volunteer movement had been found wanting on two occasions and a militia type of service might, therefore, still be necessary (64). Public pressure resulted in the appointment, in 1865, of the Second Hart Commission, whose report (65) showed that lack of enthusiasm for the service was partly due to the image of the force, for which both government and parliament were to blame. Not only did outward appearance leave much to be desired, since uniforms were not supplied in sufficient quantity, but the force was often publicly ridiculed by parliamentarians and even by serving members, like Strangways. There was also inadequate provision for jury exemption, and a lack of encouragement on the part of wealthier classes. The report closely examined certain technical and administrative details, such as the altering of rifle sights from the setting authorised by the professional soldiers, supposedly, a mark of initiative on the part of the volunteers, and the problem of storing arms. Central storage was advocated, in preference to individual take home issues, since the former would not only ensure better maintenance of the equipment, but by making a common meeting place necessary, would foster a better *esprit de corps*. In examining training procedures, the report questioned the applicability of the English Hythe practice, and the suitability of volunteer officers to act as instructors. Preoccupation with target practice, at the expense of drill, was deplored. It was agreed that fragmentation of the force into many small sub-units was detrimental both to efficiency of training, particularly officer and non-commissioned officer training, and to the control of attendance. Speed of mobilisation was adequate: most of the witnesses stated that two-thirds of their companies could be assembled within one hour of the alarm signal being given, at least at night, when members were at home; it would take longer during the day. The really important questions, however, were: whether the force should be paid, whether payment would deter certain sections of the community from joining, or from continuing to serve, and whether a militia type of force, drilling twice a year for periods of up to a fortnight, was preferable to a paid volunteer system.

The witnesses were unanimous in their opinion that payment for time spent on drill would induce the labouring classes to join, and would not deter the middle-class element from remaining in the force. The rates of pay should be commensurate with the ruling rates of pay in the Colony, in other words, the rate of 3/6 provided for in the 1859 legislation would by now be too low. Payment would also provide a means for enforcing discipline. Although those witnesses who were themselves professional officers advocated, in preference to militia, an improved volunteer system, that is, a paid force, the volunteer officers, when questioned on this point, unequivocally stated that the implementation of the Militia Act would mean the end of all voluntary effort, but that the Militia Act should be kept on the statutes as a *vis-in-terrorem*. It was also considered highly undesirable to maintain a mixed system of militia in the Adelaide area, and pure volunteers in the country: the militia members would degenerate to the status of pariahs, creating a class conflict. On the other hand, it was generally agreed that a rejuvenated, paid volunteer force would be prepared to serve under militia regulations, even accepting the provisions of the Mutiny Acts.

From the Commission's point of view, the question of pay appeared to revolve around a desire that, like their English counterparts, the colonial volunteers should remain a corps of gentlemen. In fact, the Commission suggested that volunteers should be encouraged to enrol 'to become efficient auxiliaries by offering them every possible inducement *except** personal pay', while 'a paid force [of 700 infantry and 200 artillery] should be enrolled under a special act and maintained under strict military discipline', to be called out for specified periods during the year, and kept in camps or barracks during training (66).

The government acted on the recommendations of the Second Hart Commission by introducing, in May 1865, A Bill to Provide for the Establishment and Maintenance of the South Australian Guard (67), in an attempt to obtain the best of several worlds. The force would be voluntarily enlisted, yet subject to the Mutiny Acts. The question of compulsion would not arise because the members were volunteers, but without the disadvantages normally associated with volunteers, because discipline could be enforced, and it would not be a standing army, since training was to be intermittent. Neither would it be a citizen soldier army, and to this the radicals in the Colony objected strongly. The government claimed that the Guards were to be an auxiliary to the volunteer force, not, as the *Observer* would have it and as the Second Hart Commission suggested, the other way around (68). Since Guard officers were to take precedence over volunteer officers, the Guard would have been the senior force.

The bill had a very stormy passage. The very title of the force aroused suspicion. The clause allowing for the disbanding of volunteers was heavily censured, with the *Observer* objecting violently to the voluntary principle being dismissed in such a summary fashion (69). Public pressure began to mount in the Colony against the bill. Understandably, much of it came from the volunteers. The press gave their opinions ample coverage, but at the same time was not loath to take the volunteers themselves to task. Why should they be so bitterly opposed to the formation of a small force, different from their own? After all, volunteers had failed to fill the vacuum left by Imperial regulars. The government was justified in introducing a measure for the establishment of a disciplined force. The press conceded 'that free men defending their own country gratuitously [should do] so under a system which allowed them to make their own rules', but such a system did not produce an efficient military (70). Eventually, in June 1865, the protesting voice of the volunteers forced parliament to vote the bill into committee, in other words, back into the lap of the government, and nothing further was heard of it.

It is interesting to note that, in their efforts to be heard the volunteers acted, not as individual citizens, but as members of a military body, quite contrary to the custom of the service. Even certain members of parliament, ignoring ethics and the customs of the service, attended such meetings in their capacity as volunteers. As the *Observer* pointed out, 'Caesar dared to cross the Rubicon and Kingston dared to go the Hamburg Hotel' (71).

Having tasted political success, the volunteers proceeded to campaign for a system of payment. Unlike the gentlemen volunteers in England, who feared that payment would lower the tone of the movement – reduce it to the status of a militia – South Australians saw no degradation in being paid for a day's work for one's country, provided that it was fairly earned (72).

The campaign resulted in The Volunteer Act, 1865/6 (73), which repealed all existing statutes and disbanded the volunteer force of the day, but made no change in the militia legislation. Under the new Act, the military force was to consist of a Volunteer Force (Active) of not less than 540, and not exceeding 1,000 men, and a Reserve Force, not exceeding 1,000 men. The two forces were to be based on volunteer districts and no one could enlist in the Reserve Force unless he had completed a three year term in the active volunteer Force. Members of both forces would be exempt from any other military obligations, including impressment of their houses, horses and carriages for military purposes. Duration and location of training were to be as specified. The same applied to rates of pay, which, initially, varied from 15/- per day for a lieutenant-colonel, to 5/- for a drummer, with 4/- per day marching money and a horse allowance of 6/-, payable for service outside the district. Arms, equipment and uniform, but not horses, were to be provided by the government. These provisions were reasonable; there were few complaints. Only one or two radical M.P.s objected to the graded pay. Most importantly, however, the principle of payment had triumphed. Never again was there to be any suggestion in principle that volunteers should serve without pay.

* Author's italics.

Although junior to any Imperial troops with which it may have had to serve, the volunteer force was, by implication, to be senior to any other military raised in the Colony. Nevertheless the 1865/6 Volunteer Act was not particularly successful. By June 1865, the enrolment figure was only 350, considerably less than the stipulated minimum of 450, and the public again recommended the implementation of the Militia Act (74). Such suggestions had the desired effect. By the end of the year enrolments reached 768. In 1867 the total number of volunteers on strength was 831, until resignations, again, began to outweigh enrolments by almost three to one (75).

Reports of enquiries by the Victorian Defence Commission of 1875, the possibility of British involvement in the Balkans, and renewed agitation by the South Australian press, prompted the government in 1876 to appoint the Third Finniss Commission (76). As in previous instances, the Commission's recommendations, which included the establishment of a permanent artillery force and some changes in the volunteer system, had little impact. Perhaps the findings lacked value because members of the Commission were either too old and out-of-touch, or too junior in rank to have had the experience necessary for such an investigation. The government was obliged to seek the services of an English officer, of at least field rank, to take charge of the Colony's defences (77). In October, 1877, Colonel M. Francis Downes and Major John Goodwin took up duties as Colonel-Commandant and Senior Staff Officer, respectively.

In 1877, with the possibility of escalation in the Balkan crisis, public interest in defence flared briefly. The governor reported to London:

> *That a state of war or anticipation of war is not an unmixed evil . . . may be shown by the influence on the energies, of these great Australian provinces. It purges them, pro hac vice, of the log-rolling, time-serving propensities to which they are confessedly liable* (78).

The volunteer movement received a shot in the arm when the government passed the Rifle Companies Act 1878 (79), to encourage the volunteer spirit in the Colony, and attempt to bring the various rifle clubs* under some form of military control, as well as to encourage the formation of rifle companies in country towns. These rifle companies were to be co-ordinated within the South Australian National Rifle Association, which had existed under various names since the beginning of the colony.** The organisation was mainly concerned with arranging rifle matches within tand without the Colony. Its members were obliged to attend ten drills annually, and two half-yearly inspection parades, and when called out, they were paid at the same rate as ordinary volunteers. They had the right of officer election, subject to the governor's approval, and could, at their own expense, select distinctive uniforms, subject to the approval of the Council of the Association. Each member was entitled to the loan of a government-owned rifle and to 100 rounds of ammunition per annum. The Association itself received an annual capitation grant of £1.10.0. for every efficient member. As a sporting organisation it was very popular, and received more encouragement than either

* The rifle clubs in South Australia dated back to 1838, when the first Adelaide Rifle Club was formed (80)

** There existed at that time yet another, completely private, organisation, namely the South Australian Rifle Club. The club refused to become involved in the military aspects of rifle shooting and, consequently, received no government support (81).

Corporal, Reedbeds Mounted Volunteers, 1860 - 1867. AWM A3860

the paid or unpaid volunteers. Throughout the late seventies and eighties, it had its own special column, 'The Rifle', in the *Observer*, which reported the activities of the South Australian National Rifle Association in detail. Between July and December, 1880, these reports outnumbered even cricket reports.

The movement was particularly strong in country areas. In the metropolitan area the members were mainly civil service companies and military rifle clubs, like the Non-Commissioned Officers Rifle and Carbine Club, which came into being on 16 September, 1880, in the Sir John Barleycorn Hotel. Its patron was the Governor, Sir William Drummond Jervois, with Colonel Downes as president (82).

Thus, at the beginning of 1879, South Australia maintained a threefold military system, which consisted of a permanent (regular) force, the volunteer force and the auxiliary rifle companies. This explicit division of the volunteer force into a military and an auxiliary component led to confusion, half measures and the downfall of two commandants, who had tried, by strengthening military control, to turn the rifle clubs into something resembling a military force. All control was strenuously and, until 1895, successfully resisted, possibly due to the electoral influence of these small but numerous bodies.

Downes, then wanted the paid volunteer force to be renamed the Volunteer Militia Force because, when called out, they came under strict military discipline, and since the South Australian National Rifle Association so closely resembled the English volunteers, he suggested that it be renamed the Rifle Volunteer Force (83). The government followed his recommendations and passed the Local Forces Acts Amendment Act, 1881, (84) but had to allow an important amendment to the bill inserted by the Legislative Council: the word 'militia' was not to be used. Contrary to British tradition, in South Australia militia service was, by definition and custom, felt to be inferior to volunteer service (85). For the next fourteen years the two non-permanent forces in South Australia were referred to as the Volunteer Military Force (V M F) and the Rifle Volunteer Force (R.V.F).

The effort to militarise the R.V.F. was no mere exercise in nomenclature:

> Commissioned Officers and Sergeants must pass examinations to entitle them to the capitation grant of £1.10.0. Subjects for qualifying examinations are as follows –
>
> (a) Practical and Theoretical Examination in Field Exercises, 1877, Part I and Part II.
> (b) General Definitions of Field Exercise – 1877.
> (c) Command of a Company and Battalion, Field Exercise Part III (This is not compulsory for Subalterns).
> (d) Field Exercise 1877 – Part 6, Section 3-9, 15-21, Part 7.
> (e) Practical knowledge of Rifle Exercise.
> (f) Knowledge and Competency to Superintend Target Practice. (86).

Eligibility to receive capitation payment also depended on a minimum number of drill attendances. But to enforce discipline was another matter. The realisation that the R.V.G. wielded considerable political influence, must have been a severe embarrassment to the staff officers, some of whom for the first time in their lives in direct contact with volunteers, and first generation descendants of dissenters at that. After Colonel Downes succeeded in having the Goolwa Company disbanded for lack of parade attendances (87), he was severely criticised by the Legislative Council. After all, a majority of the city members* of the R V F were electors of the Upper House, and even attempts to formally influence members to favour a particular candidate for the Legislative Council were not unknown (88).

There was little the commandants could do to improve the military force as a whole in the face of the political influence exerted by one of its components. As a military body, the paid force was more efficient, at least as far as field movements and formation work were concerned, while the unpaid force had better marksmen. And so it should, for its members indulged in little activity except target practice. They could afford both the ammunition and the time to amuse themselves at the rifle butts. Militarily speaking, rifle shooting under controlled conditions was not particularly useful, being quite unlike field firing, where targets would present themselves at constantly

---

* On 1.5.1881 the two forces in the City area were composed as follows: (89)

Well-to-do people	V M F	18%	R V F	51%
Tradesmen		55%		21%
Labourers and Farm Labourers		3%		3%
Others		19%		23%
		95%		98%

changing ranges and in a variety of forms, impossible to simulate on a firing range. Colonel Downes defended his opinion by referring to the battle of Orleans in 1871, where Gambetta's enthusiastic recruits failed against a much smaller German force, better officered and more efficiently trained in field craft (91).

> The R V F in country areas was made up mainly of 'mechanics, artisans, clerks in country stores and places of business' (90).

The major difficulty, however, lay in lack of unified control. Following recommendations by the colonel-commandant, the South Australian Government introduced the Local Forces Acts further Amendment Act, 1882 (92), empowering the governor to appoint the R V F field officers, who had previously been appointed by its Council. Also, the R V F was to be placed under the command of the colonel-commandant of South Australia.

The bill had a stormy passage. One member of the House of Assembly insisted 'he would be very sorry to do anything that would prevent the people in the country from improving themselves in the use of the rifle or from enjoying themselves' (93). Josiah Henry, later Sir Josiah, H. Symon objected that the force was about to lose the very characteristic which distinguished it from the paid Volunteer Military Force, and which in his opinion, was no better than a militia (94). He had, of course, voiced the government's true intention: that the status of the force should be changed.

Efforts towards centralisation and the curtailing of the independence of rifle volunteers received fresh impetus when Brigadier-General John Fletcher Owen took over command of the South Australian Military forces, in May, 1885. The following year, Owen engaged in a public controversy with Captain F.W. Good of Port Augusta, late 1st Dorset Rifle Volunteers, regarding the relative merits of paid and unpaid forces (95). It was a debate between the enthusiastic amateur and the dispassionate professional. As might be expected, the professional won on facts, but in doing so, lost the confidence of a society which, having achieved a measure of affluence, longed to model itself on England and was, therefore, predisposed towards Captain Good's sentiments in favour of an English volunteer organisation.

Little official notice was taken, either of Captain Good's arguments, or of the *Observer's* charges of incompetence against him (96). Good had a vested interest in a pure volunteer system (97), and he lacked the tact necessary to sail the turbulent waters of the controversy (98). However, the government could not completely disregard Owen's recommendations, which he tabled as a Parliamentary Paper in August, 1886, (99), and in which he advocated the implementation of a system based on the Canadian precedent.* Owen cited Sir Peter Scratchley, Colonel F.T. Sargood's Report on the Victorian volunteer artillery and evidence given before the New South Wales Royal Commission of 1881, as evidence for the desirability of a paid volunteer force. The government was also pressed, notably by two of the politicians, to improve relations between the two forces and to reduce overall military expenditure.

Yielding to demands, the government passed the Defence Forces Act, 1886 (101) which, together with its regulations, re-defined the defence forces of the Colony. These were now to comprise the Permanent Naval and Military Forces, the Active Militia (formerly known as the Volunteer Military Force), the Militia Reserve (formerly the Reserve Force), the Reserve Militia, the Cadet Corps, and the National Rifle Association and Defence Clubs. Enrolment in the Reserve Militia was to be compulsory if insufficient numbers enrolled in the Active Militia, or in the event of threatened invasion. Both the Active Militia and the Volunteer Force could raise cavalry, field artillery, garrison artillery and infantry, in the above order of precedence. As the governing body of both civilian and military rifle clubs, the National Rifle Association was now to have the senior military officers of the Colony on its Council. Thus, rifle shooting as a sport effectively passed under the control of the professional military.

Despite centralised control of the two components of the volunteer movement, complaints continued about the decline of the force and the failure of the propertied classes to share in the national burden of defence (102). The report of yet another investigating team, the Castine

---

* The Canadian Militia Act, 1868, divided the country into nine military districts from which the troops were drawn on the basis of the conscription principle applied to all males between 16 and 60. There was an active militia and a reserve. If not enough people volunteered, then compulsion could be resorted to. The members of the force received pay for drill periods and had to attend an annual camp during which time they came under the provisions of the Mutiny Acts (100).

Committee (103), showed that there had been an improvement among city volunteers, but country companies were neglected because instructors could not cover all country centres. The Castine Committee's report was unique – it was unanimous. More importantly, it stressed that training methods, generally, must be improved, and that, from a cost effectiveness point of view, the major training effort should be directed towards paid volunteers and mounted troops.

The Committee's report vindicated Owen's earlier views and virtually sanctioned the demise of the unpaid force, except for its highly popular mounted component. But Owen had succeeded, at the expense of his own popularity. Members of the now militarised rifle clubs objected to being treated as soldiers and not as the financially disinterested patriots they claimed to be, while the public was irked by constant criticism of an institution so dear to their heart, and parliamentarians resented having the blame for poor parade attendances and other short-comings laid at the ministry's door (104). Parliament respected but hated Owen's competence. When he offered to serve a further two year term, his offer was declined (105). He was never forgiven for destroying the volunteers' independence. His subsequent appointment to a high military post at Portsmouth drew the vindictive comment that '. . . Britain must be badly off for good officers or was still promoting incompetent ones' (106).

The Defence Forces Act, 1886 also authorised the formation of cadet corps in schools. Actually, school cadet corps had existed in the Colony for some time, since it was considered that certain disciplinary advantages would accrue from military drill in the model schools, as the private schools were then called (107). The Clare public school had had military drill since its opening in 1872 (108). It was not until 1884 that cadet training was discussed as a means of attracting youngsters to military activities (109), although some sections of the community expressed their disapproval. For instance, in 1879 the Quakers had petitioned parliament to discontinue cadet training on moral grounds (110).

The war scare of 1885 prompted a proposal for the formation of a cadet corps at Prince Alfred College, with two companies of 50 pupils each (111), and also for a cadet unit at St Peters College (112). Nothing came of these proposals till 1889 (113), but since some 500 boys in half a dozen schools had already been issued with carbines (114), a further issue of 500 carbines was made to an additional 18 schools, bringing the total of public schools conducting cadet training to twenty-four. Yet despite all this, using schools as venues for arousing an early interest in military matters was none too popular.

