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

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CONTENTS

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The Journal and Proceedings of The Military Historical Society of Australia (founded 1957)

SABRETACHE

The Military Historical Society of Australia

The aims of the Society are the encouragement and pursuit of study and research in military history, customs, traditions, dress, arms, equipment and kindred matters; the promotion of public interest and knowledge in these subjects, and the preservation of historical military objects with particular reference to the armed forces of Australia.

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The Federal Council of Australia is located in Canberra. The Society has branches in Brisbane, Canberra, Albury-Wodonga, Melbourne, Geelong, Adelaide and Perth. Details of meetings are available from Branch Secretaries whose names appear below.

Sabretache

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The Green Hole: exploring our neglect of the New Guinea campaigns of 1943-44[1]

Peter Stanley[2]

Over the past year we've seen much attention devoted to the fiftieth anniversaries of the significant military events of the Pacific war in 1942. I wonder whether this time next year we will have seen as much of names such as Lae, Nadzab or Shaggy Ridge as we have recently of Kokoda and the Coral Sea. By comparison, the series of campaigns which carried Australian and American forces from the ridges overlooking Salamaua in April 1943 to the capture of Madang in April 1944, are virtually unknown, summed up in vague references to "New Guinea and the islands". My concern is not, however, simply that the Australian people generally have forgotten what their fathers and grandfathers endured in those campaigns. Rather, I want to raise the question of why the military historical community of this country — in effect, ourselves — has neglected events which, on the face of it, would justify more than a passing interest.[3]

The New Guinea campaigns are for most of us a green hole. I'll establish the point by surveying briefly how they've been treated in print. Briefly because there isn't much to report. In one sense, of course, the New Guinea campaigns have been commemorated and celebrated with a daunting thoroughness, in the late David Dexter's volume of the official history, *The New Guinea offensives*. The naval, air and medical volumes of the official history complement Dexter's volume.

Australian unit histories amplify the official histories, often piling up detail. Variable in quality, impelled by understandable desires to chronicle and commemorate the doings of their own, they collectively represent a rich resource, illuminating the general from the experience of the particular. Sadly, they too often appeal largely to those who served, baffling even members of their families, who recall vaguely that Dad was in the infantry somewhere up in the islands.

Of general works, the picture is grim. The New Guinea campaigns have attracted both the best and the worst of Australian military historical writing over the past decade — but little else. David Horner's investigation of Australian command in war spans a series of works each better than the last, from *Crisis of command* to his splendid study, *General Vasey's war*. He is the only person present who need not feel uncomfortable. The worst must be Timothy Hall's pastiche *New Guinea 1942-44*, which disposes of the last two years in about twenty error-filled pages. There is little else to choose from.

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1 This paper was presented at the Australian War Memorial's 1992 History Conference, held in Canberra 3-6 November 1992. I am grateful to a number of individuals for their contribution to the paper; Mr Syd Tregellis-Smith, Dr David Homer, Mr Alec Hill, members of the Memorial's Historical Research Section and Information Services Section and Ms Megan Rich. This version is abbreviated but otherwise practically verbatim.

2 Peter Stanley heads the Australian War Memorial's Historical Research Section, where he has worked since 1980. He has just completed a doctoral thesis on the British army in nineteenth century India. As this paper suggests, however, his interest in Australian military history is undiminished. He has recently produced a research policy for the Memorial and is working on the refurbishment of its Sinai-Palestine gallery.

3 At this point in the presentation I summarised the New Guinea campaigns and their significance.

Memoirs such as Peter Ryan's *Fear drive my feet* or Frank Legg's *War correspondent* satisfy some of our desire to know what the war in New Guinea was like. The importance of the celebrated "Christmas books" published by the Memorial during and shortly after the war, such as *Jungle green*, should not be overlooked. The Christmas books and Parer's newsreel footage have between them propagated the classic image of the war in New Guinea, one yet to be supplanted. I'd note in passing that we usually see Parer's 1942 *Kokoda frontline*, not *Jungle patrol* of 1943.

How has the Australian army remembered these campaigns? I read in *General Vasey's war* how MacArthur's chief of operations wrote to Vasey, commending his advance up the Markham valley and remarking that "this will be a model for soldiers to study in their text books in future". I don't know how staff college texts consider New Guinea, but I looked at a run of the *Australian Army journal* for the period 1955-1960, a time when the Australian army was again fighting in the tropics. I found over those six years only two articles dealing with historical aspects of jungle warfare, but — a sign of the times — no less than 45 articles on atomic warfare.

It is important to realise the extent of the neglect. For example, of the 204 papers presented at this conference over the past eleven years only nine have dealt with the campaigns in New Guinea, and four of them related to particular units. The record of the Memorial's *Journal* is even more dismal. Since 1982 the *Journal* has published thirteen articles dealing with aspects of the war against Japan. Seven, however, deal with prisoners of war. Only one, a collection note on the nose art of an American Army Air Force Marauder bomber, deals directly with the war in New Guinea.

The number of grants awarded by the Memorial since 1976 also provides a revealing impression. It is notoriously difficult to classify their subjects, and many fit into several boxes, but 200 grants have been accepted since 1976. About 25 projects can be connected with the New Guinea campaigns of 1943-44. Fourteen, however, are unit histories; four are biographical studies, two deal with command generally. Three others relate to miscellaneous aspects: the armed forces' diets, wartime folklore, war correspondents. Only two, Leigh Edmonds's recently-completed study of the RAAF, and Alan Powell on intelligence, deal directly with operations in the south west Pacific theatre.

To give an indication of how New Guinea compares with other major aspects of Australian military history, 36 grants relate to Gallipoli, 15 to Vietnam, 11 to prisoners of war in the Second World War, most to prisoners of the Japanese. Gallipoli boasts 32 articles in the *Journal*, Vietnam eleven. I note in passing that the charge that Vietnam has been Australia's forgotten war begins to look dubious. Ironically, by comparison, it is the largest war which seems to have been least investigated.

Sceptics might ask about projects which the Memorial hasn't supported. You will have to take my word that there isn't a nefarious bias at work: if there were, I'd be a mug to have raised it.

Indeed, I suggest that the treatment of the campaigns in question by established authors in the field suggests that this apparent disdain isn't simply the Memorial's doing. Rather, it reflects a wider degree of apathy. The late John Robertson's *Australia at war*, the only substantial re-examination of Australia in the Second World War since the publication of Gavin Long's *The six years war*, devotes just seven-and-a-half pages to the chapter, "New Guinea, 1943-44". They're seven-and-a-half good pages, mind, and I would be loath to judge on length alone, but they don't compare with the 49 pages devoted to the period February to December 1942. It is accurate but not wholly fair to record that Jeffrey Grey's recent *A military history of Australia*

disposes of the military campaigns from Wau to Madang in one pithy paragraph. Obviously, both are concerned with the broader impact of the Pacific war upon Australia and its forces, and could not be expected to deal in detail with the conduct of operations, but the scale of treatment, and that they found so little to say about those campaigns suggests that they share the widespread bemusement of what to make of them.

What do we lose by this neglect? I suggest that in the absence of a clear understanding of these events we permit the survival of an attenuated menu of images which collectively represent the war in New Guinea in the popular imagination, a compound of impressions of diggers in jungle green uniforms — "the best jungle fighters in the world" — saving Australia from invasion by beating fanatical Japs. The picture becomes a caricature. "New Guinea" becomes a green blur, dotted with a couple of indistinct landmarks: Buna, Shaggy Ridge, all overshadowed, of course, by Kokoda. For the Memorial, I would argue that the consequence would be that we know less and less, raising the dangerous prospect that we eventually fail to understand the significance of our collection, particularly of official records. The net result of our deepening ignorance, I need hardly emphasise, would ultimately be to diminish awareness of those whom the Memorial seeks to commemorate.

Why is it so? I've discussed this question with a number of people recently. I won't name them, since the conclusions I've drawn are my own. I'll briefly discuss in turn five possible explanations.

First, because the New Guinea campaigns were complex, requiring a great deal of effort to understand just what occurred, why and to what point. I'd agree, but military operations by their nature are complex, and that doesn't usually deter attention. This perception of their complexity derives, perhaps, from the relationship between the nature of the war in New Guinea and the way it was recorded in the official history. Perhaps David Dexter was too close to the experience about which he wrote. Familiar with the jungle war, he largely failed to anticipate the needs of readers unfamiliar with the strategic, tactical and logistical logic of the campaigns. Speaking honestly, who has not picked up The New Guinea offensives only to be deterred or at least depressed to find that the New Guinea campaigns were so detailed.

Second, it's been suggested to me that the war in New Guinea was, compared to other operations, undramatic, lacking the highs and lows of, say, Kokoda. Perhaps David Dexter modestly presented them in a minor key, but I'd suggest that the events he chronicled are hardly dull. The three-months fight for Shaggy Ridge, perhaps the one New Guinea action popularly known, was a desperate affair, fought along knife-edged ridges on a one-man front. At Finschhafen a Japanese counter-attack drove between the 24th and 20th Brigades, and only the Australian ability to move reinforcements unimpeded prevented what might have been a messy reverse.

Third, and ironically, because they were by and large so successful. Historians thrive on tension, dissent, problems and failure. It's hard to avoid the conclusion that to be interesting Australia's campaigns have to involve a defeat, as in Gallipoli, a narrow victory, as in Kokoda, a victory so costly that it might have been better to have lost, as in the western front. British perfidy, incompetence and contempt adds zest, certainly at many sessions of this conference, so perhaps the absence of British generalship itself explains our reluctance to acknowledge arguably our most successful campaigns.

Fourth, that despite their success, the New Guinea campaigns contributed little to the war's outcome. For example, this slide was produced by the army. Its perspective exaggerates the scale of the advance. On another projection, the New Guinea campaigns appear small beer.

Nevertheless, they were the Australian army's largest, and, in any case, as the persistent fascination with Gallipoli attests, there's a clear correlation between futility and historical interest; but it doesn't extend to New Guinea.

Fifth, because Australians were and are Eurocentric. We know — or at least care — more of D-Day than we do of our own battles. Conversely, our apathy towards Melanesia, evident today in our news coverage, carries over into an indifference to the Australian war there.