However, there was considerable, if misguided, enthusiasm behind the formation of volunteer companies based on occupational or ethnic associations, despite the authorities' apprehension that such a move would lead to even greater fragmentation, South Australia had its share of well-meaning citizens, eager to promote private armies. In 1866, and again in 1879, a Civil Service Company was formed (115). There were serious suggestions to form a company of drapers, but the press rather objected to the idea. The risk to business would have been too great:

> *Imagine a corps, including all the drapers in Adelaide, being exposed to the deadly fire and imagine its ranks frightfully decimated . . . the result would be the total cessation of the drapery business for a month or two* (116).

Clinging to the principle of avoiding fragmentation, the government resisted all suggestions for raising volunteer house companies. The general-manager of the Broken Hill Proprietary Company at Port Pirie, in 1900, was deeply disappointed when advised that a BHP company could not be approved (117).

The formation of volunteer companies based on ethnic associations was at first also discouraged. When, in 1866, three leading citizens, Harris, Scarfe and Frazer, iron-mongers, pressed for a Scottish company, their request was viewed as a scarcely veiled attempt to introduce highland dress into the forces (118). Nevertheless, that year a Scottish company did come into existence, its members providing themselves with national dress at their own expense (119). For a short time there were Irish companies as well. The feeling was that while remaining true to the traditions of the past, the Irish would combine with the Scottish, the Australian and other corps to defend their common heritage. As Archbishop O'Riley enthusiastically stated,

> *. . . if Australia is worth living in, it is surely worth defending. The Highland corps now in process of formation will fight none the worse when the summons comes for being reminded by plaid or hose that they are children of Bonny Scotland nor will the Irish Rifles be less strong-hearted with a bit of green braid of*

facings or bronze shamrock to tell them where their fathers came from – the Emerald Isle (120).

Towards the end of the century national companies received official sanction. A company was formed from members of the Australian Natives Association. The Scottish units by now enjoyed tremendous support (121), and in 1900 imported from London a badge, a laurel wreath with a thistle in the centre (122), as well as receiving their first kilt, in the tartan of the Gordon Highlanders (the name of the South Australian commandant at the time was Gordon) (123).

Amid increasing economic difficulties of the nineties, heightened radical sentiments, both in the community and in the legislature, prepared the climate for further curtailing unpaid voluntary service. The Defence Forces Act Amendment Act, 1890 (124) changed the name of the Volunteer Force to Volunteer Militia Reserve Force (V.M.R.F.). Attendance at a camp, for which men were now paid, was made a pre-requisite for the extra efficiency grant. The Act also eliminated some of the earlier fragmentation. For instance, infantry could only be enrolled within a 15 mile radius by road, or 20 miles by rail, from such centres as Gawler, Riverton, Kapunda, Port Pirie, Gladstone and Moonta. This meant that infantry ceased to exist in the South West, along the southern sea-board and in the Port Augusta area. Mounted infantry, which could only be enrolled within 100 miles of Adelaide, still remained a purely voluntary body, although it was felt that it should, somehow, be made part of the Active Force. However, the radical C.C. Kingston, objected strongly to government support for such purely voluntary bodies, which 'were simply an incentive to pleasurable pot-hunting and tend to prevent men from joining a disciplined force' (125).

The 1890 Act was also intended to reduce expenditure, by shortening the engagement in the Active Militia from three to two years and thereby increasing the reserve component to include a third battalion. Every effort was made to avoid giving rise to derogatory comment on local defence matters, either among the public, or in the legislature. The new commandant, Colonel Joseph Maria Gordon, a man with extensive colonial experience in New Zealand, Victoria and South Australia, made sure that, despite severe cuts in expenditure, the best possible use was made of existing provisions. For instance, in 1894, he was able to hold well attended camps, one in the Port Adelaide area, and others in various country centres, which did not cost the government a penny: participants volunteered to bring their own provisions. This example of self-support prompted generous donations from the business community. Attendance was about 80 per cent of the nominal strength in the metropolitan area, and somewhat less in the country areas, and showed conclusively that, when called upon, the voluntary spirit in the community was far from dead (126).

Credit for the fact that the voluntary spirit was still alive must go to the press. The 'volunteer force had become a nationalised institution' (127), despite accusations of inefficiency, little support from wealthy colonists and little interest from the rest.

In England everybody from poor to peasant put their heads together and their shoulders to the wheel . . . here rich men as a rule have persistently held aloof . . . and even the ladies have not given the military a fair share of encouragement (128).

The press endeavoured to overcome the English traditional dislike of matters military by assuming the role of a public relations department and keeping the public informed of the day to day activities of the force (129). Occasionally, the military failed to supply adequate information. 'The pen and the sword appeared to have parted company', were the resigned words of the *Observer* in the early sixties (130). Nevertheless, throughout the century, the press succeeded in keeping the concept of military service in general, and voluntary service in particular, before the public as an indispensible part of the democratic way of life.

It is in a political context that we must view some of the reports of, say, rifle practices. The press took the opportunity to introduce the dissenters' own particular brand of radicalism into the military arena by contrasting English and South Australian conditions and pointing out that the support of the wealthy in England had been detrimental to the movement: 'they had smothered it by over-patronage' (131). The practice of offering bounties to induce enrolment reduced membership of the force to the very poor and the very wealthy, and created the 'great social gulf which swallowed almost every national movement in England' (132). The South Australian system was considered sounder than its English counterpart 'because it derived from the State and did not rely on private ostentation' (133). In this context the press never failed to attack profit conscious colonists mainly those in the business community,

when they found it inconvenient to release an employee for training (134).

The press did, albeit grudgingly, credit the English system with a few virtues, among them the Wimbledon rifle matches which, as a national institution, almost ranked equal with the Derby. Consequently, rifle matches by proxy enjoyed considerable popularity, as on the occasion of a contest between the Milang Company and the English Robin Hood Rifles in 1864 (135). Later, military sports activities were to assume the character of public entertainments. They were well attended. Much interest was shown in the mounted competitions, which included sword to sword exercises, lance tilting, 'cleaving the Turks head', tent pegging, and the quaint 'thread the needle race' which required horsemen carrying threads to gallop up to the ladies and dismount, wait for needles to be threaded, and gallop to the finish (136). Other activities, more for the enjoyment of the members themselves, included picnics like the popular steamer trips from Semaphore and Glenelg to the 'Yankalilla Military Picnic and Sports Day' (137).

Dinners, smoke socials and , to a lesser extent, official balls, played a considerable part in the life of the citizen soldiery. A Citizen Military Force officer, a member of the Military Board, told the author in 1958, 'fifty per cent of the success of the Citizen Military Force is due to its social activities'. The premise appears to have been just as valid a hundred years before. Apart from the conviviality – numerous toasts were the custom in those days – the smoke socials provided an opportunity for airing grievances, for making unofficial public statements, and for subtly influencing any present members of the legislature (138).

The social activities of the commissioned ranks centred around the Officers' Club, an exclusive institution, whose military function will be discussed later. The press exhibited a perfunctory interest in the club's activities (139), unless they provided ammunition for criticising the military administration. When Colonel Downes censured a member for reporting to the press on officers' functions, both the *Observer* and the *Register* were immediately indignant: the senior military officer was '. . . apparently not able to distinguish between the private rights and military obligations of club members' (140).

An experiment in democratising the force which gained a great deal of support in South Australia was the Military Club, or, as it was sometimes called, the Volunteer Club, formed to promote good fellowship between the various arms of the service. Unlike the Officers' Club, it was not meant to be a venue for implementing military policy, though for a while it appears to have been the unofficial head-quarters of the National Rifle Association (141). The Club, whose membership consisted of all other ranks, with officers as honorary members, was officially opened by the governor on 2nd July, 1881. For some time it flourished, under vice-regal patronage and, among other things, provided the premises for military band practice and for all ranks smoke socials generally. It appears however, that by 1885 the club had ceased to exist, because non-commissioned officers' functions were being held in such places as the Sir John Barleycorn Hotel (142). Although they were meant to identify the force as a civil institution, these social activities were insufficient to justify the unpaid volunteer's place in the society.

By the middle nineties, organised unpaid volunteering had come to an end, and began to give way to the concept of the citizen soldier, a concept based on universal military service. Although C.C. Kingston, and others, had anticipated the sentiments of men like Deakin, Hughes, Ewing by some ten or fifteen years (143), it was not till 1895 that the right climate for this type of citizen soldiery began to materialise. The commandant, Colonel Joseph Maria Gordon, was instructed to prepare two bills, one to be known as a Universal Service Bill and the second simply as a Re-Organisation Bill. The Universal Service Bill was never introduced, since Kingston feared the expenditure involved might have been too great (144). However, the re-organisation proposal was introduced, and contained the universal service provisions. The bill was passed as the Defences Act, 1895 (145). It provided for the South Australian military forces to consist of the Permanent Military Force, the Active Military Force and the Reserve Military Force. Significantly, no mention was made of such terms as militia or volunteers, but only soldiers. The service was to be based on universal military training, but eligible men could volunteer. There was to be no distinction between Active and Reserve Force officers; both would rank equally, in accordance with the date of commission. In other words, the Reserve Force was merely the continuation of two years' service in the Active Force.

The new legislation was well received. The *Register* congratulated Colonel Gordon on the

framing of the bill and quoted Major-General Hutton as saying that the South Australian legislation was in advance of that of any other state (146).

The wheel of South Australian military history had gone full circle. It had begun with compulsory and volunteer service legislation, side by side, as two separate acts. As the Colony prospered and became more and more Anglicised in outlook the compulsory service concept lost its original meaning and remained only as a means of threatening South Australians into the volunteer forces. Various schemes to make volunteering a practical proposition in South Australia failed, due to lack of interest and lack of support by the wealthier classes. Volunteer service was never the success it was in England. With the economic decline in the eighties and nineties, and the resultant growth of the working-class community, the radical concept of the citizen soldier, apparent in the ideas of the Adelphi planners, and frequently expressed by the first generation of colonist dissenters, revived and formed the background to the 1895 legislation. This legislation saw military service as a universal national obligation, and recognised the role of the citizen soldier as being directly in support of, and complementary to the permanent force.

Notes

The Abbreviations for Maj. Zwillenberg's Notes will be published in the July-September edition of "Sabretache".

31. O. 30.11.; 7.12.; 14.12.1895; 16.5.1896
32. *Ibid.*, p.58
33. S.A. Statutes 2/1854
34. PP 37/1854
35. PP 48/1854
36. PP 25/1854
37. PP 40/1854
38. PP 36/1854
39. *Ibid.*
40. PP 35/1858
41. PP 58/1858
42. S.A. Statutes 17/1859
43. H.A. 4.8.1859
44. H.A. 17.8.1859
45. O. 23.7.1859
46. T.B. Millar, *The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District and the Colony of Victoria*, 1836-1900, Melbourne University. MA: Thesis 1957, pp 86-87.
47. O. 3.2.1860
48. *Ibid.*
49. O. 17.2.1860
50. O. 3.2.1860
51. *Ibid.*
52. CSC/I/489/1860; O. 12.5.1860
53. O. 11.8.1860
54. S.A. Statutes 7/1860
55. O. 1.9.1860
56. H.A. 20.7.1860
57. PP 4/1861, p.71
58. O. 1.9.; 15.9.1860
59. *Ibid.*
60. O. 16.2.1861
61. S.A. Statutes 14/1860
62. O. 5.4.1862
63. *Ibid.*
64. O. 19.11.1864
65. PP 29/1865
66. *Ibid.*
67. H.A. 17.5.; 30.5.; 13.6.1865
68. O. 20.5.1865
69. O. 3.6.1865
70. *Ibid.*
71. O. 17.6.1865
72. O. 2.9.1865
73. S.A. Statutes 18/1865/6
74. R. 18.7.; 19.7.1866
75. PP 199/1868/9
76. PP 45/1876
77. GD/O/24/1877
78. *Ibid.*
79. S.A. Statutes 118/1878
80. *S.A. Gaz. and Col. Reg.* 6.10.1838.
81. O. 9.4.1881
82. O. 25.9.1880
83. CSC/I/963/1881
84. S.A. Statutes 215/1881
85. L.C. 6.10.; 13.10.1881; O. 15.10.1881.
86. CSC/I/2240/1881; O. 10.12.1881.
87. GD/O/24/1877
88. CSC/I/1034/82
89. CSC/I/201/1886
90. O. 22.8.1885
91. CSC/I/1817/1882
92. S.A. Statutes 261/1882
93. H.A. 7.9.1882
94. *Ibid.*
95. CSC/I/201/1886
96. O. 3.4.; 10.4.1886
97. CSC/I/201/1886
98. O. 8.5.1886
99. PP 95/1886
100. *D.C. Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence 1870-1914* Baltimore, 1965, pp.41-42.
101. S.A. Statutes 390/1886; GG 31.3.1886.
102. H.A. 26.10.1887
103. PP 112/1887
104. *Ibid.*
105. CSC/I/40/1887; CSC/O/25/1888.
106. L.C. 26.6.1888
107. O. 28.8.1874
108. O. 28.11.1874 L
109. H.A. 3.9.; 22.10.1884
110. H.A. 9.6.1879
111. R. 4.5.1885
112. O. 18.4.1885 L
113. * D.M. Horner, *Prince Alfred College Cadet Unit*, Adelaide, 1964.
114. H.A. 3.9.; 22.10.1889
115. CSC/O/286; O. 20.12.1879
116. O. 11.8.1866
117. O. 26.5.1900
118. CSC/I/941, 1016/1866; S.A. Arch. Newspaper Cuttings Vol. 1, p.225.
119. R. 3.8.; 4.8.1866
120. O. 11.8.1866

121. O. 3.2.; 10.2.; 24.2.; 3.3.; 17.3.; 24.3.; 7.4.; 2.6.; 16.6.1900
122. O. 18.8.1900
123. O. 22.12.; 29.12.1900
124. S.A. Statutes 500/1890
125. H.A. 9.12.1890
126. O. 20.1.; 24.3.; 31.4.; 14.4.1894
127. O. 17.10.1863
128. O. 11.8.1866
129. O. 4.2.1860
130. O. 16.4.1869
131. O. 21.3.1868
132. *Ibid.*
133. *Ibid.*
134. O. 30.4.1883; O. 23.4.1885
135. O. 23.4.1864
136. O. 25.11.1889; 9.11.1893; 19.11.1898; 18.11.1899
137. O. 2.12.1893; 6.1.1894
138. O. 6.2.1869; 16.5.1896
139. O. 27.8.1881; 14.4.1883; 22.9.1900
140. O. 28.4.1883; R. 24.4.1883
141. O. 9.7.1861
142. O. 6.6.1885
143. R. Gollan, *Radical and Working Class Politics . . .* Melbourne 1960 pp. 196-201
144. J.M. Gordon, *The Chronicles of a Gay Gordon*, London 1921, p.217
145. S.A. Statutes 643/1895
146. R. 28.12.1895

'An Entente . . . Most Remarkable': Indians at Anzac

Peter Stanley

At noon on 24 April 1915 the transport *Pera* steamed out of Mudros harbour for the rendezvous off the Gallipoli peninsula in readiness for the Landing at dawn the next day. As the *Pera* was among the first ships to sail, she passed through the fleet bearing the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, past crowded transports filled with cheering soldiers of five armies. Aboard the *Pera*, Major A.C. Fergusson of the Indian Mountain Artillery found the scene

> *most thrilling with all the troops cheering, but it was sad to think that for many . . . it would be their last cheer.*

Major Fergusson survived the campaign, and in 1916 wrote a reminiscence of it. That manuscript was donated to the Library of the Australian War Memorial in 1969, and now forms part of the Memorial's Donated Records Collection. It has been used as the basis of this article by kind permission of Major Fergusson's son, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Fergusson, who himself later served in his father's battery.

Major Fergusson's 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery was the senior of the twelve batteries of the Indian Mountain Artillery, the only Indian artillery allowed after the great Mutiny of 1857. It was raised in 1851 from disbanded horse artillerymen of the Rajah Dulip Singh, the last independent Sikh ruler. As part of the Punjab Irregular Force, Kohat battery served on the North-West Frontier of India, at Peiwar Kotal in the Second Afghan War and in the Tirah expedition of 1897.

In 1915 the battery consisted of Major Fergusson, three British Lieutenants, a doctor, half-a-dozen Indian officers and 322 Sikh and Punjabi Muslim gunners. It was equipped with six ten-pounder mountain guns, each carried by five mules, broken down into loads of about 280 lbs. Over 200 further mules carried ammunition, stores and equipment. Along with 26th (Jacob's) Mountain Battery, the 21st formed the 7th Indian Mountain Brigade, and was assigned to supplement the artillery of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in the coming campaign.

While waiting in Mudros harbour the men of the battery had become acquainted with Australians and New Zealanders on neighbouring ships who had visited the *Pera* "to look at the Indians",

and had begun "an entente which afterwards became most remarkable". Their friendship was to grow during the next six months on the Peninsula.

On the morning of the 25th, Major Fergusson woke at four a.m., forced himself to sleep until six, and then rose to see:

> *a wonderful sight, the whole sea full of ships with picquet boats, towing barges and every type of boat everywhere.*

Like the rest of the campaign, however, the landing was bungled. Kohat Battery was supposed to have been towed to the beach at 8 a.m., but "the day wore on", and no tows appeared. The men of the battery were interested spectators of the fight on the ridges above the beach. Major Fergusson was "continually trying to make officers and men sit down, so as not to start dead tired", but they were excited and "ate hugely" all day.

Around four that afternoon the gunners disembarked into lighters. The sea rose, far more roughly than the smooth waters off Mudros in which they had trained, and they sat waiting for a further two hours. Finally, ten hours after their expected time of landing, the Major resourcefully "persuaded" a passing boat to tow them into Anzac Cove. As they neared the shore the lighters came under fire. Fergusson felt "more helpless than at any other time during the war", but arrived safely to find the beach "a shambles" of dead, dazed and wounded Anzacs.

Instead of driving inland and seizing the Narrows across the Peninsula, the Australians and New Zealanders had been forced to dig in a few thousand metres from the beach. Major Fergusson was convinced that had the Indian mountain guns been landed on schedule they could have considerably assisted the 2nd and 3rd Australian Brigades assaulting the cliffs at Anzac. The first day's failure, however, was also due to the inexperience and indiscipline of the volunteer troops. Major Fergusson found them

> *out in little parties doing V.C. stunts . . . if the men had stuck to their officers I don't think there would have been so much retiring.*

Commanders were at first as confused as their men; when Fergusson sought out Brigadier General McLagan, requesting targets for his guns, the General vaguely waved his arm in a semi-circle, replying "anywhere round there". Later the battery fired in support of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions



Sketch-map illustrating the Anzac area April-December 1915.

advance on the Chessboard, managing to bring four guns into action despite difficulties of terrain and direction. The Australians were "very polite about our assistance that day, as always", the Major remembered.

In the weeks following the Landing 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery settled down to life on the rugged ridges above Anzac Cove. Battery Headquarters was located at 'Pifferpore' (from *P*unjab *I*rregular *F*rontier *F*orce) in Shrapnel Valley. The Major adopted a regular daily round, rising before sunrise and bathing in the sea "before Johnny Turk woke up" and shelled the beach. He then ate Chota Hazri, or "little breakfast' and inspected the mule lines and any drafts that may have arrived before breakfast proper. Lunch came after an arduous tour of his scattered gun sections, followed by a visit to the cluttered Cove to collect stores. In the evening he visited Brigade and Corps Headquarters to collect orders and information "and so to dinner and bed quite pleasantly tired".

The three section commanders, Thom, Trenchard and Rawson lived a rather more strenuous, if more sedentary, life. Each was responsible for a section of two guns and their observers, firing in support of the infantry manning trenches often

only yards from the Turkish line, and often under counter-battery fire from enemy guns. None of the young Lieutenants was able to be relieved, and by the end of their first month on Gallipoli Rawson and Thom had become "seedy", especially after their exertions during the Turkish attack of 19 May. Major Fergusson described it as "our worst day on the Peninsula".

Kohat Battery's worst day began for the Major at four a.m., as he inspected his section commanders' observation posts, progressing in "a series of dashes from one funk pit to another". The disastrous Turkish attacks were destroyed by rifle-fire from the front-line trenches, but the battery was heavily engaged all day, firing over six hundred rounds. The demand for ammunition called for steady courage from the mule drivers. They sat by the Senior Havildar's telephone awaiting their turn to lead ammuniton mules from Pifferpore to the gun pits. At his call for "Three mule-loads of ammunition for Right Section" the next drivers would start up the gully. Leading mules was hazardous work; they did not take cover under fire.

At the gun positions the sections came under heavy fire; one of the ten-pounders was found to have received four direct hits and over fifty shrapnel bullets. The gunners displayed the devotion to duty for which the old Indian Army was renowned. Karm Singh was posted in a communication trench between an observation post and a gun firing at Turkish batteries at Gaba Tepe. He was seen to hold a hand over his eyes. "Bilkul Iqrah, Sahib", he protested, "I am quite fit. I am quite able to pass messages". Later it was found that a shrapnel ball had passed through his eyes. At the dressing station, when asking the doctor whether he would regain his sight and receiving an optimistic evasion in reply, he said "It is nothing. Have I not eaten your salt?"

"Altogether", thought Major Fergusson. *"if the battery had never done another good thing they earned my eternal gratitude for their work this day".*

June and July were quiet. The wildflowers of spring faded, to be replaced by the flies and heat of the terrible summer of 1915, and the gunners tackled the problems of firing at the Turks beyond the trenches across the ridges. Their greatest problem was that "Gallipoli was pre-eminently a Howitzer country", and the Indian Army, despite years of warfare on the Frontier, possessed no mountain howitzers. To compensate for this they often used star-shell charges and improvised range tables, or ran the guns up onto the parapets of the gun pits, exposing the crews to sniper fire and Turkish artillery observers. As a result, they usually did so around two p.m., when the Turks were more likely to be taking their afternoon sleep.

The ten-pounder was not an ideal weapon. It had no recoil mechanism, necessitating relaying after every shot and its shrapnel shells broke-up at the wrong time, a fact known for eighteen years, though still unremedied. Worst of all, the vents in the breech blocks eroded with wear. Fergusson recalled how one evening

a very keen, fire eating Lance Naik, Prem Singh, dashed into the mess, chucked a breech block on the table and said what being broadly translated was "What the devil is the use of supplying things like this, the other gun is getting off many more rounds than us because all our breech blocks are bad".

Even with inadequate equipment the battery supported the Australians with skill and courage. On 21 June, for example, Lieutenant Thom, dug into a tunnel at Courtney's Post, was shelled by Turkish artillery. Thom unmasked his gun and fought a duel with his opponents, eventually silencing them. In the futile manner characteristic of the campaign, the Turkish guns later returned to their position. Under such difficult conditions and the strain of a continuous battle, it was not surprising that mistakes occurred; a week after Thom's action the 5th Light Horse found themselves under fire from the Indian gunners.

Sharing the hollow in Shrapnel Gully near Pifferpore was a section of the Indian Combined Field Hospital under Captain Carey Evans. Evan's bearers and orderlies maintained an affectionate rapport with the Australians in the Gully. Coming from a country where public health was part of the daily round, Captain Evans was able to teach the Australian doctors how clean and hygenic trenches could be kept. "Australians came to Evans in preference to their own hospitals", remembered Major Fergusson,

especially with stomach troubles, and our men used to feed them on dahl and chappatties when their insides refused bully beef.

A special link grew between the Indian Hospital and an Australian stretcher bearer who "attached himself to us permanently . . . We called him

Indian Mountain Gunners and Anzacs on Gallipoli. **AWM A4007.**

Murphy" from the name he gave his donkeys. 'Murphy' brought badly wounded men into the dressing station on his donkeys and

> *led a charmed life . . . until May 19 when he was killed and we found out his name was Simpson.*

The men of Kohat Battery "treasured his last donkey and evacuated it safely . . . with a view to presenting it to Australia with a short history of Simpson", but the donkey was stolen from the mule lines on Mudros.

Relations between the Indian mountain gunners and the Australians amongst whom they served were particularly cordial. The "entente" which began aboard the *Pera* in Mudros harbour flourished. Australians

> *were always hanging around chatting to our fellows, though how they communicated was a marvel.*

The loitering diggers were a nuisance at times, "sitting in the open when the guns were firing and giving the show away". Major Fergusson, relating the courtesy each accorded the other, wrote:

> *I never realised before what perfect nature's gentlemen the Sepoys were . . . I have many a time seen a driver who I know to have been up all night start off again up the hill to show an Australian the way to his unit.*

Anzacs "treated our men absolutely as equals", he wrote, citing the example of Lance Naik Satar Mohd, who supervised a well near Pifferpore. Fergusson put his own men on a ration and instructed Mohd to issue an allowance to the Australians who queued for the water in a nearby communications trench under his direction. Mohd performed this duty, in full view of the Turks, for three months with "never a complaint of an Anzac . . . not doing as he was told, and yet people say the Australians have no discipline".

Each night the Indian drivers went out leading mule-loads of water or stores for the front and only once did Fergusson hear of an Indian being ill-treated, and only then by a man who had drunk too much.

Though Fergusson was told by an Australian from Quinn's Post that they could not have stopped there without the Indian mountain guns, some Anzacs remained suspicious of the battery's professional ability. Fragments of shells filled in British India were found in the Australian trenches. It was found that they had been fired from behind Turkish lines, though no guns had been lost to the enemy at Helles, or Anzac. Much later it was discovered that the New Zealand government had bought some ten-pounder guns before the war, but finding them unsatisfactory had sold them to Turkey, where they were used against New Zealanders.

August saw the last Allied attempt to reach the Narrows. The landing at Suvla, combined with feints by the garrison of Anzac at Lone Pine and the Nek and an attack on the Sari Bair ridge should have brought victory. Each attack faltered amid indecision, poor planning and futile heroism. Lieutenant Thom took four guns of the battery in support of the New Zealanders and the Kitchener men of the British 13th Division attempting to take Chunuck Bair. Thom's men fired over six hundred rounds before the column was forced to withdraw, leaving the bodies of the New Zealanders and New Army men to mark the end of any chance of success on the Peninsula.

By the end of August the battery was distributed across the Anzac-Suvla boundary, and settled down to a chilly, if uneventful, autumn. Major Fergusson prudently had his Indian officers see that the men's dugouts were water-proofed. Right Section especially became a by-word for comfort

and a thorn in the flesh for all Anzacs as Birdie made them all go and see what could be done.

Phumman Singh, "a real bad hat" became invaluable as "Chief acquirer of stolen goods and chattels", and worked up two great-coats and four blankets per man, all from captured material. He also constructed a tunnel drying-room through which each man had to pass, inspected by the Havildar Major, before being allowed to sleep.

Battery Headquarters was turned into "a regular rabbit warren" of heated dug-outs and storage tunnels for firewood and rations. Brigade Havildar Major Amas Singh constructed an underground bathing room. Major Fergusson passed by this ingenious room during a cold snap and saw

a crowd waiting their turn to go in . . . They said . . . they would not miss their weekly bath for anything.

Thanks to their drying arrangements, 7th Indian Mountain Brigade (now commanded by Fergusson) lost no men at all from the bitter Gallipoli winter.

In November, with the failure of the campaign apparent, despite the Indian's victory over the weather, the Allies on the Peninsula began to "train the Turks to be evacuated". For hours, and even days at a time, the Allied troops refused to fire. During these quiet spells "many Australians . . . came over to see their old pals of the early days". The battery now supported the Territorials of the British 54th (East Anglian) Division, north of Sari Bair.

Orders for the actual evacuation reached the Brigade in the first week of December. On the 15th Centre Section withdrew, along with the Hospital, one of whose bearers, Rangaswammy, refused to leave. He had been acting as Fergusson's cook, and was convinced that the Major would die of hunger without him. By the 16th all that remained were four guns, thirty six men and eight mules. The finish came on the night of the 19th, and went so smoothly that the Major described it as "just like going to Waterloo to catch the last train", though the mules were almost destroyed on the beach, and were saved only through Birdwood's intervention. In the event, the only loss suffered was the destruction of eight hundred shells to prevent their capture, and the loss of an officer's shaving kit and a Sepoy's bedding. Fergusson nonchalantly "strolled" down to the beach, "found my little lot . . . and asked which was the 11 p.m. boat". The next day, aboard the *Falaba* at Mudros he enjoyed "a good wash and the first civilized meal bar one for eight months".

21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery had been constantly in action for 283 days, and under fire all the time, suffering eleven men killed and 134 men wounded. At least up to the Second World War the battery maintained the link forged with Australia at Anzac Cove by sending a memorial telegram to Australia each Anzac Day.

I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Fergusson for allowing me to use his father's memoirs as the basis for this article.

Victoria Barracks, Paddington, Part Two

Maurice Austin

The first actual use of Victoria Barracks occurred on 1 November 1846 when divine worship was celebrated in a large room which the Bishop of Sydney had been given permission to use temporarily, pending the erection of a church in the neighbourhood. Two years later both Wynyard and the Bishop were agreed that suitable, convenient accommodation should be provided for troops to attend divine service. The Bishop proposed that the church planned for Surry Hills be enlarged by a third, at a cost to Treasury of £500 thereby providing for an enlarged congregation of 300. At the same time he pointed out the advantages which would accrue if the office of military chaplain and parish minister were united in the one person. The timing of the proposal was perhaps unfortunate since Earl Grey was busy reducing the establishment and suggesting a new system of reliefs for the Australian colonies. The idea was deferred at the time and does not seem to have been revived.

Convict labour continued to give spasmodic trouble. In February 1847 those employed on the site returned more, or less intoxicated to the Hyde Park Barracks, which the *Herald* intimated was far from an uncommon occurrence. It subsequently appeared that the CRE had ordered a party down to Dawes' Point for work on the battery. Rain came on and some of the party were put under shelter, where they were able to purchase liquor from one of the boats' crew, out of the two to three shillings which they earned each week under the task system. On return to their barracks these convicts refused duty, and threatened to strike anyone who came near them. The gates were closed; Major Innes and the police sent for; the ringleaders were secured and marched to the Wooloomooloo Gaol. Fortunately for them, Innes did not want to press the charges harshly, so eight were sentenced only to bread and water in cells for eight days, one for three days, and one was forgiven. (30)

Steady progress on the work had been maintained during 1846 and 1847 as the following percentages of completion for those years shows: (31)

	1846	1847
Officers quarters	83	96
Barrack master's quarters	50	92
Soldiers' quarters	66	93
Hospital and Kitchen	66	96
Canteen	75	83
Guard room	100	100
Cooking houses	96	92
Workshops	14	83
Barrack stores	8	92
Boundary	10	100

In January 1848 another constable was appointed for the district, although the *Herald* pointed out that this was a poor addition unless a place to secure delinquents was provided closer than the City Watchhouse nearly two miles away. the *Herald*, never a great admirer of the city police, was actively campaigning for an improvement in their efficiency. A pound was badly needed – goats, cattle and horses were being mischievously let into private grounds to forage what they could, and this was only one of the many evils in the suburbs which police, except for robbery and murder, considered beyond the pale of the law. (32)

In the same month new prison accommodation for the Barracks was approved at a cost of £1000. Recent research has shown what appears to be an anomaly in the numbering of the cells from 8 to 32, raising the question as to the disposal of cells numbered from 1 to 7. (33)

There had been cells for the reception of the Sydney Garrison for many years, but it was not until the 1840s that these became subject to

scrutiny and brought under the new Barrack Cell Regulations. In October 1845 a Board of Survey, consisting of the CRE and the Major of Brigade, was appointed to select the six best adapted to meet the approved specifications. The Board, however, only found five in the rear of Treasury acceptable, and these were handed over by the Barrack Master to the Provost Sergeant, Lance Sergeant James Hill of the 99th at noon on 14 October. Four years later the Barracks prison was brought under the same Regulations; the Visitors and Prison Staff and the appointment of the chaplain, the Reverend George Fairfowl MacArthur were discontinued, and John Callaghan appointed Provost Sergeant. It is not unlikely, therefore, that all the cells in Sydney were consecutively numbered – 1 to 5 behind the Treasury, 6 and 7 in the old Guard House in George Street and the remainder – numbers 8 to 32, in the new Barrack prison. Certainly the cells in the present Guard House are not involved as the estimate for their construction was not even submitted until March 1849. (34)

The most noteworthy early inmate of the Barracks prison was James Moore of the 11th. In December 1848, he had been convicted of 'desertion' and 'loss of necessaries,' and sentenced to be branded 'D' and to serve four months hard labour, and two months solitary confinement. In March 1850 he was again absent, and awarded a similar sentence. Six days later he threw brushes at the Provost Sergeant and awarded fifty lashes and twelve months hard labour. At the end of March he again threw brushes at Callaghan, using threatening language. This time a General Court Martial gave him plenty of time to consider his fate – twenty-one years transportation, to commence at the expiry of his current sentence. (35)

By April 1848 Victoria Barracks was close to completion and tidying up began. From 7 April a subaltern and fifty men from the 99th were ordered to the Barracks for work each day except Thursday, under the orders of the CRE. This party was discontinued in June, but in July a corporal and six men were ordered to mount guard daily, from sunset to 8 a.m. for the protection of stores, which was converted to a twenty-four hour guard the following day. To this extent the 99th can claim to have been the first occupants of the Barracks. On Saturday, 22 July 1848 the advanced party of the 11th from Hobart marched into the Barracks, which 'may now be said to have been taken possession of'. A few days later surplus construction tools and stores were auctioned. The main body of the 11th arrived on 5 August and marched into their new home, which although lit externally by oil lamps, would not have a canteen in operation until the following October. Meanwhile on 6 September, with the exception of certain quarters, the George Street Barracks were available to hand over to the Colonial Architect. For the moment the Police took possession, more than grateful for the cheaper rent for the married men, and a location in the heart of Sydney. (36)

The 11th was perhaps not overimpressed with Victoria Barracks which it was claimed was occupied six months too soon, 'the interior being unfinished and ill-fitted'. However, the soldiers' barracks appear to have been acceptable, 'the rooms, to contain about twenty beds in each, are lofty and well ventilated; a broad verandah, both above and below, extends along the whole length of the front'. On the other hand the officers' quarters were subjected to severe criticism –

In the centre is the mess room, with two field-officers' quarters over it. Each wing contains another field-officer's quarter, with eighteen others for the inferior grades, at the liberal allowance of one room for each officer.

The army owes a deep debt of gratitude to those considerate beings who have ruled, that in a Sydney climate a single room is a suitable habitation for the veteran captain of twenty-five years' service, with his wife and such a quota of children as it may please Providence to bless him withal!

To these forty quarters there are attached, or detached, ten kitchens. After appropriating four of these for the field-officers, there remain six kitchens for thirty-six officers, or one sixth of a building sixteen feet by ten, for the above-mentioned captain's roasting, boiling, frying, and broiling, with sundry other performances too many to be enumerated.

. . . the presiding engineer genius has taken an alarming flight of liberality, and to the ordinary distinctive features of the superior quarters, have added the pomp and luxury of a house bell and door scraper. Not having personally made the experiment, nor even seen it ever tried, I cannot vouch whether any sound will respond to a vigorous application to the bell-pull; but the bona fide character of the scraper is self-evident. Lest, However, the sight of this unwonted luxury should excite the cupidity of



Development on the site of the Old Barracks in George Street. Source: WO 44/182, National Library, Canberra.

less favoured neighbours, the strip of iron of which it is composed is firmly mortised into the wall, and may bid defiance to the efforts of graceless abstractors of sign posts, knockers and other such tempting emblems.

A good racket court and the canteen are perhaps the most attractive features of the barrack enclosure, and we may sum up the list of buildings with the Barrack-Master's quarter, which, though last in place, is here first in importance. To a military reader it is superfluous to observe that this would necessarily be a splendid mansion; by comparison with the Field Officers' quarter it would be suitable for a General Officer. Even the servants' rooms in it are superior to those allotted to the captain on the opposite side of the square. There we find every convenience that could be desired – kitchen, scullery, larder, baker's room, laundry, stabling etc, etc, the site and prospect also being the best in barracks. All this is very consistent – with Ordnance modesty and self-denial. (37)

Mention has already been made of sand accumulating on the Old South Head Road which must have been a considerable nuisance to passers-by. Conditions inside Victoria Barracks were, however, worse, and every attempt to abate its effects were unsuccessful. The 'painful glare from the dazzling white mass' close by the north-west wall continued, with the drift defying 'every precaution to exclude it from the innermost recesses of the quarters', while as far as the Colonial Office was concerned 'the expediency of purchasing the ground in question' was a matter for the Colonial Government to decide.