The neglect which I'm arguing has occurred isn't, however, confined to the New Guinea campaigns. I'm conscious that fifty years ago today the 9th Australian Division was withdrawn from the battle of Alamein. The war in the Mediterranean theatre occupied three AIF divisions for two years, and yet how many books or articles have appeared dealing with Australia's part in it? Again the *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* has published three articles in ten years, two of them by Alec Hill and one of them was commissioned. Only fourteen research grants awarded since 1976 have dealt with the war in the Mediterranean theatre, again mostly unit histories, if anything a sign of its greater marginality. And of course my observations on the 1943-44 campaigns apply equally to those of 1945.

So it seems that the neglect of New Guinea is a part of a wider amnesia concerning the Second World War. This might appear to be a surprising claim, but is it possible that we are still fixated on Gallipoli because it relates to the perennial Australian preoccupation with national identity. Except for Kokoda, do we ignore large and important aspects of our military experience with less direct connection with impulses which have traditionally given Australian history its dynamism?

My argument so far has been a gloomy one. I'm about to depress you further, though, by asking what the neglect of the New Guinea campaigns means for the field of Australian military history as a whole. Surveying the neglect of the operational history of the two major theatres of the war, it's difficult to avoid the conclusion that Australian military history is a doughnut, a periphery without a core.

I am arguing that we have operated for some time now under a serious but unrecognised misapprehension. Practically every applicant or a research job at the Memorial whom I've encountered has made the point that military history is about more than battles. And you'd be hard put to disagree. Considering the neglect of these campaigns, though, and the successful propagation of the "new military history" which we've seen over the past decade, you'd have to hope that soon we'll start to hear aspiring research officers claim that military history is about more than attitudes and reactions on the home front. I find myself in the curious position of having just completed a thesis in which I've argued that military history can and should be integrated more closely into its social context. This afternoon, I find myself wondering whether in our field we've got the mixture wrong.

I emphasise that this does not represent a recantation of the thrust toward military social history which has been such a feature of the past decade in our field. I'm not arguing that the investigation of the effects of war on Australian society as a whole has in any sense been misdirected. I affirm that this attention has enriched our understanding of what war has meant for this country and its people. I'm not even arguing that this process has gone too far: I don't think an excess of understanding is possible, never mind undesirable.

But what we have lost is an awareness of the importance of study of military operations, their conduct and their impact on those who fought. We don't see much operational military history outside the pages of the unit and the official history — perhaps we never did. I suggest, though, that we should. It seems self-evident to me, but I don't think that a field of study that

explores the impact of war without considering the course or conduct of operations can ultimately be justified.

If the time is ripe for a re-examination of the Australian campaigns in New Guinea, in what terms should that re-examination be framed? Impelled by the pluralism inherent in my job, I'd suggest that a variety of approaches would be legitimate and welcome. At the risk of mouthing platitudes, I'd welcome publication of unit histories, of all services, and of memoirs. For the most part, though, such works will chronicle, inform and record rather than re-interpret, and I'm arguing that we need to re-think the significance of this experience.

So how should we approach such a re-examination? Research is the child of a liaison between questions and sources. Let me discuss prospects for future research by considering each parent in turn. Research pursuing fresh questions or revising aspects inadequately covered in existing studies offers one route. I offer a selection, but I'm sure that many more could be generated by others.

As I suggested, David Dexter wrote with the veteran's familiarity. As a consequence, The New Guinea offensives either assumes a knowledge of, or covers inadequately, vital aspects of the war in New Guinea. For example, Dexter documents at length the Australians' mastery of jungle warfare, but neither he nor the other official historians who cover the army's war against the Japanese account for how or by whom this expertise originated and developed. Two theses exploring this question have recently been completed, one by John Moremon, one of the Memorial's 1990 Summer Vacation Scholars. I'm sure that neither author would contend that his work offers the last word on the evolution of the Australian army's tactics in New Guinea, not to mention the ways in which the army met the requirements of that peculiar campaign.

The history of the human impact upon and interaction with the natural environment has become a topical approach The effects of the terrain and climate on military operations and their effects on the country offer much scope for new work. New Guinea offered an unfamiliar, arduous and baffling arena to an army accustomed to either the north African desert or the training camps of south-eastern Australia. We have caricatured the terrain of the battles in the Markham and Ramu valleys and the Huon Peninsula as "the jungle" betraying our real ignorance of the environment in which the war was fought. But how did the Australian army — through the Army Geographical Section, for example, — learn about and adapt to this unfamiliar environment, from mapping its contours to coping with the effects of heat, rain and humidity on men and equipment? And how did the massive military presence affect the country, from dredging and road-building to spraying DDT?

The successful prosecution of the New Guinea campaigns depended, much more so than might be imagined from existing official or unit histories, upon logistics and upon intelligence. We need to know more about the logistics of the campaigns, from the massive resources of the American landing ships to the thousands of carriers recruited by ANGAU. And we need to know more about intelligence, not simply about the strategic level, which has attracted some attention, but about the ways in which Japanese intentions, dispositions and attitudes were divined. Such studies would call upon a demanding range of skills: knowledge of the techniques of military intelligence, of the nuances of interrogation and translation, and the ability to connect both to the course of operations.

Mention of ANGAU (the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit) reminds us that our knowledge of its work is limited. We need to know more about its members, their backgrounds, and the skills and attitudes which they brought to the work of liaising between

the peoples of New Guinea and the army which needed their labour. The ubiquitous New Guinea Volunteer Rifles and Papuan Infantry Battalion, small parties of which participated in virtually every Australian operation in New Guinea, have still to be adequately treated. Studies of each might illuminate not just the roots of Australian success in the campaigns, but the nature of Australian colonialism in the territory. Despite the work of historians of Papua New Guinea in exploring the profound impact which the war made on the people of the territories, their work has largely not crossed the invisible membrane which too often separates us from historians working in congruent fields.[4]

It's a commonplace to observe that these campaigns necessitated the closest co-operation between the three Australian services, and between they and their United States counterparts. Exploration of that relationship, however, has been limited largely to considering co-operation (and that's often not the right word) at the highest level, and to exploring the American impact on Australia. Except for a useful series of studies in High command, little attention has been directed to understanding how the two nations' services co-operated at the operational level; the extent to which they borrowed or imposed or ignored techniques, tactics and lessons learned by the other. For the Australian services alone, co-operation between the RAAF and army particularly, was a vital part of the war. The importance of this question has, I think, been obscured by the Australian division by service rather than by period or subject.

We need to understand more about the social history of the AMF in the south west Pacific. For example, the discipline of the first AIF has been investigated in several theses. That of Australians in the Pacific has been almost entirely neglected. Though Gavin Long's *The final campaigns* refers frankly to the troops' disillusionment in 1945, the official histories generally avoid discussion of the ways in which the AMF coped with the difficulties of motivating or managing soldiers in a theatre in which so much conspired to depress and unsettle them. For example, the 17th Brigade remained on active service in the hills before Salamaua for six months; how did its units retain efficiency, cohesion and morale?

The re-interpretation of battles, supposedly the military historian's preoccupation, has been pursued less thoroughly for the Pacific war than for, say, the first world war. Here we need to be careful to ask, to what end, but again, a new technique, an unsuspected conjunction of sources, fresh questions, might revise events which we thought securely enclosed within Dexter's pages. The 9th Division's campaign for the Huon Peninsula, for example, comprised a series of battles fought by its brigades, a level of command which usually falls between strategic studies and unit histories. There is some light here. Having just completed his latest book, on Buna, Lex McAulay is gradually writing his way along the north coast of Papua, as is Peter Brune, now engaged in a new book on Milne Bay. It might be some years before they land at Red Beach.

So much for questions; what of sources as starting points for future research? Personal sources for the Second World War are less extensive than for the first. Indeed, as a proportion of those who served they represent arguably the weakest component of the Memorial's collection. Ron Gilchrist, our curator of private records, advises me that the Memorial holds about 900 collections of private records relating to the western front and about 800 relating to Gallipoli, but we have less than 300 relating to the campaigns in Papua and New Guinea. Without

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[4] I am pleased to record that in January 1993 the Memorial awarded a Summer Vacation Scholarship to Biama Kanasa of the University of Papua New Guinea, who spent six weeks investigating ANGAU records in the Memorial's collection.

considering the quality or extent of the later material, it has certainly been exploited much less thoroughly.

For the time being we can also count on oral history as a source. Indeed, one of the main justifications for the Memorial's major oral history project, the Keith Murdoch Sound Archive of Australia in the Second World War, was that interviews would supplement the inadequate holdings of letters, diaries and other private papers. Oral history is, however, a wasting asset. It might be indelicate to refer in this company to the approaching mortality of Second World War veterans, but the fact should prompt us to attempt over the next twenty-five years to collect personal sources relating to the Second World War. I'm flying a personal kite here in lobbying for such a drive, but hope that it could be co-ordinated by the Memorial. I hope too that Joan Beaumont's forthcoming critical anthology of sources on the Pacific war, for which she's been awarded an Australian War Memorial research grant for 1993, will impart a renewed impetus to the interpretation of private records.

By contrast, official records are abundant. Though well used by the few researchers with stamina enough to master them, they too remain largely unexploited and virtually unexamined save for a handful of unit historians and specialists.

Much of the re-examination I propose has concerned conventional military history — the study of battles, leaders, tactics, logistics and so on. But there's a larger and I suggest, more important question: what's the point? Is there a higher purpose to the accumulation of knowledge which I advocate so earnestly? I would argue that there is, that the point of these studies should be directed ultimately to the question, what did the war in New Guinea mean for Australia? It's a brave question to put, because on the face of it it's pretty simple-minded.

Naturally, I'd argue that it's not. In pondering whether and why we need to re-examine these campaigns I've taken comfort from Paul Fussell's book *Wartime*, on understanding and behaviour in the Second World War. Fussell, quoting Walt Whitman from the American civil war, discusses how "the real war will never get in the books". His conclusion, reflecting how "unbombed America" could not comprehend the reality or the meaning of its fighting men, applies equally to Australia. Either nation has not yet understood what the Second World War was like and has thus been unable to use such understanding to re-interpret and re-define the national reality and to arrive at something like public maturity.