John Pattison agreed that:

The military barracks are good, but placed in a most unhappy situation, being environed on all sides by sand hills, which has caused opthalmia to prevail to an alarming extent among the soldiers; so much so that the commander of the forces, General Wynyard, has had serious thoughts of moving the troops to the Sydney barracks in George Street. (38)

In June 1849 the Respective Officers applied for a deed of grant, at the same time requesting the inclusion of 600 feet 'from the walls, wherein this may be practicable for the purpose of establishing a good effective range for musketry practice'. The request was refused on the grounds that the application was too late – the streets

were already laid out. The deed was granted for the original area on 31 July 1850. (39)

By November serious complaints were being made by local residents at the annoyances to which they were subjected by troop misconduct. An equestrian had been chased by two soldiers; an attempt to rob a woman was frustrated by the military pursuer stumbling, and most serious of all, a labouring man was brutally assaulted and left for dead, presumably by soldiers, since three 'were seen running in a direction from the place'. 'The presence of the police may as well be abandoned if only two constables are to be provided under the disadvantage of no lock up within two miles'. If the soldiers were involved their activities were certainly assisted by the Barracks' wall which had 'ample facilities at the angles and elsewhere for 'fast men' to indulge their propensity for breaking out of barracks, by escalade, or breaking in by the same means if too late for tattoo'. Apart from this the soldiers were 'allowed to be out at all hours of the night'. While the latter statement may be somewhat of an exaggeration, the ease with which the wall could be climbed probably explains why fifty five percent of all District Courts Martial to the end of 1849 for the 11th involved the charge of desertion. These complaints died down during 1850, perhaps because the thieves moved further afield. In June 1850 a clock was stolen from Government House and later found under some sand 'within the barrack walls'. Consequently it was now 'for the military authorities to act in the matter according to the rules of the service'. If the thief was a soldier he seems to have avoided detection since no charges for theft came before Courts Martial during the next six months. (40)

In August 1849 Ordnance raised the question of barrack repairs amounting to some £750 with the Colonial Office. If left to their decision the parade ground would have been levelled, although other items would have been reduced to 'somewhat smaller amounts'. Grey directed that the barracks were to be in complete repair before being handed over. The question of repairs again arose in September 1850 when objections were raised to the Estimates in the Legislative Council. The small number of troops was entirely inadequate for internal and external defence and only present for imperial purposes to guard British prisoners. Why keep the barracks in repair when there were no troops to fill them, and they could be resumed anyway? There was no threat of foreign aggression, and no threat to life or property – borne out by the recent meeting at the Circular Quay, and lack of disturbance at the previous elections. To which it was replied that it was no fault of the almost seditious nature of press articles, and mob orators that New South Wales had not ceased to be a British colony. Reforms were certainly required, but had to be brought about constitutionally rather than plunging into anarchy. Until Yeomanry or a national guard was raised regular troops were required, and if the Barracks were not repaired the troops would be withdrawn. The estimates were passed by a margin of fourteen votes to four.

A month later the 11th did not even have to climb the wall if they wished to desert. A portion of it 'succumbed to the tempest' of 22 inches of rain in twenty four hours. (41)

By the end of 1850 some notable 'firsts' had been established by the 11th in the Barracks. In August 1848 John Robinson came before the first District Court Martial and received four months hard labour and two months solitary confinement for striking a corporal. The following month the first General Court Martial was held on similar charges and W. Symons was sentenced to fifty lashes (remitted to fourteen days hard labour) and six months hard labour. In the British Army the use of the lash was gradually disappearing at this time and it was not at all uncommon in the Australian Colonies for sentences involving corporal punishment to be remitted to additional hard labour. Nevertheless this did not prevent the 'triangle' being erected in January 1849 for the first time to deal with James Gill who was also charged with striking his superior officer and being an habitual drunkard, and sentenced to fifty lashes and two months hard labour. (42)

It was not until the end of 1849 that a General Court Martial dealt with an officer, when Lieutenant Charles Philip O'Connell of the 65th was given a Severe Reprimand and ordered to make good £21/3/3 on charges of Embezzlement, and Disobedience of Orders. Harsh as the other rank sentences may appear to modern eyes it was a far cry to John Carr of the New South Wales Corps, who in September 1804 had been sentenced in the George Street Barracks to 1000 lashes and seven years transportation for mutinous conduct. Or for that matter to William Yerns of the 3rd who had deserted in Sydney 'with his arms etc' in February 1825, and had been sentenced to be shot to death, although this

sentence had been commuted to transportation for life. (43)

In happier vein Major Singleton's wife bore a son on Christmas Eve 1849, and even though she and Mrs O'Grady may well have been 'sisters under the skin', Singleton junior may not have been the first baby born in the Barracks, as the offspring of other ranks were highly unlikely to have been reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald.* In July the following year the commander and his officers held a regimental ball at which His Excellency, the Governor General, and 400 of the elite of Sydney were expected to attend an event of 'unusual splendour'. (44)

The arrival in Sydney of the new commander, Major General (Sir) Robert Nickle in July 1853 was hardly propitious. As he was unwell there was no public display, and he proceeded from the ship direct to the Brigade Major's Office to assume his new command. Between 7 and 8 pm that evening Victoria Barracks had its first murder. Sergeant Pearson, of the 11th, said to be an ex-commissioned officer, 'of gentlemanly bearing, and most inoffensive in his conduct', was quietly reading when Private Crowley, also of the 11th, a regular church-goer, and 'generally of gloomy appearance', took down his firelock and deliberately shot him. Private McCarthy saw the shot fired, and ran to the corner of the room to protect his children. Crowley disappeared, but was apprehended two days later at Canterbury, and lodged in Darlinghurst Prison. Crowley never came to trial. Some weeks later he committed suicide one Sunday by cutting his throat with a sharpened piece of hoop iron in an unfinished water closet in Darlinghurst Prison.

Death from quite other causes occurred in August 1854, when Michael Walsh of the 11th disappeared. He was found ten days later in a pond sixteen feet deep at the rear of the Barracks by Mary Ann Benson. The ball and number plate of his shako were missing. As colour Sergeant Edwards testified – Walsh was intemperate and he had no doubt that death had occurred trying to get into the back of the Barracks after the usual hour. (45)

Perhaps the last finishing touch to Victoria Barracks was the provision for a "large clock' in the Supplementary Estimates for 1853 at an estimated cost of £150, which could only be a considerable improvement on previous arrangements.

In 1840 the *Sydney Herald* suggested that an evening gun be fired at five minutes and one second after 10 pm to notify Greenwich Mean Time from Fort Macquarie (now the Sydney Opera House) so that chronometers could be set, and a colonial curfew notified. There would also be additional advantages – the low cost of 365 charges of gunpowder, independent of the cost of the 'regulator'; the troops located in the Fort would be exercised; the guns would not deteriorate through unemployment and the flash could probably be seen as far distant as the 'South Head Pharos'.

This idea does not seem to have been adopted, although six years later

> *on the dial in the Barrack Yard in front of the Commissariat Office a small gun has been placed over the touch hole of which a lens has been placed by which the rays of the sun at its meridian are collected at its focus when the priming is ignited and the gun discharged. The inhabitants of George Street are thus reminded of the time, and are enabled to regulate their clocks and watches with perfect precision.*

The same idea was adopted four years later in Paris although there is no record that the English comment was adopted from the inhabitants of George Street. (46)

'No sun, no gun'.

Notes

30. 12, 15-2-47 SMH.
31. Adapted from CO 206/88 and 89.
32. 20, 21-1-48 Col Sec/CRE 48/7, 48/290 NSWA 4/3803; 26-1-48 SMH.
33. *Triad* No.4 p.14 – 'Conserving a wealthy heritage'; Lt Col L.B. Swifte.
34. 3-12-49 WO 17/2334 R919; 8, 13-10-45 General Orders (GO) NSW 177, 180 R1074 F142; 16-5-49, 16-8-49, 17-8-49 WO correspondence WO17/2333, 2334 R919; Greville *op cit* p.19.
35. WO 86/6 R2719; WO 90/2,3 R2724.
36. 3-4-48, 24-6-48, 9, 12-7-48 GO NSW R1074 F280, 292, 298; 1, 24-7-48, 1, 7, 21-8-48, 9-9-48 SMH; *Blue Book* NSW 1848 CO 206/90 R1175; 6-9-48 Col Sec/CRE 48/157, 48/970 NSWA 4/3803; some months later their mounted colleagues moved to the Carters Barracks at the southern end of Pitt St 3-5-49 SMH.
37. Colburn 51-1-511.
38. Colburn *ibid.*; 21-11-49 CO/Ord WO 1/521 R899 F515; *New South Wales, its past, present and future condition etc*, John Pattison, Edinburgh 1849.

39. The boundary of the Barracks had been moved earlier, Greville *op. cit.* p.13; 1-8-49 Col Sec/Respective Officers 49/12, 49/6017 NSWA 4/3803.
40. WO 86/6 R2718; 14-11-49; 18-6-50 SMH.
41. 21-11-49 CO/Ord WO 1/521 R899 F555; 13-9-50 SMH; 17-10-50 SMH; the 'recent meeting at Circular Quay' refers to the arrival of the *Hashemy* in June 1849.
42. WO 86/6 R2718.
43. WO 90/1 R2723.
44. 27-12-49, 18-7-50 SMH.
45. 26, 28-7-53, 1, 5-8-53, 24-9-53, 7-9-54 SMH.
46. 11-5-40 SH (Supp); 1-5-46 SMH; 'Greenwich and Standard Time', Alan G. Davies, *History Today*, Mar. 1978, p.199; the time problem for the city of Sydney was overcome in May 1852 by combining the functions of Meteorological Observer and the operation of a Time Ball from Fort Phillip – 9-9-52 VPLCNSW 52-2-1351.

The Battles on the Tugela

A personal view by a Tasmanian with Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry.

Athol Chaffey

The opening battles on the River Tugela and the Heights beyond, by the Natal Field Force, were a mixture of indecision by the officers commanding the army on one hand, and resolute service by the troop engaged, on the other. The whole grueling affair culminated with the battle of Spion Kop.

Private Hawson was a Tasmanian serving with Thorneycroft's Mounted infantry and took part in the various battles on the Tugela, being wounded at Spion Kop.

Harold Hawson was born in Hobart, Tasmania, on 20 July 1874, son of Edward Hawson, accountant.

Hawson was in South Africa engaged in commercial pursuits on behalf of a local company when war with the Boer Republics broke out. He enlisted in Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry at Maritzburg, on 20 October 1899.

His letters to his father, published in the *Mercury* newspaper, tell of his brief but eventful military service.

"Chieveley Camp, December 17, 1899.

Firstly, I am in excellent health, in every way getting along first-rate, as well as the circumstances of this rough life permit. Since my last we have had a very big battle, which has proved very disasterous [sic] to our arms as well as to the Boers. Last Friday, December 15 (only two days ago, and yet it seems an age), the battle near Colenso was fought out, and it will be remembered in history as one of the biggest engagements of recent years. The Boers occupied, and are still occupying, an impregnable position on the high kopjes immediately above Colenso, where they had their heavy guns in position, and also excellent cover for themselves. Our attack was made on open country, and almost without any cover whatever.

"At 2 a.m. we received orders to saddle-up, each man doing so with a certain amount of peculiar anxiety as to whether he would be present when the next roll-call would be called. At 2.30 we moved off as quietly as possible – the cavalry, in all, numbered about 3,000. It was a magnificent spectacle, I can assure you – (as I write the big naval guns are thundering away at the Boers, with good effect I expect). After galloping over five miles of rough veldt in support of our artillery, we at length got our position taken up – Thornycroft's being on the extreme right, our place throughout the campaign, and it proved a very hot corner in this battle. At last comes the order to dismount. Number three in every four men being told off to hold the horses. We then advanced down a very steep donga or creek for a few miles, then waited for the start; this was not long in coming, and then from either side came such a fusilade of fire that one hardly knew where he was. Our object was to prevent the enemy coming towards and on to our main body; and this we suc-

ceeded in doing, but at terrible loss of life; out of our little band of scarsely [sic] 400, we had 42 killed and wounded. The Boers, of course, as usual, were hard to locate, as they had such excellent cover; our poor beggers had none. To say that the bullets rained on us is as near as I can describe it to you; they came thick and fast, with the usual Ping! pang! ping! One couldn't stir without seeing some poor fellow hit. Our officers behaved splendidly, and have earned the admiration of every man. We had no artillery to support us – some mistake somewhere, and the wonder is that so many of us came out alive. Of course I had some narrow shaves, but, thank God I was not even injured. At last the firing got too hot for us, and we got the order to retire, but in order to regain our horses we had to cross an open ploughed field. Here it was that we got such a high death rate. One poor chap was running along by my side, and suddenly I saw him throw his hands up and say, "Oh! My God! I am hit;" and he had received his death blow. Another man was hit in seven places. For about fifteen minutes we were exposed to as heavy a rifle fire as ever could be. It was pitiable to see the poor fellows reeling over; but we had to move on, and at last, completely knocked out, we reached the donga, and quickly got behind the bank. Then the bullets came whistling over near our heads, some of our horses being killed, but ourselves for the time being practically safe. I just lay down, and did not seem to care whether I was shot or not. Our thirst was unquenchable, and we still had about a mile and a half to go before we could reach our own water cart. Somehow we got there, and the water, though brackish, seemed like heaven itself.

"The fight lasted eight or nine hours, and, so far, was the stiffest struggle of the campaign. We had with us part of the imperial Light Horse, Royal Horse Dragoons, Carabineers, and several other mounted regiments. Of course, this is only a description of our part of the battle. Our artillery suffered very much, nearly every man, including officers, being shot out of his saddle. Some 200 Dublin Fusiliers were shot; still, they must have shot a large number of Boers before they went under. The Boer trenches were admirably constructed, some being 30ft to 40ft deep (?), but it was here that our lyddite shells did fearful damage, simply destroying the Boers wholesale. In order to get near these trenches our infantry had to cross the River Tugela across which the Boers had fastened layers of barbed wire, and it is said about 40 Dubliners were drowned in crossing. Our loss is estimated between 300 and 400 killed, and 800 wounded. The Boer loss must be near 2,000; it cannot be less. Whether it was a victory or not for us no-one seems to know. I am inclined to think not, as we have had to evacuate our former position, and have pitched camp here, about two miles further back, out of range of the Boer big guns. We had altogether from 15,000 to 16,000 troops engaged, and it was a terrible and awful conflict. If I live to come through I can never forget it.

"How we are going to get over these hills I do not know, as the Boers are in a perfect entrenched and impregnable position, and must have first class German or other officers directing and leading them, as they are fighting in such a systematic and strategic manner that it seems almost an impossibility to get them out of it. The big guns are booming away this morning, and I expect we shall be making a night attack. The weather is suffocating; I really could never have believed it could be so hot and depressing. Water is very scarce, and not good; otherwise we are doing alright. We hope to relieve Ladysmith in the next two weeks or so, but we must look forward to a stiff time of it. We are going to get there all the same. It is one of the biggest jobs ever undertaken by a military expedition.

"Our cause is a just one, and we need all your prayers and sympathies."

'Wynberg Hospital, Capetown, 8 February 1900:'

"At last I have a chance of writing you, but must condense my news as much as possible. I am glad to say I am getting along very well as regards my wounds; they are healing up wonderfully, but of course the stiffness in the joints and around the wounds is still very sore. I don't know if I told you where I was hit. I got the bullet in the left shoulder, and right through my back and out again under the right shoulder; it hit one of my lungs in it's [sic] passage, but it will be alright when properly healed, and will not affect me in any way. Spion Kop was the name of the place where the battle was, and where I got shot. It was a fearful time! It is impossible to describe to you what it was like in a letter, but the list of killed and wounded, 1,500 to 1,700 will give you some idea that things were very warm. I am not at all anxious to go back to another Spion Kop, as we absolutely had no chance whatever. Imagine us scaling almost inaccessible kopjes, and then, when we reached the top, to be subjected to a whithering rifle fire from the Boers, who were

concealed behind concrete walls with loop holes in them, and then shrapnel shells bursting all about a chap. I tell you it took the cake. I was one of the first of Thorneycrofts to get knocked over, and have cause to be very thankful. I got off so lightly when I think of all the brave, good sort of fellows I knew who were killed. It is awful."

"We did not take part in the fight till 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Then came the order to advance. We had to gallop out singly across a plain to avoid being hit by the Boer shells, which were bursting all around us. We had to get across a river, and then across again over open country to the base of this huge kopje, where we had to leave our horses and get to the top the best way we could."

"Now the fight started in earnest, bullets cutting up the ground in front of us; in fact, it was a veritable storm of bullets and shells at us. At last we gained the top, and had to work our way around in order to get within range of the Boers. I had got what I thought pretty decent cover, and had fired almost 60 rounds off, and was just coming down from the shoulder to load again, when bang! I got knocked over. Where I was hit I did not know. I lost the use of my body from the waist downwards completely and thought I was shot through the spine. I made up my mind it was all up with me. I fairly gave in; but after some time lying helpless an officer spotted me, and he and a private soon had my coat and shirt off and found out where I was hit; and I was so glad to hear him say he did not think the wound was fatal. This cheered me, and though unable to move; I kept my spirits up."

"I had to stay out on the battle-field all night, as the firing was too heavy for them to remove me before dark. In the morning I was carried on a stretcher two miles, under a heavy artillery fire, but fortunately none of us were hit. I was then sent by ambulance to Mooi River Hospital, from thence to Durban, and then on to the hospital ship Lismore Castle for Capt Town, and here I am waiting to get well. I don't know what my future fate will be, very likely kept round here for duty; at all events, it will be some weeks before I can use my arm, so I shall have a chance of having a good rest. It is just delightful to get into a nice soft bed again. What price bread and butter, after those hard biscuits and bully beef!"

"My home letters have not turned up yet. When I get back to Maritzburg, where I shall probably be shortly, no doubt I shall get them all together. The Boers are getting it pretty hot now, and I do not think the war can last much longer."

"Maritzburg. 3 April, 1900."

"I am glad to say I am picking up very well. When I returned from Cape Town I was a complete shadow of my former self, but since here, with plenty of rest and good meals, I have improved wonderfully. At the same time, I will not be fit for the front for some time. I don't [sic] believe I could mount a horse at the present time, being very weak in the back. The doctor told me the shot had affected my nerves. My legs are affected, so that I cannot walk a great distance without having a rest. I am thankful I am no worse, as for some hours after I was shot I couldn't use my legs at all; but now I am very much alive and kicking. I will not be coming home yet, as I want to see the whole thing through, if possible. The Thorneycroft's have made a name for themselves, and our Colonel is second to none in South Africa. He is held in great esteem by the whole regiment, and regulars too. The colonial officers, as a rule, can just give the Imperial ones points as regards this war. The Imperial Light Horse have been in town the last fortnight, but are moving out again for the front. Clem Kenn is staying behind, being unfit for duty. He was shot in the stomach. It was very fortunate we both got hit with Mauser bullets; they make such a nice, clean wound. Had they been any other I should have been somewhere else today. I have been in five big engagements, not including small skirmishes. War is an awful thing. When I think of all I have seen, the terrible groans from the wounded and dying, it makes me shudder."