I suggest that we need a book to do for New Guinea what Bill Gammage's *The broken years* did for the first AIF. *The broken years* revealed the Australia of 1914 and how the Great War changed it. We need a book which will not simply attempt to replicate — a *Broken years* in jungle green — but which considers how characteristic aspects of the war in New Guinea shaped both the experience of serving there and post-war Australian society. I'm thinking of the inherent tension between military authority and egalitarianism, the impact of observing American technological mastery, the growing Australian capacity to manage a complex military effort, the encounter with the cultures of Melanesia, and the troops' perception of the Japanese, the consequences of all of which are evident in post-war Australia.

I don't want to be thought to dwell unduly on the slot on the conference program this paper occupies. Indeed, there's a good deal of sense in it, In a way it's more the Clayton's keynote address for next year rather than the final paper for this year. I hope that at subsequent conferences we'll see the green hole gradually filled in.

The Battle of the Beach Heads, November 1942 - January 1943

Fred Cranston

There have been many 50th military anniversaries celebrated over the past twelve months or so. One that will probably not be recognised or celebrated, although it had a great significance to Australia, is the Battle of the Beach Heads fought in New Guinea between November 1942 and January 1943.

The Battle of the Beach Heads was a battle almost won by the anopheles mosquito as both Allied and Japanese forces involved were decimated by this infernal pest. On the Allied side, malaria caused by this mosquito accounted for three to four times as many casualties as did the enemy. Other tropical diseases such as dengue fever, scrub typhus and dysentery affected soldiers, but none could match the debilitating malaria, as the effects were felt over a long period with most personnel suffering multiple relapses for several years afterwards. One reason contributing to this was the shortage of infantry troops for the front line, with men not evacuated until their temperature reached 104° F (40° C)!

Six months after the campaign, twelve men per week were being evacuated from the 49th Battalion with relapses of malaria.[1] It would be fair to say that a similar situation existed with all the other units that had served in the area, not only infantry troops, as the 32nd American Division dropped 2,334 officers and men eight months after the campaign ended because of fever relapses.[2]

The Beach Heads campaign resulted from the defeat of the Japanese on the Kokoda Track by the Australians, where the enemy had fought delaying actions at Templeton's Crossing, Eora Creek and finally the battle at Ovi and Gorari where the Japanese were completely routed leaving an estimated 600 dead at the latter place alone![3] They also lost their commander, General Horii, who with many others, drowned in the attempted escape across the flooded Kumusi River. Several hundred finally reached the beach-head after crossing at the river mouth in December.

Following this, the Australians set out after the enemy, with 25th Brigade headed for Gona and 16th Brigade headed for Sanananda. The Beach Heads area stretched from Gona to Buna-Cape Endaiadere, being roughly divided by the Girua river. The Australians were allotted the western side with 126th American Regiment from their 32nd Division. This division had been gathering on the eastern side of the river for some time and were given the task of capturing the Buna and Cape Endariadere area. They had attached the Australian 2/6th Independent Company. Later, when the Americans were bogged down in their assault, they were to have the brilliant Australian 18th Brigade brought in from Milne Bay which was to play a major and vital role in reducing this strong point.

The whole country in these parts was flat and swampy and the Japanese had carefully chosen the positions they were going to defend, being virtually the only "high" ground available.

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1 Cranston, Fred, *Always Faithful*, Brisbane, Booralong, 1983, p 192.

2 Milner, Samuel, *Victory in Papua*, Washington, DC: American Official History, 1970, p 372.

3 McCarthy, Dudley *Southwest Pacific Area, First Year*, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1959, p 331.

Their fortifications were formidable and consisted of a series of bunkers, which in some cases were only slightly excavated as the water table would not allow deep diggings — something the Allies quickly discovered. These fortifications were constructed mainly with coconut logs for both walls and roofing. In some cases steel drums filled with sand reinforced walls and steel plating did likewise to the roofing. These bunkers were connected by trenches and were sited to give mutual supporting fire, with snipers tied to the trees also protecting the lanes of fire and approach. Direct hits from the 25 pounder shells and mortar bombs had little or no effect on them. The bunkers were well camouflaged with fast growing vegetation. Usually they could not even be seen from just a few yards away. The Japanese had to be literally dug out or blown out of these positions.

The fanatical resistance displayed by the Japanese was a significant factor, as was their plentiful supply of all types of weapons. But the crucial mistake of the campaign was the under estimation of the enemy strengths manning the defences. The Americans estimated there were 300[4] in the Buna defences, and the Australian General Vasey thought about 1,500 to 2,000 enemy defended Gona and the Sanananda area.[5] In the former were some 2,000-2,500 and the latter 5,500 with 1,700 at the Sanananda road — Cape Kilerton track junction guarding the approach to the Giruwa area where the main Japanese base was located. Gona contained 800-900 enemy.[6] About 1,000 fresh and battle tested infantry reinforcements reached Giruwa in the middle of November and, as late as 2 December, a further 400-500 arrived.[7]

It is no secret that the government of the time should also share the blame for the military situation that followed, as total control of the Australian forces was given to the American, General MacArthur, who would not listen to the advice of the allied fighting generals and sat hundreds of miles away from the action issuing personal orders that had no real relevance to the situation. For example, he issued orders such as:

> "All columns were to be driven through to their objectives regardless of losses".
>
> "The fighting at Buna was being done with great gallantry but with too little concentration of force. Where you have a company on your firing line you should have a battalion, and where you have a battalion you should have a regiment and your attack instead of being made by two or three hundred rifles should be made by two or three thousand."[8]

Further, he was urging speed on General Eichelberger, his American commander at Buna, who recalls messages on a least three occasions "that time was of the essence" and so on. Yet later, MacArthur stated "the time element was in this case of little importance".[9]

The allies, urged on by their commander, were thrown against stubborn defenders. Many brave men were needlessly killed or wounded: the Americans at Buna, then the Australians at Gona and Sanananda. The 25th brigade and 3rd (militia) Battalion spent itself at Gona and the

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4 Eichelberger, R L, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*, London, Odhams Press, 1951, p 80.

5 Milner, op cit p 139

6 Milner, op cit, pp 145, 146 McCarthy, op cit, pp 383, 415, 441.

7 Milner, op cit, p 146 McCarthy, op cit, pp 415, 416.

8 Mayo, Lida "Bloody Buna", Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1975, pp 102, 155.

9 Milner, op cit, pp 369, 370

16th Brigade at the Sanananda track junction. It should be remembered that these Australians "alone" had already fought the spectacular and strenuous actions across the Kokoda Track.

The American 126th regiment then took up the fight at Sanananda, hinting to the Australians that they "could go home now" as they (the Americans) "were here to clean things up".[10] They were in for a shock, and apart from establishing a road block some 1,300 metres from the track junction, they were no more further advanced and had suffered substantial casualties.

It was then the turn of the untrained militia of 30th Brigade (being 49th and 55/53rd Battalions). Early in December, General Blamey had told Mr Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, that he was committing an intensively trained militia brigade (30th Brigade). This was simply untrue as its training level was at its lowest possible level.[11] Both these battalions were to suffer terrible casualties in their first attacks as a result of lack of training and poor information, the former losing up to 60% of the attacking force which was 48% of the Battalion. Then the 36th (militia) Battalion and the 7th Division cavalry who were fighting as infantry were committed and virtually obtained similar results. This brought about a stalemate. As Colonel Keogh wrote, in *The South West Pacific 1941-45*:

> "If World War I taught anything at all it taught in many battles the costly folly of sending inadequately supported infantry against undamaged fortifications manned by a determined garrison plentifully provided with automatic weapons".[12]

Gona was the first strong point to fall to 21st Brigade and 39th (militia) Battalion both of which performed so well on the Kokoda Track. They had been rested, partially reinforced and brought over to relieve the battle fatigued 25th Brigade. More heavy fighting was to follow west to Haddy's village before they were, in turn, relieved by 14th Brigade. Buna was the next to fall on 2 January, but not until the Australian 18th Brigade was brought in from Milne Bay with some carriers and tanks to support the Americans. Sanananda was the last to fall and, again, the brilliant 18th Brigade had been reinforced and brought over from Buna. With the aid of tanks and assisted by elements of I/163rd American Regiment from 41st Division, they brought the fighting to an end on 22 January 1943. The first attack by this Brigade with the tanks was again a costly failure as the tanks could only operate on the narrow road and were soon put out of action after much brave fighting. However, the Japanese had been ordered to withdraw, a fact the Australians learned from a Japanese prisoner. The Australians quickly followed and completed the rout. Meanwhile, fighting had continued west of Gona. The 36th and 55/53rd Battalions completed the cleaning up there although it was estimated that probably 1,000 enemy eluded the final fighting with many making their way up the coast to Salamura and Lae.

The victory had been won at a terrible cost to the allies and it was to be the bloodiest fighting of the Pacific war for MacArthur. "Except for Bataan and Corregidor, this was his darkest hour".[13] There were to be, in all, more than three times the battle casualties than at Guadalcanal. The Australians suffered the most. One third of the total casualties were from the five militia battalions committed (3rd, 36th, 39th, 49th, and 55/53rd), compared with those

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10 McCarthy, op cit, p 394.

11 Horner, D M *Crisis of Command*, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1978, pp 86, 87, 236.

12 Keogh, E G *The South West Pacific 1941-45*, Melbourne, Grayflower Productions, 1965, p 277.

13 Manchester, W *American Caesar*, Melbourne, Hutchinson, 1978, p 328.

Tanks and infantry in close co-operation in the fighting at Buna (courtesy, AWM)

suffered by the AIF and Americans.[14] Significantly, for every battle casualty there were three evacuations due to illness. The cost was enormous. To illustrate, the following figures show the number of personnel evacuated in some units involved:

16th Brigade: **2/1st; 2/2nd; 2/3rd Battalion** — 26 officers and 576 ORs killed and wounded; 53 officers and 856 ORs evacuated sick. This represents 85% of the units.