Private Hawson was discharged, unfit for duty due to his wounds. He returned home to Tasmania on the *Medic*, departing South Africa on 13 August 1900.

He died in Hobart on 10 June, 1912.

Guidons, Colours and Banners:
Part One: Mounted Regiments

The Ceremonial Section of the Directorate of Personnel Support, Department of Defence (Army) has kindly allowed *Sabretache* to publish an abbrevaited version of their six-monthly return of Guidons, Colours and Banners of the Australian Army. Subsequent issues of the Journal will feature Infantry Colours.



The Guidon of the 4th Light Horse Regiment. (The Corangamite Regiment).

Unit	Date Presented	By Whom Presented	Type	Date Laid Up	Where Laid Up	Remarks
1st Australian Light Horse Regiment (NSW)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	1. 6.24	St John's Church Parramatta	Now at the Lancer Barracks Parramatta
1st Light Horse	14. 8.20	Sir Ronald Munro Fergusson	KB	–	Lancer Barracks Parramatta	
1st Australian Light Horse (NSWL)	2. 4.28	Lt Gen. Sir Harry Chauvel	G	25. 3.58	St John's Church Parramatta	
2nd Australian Light Horse Regiment (NSWMR)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	27. 2.55	Holy Trinity Church Orange	
2nd Light Horse (Moreton Light Horse QMI)	–	–	G	19. 4.19	St John's Cathedral Brisbane	Faded badly, but otherwise in good condition.
2nd Light Horse (Moreton Light Horse QMI)	28. 3.28	Lt Gen. Sir Harry Chauvel	KB	Aug. '72	Held by 2/14 QMI Officers Mess, Brisbane	In good condition

Unit	Date Presented	By Whom Presented	Type	Date Laid Up	Where Laid Up	Remarks
3rd Light Horse Regiment (AH)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	17. 4.55	St Peter's Cathedral Adelaide	Badly in need of repair
3rd Light Horse Regiment (SAMR)	25. 9.20	H.E. Sir R.M. Fergusson	KB	10. 4.55	St Peter's Cathedral Adelaide	Presentable condition
3rd Light Horse Regiment (SAMR)	25. 3.28	Lt Gen. Sir Harry Chauvel	G	14. 5.61	St Peter's Cathedral Adelaide	Presentable condition
4th Australian Light Horse Regiment	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	1927	St Paul's Church West Maitland	Lost in the flood of 1955
4th Light Horse Regiment (NSWL)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	16. 3.38	St John's Church Warranbool	Only a fragment (30cm x 30cm) remains in a glass case
4th Light Horse Regiment (Corangamite LH)	6.10.63	–	G	27. 9.64	The Shrine Melbourne	Colour fading
5th Light Horse Regiment (NSWMR)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	–	–	Location unknown
5th Light Horse Regiment (Wide Bay & Burnett Light Horse (QMI)	–	–	G	10. 7.59	St John's Cathedral Brisbane	Slightly faded, several small holes, but otherwise good condition
6th Light Horse Regiment (AH)	14.12.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	27. 2.55	Holy Trinity Church Orange	
6th Light Horse Regiment (NSWMR)	2. 4.28	Lt Gen. Sir H. Chauvel	G	23. 4.61	Holy Trinity Church Orange	
7th Light Horse Regiment (VMR)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	24. 4.38	Town Hall Seymour	Badly fading and beginning to disintegrate
7th Light Horse Regiment (Australian Horse)	2. 4.28	Lt Gen. Sir H. Chauvel	G	5.10.58	St Saviour's Cathedral Goulburn	
8th Australian Light Horse Regiment (VMR)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	25. 4.38	Holy Trinity Church Benalla	Badly torn and disintegrating
8th Australian Light Horse (Independent LH)	1920	H.E. Sir R.M. Fergusson	KB	1938	Holy Trinity Church Benalla	Badly torn and disintegrating
8th Light Horse Regiment (Independent (LH)	–	–	G	–	–	Held by 8/13 VMR
9th Australian Light Horse Regiment (VMR)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	1938	St John's Church Warranbool	Now destroyed
9th Australian Light Horse Regiment (VMR)	25. 9.20	H.E. Sir R.M. Fergusson	KB	7. 6.42	St Peter's Cathedral Adelaide	Presentable condition
9th Light Horse Regiment (Flinders Light Horse)	25. 3.28	Lt Gen. Sir H. Chauvel	G	14. 5.61	St Peter's Cathedral Adelaide	Good condition

Unit	Date Presented	By Whom Presented	Type	Date Laid Up	Where Laid Up	Remarks
10th Light Horse Regiment	2.10.20	H.E. Sir R.M. Fergusson	KB	–	–	Location unknown
10th Light Horse Regiment	10. 3.28	Lt Gen. Sir H. Chauvel	G	10. 6.67	War Memorial Perth	Good condition
10th Light Horse Regiment	1. 5.66	H.E. Sir D. Kendrew	G	28.11.76	10 LH Officers Messs	Held by 10 LH Officers Mess
10th Light Horse Regiment	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	1938	St Paul's Cathedral Sale Pike transferred Melb. Shrine of Remembrance	Pike only. Fly missing
11th Australian Light Horse Regiment (VMR)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	26. 4.25	Christ Church Warranbool	Now destroyed
11th Light Horse Regiment	23. 8.20	H.E. Sir R.M. Fergusson	KB	22.11.59	St Luke's Church Toowoomba	Good condition
12th Australian Light Horse Regiment (TMI)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	13.11.49	St David's Cathedral Hobart	Presentable condition three holes
12th Light Horse Regiment	14. 8.20	H.E. Sir R.M. Fergusson	KB	–	–	Held by 12/16 HRL
13th Light Horse Regiment	14. 8.20	H.E. Sir R.M. Fergusson	G	–	–	Held by 8/12 VMR
13th Australian Light Horse Regiment (QMI)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	–	Shrine of Remembrance Melbourne	Location unknown
14th Australian Light Horse Regiment (QMI)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	–	Officers Mess 2/14 QMI Brisbane	Good condition
14th Light Horse Regiment	–	–	G	8.72	St John's Cathedral Brisbane	Transferred to Australian War Memorial 13.11.74
15th Australian Light Horse Regiment (QMI)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	–	–	Held by 1/15 RNSWL
15th Light Horse Regiment (Northern River Lancers)	–	–	G	2. 3.58	St John's Church Parramatta	–
16th Australian Light Horse Regiment (SAMR)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	17.11.26	St Augustin's Church Victor Harbour	Satisfactory condition
16th Light Horse Regiment (M.G. Regiment HRL)	12. 9.59	H.R.H. Princess Alexandria	G	23.10.60	St Paul's Church West Tamworth	–
17th Australian Light Horse Regiment (SAMR)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	Prior 1949	Christ Church Echunga (SA)	
17th Light Horse Regiment	–	–	G	–	–	1 gold tassell missing Held by 4/19 PWLH
18th Australian Light Horse Regiment (WAMI)	14.11.04	H.E. Lord Northcote	KB	–	–	Location unknown
18th Light Horse Regiment (Adelaide Lancers MG)	25. 3.28	Lt Gen. Sir H. Chauvel	G	6.11.49	St Peter's Cathedral Adelaide	Needs repair to fourth canton and tassell

Unit	Date Presented	By Whom Presented	Type	Date Laid Up	Where Laid Up	Remarks
19th Light Horse Regiment (Yarowee LH)	–	–	G	–	–	1. Eyelet torn on top left canton 2. Small tear lower left canton 3. 1 gold tassell missing Held by 4/19 PWLH
20th Light Horse Regiment (VMR)	–	–	G	–	–	Held by 8/13 VMR
21st Light Horse Regiment (Riverena Horse)	28. 4.28	Lt Gen. Sir H. Chauvel	G	28.10.58	St Mathais' Church Paddington	
22nd Light Horse Regiment (TMI)	10. 3.35	Sir Ernest Clark	G	13.11.49	St David's Cathedral Hobart	Reasonable condition but fading
23rd Light Horse Regiment (Barossa LH)	25. 3.28	Lt Gen. Sir H. Chauvel	G	7. 6.42	St Peter's Cathedral Adelaide	Needs repair to the fourth canton
1st Armoured Regiment	6. 2.56	H.E. Sir William Slim	G	–	–	To be replaced by a standard – 1977
2nd Cavalry Regiment	27. 4.70	H.E. Sir Roden Cutler	G	–		Replace in 1985
1st Royal New South Wales Lancers	24.11.57	Lt Gen. Sir E. Woodward	G	–		Replace in 1977
2/14th Queensland Mounted Infantry	14.11.71	H.E. Sir Paul Hasluck	G	–		Replace in 1991, held by QMI
2nd Light Horse (QMI)			G	–	Officers Mess 2/4 QMI Brisbane	Good condition
14th Light Horse (QMI)			G	–	Officers Mess 2/14 QMI Brisbane	Good condition
3rd South Australian Mounted Rifles	7. 2.60	Lt Gen. Sir S. Rowell	G	–		Replace in 1980, held by 3/9 SAMR
9th Flinders Light Horse	7. 2.60	Lt Gen. Sir S. Rowell	G	–		Good condition Replace in 1980, held by 3/9 SAMR As above

KB = King's Banner G = Guidon

The Sudan Embarkation

Adrian Stevens

Tuesday, 3 March, 1885, was a public holiday for the colony of New South Wales. On that day the New South Wales contingent to the Sudan was to embark on the troopships *Iberia* and *Australasian*. The *Sydney Mail* wrote: "It is believed that the demonstration on the occasion of the departure of the troops will be one of the most remarkable incidents in the history of the colony",[1] and a remarkable incident it was.

Only four days had separated the news of General Gordon's death at Khartoum, the offer of troops by the New South Wales Government to the Imperial Cabinet, the acceptance of the offer by England, and the commencement of preparations for the troops' departure; it took just over a fortnight to organise the 762 men, (Infantry 524, Artillery 191, Ambulance 36, and Staff 11, under the command of Colonel J.S. Richardson)[2] and prepare for their embarkation. It became a celebration of colonial loyalty and a show of military strength, even at the Empire's farthest outpost; a day, the *Sydney Morning Herald* claimed, "on which this colony, not yet a hundred years old, put forth its claims to be recognised as an integral portion of the British Empire," adding, to emphasise the point if a little unglamorously, "just as much as if it had been situated in the county of Middlesex."[3]

New South Wales was not in the county of Middlesex, but what must strike the observer is how British the scene actually was. Indeed, in less than a hundred years, where at this very place Governor Phillip had decided to plant Britain's convict colony, the landscape had been entirely transformed. There at the Quay were the wool stores, symbol of prosperity; sandstone warehouses and offices, and further along the cove, residences covering the slopes, all evidence of the settlement's permanence; and anchored at the wharf, steam and sailing ships, the sign of mastery over the elements that separated Mother England from its child, and a reminder of the supremacy that the Anglo-Saxons had won for themselves through the Royal Navy. Now the convict past was forgotten; now colonists offered their most precious service to an Empire they emphatically believed in.

Our illustrations show us the scene at the Quay, but they do not tell us of the march from Victoria Barracks, the two hundred thousand that lined the streets pressing against the Mounted Troopers, foot police, dignitaries, infantry, blue-jackets, the contingent itself and the artillery ("them Gatlings were regular terrors" remarked one old salt[4]). We cannot hear the contingent's own band play "The girl I left behind me", or the cries from the crowd of "Bravo, boys", "Give it to the Mahdi", and "Advance Australia"[5]. (The colonists were not entirely parochial in understanding the significance of their contribution.)

The subject of this article is what we can see from these illustrations of the embarkation, and how we should interpret them. They are, as it were, three "windows" into the one event, but each has something different to tell, each from a different vantage point to a different audience.

The first, an oil on canvas, is entitled "The Embarkation of the Sudan Contingent at Circular Quay, 3 March, 1885", and is thought to have been originally commissioned by the New South Wales Government to commemorate the event.[6] That is what the Australian graphic artist, Arthur Collingridge, has attempted to do: create a lasting document. It is an academic exercise, pre-impressionistic, with no attempt by the artist to personally intervene: all Collingridge does is show us a composite view of the day. It is not meant to be a photographic reproduction; it is likely that he drew several sketches of the politicians and Governor of New South Wales, and placed them together in the foreground, together with scenes featuring a soldier's farewell to his dog,



The Embarkation of the Sudan Contingent at Circular Quay, Sydney 3 March 1885'.
Arthur Collingridge. Australian War Memorial.

a bugler's goodbye to his family, and with a twist, the artist himself painting by his easel. As can be seen, it is a record rather than a reproduction. The centre of attention is the politicians surrounded by the volunteers and well-wishers, the clouds and the swirling smoke of the *Namoi* in the background, reminiscent of the French Revolutionary style: gallantry and heroism. On a banner hung from the *Namoi* to the shore is "Well Done N.S.W. God Speed", Gladstone's wishes to the colony. Perhaps the most "human" touch is the husband saying farewell to his wife, with his young child unsuccessfully fighting the tears. This Victorian sentiment was found in the newspaper reports of the day: "There were hurried squeezes of the hand, a last kiss to sweethearts, wives, or sisters, and the men seizing their rifles rushed off amidst numerous 'goodbyes' to their positions."[7]

So Collingridge's work is very much a record of the political event, and the scene close-up. One gets very much the sense described by Tom Gunning, a member of the contingent, when he wrote:

> *Ours was no under-cover-of-night departure; no slogans advising people to seal lips and save ships. Quite the reverse. We had passed through medical examinations; we had been bellowed at on the parade ground; we carried our old rifles, complete with saw-edged-bayonets – and all this was rounded off by the glorious feeling of wearing the splendid scarlet and blue uniform. In short, we were soldiers, and Sydney shouted it from the housetops.*[8]

A sense, certainly, of their pride, but less that of the enthusiastic crowds. The *Namoi,* chartered by members of parliament and their wives, lists to starboard but the thronging tens of thousands, are excluded from our view.

The lithograph gives us a much better view of the proceedings. It is diagrammatic: the *Australasian* to the left, and *Iberia* to the right; the troops and their band making their way past the crowd to embark; before us are the citizenry, patriotic and genteel, come to see their colony's proud day. It is a very simple, straightforward scene, placing all elements in their context, spectator and ceremony.



Lithograph of the Embarkation. Original in the Australian War Memorial. Artist unknown. AWM 34374

The photograph, by contrast, abandons all such discipline. Here we see the blur of white helmets making their way through the crowd, and no genteel crowd at that. We can see people on rooftops and standing on fences, anxious for a sight of their champions. We can imagine, more easily than in the sketch, a fruit pedlar losing his basket to some larrikins, his wares tossed into the air, and then kicked about.[9] It is a more animated scene, and the discrepancy between the previous sketch and this photograph should caution the military historian: the former places the crowd well apart from the volunteers, while the other has the troops pressed amongst the crowd. Collingridge's painting almost excludes the crowd altogether.

Explaining these contradictions is perhaps easier here than sometimes face the researcher. The discrepancy seems due to the different vantage points (the photograph is taken further down the column, almost opposite the *Australasian*), but also from a difference in purpose. Collingridge is painting a perhaps commissioned work; it is directed towards his patrons the politicians, and scarlet splendour that surrounded them. The sketch attempts to show the viewer the broad sweep, and if liberties were to be taken with minor details it would neither be a travesty nor a surprise.

And though the camera may never lie, giving authentic images of an event, it may nevertheless deceive, and is a challenge to the military historian's judgement. By taking one portion of the scene, no attempt to generalise should be made without checking other sources. The actual embarkation was quite orderly:

> *. . . the men being marched off in messes of 10, and going up the gangways with alacrity, their features betokening that they realised the greatness of the trust reposed in them, and that they were resolved not to return without having attempted to do something for the honour of the country.*[10]

A picture may tell a thousand words, but even a thousand words has its limits. Illustrations need to be placed in their context. Then again, a photograph of a thronging crowd can have a greater impact than mere words; both supply important evidence to our final understanding.



Photograph of the Embarkation **AWM 106140.**

But further questions still need answering, placing the embarkation itself in a wider context. What honour were the volunteers redeeming? "For England, Home, and Gordon", as a banner in Park Street had proclaimed?[11] Or was it something deeper than that?

As it happened, nine Australians died on the expedition, while three soldiers and one journalist were wounded, but personal tragedy was to come sooner. As the troopship *Iberia* made its way around Inner South Head, bound for Suakim, it collided into a steamer full of well-wishers, killing two women and injuring a few others.[12] The volunteers watched the ill-fated boat turn and return to the company's wharf. In their proud moment, the steamer *Nemesis* may have given some a moment to doubt.

Notes

1. *The Sydney Mail*, February 28, p.463.
2. R. Clark, *The Soudan Campaign 1885*, revd., MHSA, Canberra, 1972 p.2.
3. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, March 11, p.5.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Owned by the Australian War Memorial since 1968.
7. *SMH*, March 11, p.5.
8. T. Gunning, "Those Sudan Days", in R. Clark, *op.cit.*, p.12.
9. *SMH*, March 11, p.5.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*

The author welcomes any further details of the illustrations discussed in this article.

Who are 'the Anzacs'?

John McLeod

John McLeod recently spent some six weeks at the Australian War Memorial on an Anzac exchange from the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum at Waiouru, New Zealand. This article does not necessarily reflect the views of that institution.

The ANZACs – their ranks are but scanty all told,
Have a separate record illuminated in gold,
Their blood on Gallipoli's ridges they proved,
Their soles with the scars of that struggle are scored,
Not many are left, and not many are sound,
And thousands lie buried in Turkish ground.
These are the ANZACs; the others may claim,
Their zeal and their spirit, but never their name.[1].

Who are 'the Anzacs'? What does the word 'Anzac' describe? In my naive insular Kiwi mind I thought it derived from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps formed at Gallipoli in 1915 and was now colloquially used to describe anything jointly Australian and New Zealand, particularly military related. And, of course, I assumed 'big brother Aussie' would see it in a similar vein.

From a very short experience of working and living in Australia (six weeks on an Anzac exchange) and of talking to Australians and reading Australian Literature I would suggest Australians have a different concept of 'Anzac'. In possessing this different concept I believe they have lost all understanding of the true meaning of 'Anzac' and 'the Anzacs'. The common oral usage of the word has come to be synomous with the Australian soldier.

I was horrified when I saw Patsy Adam-Smith's book, *The ANZACS*. The Anzacs in her book are not Australians and New Zealanders. They are Australians! Was there ever a more misleading title for a book? Eagerly I went to the reviews of her book. Surely they would have some comment to make. But no! They actually condoned the use of 'the Anzacs' to describe Australians, and Australians alone. B.J. Videon, reviewing the book in *Sabretache*[2], even comments on the similarities between 'the Anzacs' and the present day 'Ockers' and goes on to say that 'the original ANZACs were well represented by their sons in World War II and their grandsons in Vietnam and the other conflicts of the post 1945 era.'[3]

There is certainly a case for agreeing with Mr Videon that 'the Anzacs' have been well represented by their sons and grandsons. But not in the context he suggests. Both the Australians and New Zealanders have earned, justifiably or not, fine fighting reputations, but few have earned that reputation as 'Anzacs'. After Gallipoli the ANZAC Corps did continue to exist in France at various stages between 1916 and 1918. In World War II after one abortive attempt by Wavell in 1940 to form an ANZAC Division, the Anzacs once more became a reality on 12 April 1941 in Greece. General Blamey in his announcement to the 6th Australian and 2nd New Zealand Divisions, who were joining to form the Anzac Corps, said, 'the reunion of the Australian and New Zealand Divisions gives all the greatest uplift.' The New Zealand officer who took the instruction to the New Zealand Division, was told by Blamey, 'There you are sonny, you have only got to live to six o'clock tonight to be a . . . ANZAC.'[4] The Anzac tradition was fostered in Korea in the Commonwealth Brigade, in Malaya, and more recently in Vietnam. Battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment which had a New Zealand Company attached were designated 'Anzac Battalions'.

The men who have been members of these units, both Australians and New Zealanders, have, in a way, a right to be called 'Anzacs'.

But do they really? As we have attempted to foster the Anzac tradition we have diluted the true concept. This has resulted in situations such as the Australians adopting it for their exclusive use. Although my opinion may seem idealistic, it appears to me that there is only one group with the right to be called 'Anzacs', those men who served as part of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps at Gallipoli in 1915. Never can the importance of that occasion with those men, and that spirit, be repeated. In our attempts to recapture the spirit of 'the Anzacs' we have made the term a debased and jingoistic one. We have used it to instil morale and espirit de corps, for its recruiting value, and in propaganda to engender public support. For example recruiting posters used the 'spirit of Anzac' to make appeals to New Zealanders to enlist in World War II.[5] It could also be suggested that it may have been hoped that the concept of Anzac battalions in Vietnam may have helped dissipate some of the anti-war public opinion.

I doubt that the alteration of the meaning of 'Anzacs' by Australians has been a recognition of the significance of the Anzacs' contribution to their national heritage, but suggest it is a lazy adaptation of a term that has popular appeal. This is not the place to enter the argument as to the importance of 'Anzac' and 'the Anzacs' of Gallipoli to Australian and New Zealand national tradition. It is worthwhile noting, however, Dr C.E.W. Bean's comment that 25 April 1915 was the day 'the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born'[6], and that of W.P. Morrell who considered it was a watershed in New Zealand's history – an awakening of a new nationalism: 'They fought for the Empire, but also for New Zealand.'[7] The landing of the Anzacs at Gallipoli in April 1915 provides a focal point for discussion on our respective national traditions. A series of articles in the *Meanjin Quarterly*[8] has examined the 'Anzac' and 'digger' tradition as it relates to Australians but no significant work has been produced by New Zealanders.

How then does Anzac Day fit into the debasement of 'Anzac'. It could be suggested that the day has lost much of its meaning and relevance and now its main significance lies in being a public holiday. But in the context of this article Anzac Day is still very relevant and alive. The day had its origins in the desire to remember the deeds of Australians and New Zealanders on 25 April 1915 at Gallipoli, and from that it has become a day to remember our war dead. The term 'Anzac Day' is given to 25 April as we identify this day as the origin of our military tradition and nationhood. The commemoration may now be seen as a day for each nation to remember her own war dead, but the origin was still a common one. Men of Australia and New Zealand together created the occasion for their own national traditions – the significance continues.

New Zealanders and Australians believe that we have forged very successful military traditions since Gallipoli. Since then no significant part of that reputation has been forged as 'Anzacs'. The reputation attained by both countries since 1915 has been as Australians and New Zealanders. For Australians to adopt the term 'Anzacs' as their own, is to defeat the very essence of the tradition. It may be barely acceptable for Australians to borrow 'diggers' for their own use, but 'the Anzacs' mean too much to both countries to be taken over exclusively by Australians.

Although there may be only one group of 'Real Anzacs', it is too much to expect the word to be only used in its original context. Distortion and adaption of the last sixty six years has removed that possibility. All one can really hope for is that Australians will adopt a sensible attitude and desist in attempting to adapt 'The Anzacs' to their own use. If the Australian historical oracle, Dr C.E.W. Bean, can include Australians and New Zealanders together in his description of the significance of 'Anzac' and 'the Anzacs', surely it is good enough for Australians today.

> *In facing that necessity, we now share with the New Zealanders one condition that was lacking to our young nations in 1915: we have passed the test which until now, unfortunately, has necessarily been judged by mankind as the supreme one for men fit to be free; and we have emerged from that test with the Anzac tradition.*[9]

Perhaps it is too late, for the concept of the Australian 'Anzacs' may be too well entrenched in 'big brother's popular mind. New Zealanders too, may be clinging to an outmoded view of "Anzac", as it makes us feel more significant to be associated with Australian military might. It may now be time for New Zealanders to take a similar egocentric approach to her military tradition. Perhaps we should become the NZAACs (NEW ZEALAND and Australian ARMY CORPS)? Perhaps only then will justice be done to the 'Real Anzacs'.

1. From 'The Real ANZACS' which appeared in *Punch* on 1 November 1916. The poem was contained in a letter from Alan J. Agnew, Managing Editor of *Punch*, to Lt Col. C.F. Seaward, 11 May 1954. Seaward Papers, Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum.
2. *Sabretache*, January-March 1979, Vol.XX, No.5, pp.38-9.
3. Ibid, p.38.
4. W.G. McClvmont. *To Greece*, War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1959, pp.222-3.
5. Michael King, *New Zealanders At War*, Heinemann, Auckland, p.172.
6. Geoffrey Serle, 'The Digger Tradition and Australian Nationalism', *Meanjin Quarterly*, Vol.24, No.2, 1965, p.149.
7. W.P. Morrell, *New Zealand*, Benn, London, 1935, p.112.
8. Serle, pp.149-58; Noel Mclachlan, Nationalism and the Divisive Digger Three Comments', *Meanjin Quarterly*, Vol.27, No.3, 1968, pp.302-08; K.S. Inglis, 'The ANZAC Tradition', *Meanjin Quarterly*, Vol.24, No.1, 1965, pp.24-44.
9. C.E.W. Bean, *ANZAC to Amiens*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1968, p.539.

Australia's Hall of Valour

Peter Burness

Visitors to the Australian War Memorial in Canberra will be aware of the extensive collection of Australian Victoria Crosses housed there. In November 1964 the then Governor-General, Lord De L'Isle VC, opened "VC Corner" to accommodate the Memorial's six Victoria Crosses. Since then the collection has expanded rapidly and today it contain 28 Crosses – the largest single collection known to exist. With only one exception, all these VCs have been bequeathed or donated to the Memorial by the recipients, their families, or ex-service organisations.

The expansion of the collection placed pressure on the limited space available in "VC Corner". Accordingly it was decided that a new gallery, to be called "The Hall of Valour" should be developed. The Memorial's Council was anxious that the new gallery would truly represent Australia's tribute to those men who had received the highest honour for valour. In addition men and women who had been highly decorated in other ways would also be represented.

It was decided that the new gallery would provide an individual display case for each of the VCs held by the Memorial. Each display would include a portrait of the recipient, details of the exploit for which the award was made, a supporting map,

Entrance to the Hall of Valour. Show case at right displays five of the seven VC's won at Lone Pine.



and other biographical information. Below this would be the appropriate medal group.

The new displays had to be permanent. However provision had to be made for future additions to the collection. Even as the Memorial's designer, Mr Tom Hewitt, began work on the plans two more Victoria Crosses were presented to the Memorial. Security was also an important consideration and each showcase was designed to accommodate the most modern electronic security devices.

To display other high gallantry awards 21 special display boxes were designed. These are mounted on an island in the centre of the gallery. Unlike the Victoria Crosses which are displayed permanently, it is planned to change the centre displays periodically.

Work commenced on the new gallery in February 1981 and was completed on schedule in time for the official opening by His Royal Highness, The Prince of Wales on Monday 13 April.

The new gallery immediately attracted many visitors and high praise for the standard of presentation. It contains a number of interesting features in addition to the collection of outstanding Australian gallantry decorations. The uniforms of Private S. McDougall VC, and Flight-Sergeant R. Middleton VC, are displayed. So too are the German machine guns captured by McDougall, Sergeant W. Brown VC, DCM, and Captian G. Cartwright VC, ED in the actions for which they received the Victoria Cross. A German machine gun which featured in the incident at Tobruk in 1941 in which Corporal J. Edmonson received a posthumous VC is displayed alongside his medals and other personal effects. Photographs of all Australia's 96 Victoria Cross winners are also displayed.

The War Memorial's collection presently contains the Victoria Crosses award to:

Capt. N.R. Howse	Boer War	1900
Lt L.C. Maygar	Boer War	1901
L/Cpl L. Keysor	Gallipoli	1915
Lt W.J. Symons	Gallipoli	1915
Cpl A.S. Burton	Gallipoli	1915
Cpl W. Dunstan	Gallipoli	1915
Lt F.H. Tubb	Gallipoli	1915
Second Lt F. Birks	Belgium	1917
L/Cpl W. Peeler	Belgium	1917
Capt. P.H. Cherry	France	1917
Sgt S.R. McDougall	France	1918
Sgt W. Ruthven	France	1918
Cpl P. Davey	France	1918
Cpl W.E. Brown	France	1918
Lt L.D. McCarthy	France	1918
Cpl A.C. Hall	France	1918
Pte W. Currey	France	1918
Sgt M.V. Buckley	France	1918
Pte J. Ryan	France	1918
Cpl A.P. Sullivan	North Russia	1919
Cpl J.H. Edmondson	Tobruk	1941
Flt/Sgt R.H. Middleton	Europe	1942
Flt/Lt W.E. Newton	New Guinea	1943
Pte R. Kelliher	New Guinea	1943
Cpl J.B. Mackey	Tarakan Island	1945
Lt A. Chowne	New Guinea	1945
Major P.J. Badcoe	Vietnam	1967
WO II R.S. Simpson	Vietnam	1969

These include the first VC awarded to an Australian; five of the seven VCs awarded for actions at Lone Pine on Gallipoli; one of the two VCs awarded for service in North Russia in 1919; the first VC awarded to an Australian in World War II; two of the three VCs awarded to Australian airmen in World War II; and two of the four crosses awarded for service in Vietnam.



Twenty-one important decorations, other than VC's are displayed on a central island in the Hall of Valour.

Distinguishing Badges of the AIF

K. M. Lyon.

The Australian Army has recently printed and distributed with *ARMY* Newspaper, a facsimile copy of a chart of WW I colour patches – Distinguishing Badges of The Australian Force. The chart was reproduced for Anzac Day 1981 as a tribute to the soldiers who wore them.

The earliest chart of colour patches that I know of is "Australian Imperial Forces Distinguishing Colour Patches", marked 'For official use only', compiled by R.K. Peacock, 1918, for the Department of Defence, Melbourne. The facsimile chart, copyrighted by The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd, 5 April 1919, appears to have been copied from the Peacock chart, even to the layout. The only difference, apart from the poor colour depiction, is in the addition of some sixteen colour patches. The additions are understandable as Peacock compiled his chart in Australia some time in 1918, the Herald chart was compiled in 1919 when more information on colour patches would have been available. The reason that the information was not readily available in Australia lies in the fact that most units of the First Australian Imperial Force were formed overseas and that was where colour patches were introduced and issued. The exception to this was the issue of colour patches to the Third Division before their embarkation from Australia, this being the only division which trained here.

The shapes, proportions and colours shown on the chart should not be accepted as authentic. The Third Division patches should be true ellipses; the diamond shaped patches are not in correct proportion to the rectangular ones; the Machine Gun Coy patches should be the same size as the brigade and battalion patches. The divisional medical and veterinary patches seem in the reprint to be of the same colour – the medical patches should be brown and the veterinary should be maroon. It is not known whether this error is attributable to the facsimile reprinting or whether it occurs in the original Herald chart. Peacock's chart certainly shows them in their correct colours. 1st Sig. Sqn, 1st Fd Sqn and LH Div. ASC should all be vertical oblong as these were altered, by 1919, from the squares shown on this and Peacock's chart.

There are two other errors carried over from the Peacock chart. The LH Field Artillery was not an Australian but a British colour patch worn by some Royal Horse Artillery and or Honorable Artillery Company Batteries. The other error lies in the red triangle shown as 'Camel Corps'; this was the patch of the 1st Battalion ICC only, the others were – 2nd Bn (British) green, 3rd Bn (Australian) black and white, 4th Bn (ANZAC) dark blue. The second of these errors has been perpetuated in the chart in Volume III of the *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918.*

Military historians will nevertheless be grateful to the Army for reporducing this chart. It is understood that the Army is also contemplating the production of a publication on colour patches of WW II. Such a publication will be looked forward to with a great deal of interest but it will be a task of some magnitude. The errors pointed out in this chart exemplify the difficulties facing any authority undertaking this work.

The Society has a quantity of these charts – **unfolded** – *which are available to members only* – **free**. *They will be forwarded in cardboard tubes at a charge of $2.50 to cover the cost of packaging and postage. Members who wish to obtain a copy should advise the Federal Secretary before 31 July 1981. A remittance of $2.50 must accompany the request. All orders will be sent out by mid-August.*

One copy only is available to each member. A number will be reserved for overseas members who will not be able to send in their request by 31 July.

T.C. SARGENT
Federal Secretary

Andrew Kirkwall-Smith, DSC, MM.

"An able and couragious intelligence Officer."

Michael Downey

It is just on 40 years ago since the Japanese commenced their Eastern New Guinea invasion operations and bombs rained down on Rabaul, New Britain and Madang in New Guinea.

As the last flight of bombers disappeared into the twilight a small, battered schooner slipped into Madang Harbour. Bob Emery, then a Sergeant in the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, went down to the jetty to check the new arrival.

"It was the first time I'd met Andy Kirkwall-Smith. He'd sailed down from his plantation on the coast to enlist as soon as he'd heard the Japs had attacked."

Bob Emery was happy to sign up another recruit "even if he was a bit long-in-the-tooth". At that stage Bob was guarding the Madang airfield with a total force consisting of 3 white soldiers and 10 native police! And as Andrew Kirkwall-Smith signed his enlistment papers no doubt his thoughts went back some 26 years to July 1915 when, as a young man of 20, he took the Kings shilling for the first time.

Born in the town of Kirkwall in the Orkney Islands of Scotland young Andrew migrated to Australia early in the 1900's. He was settling into his first job when war was declared in August 1914. His father was not keen on his son rushing into the army, but as news filtered back in May 1915 of the landings at Gallipoli and the casualty rolls began to grow there was no holding young Andrew.

He was accepted into the A.I.F. on 5 July 1915 as a private in the 7th Battalion. After completing basic training he left Melbourne on the Transport *Star of Victoria* with the 9th Reinforcements on 10 September 1915.

The 7th Battalion suffered heavy casualties during the Gallipoli campaign, 23 officers and 730 men being killed or wounded in action. Private Smith landed at Anzac on 7 December, the day before the British Government decided to withdraw all troops.

Frustrated in his attempts for some "action", Kirkwall-Smith transferred to the 59th and then the 60th Battalion. He left for France in June 1916 and joined the 13th Field Artillery Brigade in July. He served with this unit throughout the bloody years of 1917 and 1918. In April 1918 he was promoted Sergeant. Just prior to this his proud father received a short note from Base

Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith DSC, MM, RANVR.

Records Office A.I.F. to the effect that "No. 2890 Bombardier A.K. Smith had been awarded the Military Medal for conspicuous services and bravery in the field".

Andrew returned to Australia on the *Orontes* and took his discharge on 22 August 1919. After the war Kirkwall-Smith purchased a plantation on the Rai Coast in North East New Guinea.

From February 1942 until August 1943 Kirkwall-Smith served with the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles and "M" Special Unit. He was promoted to Warrant Officer 2nd Class after a number of hair-raising episodes that included the evacuation of refugees from Rabaul and their safe conduct to an inter-island steamer that was bound for Australia.

Throughout these hectic months Bob Emery fought alongside Andy. Bob recalled that they were offered a berth on the steamer back to Australia but both agreed that the boat didn't have much chance of getting through. They returned to Madang, stocked up on supplies and went bush. They finally linked up with other Australian troops and Bob transferred to the 5th Independent Company A.I.F. He was later wounded in action and awarded the Military Medal for bravery in the field.

Eric Feldt, in his book, *The Coastwatchers* gives a vivid description of the work done by Andrew Kirkwall-Smith as a member of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. During the latter half of 1942 Kirkwall-Smith was operating behind the lines on the Rai Coast of New Guinea providing information on enemy movements around Buna. Early in 1943 he crossed Vitiaz Strait and landed at Cape Gloucester in New Britain. From his position it was possible to observe any Jap activity from Rabaul towards the Huon Gulf.

Kirkwall-Smith's party was ambushed by a Jap barge as they returned in their canoes. He dived overboard and swam ashore, hiding in the jungle until night fell. Unarmed and barefooted, he crept back through the jungle to the base camp where a lone native told him the story of the Japanese attack. Then followed two days of trudging through dense jungle until, exhausted and with his feet cut to ribbons by coral, Kirkwall-Smith linked up with a missionary, V. Neumann, another coastwatcher who had a small motor launch. They reached the mainland of New Guinea a day later. Andy then led a group of survivors across the mountain range to Bena Bena where they were flown out to Port Moresby.

In August 1943 Kirkwall-Smith left the army and was commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy Volunteer Reserve. He became involved in the beach reconnaissance group, a sub-unit of the newly formed Amphibious Force.