25th Brigade: unit numbers when evacuated from fighting were respectively: **2/25th Battalion** — 14 officers and 233 ORs; **2/31st Battalion** — 9 and 197; **2/33rd Battalion**— 8 and 170. Their average strength at the start of the campaign was 27 officers and 504 ORs.[15]

30th Brigade: unit numbers when evacuated from fighting were respectively: **39th Battalion** — 7 officers and 25 ORs; **49th Battalion** — 6 and 44. (49th battalion full casualties were killed and wounded — 14 officers and 282 ORs; evacuated sick — 11 and 302.)[16]

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[14] McCarthy, op cit, pp 407, 435.

[15] McCarthy, op cit, p 407, 435.

[16] Austin, Victor, *To Kokoda and Beyond*, Melbourne University Press, 1988, p 236. Cranston, op cit, p 193.

126th US Regt: killed, 305; wounded 728. Strength on evacuation 32 officers and 579 ORs. Regiment original strength 131 and 3,040.[17]

Certainly, the fighting could not have been carried out without the support of other army units such as artillery, army service corps, medical, engineers and so on. A large contribution was also made by the RAAF, American 5th Air Force and allied navies.

For those who took part in the campaign and survived, there will always be the memories of the atrocious conditions under which the campaign was fought and the sick and fever racked bodies of their companions, some losing anything from twelve to twenty kilograms of weight. Added to this was the interminable rain and stifling heat and humidity and the monotonous rations of tinned "Bully Beef" (corned beef) and "Dogs Biscuits" (army biscuits) for every meal (although in the early part most Australians went hungry because of the shortage of even these rations and the fact that the enemy stripped the local native gardens during their withdrawal). Nor will they forget the fixed purpose and fighting qualities of the Japanese in defence. For example, at Gona, the Japanese had been seen with gas masks on because of the smell stirred up by artillery fire of their own unburied dead, the bodies of whom, in some instances, were used to help protect those still fighting. Many bodies of Australian and American soldiers could not be recovered during actions on all of these fronts and were never found. This contributed to vile smells everywhere near defences. In most positions the Japanese were literally starving as their supply lines had been completely cut, although this was no deterrent to their fighting, and, in comparison, few unwounded or sick prisoners were ever taken.

Whether or not this battle was necessary will always be open to discussion, as it was thought by some commanders that the enemy could have been sealed off and allowed to wither away. However, it was fought, and later admitted by MacArthur's chief intelligence officer that the battle became a race between MacArthur and the commander at Guadalcanal to see who would turn in the first "land" victory over the Japanese.[18]

It was certainly a victory, but at what cost?

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17 Milner, op cit, p 371.

18 Mayo op cit p 187.

Not "a Wimbledon common or even a Werribee encampment affair": the first Tasmanian Volunteer encampment, 1868[1]

Gillian Winter

In his study of Tasmanian volunteer military forces before 1901, *A lion in the colony*, D M Wyatt notes that the first annual military encampment was held at "Mona Vale", Ross during Easter 1885. At least one earlier military encampment had taken place, however, in 1868, during the first decade of the volunteers' existence.

Lloyd Robson has noted that the change from a penal to a self-governing colony (in 1856) led to a growth in "imperial sentiment, strengthened and increased by a yearning on the part of the self-appointed respectability to be true-blue Britons". It is perhaps not surprising then, that when the Crimean War was over and "a call to form a volunteer movement echoed throughout the British Empire", the Tasmanian Parliament passed a *Volunteer Act*, 1858, which was enthusiastically supported by the local population, including retired officers and soldiers of British regiments.

By 1863, the Tasmanian Volunteer Force comprised 957 men, but had declined to 421 by the end of 1866. A local satirical magazine which flourished, first as *Tasmanian Punch* and later as *Hobart Town Punch*, from July 1866 to February 1868, considered "the Jolly Dogs" fair game and noted their declining numbers:

> "Has anybody seen anything of the volunteer force lately? We have not. There was a guard of honour certainly at the opening of Parliament, but with that enormous demonstration of military enthusiasm, the martial ardour of our brave defenders seems to have temporarily expired ... We couldn't do without volunteers now a days. They have become a necessity, if only to keep our youngsters out of mischief. The people believe in them, the ladies especially believe in them, the little children believe in them and, a hem! *We* believe in them."

A Royal Commission was appointed in 1867 to inquire into the condition of the Volunteer Force. It found that lack of community and government support and the cost and difficulty of training deterred men from joining, or staying if they did join. In fact, the colony of Tasmania was, in the 1860s, experiencing an economic depression and finding self- government an expensive undertaking. While British regular troops remained in the colony (which they did until 1870) and there was no immediate threat of foreign invasion the Tasmanian government was not prepared to support patriotic sentiment with funds and the volunteers themselves were left with the financial liability. As *Tasmanian Punch* succinctly remarked:

> "Subscriptions are the present bane of the Volunteer force, and if the men were only allowed to perform their duty without being compelled to pay for the privilege, no doubt not [sic] we should see them on parade oftener."

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[1] This article was originally published by the Tasmanian Arms and Militaria Society. The President of that Society requested that *Sabretache* republish the article in order to bring it to a wider audience. Despite usual policy of *Sabretache* not to reprint material, Federal Council was pleased on this occasion to accede to the request of the Tasmanian Arms and Militaria Society.

The volunteer numbers continued to decline and the government did not take serious action until the *Volunteer Act* of 1878. Its immediate response to the Royal Commission of 1867, however, was to reconstitute and consolidate the volunteers into one artillery corps in the South and one in the North. The Master Gunner and Instructor of Artillery, R H Eccleston, in the introduction to his handbook for volunteers published in 1868, tried to imbue his readers with a sense of importance in the task in hand:

> "You have taken an Oath of Allegiance to Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, that you will faithfully serve Her in this Colony for the defence of the same ... In the eyes of your fellow-Colonists it must (or should) be a most meritorious act on your part. It shows that you are willing to sacrifice relatives, friends, and self for the public weal ... strive to obtain all the knowledge you can of your self-imposed duties ... and you will raise yourself in your own opinion, in that of your Officers, fellow-Colonists, and friends."

An outcome of the attempt to revitalise the volunteer corps in 1868 was the proposal for a two-day military encampment. The *Mope-Hawk* (a bi-monthly magazine, published from May to December 1868, which succeeded *Punch* as a satirical commentator on local affairs) published a letter on 1 November from "Scarlet Runner":

> "Dear Mr Mope-Hawk, Have you heard the glorious news? There is going to be a Volunteer Encampment — real tents, and all that sort of thing! Isn't it fun. I am so fond of all the dear soldiers and volunteers with their darling uniforms — they look so handsome. Indeed I think a pair of striped trowsers — red and black you know — make any man look well. And there will be a band and sentries, and all the rest!"

The letter was accompanied by a lengthy poem "The Brown's River Picnic", enumerating the supposed joys of camp life. The proposed encampment had been first publicly mooted in the *Mercury* in a letter from "An Old Campaigner", complaining both of the cost and the brevity of the camp:

> "This is a style of playing at soldiers for which the public should certainly not be put to any charge. It is utterly impossible that the slightest knowledge of camp duty can be imparted to the men of the force in the time mentioned."

The sentiments of the editor were at one with "An Old Campaigner" and he launched a further attack several days later:

> "We felt inclined to regard the matter as a joke, but it seems there was truth in the statement, and that the absurdity is to be perpetrated in the neighbourhood of O'Brien's Bridge [Glenorchy] on Saturday, Sunday, and Monday next ... If it is the intention of the Artillery volunteers to hold this pic-nic, — for it is sheer burlesque to designate it by any other title, — at their own expense, we have not one word to say, as they have a perfect right to amuse themselves as they think proper ... [but it] should not be allowed to cost the public one farthing!"

The proposed modest encampment, comprising eight tents and about 100 officers and men for two days, at a distance from the batteries which were to be the basis of Hobart's defence in the event of foreign aggression, had raised the ire of the *Mercury*. The *Mope-Hawk's* second account throws considerable light on the reason!: the ubiquitous John Davies, proprietor of the *Mercury*, and lampooned by *Punch* as "Captain Jack" of the Jolly Dogs' Second Rifles, was no longer an officer in the reconstituted Hobart Town Division of the Tasmanian Volunteer Force.

> "With such men holding prominent position, it was no wonder that the public withheld their support and it was with a view to removing this reproach from the Volunteer movement that the late force was disbanded, care being taken that as far as possible the new officers should at all events be men possessing respectability of character, and propriety of demeanour."

The *Mope-Hawk* went on to claim that the 120 volunteers of Hobart Town who had opposed John Davies and braved his public scorn by attending the camp had demonstrated "one indispensable requisite in the soldier, namely courage". The *Mope-Hawk* was also pleased to be able to report that the military and camp duties had been carried out with "a hearty good will" and "a better or cheaper way of combining amusement with instruction to our citizen soldiers can scarcely be devised".

In fact, the *Mercury* had already tried to change its public stance by objectively reporting the progress of the camp on the final day of its duration. The thirty tents, (sent from Melbourne by the Victorian volunteers) and the field artillery had been set up in Mr Wilkinson's paddock, bordering, it was stated, on a beautiful bay on the town side of O'Brien's Bridge (ie the area now covered by Elwick racecourse). The tents were arranged in a square within a huge natural amphitheatre, those of the men being on either side, while the officers' tents and messroom were at the head and the tents for catering at the other end. Cooking arrangements were the responsibility of Bombardier Webb, "the young Tasmanian Gunter". An advance fatigue party made preparations on Saturday for the arrival of the troops. The latter assembled at the Drill Yard in lower Macquarie Street at 7.00pm after their normal day's work, and marched off to the strains of the band playing *The girl I left behind me.*

"A large concourse of people" followed the volunteers through Hobart to the "Horse and Jockey" or Cooley's Hotel (then, as now, in Main Road, Moonah) where they had refreshments, finally reaching camp at 10.00pm.

On Sunday camp duties mainly centred on mounting and relieving guards and a church parade. The Rev. R D Harris, M A, preached to the Protestants on the text "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might", suggesting that "Unless a little corps of this sort is like a clench'd fist, it is utterly useless for any practical purpose". The Roman Catholics attended the local church. In the afternoon "many hundreds of persons" visited the camp, including regular officers stationed in the colony, who expressed their approval of the arrangements.

Monday was a public holiday for the Prince of Wales' birthday. A salute was fired in his honour and in the afternoon it was estimated that 1,000 people visited the camp, "'the distance from town being such as to render it accessible to all classes". The volunteers spent the day drilling and returned to the city by 9.00pm.

An estimate of the success of the camp is provided by the Tasmanian *Times* newspaper account. It clarified the question of cost - the volunteers (133 men plus officers) who attended paid pro rata expenses (commencing with gunners at 2/- each) and the government paid the balance, chiefly for ammunition. The *Times* opined that order and regularity were conspicuous in all the arrangements and activities and that such a camp was

> "preferable to moonlight march outs, which, after all, were merely to a favourite country hotel, and could be of no real service to the volunteer in teaching him his duties ... This is the first attempt that has been made at training our small corps of artillery into ... the real life of camp and they have gone through the ordeal in a very satisfactory manner."

Literary Remains of the Lone French General

Frank Carleton

Glumly contemplating the loss in early 1992 of my leather framed portrait photograph of Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) — a consequence of another's memory lapse — I recalled its origins. The splendid full leather frame had been acquired for $2.50 in a junk (or was it junque?) shop and brought to a martial shine by numerous applications of leather dressing. The portrait was a reproduction of the frontispiece to vol. I of the English translation of de Gaulle's three volume *Mémoires de guerre*[1] entitled, *The call to honour*.[2] General de Gaulle is depicted at his desk in his wartime London headquarters in Carlton Gardens not far from Pall Mall.

The work opens with brief, but evocative, autobiographical detail grounded in the purest patriotism and beginning: "All my life I have thought of France in a certain way." This extended narrative by a writer steeped in Caesar's *Commentaries* and the French literary classics recounts the origins and development of the Free French movement, one of the great human adventures of the twentieth century, formed in the anguish and humiliation of national defeat and consummated in the triumph of the Liberation. This political and military testament of the Man of 18 June, 1940 — "Moi, General de Gaulle"[3] — was composed during his self-imposed exile at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, where, disgusted by the post war recrudescence of the self serving puny party politics which had eviscerated the Third Republic, he awaited a new call to serve France. It came on 28 May 1958 when René Coty, the last President of the expiring Fourth Republic, then hopelessly enmeshed in the Algerian War and facing the possibility of civil war, announced the summons to "the most illustrious of Frenchmen"[4] to the helm of the Republic.

Before the military and political debacle of 1940 thrust de Gaulle to prominence, he had published several books of small public repute.[5]

His earliest work, *Une Mauvaise Rencontre* (An unfortunate meeting), a precociously ironic verse duologue between a brigand and a traveller, after the style of Rostand, was written at the age of fourteen and performed *en famille* in 1905 by the author and his cousin. It won a small

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1 Charles de Gaulle *Mémoires de guerre*. 3 vols. I. L'Appel, II. L'Unité, III. Le Salut. Paris: Plon, 1954-1959

2 Charles de Gaulle *War memoirs*. Vol. I. *The call to honour 1940-1942*. Translated by Jonathan Griffin, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955

3 3. De Gaulle flew from Bordeaux, the last refuge of the distracted Reynaud Government on 17 June. In Churchill's words, "The machine soared off into the air, while the French police and officials gaped. De Gaulle carried with him, in this small aeroplane, the honour of France" (W.S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, 3. The Fall of France. London: Cassell, 1964 p. 194). At 6.00 pm. on 18 June, as Pétain's government of national defeat prepared to seek an armistice with Nazi Germany, de Gaulle broadcast his historic, if little heard, call to arms on the BBC: "I, General de Gaulle, now in London, call on all French officers and men who are at present on British soil, or may be in the future ... Whatever happens, the flame of French resistance must not, and shall not die". Speech quoted in full in Francois Kersaudy, *Churchill and de Gaulle*, London: Fontana, 1990 p. 80.

4 Quoted, *De Gaulle: anachronism, realist, or prophet?* Ed. by F Roy Willis, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, p. 6.

5 Regrettably, but inevitably, it was necessary to rely upon the two library catalogues cited below for descriptions of several of de Gaulle's books.

literary competition and was published. In July and August 1943, the play had six performances, three in each of two manors in Normandy, one of them occupied by soldiers of the Wehrmacht, who had no knowledge of the play's authorship.[6]

In his first book, *La Discorde chez l'ennemi* of 1924,[7] de Gaulle drew upon his direct acquaintance with the Germans gained as a prisoner of war from February 1916, when, in a terrible six day battle at Verdun, in which most of his company was wiped out, he was captured, having been knocked out by a shell burst. Five escape attempts were frustrated by his recognisable great height. In the year of publication, he was serving with the French army of occupation at Mainz.

The preface to the book by his patron and first colonel, Marshal Pétain, predicted: "One day a grateful France will call on him".[8]

A year and a half on the staff of the French army of the Levant in Beirut, beginning in 1929, yielded two books. With Louis Pierre Jean Yvon, de Gaulle edited *Histoire des troupes du Levant* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1931), a work for the Exposition coloniale internationale in Paris in its year of publication, which appeared in the series, *Les armées francaises d'outremer* (ser. I, no. 4).[9] In 1932, Berger-Levrault published *Le fil de l'épée* (The edge of the sword)[10] which expounded de Gaulle's historically and philosophically based theory of military leadership. It was a revised and expanded version of the lectures he had given to the French Staff College in 1927 with the patronage and in the presence of Marshal Pétain, then still in the full flower of his glory as the hero of Verdun, not yet the senile symbol of military obsolescence and the Vichy régime which debauched and perverted the Republic it displaced. De Gaulle's lucid and profound reflections on the nature and exercise of leadership in the ever fluid milieu of war had evoked the derisive incomprehension of some in the already fossilising French military hierarchy that, by 1939, was ready to fight the next war with the elderly generals and static tactics of the last. The book contained two supplementary chapters that stated the case for empirical reason and against dogmatic "metaphysical" theories of generalship. It was not until 1960 that it was published in English in New York.[11]

From 1932 to 1937, de Gaulle was Secretary to the Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, a permanent body at the disposal of the French Premier to prepare the state and the nation for war. In those years there were fourteen French governments[12] as the poisonous impotence of party politics sapped the vitals of the state.

In May 1934, de Gaulle, by then a lieutenant-colonel, published his seminal work of military strategy, *Vers l'armée de métier* (Towards a professional army) (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1934

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6 The full text in English translation is given in J R Tournoux, *Pétain and de Gaulle*. Transl. by Oliver Coburn. London: Heinemann, 1966 pp. 9-15.

7 *La discorde chez l'ennemi*, Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924 viii, 140 pp., National union catalog, pre-1955 imprints ... Vol. 192. London: Mansell, 1968-80 p. 537 (henceforth NUC).

8 Quoted André Morize, *Facts about Fighting France*, London: Fighting France Publications, 1943 p. 3.

9 NUC 192: 539.

10 NUC 192: 538.

11 *De Gaulle s anachronism* ... op. cit. p. 120

12 De Gaulle, *War memoirs*, Vol. I. op. cit. p. 12.

211 pp.).[13] The writer argued that the defence of France's historically fragile north and north-eastern frontiers could be accomplished by a regular professional force of 100,000 men, "an army of manoeuvre and attack, mechanised, armoured, composed of picked men, to be added to the large-scale units supplied by mobilisation".[14] He enumerated the components of this force: "Six divisions of the line and one light division motorised throughout, armoured in part, will constitute the sort of army to bring about decisions."[15]

As de Gaulle acknowledged in his *War memoirs*, he was not the first French or other apostle of armoured warfare.[16] But the Maginot line, a great line of casemates along the German and Luxemburg frontier, which epitomised the defensive French politico-military *rigor mortis*, had been determined by the French Parliament in 1929.[17] The book, which sold about 700 copies in France,[18] was a publishing failure.

Nonetheless Paul Reynaud proposed the creation of the force specified by de Gaulle to the Chamber of Deputies in March 1935, but without success.[19] On 24 September 1938, five days before the Munich agreement which betrayed France's ally, Czechoslovakia, de Gaulle wrote to him: "On Tuesday, a book of mine was published entitled *La France et son armée*. I am sending you a copy. It is a summary of a thousand years of our country's history, our fighting, suffering and triumphant country".[20]

This book effected a decisive rupture between de Gaulle and the mentally declining, but dotingly ambitious, Pétain, the two representing opposed strategic conceptions. While on Petain's staff in 1922 de Gaulle had written the first five chapters of this work which the Marshal had intended would appear under his name. A sardonic remark by Marshal Lyautey that it would be written, as it actually was, by another caused Pétain to put the manuscript away. After leaving Pétain's staff in 1927, de Gaulle continued and completed the book with the Marshal's authorisation. When Henri Daniel-Rops of Plon sought a book from de Gaulle in 1936 this was offered and accepted for publication. The dedication acknowledged the original association with Pétain:

To
Monsieur le Marechal Pétain
who wanted this book to be written
who directed with his advice
the writing of the first five chapters,
and thanks to whom
the two last are the history
of our Victory.

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[13] It was published in English as *The Army of the future* in London by Hutchinson in 1940 and by J B Lippincott in Philadelphia in 1941. French reprints were issued in Paris in 1940 and 1944, NUC 192: 536 & 540.

[14] De Gaulle, *War memoirs*, Vol. I. op. cit. p. 15.

[15] Quoted from *Vers l'armée de métier* in ibid. p. 17

[16] Ibid. p. 20

[17] J P T Bury, *France: the insecure Peace*, London: Macdonald, 1972, p. 138

[18] Kersaudy op. cit. p. 25

[19] De Gaulle, *War memoirs*. Vol. I. op. cit. p. 23.

[20] Quoted, Tournoux op. cit. p. 94

Pétain wanted and specified another form of dedication and complained, unavailingly, to the publisher, when it was not used. It remained a continuing source of Pétain's rancour.

The first edition was not exhausted when war broke out in September 1939 and was available until sold out in 1943. Whether deliberately or accidentally, the occupying Germans did not blacklist it. It was reprinted by Plon in 1944.[21] The English translation, *France and her army* was published by Hutchinson in London in 1945 and the same publisher issued it in French in 1948.[22]

De Gaulle's last and posthumously published book, *Mémoires d'espoir* (Memoirs of hope)[23] recounts his return to power in 1958 and the decisive years of his presidency at home and abroad when the dissonant impotence of party politics (the Fourth Republic had twenty-four governments in twelve years of existence) was exorcised under the enhanced presidency of the Fifth Republic. Originally planned as a trilogy, only *Le Renouveau*, 1958-62 (Renewal) and the first two chapters of *L'Effort*, 1962-66 (Endeavour) had been completed at the time of his death in 1970, *Le Terme*, 1966-69, having been projected, but not started.