He landed at Cape Gloucester late in September 1943 with the object of obtaining as much information about the enemy prior to the forthcoming allied landings. After twelve days he was taken off by P.T. Boat bringing details of enemy gun positions, roads, barbed wire, etc.

By January 1944 the Americans had landed at Saidor to cut off Japanese retreating from Finschafen. Lt Kirkwall-Smith was attached to the American forces and carried out a number of long range patrols to determine the trails that were being used by the Japs.

On one of these patrols his section leader, Corporal J.C. Binks, was wounded. The native carriers who had accompanied the allied patrol remained and carried Binks out under heavy fire. Feldt quotes this incident as a "high tribute to Kirkwall-Smith's leadership and the trust the natives had in him".

In February 1945 the *London Gazette* carried the terse citation stating that Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith R.A.N.V.R. was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross "for outstanding courage and skill shown in hazardous reconnaissance operations in the Far East." Demobbed in December 1945 Andy received a letter from Commander R.B.M. Long O.B.E. (Director, Naval Intelligence). Long wrote:

"You have made history. Your work as a 'Coastwatcher' had a direct bearing upon operations and in the opinion of the highest ranking Allied Officers was invaluable."

In the post-war years Andy owned an orange grove at Lake Kangaroo in Victoria, finally retiring to Swan Hill in 1970. He died on 7 January 1973 and is buried in the Swan Hill cemetary.

It is possible that the award of the Military Medal and Distinguished Service Cross to one man is a unique honour for an Australian. What is certain is the outstanding bravery displayed by Andrew Kirkwall-Smith when facing his country's enemies "face-to-face" in two World Wars.

I wish to acknowledge the assistance given to me by: Miss L. Salmon, Mr R. Emery M.M. Central Army Records Office.

Book Reviews

C.E.W. Bean, *The Story of Anzac*, Volume 1 of *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18*, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1981. Recommended price: hard cover $30.00, paperback $14.95. Review copy supplied by the University of Queensland Press.

Publication by the University of Queensland Press of a new edition of *The Official History of Australia in the War 1914-18* by C.E.W. Bean will be one of the most important events in Australian military historical literature in recent years. It will allow greater access by the general public to what is rightly considered by many to be one of the finest, most detailed and accurate military histories ever written. The fact that it is on Australia's own armed forces and covers arguably the most significant war in our country's history adds considerably to its value. This wider access and the renewed interest in the First World War which the new edition will most certainly engender, will create, it is to be hoped, a greater public awareness of the tradition of Anzac and the heritage which stands behind it. Sadly and most unfortunately Anzac Day itself has been declining in importance amongst some Australians over the last decade, possibly partly because of the passing of many veterans of the First AIF. Perhaps the wider availability of such an excellent history as Dr Bean's will encourage more members of the public to participate in and support one of the most national of our public days.

Volume 1 of the *Official History*, The Story of Anzac, was the forerunner of a twelve volume series containing almost four million words. The first six volumes, written entirely by C.E.W. Bean, took that writer over twenty-three years to complete. The *History*, because of its great detail and accuracy as well as its lucid and readable style has become recognised as one of the major sources in modern Australian history. The series is also considered one of the most perceptive and unbiased accounts of any country's participation in the First World War.

The worth of the Australian *Official History* becomes apparent on comparison of its two volumes on Gallipoli with those on the same campaign written by Aspinall – Oglander for the British *Official History*. Unlike the British version Bean's was not subjected to the rigours of the official censor. He was given absolute freedom in his analysis of the Gallipoli campaign and his criticism of its handling. Furthermore, the soldiers were the subject of the narrative of his volumes to an extent unmatched in official military historical works. The British history had no biographical footnotes for the soldiers mentioned in the narrative. This was essential to Dr Bean's approach – to emphasize the role of the lower ranks in the fighting. After all, the *Official History* was designed to be a monument to the men of the A.I.F. Bean said in the preface to the series (which is contained in Volume 1): "The more he saw and knew the men and officers of the Australian Imperial Force the more fully did the writer become convinced that the only memorial which could be worthy of them was the bare and uncoloured story of their part in the war."

Nor did Bean make his notes of the campaign from the safety of the rear areas. He relied heavily on his personal experience of the front line. As he stated in the preface: "The writer himself, either on the day of the battle or soon afterwards, visited so far as it lay in his hands to do so every important trench or position mentioned in this and the following 5 volumes." This adds immeasurably to the accuracy and value of the series.

The main part of the University of Queensland Press publication is a facsimile of the printing of the 1942 edition of Volume 1. As such it contains the corrections to the narrative which Bean included in 1934 as a result of later information coming to light which added to the knowledge of the campaign. However, the vast majority of the text is the same as that which appeared in the original edition of Volume 1 which was published first in 1921. Volume 1 of the *Official History, The Story of Anzac*, covers Australia's part in the First World War from the outbreak of the conflagration to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli campaign on May 4, 1915.

The Volume begins with a sketch of Australian society in 1914. From this section of the book emerges clearly C.E.W. Bean's literary skill, his powers of observation and the conclusions he had reached about the national characteristics during his tours of the Australian outback as a correspondent for the *Sydney Morning Herald* prior to the war. There follows an examination of the crisis in Europe which

led to the outbreak of hostilities and Australia's offer to assist the mother country. Attention is then turned to the Australian Imperial Force. There are detailed chapters on the raising of the A.I.F., the journey to Egypt, the subsequent training in the desert and the plan to attack the Gallipoli peninsula. But the main focus of the Volume is on 25 April, 1915. In nine chapters, of over ninety thousand words, Dr Bean produces an exhaustively detailed account of the landing on Gallipoli and the subsequent desperate fighting of that day. The remaining chapters deal with the bloody conflict which followed as the Anzac Corps attempted to strengthen its tenuous hold on the beachhead. The Volume ends with May 4, the first day of relative inaction when both sides stopped to consider their positions and count their dead.

Volume 1 is also a clear and telling reflection of the character and beliefs of its author, C.E.W. Bean. Its painstaking detail and meticulous description of the gallant role they played is his memorial to the men of the A.I.F. He wanted to show that the failure of the campaign was not the fault of the Australian soldiers who had performed valiantly in the circumstances. He aimed to prove that the disaster was of Imperial, not Australian, making. Throughout Volume 1 he maintained his firm and unyielding belief in the high standard of the Australians' performance and their ability as soldiers. Yet the price had been high. Of the two thousand three hundred Anzacs killed during the Landing and the first five days Bean said: "They were men whom their countries could ill-afford to lose. But with their lives they purchased a tradition beyond all human power to appraise, and set for all time the standard of conduct of the Australian and New Zealand soldier." Of the Landing itself he was later to add: "In no unreal sense it was on 25 April, 1915, that the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born."

In addition to a reproduction of Volume 1 of the *Official History*, the University of Queensland Press edition includes a preface to the new edition of the series written by Dr Robert O'Neill and an introduction to the UQP edition of Volume 1 of the *Official History* written by Professor Ken Inglis. Both these writers are leading authorities in the field of Australian military history. Dr O'Neill's preface contains interesting details about the actual writing of the *Official History* by Dr Bean and the other authors, and the enormous problems involved in producing such a major work. Professor Inglis's introduction includes an examination of some of Dr Bean's experiences at the front on Gallipoli and his aims in writing the *History*, as well as a consideration of the contents of Volume 1. Both these articles provide absorbing reading and interesting background information to the series.

The University of Queensland Press edition of Volume 1 of the *Official History* is attractively presented and includes a reproduction of a painting by war-artist George Lambert on the front cover of the paperback version. The price of $14.95 for the paperback version is reasonable when one considers the spiralling cost of books and the six hundred and sixty-two pages which the volume contains together with its many photographs and diagrams. Above all, the price is realtively low for what can only be described as an outstanding piece of history.

The reviewer strongly recommends the publication to all those attracted to military history, particularly readers interested in Australia's participation in the First World War. The new edition of Volume 1 provides a reasonably priced but good quality start to a collection of the entire twelve volumes of the *Official History* or may alternatively serve as a replacement for an incomplete set of the original edition.

M.C. DICKER

D. Corbett, *The Regimental Badges of New Zealand*, 2nd Edition 1980, published by R. Richards, Auckland, N.Z. 320pp. hard cover.

A major problem in today's collecting of badges is the lack of information in many areas of importance to the collector. For example, very little comprehensive material has been published in a readily accessible form on Australian badges from before Federation to the present. Mr Corbett has achieved the enviable result of providing a reference text that has no equal in the field of New Zealand badges with the second edition of his pioneering work. This book is just not a catalogue of badges, but also includes a history of the units that wore them and is thus of vital interest to the military historian as well as the badge collector. The work is well researched and profusely illustrated, the author is an acknowledged leader in his field, and the standard of presentation is high.

The layout is basically the same as in the first edition (reviewed briefly in *Sabretache*, vol.XXI, p.92), but the contents are considerably revised and expanded. Most of the faults in the presentation of the earlier edition have been corrected, particularly the helmet plate illustrations. These have now been tied into the main text whereas previously they had been lumped together without identifying captions at the end of the book. However, the placement of many of the helmet plate illustrations throughout the book can be confusing at times if the reader does not closely follow the lineage data in the text. The author appears to have used a number of criteria in the layout of these illustrations, but the final result is a vast improvement over the first edition.

Occasional proofing mistakes occur in the text such as the index reference to the Piako Mounted Rifles. The index indicates that the illustration of this units' badge is on p.167 when it is actually on p.164. To further confuse things, the text reference to this regiment is on p.147, where I feel the illustration should have been placed in the first place. In some cases badge illustrations could also be enhanced with some explanation as to when they were worn when this is not apparent in the text. For instance there are four types of Dental Corps badges illustrated on pages 268-9, but no information on when each type was worn or discarded. The Queen's South Africa Medal on p.131 is also probably better left out as it is a medal and not really within the scope of this book.

Compared with the wealth of information presented in this book, these criticisms are relatively minor. The expanded introductory section, particularly the badge lists for officers and anodized types, is most useful. Other sections not present in the first edition include rank and trade badges (a much neglected field), buttons, bridle bosses, and service association badges. Illustration quality if of a very high order and among the many expanded sections, those on the NZ contingents to South Africa and the 1914-18 War reinforcements are most welcome. Perusing the limited material on NZ badges available, such as the *Queenslander* articles of the 1930's and various historical society publications, I would think that very few N.Z. badges have been omitted from this book. In addition, many badges not found in the first edition have been included. As such this work must rank as the best available on the subject and no serious collector or student of Commonwealth military badges can really afford to be without this book.

D.P. LEGG

Alan Fitzgerald, *The Italian Farming Soldiers: Prisoners of War in Australia 1941-1947*, Melbourne University Press, 1981.

Canberra journalist Alan Fitzgerald has produced an interesting study of a relatively obscure aspect of Australia's Home Front during the 1939-45 War. Australia's 18,000 Italian Prisoners of War have been rather overshadowed by the spectacular tragedy of the Cowra escape, and they have tended to appear only in walk-on roles in the several studies of that affair.

The story of the Italian Prisoners of War is told for the first- and probably the last-time in this work, which details their life in camps in every state of the Commonwealth. The boredom and futility common to all Prisoners of War is described, but also the peculiar features of the Italians' experience. Thousands of kilometres from the disintegration of Mussolini's Roman Empire, they squabbled over the passions of Fascism and Royalism, feuding, arguing and cutting each other dead, while all the time clad in the incongruous magenta cast-offs of the PoW.

By far the most interesting portion of the book is the detailed and at times skilful evocation of the PoW's contribution to the Australian war-time rural economy. Fitzgerald tracked down and spoke to both prisoners and their civilian employers, combining official records and individual reminiscence to produce a readable and effective narrative. The Italian contribution to Australian rural life was appreciated at the time and commemorated, unofficially at least, in the so-called 'Italian Rope Trick', a more effective method of roping steers.

While the book is readable and useful, it is deficient in some respects. Some portions, notably the short chapter on 'Sex and the POW', are too much like strings of extracts from official files (which he has made good use of elsewhere) rather than serious attempts to discuss the sexual and social relationship between the Italians and their hosts.

P. S.

Tony Ashworth, *Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System*, Macmillan, 1980.

The Christmas Truce of 1914 is well known to students of the Great War. All along the British front, Tommies in cap comforters and mittens stood in No Man's Land exchanging souvenirs and good cheer with their great-coated adversaries. A few hours later they each returned to their trenches and the war resumed. Never again, we have been led to believe, did such a truce occur – or did it?

Early in his research into the sociology of trench warfare, English sociologist Tony Ashworth spoke to a veteran of the British 47th Division, "a brave and astute man, who had known the many moods of trench war during his three years on the western front . . . " The sergeant made a remark that puzzled Ashworth at the time. "He observed that naturally trench war was not a pleasant experience, yet . . . nevertheless it was not nearly so bad as some would have one believe" . . .

Ashworth has now produced a work which will challenge students of the 1914-18 War, prompting many to revise their ideas of what the war in the trenches was like. His book makes sense of the sergeant's remark, in an innovative and coherent reappraisal of the nature of trench warfare.

He firstly analyses the trend of tactics, command and control over the four years and concludes that from 1916 the war in France and Flanders became "bureaucratised". In the first phase, 1914-15, the responsibility for the routine conduct of trench warfare rested with company and battalion officers. For example, trench raids were mounted when the individual officers saw fit and carried out by volunteers in their own way without elaborate support or supervision. By 1916, Ashworth argues, the BEF's war was becoming increasingly subject to the control of "non combatant" higher commanders and more specialised in its conduct. In this second phase, for example, the battalion lost its hitherto organic heavy machine guns and trench mortars, which were thenceforth controlled by the higher commanders in pursuance of their own aims. By this time, trench raids were mounted on the orders of divisional or even corps staffs, supported by machine gun, mortar and artillery units outside the control of the infantry performing the raid itself. As Ashworth puts it:

> *". . . the local control of violence in 1915 gave way in 1916 to an impersonal centralised control, and, further, the latter more than the former constrained trench fighters to violence".*

Trench fighters had to be "constrained" to violence" because, with the exception of "elite" units (which he discusses in detail), the average trench fighter was more inclined to let sleeping dogs lie; he was an exponent of the "Live and Let Live" system. Ashworth's main purpose in the book is to investigate the way in which men adapted to trench fighting. The Front was not, of course, a place of continual battle, but comprised varying degrees of aggression from passivity to necessary retaliation through provocative raiding to assault. He provides convincing evidence that the front line soldier preferred and actively sought peace and quiet, against the wishes of his generals. This is ingeniously linked to his theory about the bureaucratisation of the BEF's war by proposing that the increasingly centralised control of operations was the direct result of the trench fighters' inclination to lead a quiet life.

While the significance and extent of this tendency can be disputed, it is without doubt a most original and provocative conclusion, well worth consideration.

Ashworth has combined personal reminiscence, sociological theory and diligent research to produce a book which makes a great deal of sense. While he could have made more use of unpublished material, there is too much evidence in the book for his theory to ignore it altogether. It would be well worth attempting to ascertain the relevance of it to the First AIF in France and Flanders. I suspect that they were less inclined to let sleeping dogs lie, whether from their unique composition as the Empire's only wholly volunteer force (not "Commonwealth" as Ashworth has it) or from their formative experiences on Gallipoli, or from a curious quality of Australian aggression.

Ashworth is a sociologist, and he has brought to his work the formidable analytical tools of that discipline. The study is richer for it, but he has unfortunately tracked in the ugly vocubulary of the sociologist as well. Unfamiliar, specialised or clumsy words and phrases mar an otherwise excellent book, lessening its appeal to military historians without training in or familiarity with sociology. He uses "agress" as a verb, for instance, and writes of "primary instrumental exchanges" when discussing fraternisation. Do not be put off by these flaws.

Despite its failings, the book is well worth reading as a most original contribution to the study of humanity at war, and should be read by any who consider themselves serious students of the war in the trenches.

P. S.

Brian Johnson, *Fly Navy – The History of Maritime Aviation*. Published by David and Charles, London. Available in Australia from Australia and New Zealand Book Co. Pty Ltd. Recommended price $40.95.

In his introduction, the author points out that not even the most ardent proponents of naval aviation, at the end of World War I, would have prophesied that the greatest naval engagements ever fought would be between opposing carriers and their aircraft. Yet, this was the case during World War II. Perhaps in the eyes of some naval historians this claim may be regarded more as journalistic licence; however he does illustrate dramatically the changes over that period.

Naval aviation, according to the author, could be said to date from 14 November 1910, when Eugene Ely flew a Curtiss biplane from a wooden ramp built on the forecastle of the light cruiser, USS Birmingham, off Hampton Roads, Virginia. However, this was only a start, as the ships utilised only a 'flying-off deck' for some time; aircraft, other than seaplanes, either landed on airfields or were ditched into the sea. Many of these incidents are recalled in vivid detail.

From the story of those early days, the history moves on to the experiments and conversions of World War I, discusses the long struggle by both the British and American Navies for recognition, and graphically recalls the combat of World War II. Although he tells this history with a broad panoramic sweep, Brian Johnson includes detailed accounts of individual action by the personnel involved; the horrors of a *kamikaze* attack, and the hopelessness of pilots in the air who had lost their bases through enemy attack.

The book contains a wealth of information on carriers, aircraft types, and technical detail, and is well illustrated with many photographs of the ships and their aircraft. It is particularly well indexed, and scholars of naval history will find the additional appendices and notes useful reference material. Unfortunately, although an excellent book, I feel the price may inhibit sales in quantity, but for the student in history or ex-mariner, it is a worthwhile buy.

R. WEBSTER

R.A. Westlake, *Collecting Metal Shoulder Titles*, Frederick Warne Ltd, 1980. 187 pages, hard cover. Review copy courtesy of Methuen Australia. Recommended price $38.95.

Shoulder titles have until quite recently been collected very casually, being regarded as a secondary interest to the more desirable helmet and cap badges. Now, perhaps because of rising prices and re-strikes of rare badges, many collectors are turning their attention very seriously to these once neglected items as an alternative interest.

R.A. Westlake's book *Collecting Metal Shoulder Titles* is very well researched and contains a considerable amount of lineage details for every British unit from around 1860, including the Yeomanry, Territorials, Cyclists, Cadets, Schools and Training Establishments, Women's units and many miscellaneous corps. In authenticating details of titles the author has enumerated many sources often neglected in other works on the subject, leaving the collector or researcher wondering whether 'facts' found in previous 'authorities' are correct.

The 120 plates, all of good photographic quality, illustrate over 1500 different metal shoulder titles. This is better than any number of line drawings of badges 'believed' to exist. Where photographs of shoulder titles are not available, they are described and considered 'unidentified to date'.

I highly recommend this valuable reference publication to the collector, researcher and dealer alike. I regard it as an equal, in its own right, to *Headdress Badges of the British Army* by Kipling and King, which I am sure most people will agree is the ultimate reference work for collectors of British badges.

RCH COURTNEY

Letters to the Editor

The Editor,

I refer to the article by Messrs De Totth and Courtney in the April-June 1980 issue of *Sabretache*. I must immediately point out that any criticism I have is meant to be constructive – the subject of Army numbers in a difficult one.

The letter 'P' after a state prefix in an Army number (EG, VP) did not indicate that the PMF member had not volunteered for the AIF. It indicates that he was a member of the PMF during the period for which the medal was issued (awarded). Even though he may have volunteered for the AIF, the fact that he had a 'P' number indicated that he had enlisted in the PMF and was not released for service in the AIF (for that period). Some PMF members enlisted in the CMF in order to see service outside Australia, thereby losing the 'P', but gaining a new Army number without an 'X'. The 'X' numbers were given to them when they later enlisted in the AIF, after having been released from the PMF. This presents some difficulty as, even though they were serving in the AIF, they were, officially, still in the PMF on secondment.

A type of Army number not mentioned in the article is that of the pre-war Militia. These were unprefixed, that is, without letters. In most cases they resemble the RAAF numbers shown in the article. They were first allocated in 1921 when regimental numbers were abolished. (Note the distinction between regimental numbers which were peculiar to a unit or corps, and Army numbers which are issued from Army level). The block 1 to 49,999 was allocated to the PMF, 50,000 onwards to the Militia. The PMF never actually used their whole block, getting only to the 12,000s. PMF members retained their number on the outbreak of war, later adding a state prefix and the letter 'P'. The state prefix adopted was that of the state in which they were serving at the time, hence the seemingly high proportion of PMF enlistees in the Northern Territory. These were the DPs, and later DXs, who were serving in Darwin, mainly in the RAA and the Darwin Mobile Force.

The pre-war Militia were enlisted under peace-time conditions, i.e., for two years, which was automatically extended under the Defence Act to the duration of any war. On the outbreak of war many of these men did not enlist, or were not allowed to enlist, in the AIF as they were required for home defence or to train the AIF. At a later stage some were allowed to enlist in the AIF but after Japan entered the war general mobilization was declared and all men still having pre-war numbers were issued with CMF numbers, prefixed with a state letter only – N, V, S, etc. without the 'X'. Many of these men later enlisted in the AIF and were given new 'X' numbers. (A system was proposed where a CMF man who enlisted in the AIF was to add the letters 'XM' after his state prefix (e.g., VXM), to indicate that he was a CMF soldier who had enlisted in the AIF but this system presented many problems and was dropped, although a few records still show this type of number, crossed out).

The statement in the referenced article that members of the NGVR 'consequently bore the 'NGX' prefix' is misleading. Prior to 1942 the NGVR had regimental numbers, not Army numbers, as they were not part of the CMF, being sponsored by the Army (it was illegal for Australia to form Defence Forces units in mandated territory). When the NGVR was mobilized, all those men who had not been accepted for the AIF, but who were called up for full-time 'NG' numbers. If they subsequently enlisted in the AIF they were allotted new AIF 'X' numbers. Many, but not all, joined the AIF.

The information given in the article on native units is basically correct, although there are a few minor problems. The 'R' prefix for M Special Unit Infantry Unit (as distinct from a Special Unit which consisted of white Australians) did not come into use until 2nd February 1945 when natives who were *employed* by the Allied Intelligence Bureau were 'deemed' to have been *enlisted* into the unit. Any service prior to that date does not count as Army (or RAN or RAAF) service, even though they were armed, equipped and trained (some in Queensland) by the Services – and even though they may have died while fighting alongside Australian soldiers.

The Royal Papuan Constabulary was, indeed, a civilian organization – but it was under Army jurisdiction as the Army administered the Territory. Some RPC numbers had a suffix after the numerals but I have not been able to work that system out, although it may have something to do with the amalgamation of the Royal Papuan Constabulary with the New Guinea Police Forces to form the RPC.

Another rare system of numbers was that used for philanthropic members, mentioned in the article. But is should be remembered that official war correspondents, artists and photographers also were issued with these numbers, although some of them who had served only in the early part of the war may not have received a 'B' number. This 'B' system of numbers was used for persons *accredited* to the forces, but not enlisted in them. They were administered by the services, and were subject to military law, but were still civilians. These 'B' numbers have now been replaced by numbers in the 950,000 block of Army numbers, prefixed with a state numeral.

I trust that my comments have been accepted in the spirit in which they were intended – as an amplification of the referenced article, and not as adverse criticism.

G.R. VAZENRY
66 O'Connor Street,
Reservoir,
Vic. 3073

The Editor,

Further to 'Who Killed Cock Robin' by Brigadier Austin in *Sabretache* Vol.XXII No.1, James McClelland records in his 'History of NSW' – Book 1, that in 1830, after the death of the bushranger Jack Donohue

"The song 'Bold Jack Donohue' was banned from being sung in all the Public Houses. However versions of the song survive today under the name of 'The Wild Colonial Boy' ".

– So much for Doctor Hook and the Top Ten of 1981!

TCS

The Editor,

I recently received a personal enquiry from Captain Ray Cooper Secretary of the NSW MHS who had been researching family history and found that two early Australian surveyors – Mortimer Lewis and Robert Hoddle (he laid out the streets of Melbourne) were on half-pay from the Corps of Royal Military Surveyors and Draftsmen. Ray was seeking information on the Corps.

The answer was found in the recent published (1980) *History of the Ordnance Survey*, edited by W.A. Seymour. This unique Corps was short-lived. It was formed in 1800 and disbanded in 1817. Its members were the civilian draughtsmen and surveyors employed on the Ordnance Survey in the Drawing Room at the Tower of London. The formation of the Corps brought its members under the command of the Chief Engineer and made them 'subject to the Rules and Discipline of War'. They were provided with blue uniforms 'bearing a resemblance to the Uniforms worn by the Corps of Royal Engineers'. The Corps was recruited from the Drawing Room and by the enlistment of suitably qualified outsiders and trainees.

In 1805 it had a strength of 51 and the members were termed 'Surveyor and Draftsman' from 3rd to 1st Class, 2nd and 1st Assistants and one Chief Surveyor and Draftsman. Nevertheless when the Corps was disbanded 'most of its warrant officers were put on half-pay'. (PRO WO 44/517). In 1816 the distribution of the Corps was 10 members employed on the surveys of Great Britain; 19, including 8 cadets, were stationed at the Tower, a number were on home stations – Chatham, Dublin, Jersey, Plymouth, Portsmouth and Woolwich, the remainder were overseas in Canada, Gibraltar, Malta and the West Indies. One draughtsman was 'With the Army in France'. The Corps member at Woolwich was engaged in training cadets for commission in the Royal Engineers.

As mentioned, in 1817 the Corps was disbanded and the members employed by the Board of Ordnance drastically reduced. No doubt Lewis and Hoddle went on to half pay then and eventually found their way to Australia to fill appointments in the survey of the Colony.

A search of War Office records of the Corps of Royal Military Surveyors and Draftsmen would perhaps gives us more of the story of Lewis and Hoddle.

T.C. SARGENT

Society Notes

Subscriptions

Members are reminded that the annual subscription of $15 is due on 1 July 1981 for the membership year 1981-82. Subscriptions may be paid to the Federal Secretary or to Branch Secretaries.

The Constitution provides that 'members whose subscriptions are 3 months in arrears shall not receive further publications of the Society until their subscriptions are brought onto to a current basis.'

Members whose fees have not been received by the Federal Secretary before the October – December *Sabretache* is ready for postage, in late December 1981, will not be sent that issue.

Membership List

The April 1978 Society membership list is badly out of date. It is proposed to produce a new list for issue early in 1982 and to keep this updated by amendment lists sent out with subsequent issues of *Sabretache*.

Members are therefore asked to confirm or state their interests, for inclusion in the membership list, when paying their 1981-82 subscriptions. Those who do not wish to have their interests shown are asked to say so.

Interests will be coded. The codings used in the 1978 list were very extensive and created problems in administration and printing. For the 1982 list members are asked to keep the indication of their interests as general as possible. Specific codings should be restricted to no more than four and should be selected from the list below. Where an interest can not be identified within the codes shown it should be classified as 'Other' and specified. If sufficient of the same interest are received it will be coded and included in the code key.

Code Key

Military History MH

MH 01 General
10 Australian – General
11 British Regiments in Australia & New Zealand
12 Australian Forces – pre Federation
13 Australian Army – post Federation
14 RAN
15 RAAF
20 British, Empire and Commonwealth – pre 1900
21 British, Empire and Commonwealth – post 1900
30 South African War
40 WW I
50 WW II
60 Post WW II
70 Other (specify)

Badges and Insignia B

B 01 General
10 Australian
11 RAN
12 Australian Army
13 RAAF
20 British and Commonwealth
70 Other (specify)

Orders, Decorations and Medals OM

OM 01 General
10 Australian
20 British and Commonwealth
70 Other (specify)

Arms and Ammunition AA

AA 01 General
10 Australian
20 British and Commonwealth
30 Antique
70 Other (specify)

Uniforms and Equipment UE

UE 01 General
10 Australian
20 British and Commonwealth
70 Other (specify)

Prints, Books and Memorabilia PBM

PBM

Models F

F

Albury-Wodonga Branch Activities

The Albury-Wodonga Branch has played a large part in the establishment of a Light Horse Troop in 8/13th VMR, the local Army Reserve Unit. The troop is ten strong, commanded by Lt R. Morrison, who is a Branch member, and parades on ceremonial occasions and in support of recruiting activities. Much of the work involved in setting up the Troop has been undertaken by Branch President, Don Campbell, who has received substantial financial support from Miss M. Bowman, also a member of the Society.

8/13TH VMR have resolved to set up a unit museum. Don Campbell has been appointed a civilian member of the Board of Trustees, along with Lt Col. John Neale (RL) and Major Norman Whitehead MC(RL) both of whom are well known in the Border district for this interest in and their support for the Regiment.

Obituary

Sea Cadet Commander Leonard Edgar Forsythe, BEM, SSD

Len Forsythe, a long standing member of the Society, died in Sydney on 16 February, 1981, aged 88.

To those of us who were fortunate enough to have met him, his passing will leave a gap in our lives, but perhaps the greatest loss will be to the youth of Australia. Len had devoted his life to the training of sea cadets and over 4,000 youths passed through his hands in over 50 years of service.

Len was an Anzac and also served in World War II with Army Water Transport units, but despite his Army service, his great love was the Sydney Training Depot which he established on Snapper Island, in Sydney Harbour, in 1931 as a memorial to HMAS SYDNEY's victory over the EMDEN at Cocos Island in 1914.

His first connection with youth training was in 1921 when he formed Sydney's first Sea Scout Troop and shortly afterwards units of the Navy League Sea Cadets at Birchgrove, Drummoyne and North Sydney. He was forced to relinguish his connection with the Sea Cadets in 1924 due to business commitments, as a radio engineer, in connection with the establishment of commercial radio in Sydney.

However, in 1928, he was again asked to serve as an instructor to the Sea Cadet Corps, a 'temporary' appointment which lasted for 48 years.

His tangible memorial is the fine establishment, Sydney Training Depot and the Snapper Island Maritime Museum, a unique and priceless part of our National Heritage, based on a fine collection of relics of the *Sydney-Emden* battle. A finer memorial is the 4,000 young Australians he trained and who, in both war and peace, lived up to the principles he taught them.

In addition to his training activities, Len was an internationally recognised authority on decorations, medals and flags.

He is survived by his wife Grace and the thousands of Snapper Island 'boys' who passed through his hands.

K.R. WHITE

NB The post nominal SSD is for Special Services Decoration of the Navy League of Great Britain which was awarded to Len in 1932. He was also awarded the Cadet Forces Medal with three clasps.

Military History Library and Museum

Mr A.F. Jackson of Lismore established a military history library and museum in 1975 and 1979 respectively, initially as an aid to his study of World War II. The collection now covers other periods and is available for loan. Mr Jackson invites all members of the Military Historical Society of Australia to write to him seeking a book list. Return postage is required for all material borrowed.

MR A.F. JACKSON,
Lot 4, Corndale,
via Lismore,
NSW 2480.

Legal Corps alliance

The Australian Army Legal Corps formed an alliance with its British counterpart in February of this year. Australian units usually form links with British regiments with much longer histories, but in this case, it is the Australian corps which is the elder. The AALC was formed in 1943, while the British Army's legal service became a Corps only in 1979. Both, however, share a tradition of professional and personal connections and the motto, "Justitia in Armis".

MA to Canberra member

A unique honour was recently bestowed on a member of the Society. In April, an honorary degree of Master of Arts was awarded to Mrs Nancy Phillips, a long time member of the ACT Branch, for her work as a research assistant on the staff of the Australian Dictionary of Biography from 1961 to 1980. Mrs Phillips was presented for the degree by Professor K.S. Inglis, head of the department of history in the Research School of Social Sciences. Mrs Phillips has also been the Honorary Secretary of the Canberra and District Historical Society for the past eighteen years.

Korean War History Launched

The first part of the two-volume official history, *Australia in the Korean War – 1950-53*, was launched by the national President of the Returned Services League and Korea and South East Asia Forces Association of Australia, Sir William Keys, at the War Memorial on 24 April – the 30th anniversary of the Battle of Kapyong, in which Australian troops helped to stem a major Chinese offensive. The history is by Dr Robert O'Neill, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.

The first volume, *Strategy and Diplomacy*, is based on full access to classified documents of the Australian Government, supplemented by the views of surviving Ministers, senior public servants and military officers. The second part, *Combat Operations*, deals with the war experiences of the Australian forces. It is due to be published next year. The first volume is available from the War Memorial or the Australian Government Publishing Service. The price is $27.50, postage extra. A review of the first volume will appear in the July-September issue of *Sabretache.*

'Soldiers of the Queen'

Model soldier collectors amongst our members may be interested to know of the 'Soldiers of The Queen' series of 'old toy soldiers produced by D. B. Figurines, 224 Clarence Street, Sydney, and also available at Strand Models, 2nd Level, Strand Arcade, Sydney.

The initial range comprises five Australian Regiments, each boxed as six figures (one officer and five men).

The attractively designed boxes contain a brief description of the regiment. Each figure is approximately 54mm high with raised detail. They are hand painted and finished in gloss lacquer. The figurines are cast in quality white metal, and are collectors items – not recommended for children. New regiments will be added to the range of intervals and more than fifty sets are planned.

Price per boxed set: A$19.50
UK£12.00

Australian figures are rare and with a current trend by some makers to return to the 'toy soldier' concept, Soldiers of The Queen presents an interesting series.

MEMBERS' SALES AND WANTS.

Wanted

Two copies World War II Engineers' book *R.A.E.*

One copy Official History World War II books *Royal Australian Navy 1939 - 42* and *Air Power Over Europe 1944 - 45.*

K. G. Laycock, 20 Bremer Street, Griffith, A.C.T. 2603.

Wanted

3 Squadron At War, J. Watson & L. Jones, Sydney, 1959, Published by 3 Sqn Association.

Australian Airmen, History of 4 Squadron AFC, Lt. E. J. Richards (Editor), Melbourne, Bruce & Co., no date.

H. Hodgson, 7 Valley Road, Lindfield, N.S.W. 2070. Telephone: (02) 463768 (H) 2648077 X278 (B).

Wanted

MSM, 795, Ferguson, 2 Pnr Bn.
Trio, 1136, Hempel, 7 Bn.
Star & VM 518, James, 15 Bn.
Trio, 2044, Marsden, 17 Bn.
Pair, 5378, Morris, 17 Bn.
Pair 6341, Hopper, 23 Bn.
BWM, 564, Goodall, 6 Bn.
Pair 5200, Slavin, 11 Bn.
Star, 1175, Donohoe, 15 Bn.
Pair 5340 Dryden, 17 Bn.
Trio, 2383, Howes, 20 Bn.
Pair, 5878, Holt, 28 Bn.
Trio 2806/Lieut, Mollison.

M. P. Lucas, 62 Blackwood Tce, Holder, ACT, 2611 (062) 88 8198.

THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA

The aims of the Society are the encouragement and pursuit of study and research in military history, customs, traditions, dress, arms, equipment and kindred matters; the promotion of public interest and knowledge in these subjects, and the preservation of historical military objects with particular reference to the Armed Forces of Australia.

ORGANISATION

The Federal Council of the Society is located in Canberra.
The Society has branches in Brisbane, Canberra, Albury-Wodonga, Melbourne, Geelong, Adelaide and Perth.
Details of meetings are available from Branch Secretaries whose names and addresses appear on page 2.

SABRETACHE

The Federal Council is responsible for the publication quarterly of the Society Journal, *"Sabretache"* which is scheduled to be mailed to each member of the Society in the last week of the final month of each issue.
Publication and mailing schedule dates are:

Jan–Mar edition mailed in the last week of March.
Apr–Jun edition mailed in the last week of June.
Jul–Sept edition mailed in the last week of Sept.
Oct–Dec edition mailed in the last week of Dec.

ADVERTISING

Society members may place, at no cost, one advertisement of approximately 40 words in the "Members Sales and Wants" section once each financial year.
Commercial advertising rate is $4.70 per Column inch.
Advertising material must reach the Secretary by the following dates:
1 January for January – March edition.
1 April for April – June edition.
1 July for July – September edition.
1 October for October – December edition.

QUERIES

The Society's honorary officers cannot undertake research on behalf of members.
However, queries received by the Secretary will be published in the "Queries and Notes" section of the Journal.

SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS

Society publications advertised in *Sabretache* are available from:

Mr K. White, P.O. Box 67, Lyneham, A.C.T. 2602.
Orders and remittances should be forwarded to this address.

THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA

Please address all Correspondence to:
The Federal Secretary, P.O. Box 30, Garran, A.C.T. 2605. Australia.

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

I / We .....of .....
(Name, Rank, etc.) (Address)

.....

hereby apply for membership of the MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY of AUSTRALIA. I/WE agree to abide by the Rules, etc., of the Society and wish to be admitted as a Branch member of the.....
Branch/Corresponding Member/
Subscriber to Sabretache.

(Strike out non applicable alternative.)

My main interests are .....

I/We enclose My/Our remittance for $15.00 (Aust). being annual subscription, due 1st July each year.

.....

Summit Press Pty. Ltd.