As a military figure and as a political one, de Gaulle is an eminently collectable persona (I think he would approve the term), a nemesis for Colonel Blimps in the first avocation and the sardonic scourge of party nonentities in the second. There are numerous printings of his speeches, both single items and collections, from the 1940's onwards. Then there are numerous biographies ranging from the hagiographical to the antagonistic by both French and foreign writers. I mention but one, François Kersaudy's delightful study of de Gaulle and Churchill and their extraordinary relationship in which the irresistible force met the immovable object. In his 1989 preface to the 1990 English edition Kersaudy wrote:

> "Since it first appeared in 1981, *Churchill and de Gaulle* has occasionally been called 'the best book ever written on the subject' — which after all may well be true, since it is also the only one."

First published in English it was published in French in 1983 as (naturally) *De Gaulle et Churchill.*

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21 Ibid. pp. 97-101

22 British Museum. Dept. of Printed Books *General catalogue of printed books to 1955.* Photolithographic ed. Vol. 82. London 1959-66 column 802.

23 De Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir.* Paris: Plon, 1971; *Memoirs of hope*, Translated by Terence Kilmartin, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.

Not in Murray's

Don Pedlar

Official Records of the Australian Military Contingents to the War in South Africa, compiled and edited for the Department of Defence by Lt Col P L Murray RAA (Ret), otherwise known as "Murray's Roll", has long been the Bible of Boer War collectors and researchers, but it is only as accurate and comprehensive as the information that was available when it was written.

Australians joined many units of non-Australian origin, either subsequent to service with a Colonial[1] or Commonwealth unit or directly as a result of being overseas or having missed out on local selection and going directly to South Africa to enlist. Others joined Australian units under assumed names or swapped with those who, for various reasons, were unable to go.

During my research on Boer War Memorials, three names appeared that were not to be found in Murray, but for which research has yielded results.

Trooper H St J Beasley

The memorial in Orange, NSW, has, on its northern face four names including Trooper H St J Beasley. On requesting information on this man, Miss M Angland provided the following:

> "I am a great niece of Trooper Beasley, he was my Grandmother's brother. When the Boer War broke out and young men were enlisting, Harry Beasley had a friend by the name of Gander who joined up to go, but Harry took his place and went under the name of Gander.
>
> "The family, for many years, tried to have the name changed from Gander to Beasley on official records and in the Canberra Memorial, but to no avail. Here in Orange, where he grew up, they have him listed under his own name, Harry St J Beasley."[2]

Gander appears in Murray at page 133 as 1391 Private Gander, George, "D" Squadron, 3rd NSW Mounted Rifles. He died of disease at Wynberg on 19 March 1902.

Lieutenant R H Tuckwell

A memorial plate in St Peter's Cathedral, North Adelaide, has a name not listed in Murray — Lieutenant R H Tuckwell. The *Observer* newspaper shows that he died at the age of 28 years. He was the eldest son of Mr Samuel Tuckwell of the AMP Society.[3]

As a youth, Robert Henry Tuckwell stopped a pair of runaway horses pulling a waggon by climbing on the vehicle, then jumping on one horse and securing the trailing reins. He later went to India, joining an Imperial Regiment, but after three years service, was invalided to England. On returning to Adelaide, he joined the Militia, becoming a lieutenant. Tuckwell was a Freemason and worked for the AMP Society. He left for the Philippines in the hope of

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1 ie, an Australian colony before 1 January 1901

2 Quoted by permission of Miss Marjorie Angland.

3 *Observer*, 28 July 1900, page 5.

obtaining a commission in the American Army. Failing in this endeavour, he went to Hong Kong, where he began a promising career.

On the outbreak of the Boer War, Tuckwell took passage to Durban. Unable to secure a place in the first South Australian Contingent, he enlisted in Bethune's Mounted Infantry. His squadron fell into a Boer ambush and, in the ensuing action, he was killed. Stirling's *The Colonials in South Africa*, briefly describes the incident but does not mention a Lt Tuckwell in the Officers' casualties. The South African Casualty Roll, at page 215, lists trooper Tuckwell, R H, as killed on 20 May 1900. His rank on the memorial is, therefore, his local (South Australian) forces designation.

Surgeon Captain A J Campbell

Allan James Campbell was born in Adelaide on 2 August 1872. He was the son of Allan and Florence Campbell. He attended the Collegiate School of St Peter near Adelaide, where he took a prominent position on class and on the sports field.[4]

After a distinguished undergraduate course at the University of Adelaide, he took his degree as MB and ChB at the end of 1896, and was placed in the First Class. He then filled the position of House Surgeon at the Children's Hospital, North Adelaide for twelve months.[5]

In December 1897, Campbell proceeded as medical officer on a voyage to China and Japan. In July 1898, left Adelaide for London to gain further medical experience. Within six weeks of his arrival, he took the MRCS and LRCP qualifications. He spent a year as House Surgeon at St Mark's Hospital, London, with a view to obtaining his FRCS, but while engaged in that course of study, the war broke out in South Africa, and, in October 1899, he went aboard Mr Jesser Coope's yacht, *Sunrise*, to Durban. He served there for a few months aboard the hospital ship, *Nubia*.

From there, he transferred to the hospitals at Ladysmith and Howick, where, for six months, he devoted himself, night and day, to arduous work, earning high encomiums from his superior officers, including Colonel Westcott CMG RAMC, Principal Medical Officer.

In 1901, under the instructions of Lord Kitchener, Major Steinacker had formed his corps, afterwards known as Steinacker's Horse, with the object of operating on the borders of the Portuguese territory. The headquarters were to be at Koomati Poort, the centre of the deadly malarial district. A medical officer was required for the Corps, and Dr Campbell came forward and offered his services, notwithstanding the extreme danger of the position. The offer was readily accepted, and he was immediately appointed Surgeon Captain to the Corps. He occupied this difficult and dangerous post through the worst months of the fever season, and then fell victim, himself, to the malady. He stated:[6]

> "The work was very monotonous, being nothing but malaria, which was terrific. Our men suffered a bit, but the Tommies went down like sheep, going sick at the rate of 30 a day. I stood it out from November to March, but just as I had seen all out

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4 *St Peter's School Magazine*, March 1902. My thanks to the school archivist, Mr R W Fisher.

5 *Proposed Commemoration of the late Surgeon-Captain Allan James Campbell*, 31 July 1903, University of Adelaide. My thanks to Susan Graebner, Acting Records Manager.

6 Quotes from Dr Campbell's letters are taken from newspaper cuttings that are unsourced. I have been unable to locate them in papers of the period.

officers go down I went a stinger. I had a liver as big as a house and a spleen half as big as London."

Dr Campbell became very ill and his life was despaired of. Upon learning of his illness, a near relative wrote, urging him to obtain a transfer to another district, but he replied:

"I cannot run away from what is my duty. I should be a coward if I left them now and you would not wish that. It is my duty to stick to my work as though I were a fighting man."

He was sent for treatment to Delagoa Bay, where he spent three weeks on the hospital ship, *Orea*, and thence to Durban. He wrote:

"Honestly I believe they thought I was going to die. I nearly did die on that beastly ship, the treatment was so bad. After giving me bilious remittent fever by overdoses of quinine, I was fed on greasy beef tea and condensed milk."

In Durban, he resided for three weeks in private lodgings, then went to Howick, soon becoming convalescent. He was sent away for a month's leave. He wrote, "Kate and I were married on the 14th of May, three days after leaving Howick". Kate was the daughter of the late Major General Durant, her mother being the youngest sister of Field Marshal Earl Roberts.

Upon completion of leave and being fit for duty, Campbell returned to Koomati Poort, but again was attacked by malaria, and had to leave the district. When he recovered, his services were secured again by the PMO, Colonel Westcott — this time for the military hospital at Harrismith. He remained there from September 1901 until February 1902. On Christmas Eve, 1901, a disaster befell Colonel R B Firman's column of Imperial Yeomanry at Tweefontein. The casualties on the British side were very heavy, the column being almost annihilated. Dr Campbell's last letter describes the conditions at the hospital:

"You no doubt heard of the Yeomanry disaster at Tweefontein at Christmas when De Wet scooped up the whole of Firman's column. All their wounded came to us. We admitted 84 one evening and about 40 more next day. I had about 50 at once and had to work nearly all night, beginning at 5 in the afternoon. The procession of ambulances across the plain to the hospital was a sight that will always live with me. Most of the wounds were very large, either inflicted by the Martini bullet or the expanding effect of the Mauser at close quarters. When I tell you that I had nine compound fractures, the men in adjacent beds, you will understand how heavy the work was. Out of the 120 odd admitted, so far only two cases have died, one 10 minutes after admission so you will see that military surgery has made some advance since the Franco-Prussian War. I keep my health much better now, my last fever attack lasting only a few hours instead of days and not obliging me to go off duty at all."

An eye witness at the hospital stated, "No one can sing his praises sufficiently. Campbell has so far surpassed all expectations and has not lost one case out of 60. He had to undress, wash and feed many of his cases, there were too many for the sisters to do. Now he is exhausted."

Continued ill health due to malaria and stress of work compelled him to resign his appointment and he left the Harrismith Hospital on 12 February 1902 with the onset of enteric fever. He proceeded to Pretoria but his strength had been expended in helping others, and he died at Pretoria on 19 March 1902, aged 30.

A trooper of Steinacker's Horse said of him, "He is a good man and a good doctor and always game."

When Dr Campbell left the Harrismith Hospital about a month before his death, Colonel Westcott wrote the following to him:

> "I have much pleasure in placing on record the excellent service of Civil Surgeon A J Campbell while employed under the Medical Department of the Army from June 25th to November 25th, 1900 at the General Hospital, Howick, and from September 28th 1901 to February 12th, 1902 at the Stationary Hospital at Harrismith. This officer is highly qualified in most branches of his profession and has great tact and judgement and a quiet but firm manner. He is a good operator, an expert in X rays and a bacteriologist. He is much liked by all and he leaves the service to the regret of all his brother officers."

Allan James Campbell is commemorated by a fine brass plate in the Elder Hall of the University of Adelaide and is also listed among the fallen in the Memorial Cloisters at the Collegiate School of St Peter.

Surgeon-Captain Allan James Campbell

1/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers Band and Canberra's Political History[1]

S H Pyne

I began researching the 1/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers Band as the second of the series I have in mind on the music of the Australian Light Horse, unaware of the Band's repeated involvement with Canberra. Although, I was aware that the Light Horse were present for the Dedication of Canberra on 12 March 1913, I did not realise the extent of the 7th Light Horse (New South Lancers) involvement, until researching the article for the 3/11th Light Horse (Australian Horse)[2].

My research into the New South Wales Lancers Band commenced with reading its regimental history.[3] I soon became aware of the extent of the Lancer's involvement with Canberra. The Band was formed in 1891, and my article, subsequently published in *Sabretache* Vol. XXXII No.4 Oct/Dec 1991, was written as part of the 100th birthday celebrations for the Band.

In the course of my research I visited the RHQ Lancers Barracks, Parramatta NSW (its historical museum is at the Barracks) and made contact with present and former members of the Band. I also examined Parramatta newspapers at the Parramatta City Library and viewed the film of the Canberra Dedication Ceremony at the National Library's Film Library (the Photographic Library) which possesses photographs of the 1913, 1927 and 1951 Canberra ceremonies. I then read the Microfilm copies of *Canberra Times*, *Goulburn Herald*, *Goulburn Evening Post*, *Queanbeyan Age* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* in the Newspapers Collection and the Commonwealth and NSW Gazettes.

During these searches my attention was drawn to a *Commemorative Volume of the Canberra Dedication Ceremony* published by the Commonwealth Government Printer in 1913, but I was unable to locate a copy. Fortunately, the Photographic Library did have copies of the photographs used in the volume. These included copies of the Mounted Band leading the Parade on 12 March 1913. I already had a copy of a photograph of the Australian Horse and NSW Lancers Band, taken together after the ceremony, that was provided by the late Mr Stephen Tazewell, and the Goulburn Historical Society. I had used this photograph in conjunction with my article on the 3/11th Light Horse (Australian Horse).

The New South Lancers first came to Canberra in March 1913 for the annual training camp of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade (7th (NSW Lancers), 8th (NSW Mounted Rifles)[4] and the 11th(Australian Horse) — some 800 strong). The camp concluded with the Brigade riding past in review order at the Canberra Dedication Ceremony on 12 March 1993. The music for the

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1 This article was given as a talk at an ACT Branch meeting of the Australian Military Historical Society. The purpose of the talk was an explanation and location of the sources used and of the unexpected information those documents contain, which can open up new vistas when undertaking historical research.

2 *Sabretache*, Vol XXXI No.3, July/Sept 1990

3 Lt. Col. P Vernon's *New South Wales Lancers, (1885-1960)* (Canberra Public Library) and the 1985 revision which covered the Regiment's centenary (Australian War Memorial)

4 The NSW Mounted Rifles had a mounted band for a short period in the 1890s, but was dismounted when it participated in the Federation Parade in Sydney in 1901. The Band disbanded around 1908.

Dedication being provided by the combined bands of the NSW Lancers and the Australian Horse.

The Brigade camped beside the Molonglo River. Part of the camp site is now in Lake Burley Griffin, and the remainder in the suburb of Yarralumla. The film of the Ceremony shows the Brigade coming over the hill on which the Prime Minister's Lodge now stands. Approaching the Dedication Site, the Squadrons turned into line and, led by the NSW Lancers Band, paraded past the Governor-General, Lord Denman. After the Parade, the bands returned to the Commemoration Stone and joined together to provide the music for the Dedication Ceremony.

The Guard of Honour for the ceremony was provided by the Corps of Staff Cadets, Royal Military College Duntroon, which had opened earlier that year. This was probably the first official parade in which Duntroon Cadets participated.

Photographs of the Parade were used in the Commemorative Volume. As well as the copies that are held in the Photographic Library, National Library of Australia, other photographs are held by the Goulburn Historical Society, St. Clair, Sloan Street Goulburn, and in the NSW Lancers Museum, Lancer Barracks, Parramatta.

The NSW Lancers Band and a contingent from the Regiment returned to Canberra to participate in the March Past held at the Formal Opening of the Temporary Parliament House by HRH Duke of York (later HM George VI) on 9 May 1927. The Bandmaster WO1 A E (Bert) Taylor (who joined the Band on its formation at Maitland in 1891) and F J Heapy, 1st Trombone (who joined the Band in 1906)[5], had both been present at the 1913 Ceremony and there may well have been others in the Contingent. The *Canberra Times* report of the Opening of the Parliament contains a comment by a local resident who was present at the 1913 ceremony, stating that the Light Horse who were present in 1913 were not present in 1927. Perhaps it was because the Lancers marched rather than rode that the resident apparently did not recognise them.

A photograph was taken of the Band at Parramatta in 1927. The Band then numbered 30 and they still wore the Band Bandoliers in which the March Cards were carried. Bert Taylor and Fred Heapy can clearly be seen. Bert is sitting in the front row and Fred Heapy is standing at the left hand end of the first standing row wearing his S. Africa and WW1 medals.

In 1935, King George V granted the Regiment the title Royal News South Wales Lancers, but the official authorisation of its use did not occur until after the King's death.

The RNSWL Band returned to Canberra on 10 March 1936 to provide the music for the first session of Parliament of King Edward VIII. Bert Taylor, by that time, had reached retiring age, but was granted an Honorary Commission and still commanded the Band. It is not known if Fred Heapy was present, but his son, Jim, was present. He had joined the Band and also played 1st Trombone. At the conclusion of the Opening, the Prime Minister Hon. Joseph Lyons, invited the Band inside to play in Kings Hall. According to former Bandsman Harry Perry (1st Trombone), Bert Taylor, declined saying the Band was non-political and non-religious and consequently he could not allow the Band to enter Parliament House to play and it did not.[6]

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5 Heapy had previously served as a Trumpeter in South Africa.

6 In deference to some readers, the expletives used have been deleted.

The RNSWL returned to Canberra for a camp at Easter in 1939, camping this time at a site later called Camp Royal, located east of Anzac Parade in the present suburb of Campbell. This site was again used in 1951. According to the late Harry Perry the Band did play publicly in Canberra but not, as far as he could recall, at any official function. James Heapy, Fred's son, was a member of the Band on that occasion. Harry Perry always obtained a photograph of the Band if they were taken when the Band played at an official function. The only one he had of Canberra in 1939 is of a group of bandsmen, including himself, taken outside a tent.

For the 50th anniversary of the opening of the Commonwealth Parliament, on 9 May 1951, a special sitting of Parliament was arranged. The RNSWL, in armoured vehicles, participated in the March Past and a photograph appears in their Regimental History. The original intention was for the Parade to be led by what is now the 2nd Military District Band, Victoria Barracks, Paddington. But, they were unable to participate and the RNSWL Band was called upon at the last moment. They wore the 2nd MD Bands uniform and white pith helmets. In the programs and other references to the Band it is that of the 2nd MD. The first source that the RNSWL attended is from Bandsman N F Heapy, grandson of Fred, who joined the RNSWL Band in 1953 (also playing 1st Trombone). As a teenager he remembered his father bringing home the uniform and helmet and preparing them for the 1951 Canberra Parade. Harry Perry later stated that he also came to Canberra with the Band. That the Band was asked to play at a late stage was later confirmed by Lt Col P Vernon, who stated that he had overlooked its inclusion in the 1951 reference in his book.

After the 1953 Graduation Parade at RMC Duntroon, the Governor-General, Field Marshal Viscount Slim, informed the Chief of the General Staff and the Commandant RMC, that next year he would prefer an Army Band at the Graduation Parade rather than a civilian one. The RMC Band was established in the following year and played at the 1954 Graduation Parade. The RMC Band is also required to play at official functions in Canberra and consequently played at the opening of the new Parliament House in 1988.

As part of the Ceremonies, and to pay tribute to the attendance of the Australian Light Horse at the Dedication Ceremony in 1913, a Memorial Troop from the 8th/13th Victorian Mounted Rifles was invited to attend and did. But I have been unable to discover whether an invitation was extended to the RNSWL. No one at the RHQ in 1989 could remember receiving one. The RNSWL also has a Memorial Troop and when it parades, the Troop wears the remaining White Band Bandoliers worn by the NSWL Band.

It is regrettable that an apparent failure of the researchers for the arrangements in connection with the opening of the new Parliament House to use these sources (that were readily available in Canberra), resulted in the Royal New South Wales Lancers, and its Band, failing to be invited to participate in the ceremonial opening of Permanent Parliament House in 1988. Thereby an historical continuum was lost. The Band had been present at the site of Parliament House for the Declaration of Canberra as the National Capital — Commemoration Stone is located in the forecourt — the opening of the temporary Parliament House in 1927, the ceremonial opening of Parliament in 1936, and the fiftieth anniversary of the opening of the Commonwealth Parliament in 1951.

The Tragic Voyage of the Troopship *Drayton Grange*[1]

John E Price

There was probably little doubt in the minds of the 2,000 or so officers and men who assembled at the Durban quayside in July 1902 that their return to Australia would be nothing more than a pleasure cruise. The Boer War was over and they were going home.

Their troopship, SS *Drayton Grange*, was structurally suitable for transporting troops in large numbers, being a twin screw, four-masted vessel of 6,591 tons gross (6,697 tonnes), British register. Constructed withe seven water-tight bulkheads and triple expansion engines, its length was 450.05 feet (137.3 metres), with a breadth of 55.2 feet (16.8 metres). Having been built of steel in December 1901, the ship was modern and carried a current Board of Trade certificate for passengers.

The vessel had been fitted out at Cape Town to the satisfaction of Admiralty Transport Regulations, and chartered by the local Principal Transport Officer (PTO), for the conveyance of troops returning to Albany, Melbourne and Sydney. The officers would be berthed and dined as First Class saloon passengers, with soldiers travelling Third Class. Their hammocks and bedding being supplied from the PTO's stores. Generally speaking, the food on board troopships was good and plentiful resulting in few complaints.

Under orders, the *Drayton Grange* proceeded to Durban to embark the following troops:

- 34 officers and 1,327 men of the eight Commonwealth Horse battalions;
- 45 other ranks of the Commonwealth Army Medical Corps;
- 6 officers and 330 men of the 3rd New South Wales Imperial Bushmen;
- 1 officer and 144 other ranks of the Scottish Horse;
- 19 Doyle's Australian Scouts;
- 6 discharged Irregulars; and
- 1 officer of the 5th Queensland Imperial Bushmen.

Thus, there was a total of 42 officers and 1,983 other ranks, which was far in excess of the 1,500 troops that the vessel was supposed to carry and, should an accident have occurred at sea, there were only enough lifeboats to carry 800 men.

Embarkation took place over 10-11 July. On the afternoon of 11 July, the *Drayton Grange* left the wharf and anchored in the stream. Later, at 8:00pm, the ship left Durban harbour. The decision to sail so soon after completion of embarkation was, apparently, on the Imperial Embarkation Officer's instructions and was supported by the ship's Master who was influenced by adverse weather conditions.

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1 This article is an edited version of a paper delivered by the author at the 1990 Australian War Memorial History Conference. Sources for the article are:

Commonwealth Gazette, 1902 issues
Melbourne Argus and Age newspapers, 1902 editions
Price, J E, *They proved to all the earth*, 1982
Price, J E, *Southern Cross Scots*, 1992
Mr Geoff Paton, Sydney, NSW
Mr Ray Watson, Sandy Bay, Tasmania
Murray, P L, *Records of Australian Contingents to the War in South Africa 1899-1902*, 1911

Lt Col J S Lyster, 1st Australian Commonwealth Horse, as OC Troops, protested vigorously, but to no avail, at the undue haste and quoted a paragraph from Wolseley's *Soldier's Pocket Book*, which read:

> "Under ordinary circumstances, if the voyage is to be a long one, it is advisable that the ship should not leave until the day following the embarkation."

Had this instruction been complied with, it might have evolved order, tested the accommodation numbers, and provided time for representations to be made to the local authorities, as well as allowing a fuller compliance than was attempted with King's Regulations for embarking troops. It was later discovered that no copy of HM Transport Service Regulations had been supplied to the ship's Master, nor to Colonel Lyster.

There was considerable confusion on board during the first night at sea, due mainly to the lack of order in the embarkation, the men being disorderly, no effective means being taken to prevent stowaways from boarding, the sudden compression into close quarters of a large number of troops from different corps, and the presence of details without officers, including three Commonwealth Horse drafts.

According to press reports made during the subsequent Court of Enquiry, the troops' berthing arrangements were horrendous with the space available being so inadequate that, at night, the men had to sleep where they could — on tables, benches, and even on deck. Also, as the hammock hooks were placed too close to each other, there was little space in which to sling a hammock. Those who could, found that the storage bins were so cavernous that it was impossible to ascertain whether of not they had collected their own bedding before "lights out". Each man had been issued with two blankets, but most were found to be vermin infested.

As the voyage progressed, the atmosphere on the overcrowded troop decks quickly became fetid, with disease spreading like a bushfire. Sickness had been noticed while the ship was alongside the Durban wharf, when two men suffering from measles were taken ashore.

There had been little organisation of the medical services before departure, with no Principal Medical Officer (PMO) being appointed. Colonel Lyster had three doctors to choose from, which, under normal circumstances, would have been sufficient, but with an epidemic imminent, was inadequate. For reasons best known to himself, the OC Troops chose Captain D A Shields, medical officer of 6th Australian Commonwealth Horse, the youngest of the three, and having had the least amount of active service, as PMO. From then on, Shields solely administered the ship's hospital. The two other doctors, who would have willingly taken on extra duties, alternated as daily Orderly Medical Officers.

The weather on the voyage between South Africa and the Western Australian coast was cold, boisterous and wet. With rough seas, rolling swells, and gale force winds being noted in the ship's log on 16 of the 19 days passage. Between Durban and Albany, the Drayton Grange's steaming rate was 10½ knots, and she journeyed as far south as the "Roaring Forties". Although this was the usual steamship route, a more northerly passage, although taking slightly longer, might have been less violent and, consequently, more beneficial to the troops' health and comfort.

Sick parades were held twice daily at 09.00 and 16.00, when often up to 150 men would stand on the cold iron deck of the starboard side, for as long as two hours waiting for treatment. During this time, they were exposed to the elements and their feet were soaked as ablution and urinal fluids passed from side to side with each roll of the vessel.

The main illness were inflammation of the respiratory organs, although others were induced and magnified by the unsanitary conditions. Over 2,200 prescriptions were issued between 12 July and the arrival at Port Melbourne on 7 August.

Life for one troopdeck section was not eased when a hold of decaying vegetables wafted a putrefying odour into the living quarters. Although the men complained vehemently, there was some delay before the offending produce was thrown overboard, but the stench remained for a long time.

Consequently, there was much grumbling among the troops on board, and trouble-makers were quick to urge mutinous acts. One suggestion was that the vessel be seized and sailed to either Crozet Island or Kerguelen. Although common sense prevailed, sickness continued.

The ship's hospital had accommodation for only forty patients, with no isolation ward for infectious diseases and, while it carried a sufficient quantity and variety of medical equipment, there was no disinfecting apparatus available and very few clinical thermometers.

The total number of patients treated between Durban and Sydney was 234, of whom 154 had contracted measles. The remainder suffered from influenza, chest ailments, dysentery, tonsillitis, and one patient had enteric fever. When the hospital space was quickly filled, temporary quarters were set up on the main top deck, with an area amidships being partitioned off by canvas. Soon all berths were occupied and extra bunks, fitted in the officers' smoking rooms, were in use as soon as they were completed. Finally, the orderly room and portions of the troop decks were pressed into service to house the overflow, but, in the latter case, there were vigorous complaints from the soldiers. Captain Shields ceaselessly worked day and night administering to the hospital patients' needs, and even contracted a slight attack of measles. He was assisted by ten men of the Commonwealth Field Hospital unit who, together with 35 men from the Bearer Company, proved to be a well disciplined efficient squad. However, they were too few for the massive task confronting them.

On 7.45 am on 30 July, the Drayton Grange, flying the yellow quarantine flag, arrived at Albany. There, three officers and 106 other ranks of the Western Australian element landed and, apart from two sick men, all were in good health. The three medical officers sent the Port authorities a strongly worded note requesting that the sick men be taken ashore, even if it meant housing them in tents. Captain F A Dove, DSO, one officer and 197 soldiers, bound for the Eastern States, even volunteered to remain ashore until taken on by another troop ship in order to create extra room on board for the sick. The discovery that there was an empty quarantine station with suitable hospital accommodation led the medical officers to abandon the idea of tents in favour of a superior building. They even offered to provide 80 swinging cots that, because of the lack of space, could not be used on board the *Drayton Grange*. The local agents of the shipping company offered to bring civilian nurses from Perth to assist in the crisis.

After the local Health Officer had steadfastly refused to allow the sick ashore, claiming that there was insufficient space, Colonel Lyster ordered the vessel to proceed on her voyage. At 8.45am on 1 August, the *Drayton Grange* left King George's Sound bound for Melbourne. Six days later, she entered Port Phillip with the yellow "jack" flying and the ship's ensign at half-mast for five men who had died during the passage along the Australian coast.

Accompanied by the Field Hospital team, 75 patients were taken off and placed in the hospital at Port Franklin, near Sorrento, where, during their stay, five more died.

Eleven officers and 828 other ranks disembarked at Melbourne. These included 66 sick, of whom three died in hospital. P W Dudley, a Commonwealth Horse trooper, had been sinking fast with dysentery, so, in an effort to keep him alive, the medical staff poured whisky and champagne into him, but this was of no avail and he died before his family could arrive from Mildura. Trooper Herbert Parker, a victim of a shipboard practical joke, also died after reaching his Ballarat home.

During its stay, the *Drayton Grange* was fumigated, and left port at 15.00 on 8 August. Two days later, on the evening of 10 August, it dropped anchor in Sydney Harbour. Next day, 26 officers and 756 men landed in good health, together with 29 sick men. Within a month, two of these men were dead, making a total of 17 deaths for the voyage.

A public outcry ensued because, of the 50 transports that had carried Australian volunteers to and from South Africa during the three years of war, none had such a record of disease. In a scathing editorial, *The Australian* likened the conditions to "The Black Hole of Calcutta".

A Royal Commission was appointed and held eight meetings in Sydney and 16 in Melbourne to investigate the causes of the ill-fated voyage. Some 67 witnesses, including one stowaway,[2] were interviewed.

At Sydney's Garden Island, the Commissioners inspected beer, hammocks, blankets, and medicine chests still available on the *Drayton Grange*. They also examined troopdeck accommodation on board the SS *Britannic* that had left South Africa at the same time and had also experienced overcrowding problems. Naval berthing arrangements were also inspected on board HMS *Katoomba*.

In summing up, the President commended the Master and ship's officers for seemingly having readily responded to every request from those in charge of the troops. Generally speaking, the officers had obeyed Colonel Lyster's orders and performed their duties in an apparently satisfactory manner for there had been no complaints lodged against any of them by the men.

The PMO was criticised for not delegating duties to subordinates and, in evidence, Colonel Lyster had accused him of being nervous and timid. However, being a newcomer to the military scene, Shields may have felt awkward in exercising full authority.

The Western Australian authorities were criticised for not landing the sick at Albany.

Another finding was that many of the men had contributed to the troubles by their own acts, habits and negligence — from which others suffered. Few took effective steps by approaching their officers to have matters altered for the better, even where alteration was possible. The majority seemed to have mildly submitted to discomfort and worse when any exertion on their part may have provided relief.

Both Lyster and Shields, as PMO, came in for some blame for failing to improve the undesirable conditions on the Drayton Grange — whereby the men kept their baggage around them, thus cluttering up the troop decks, instead of having every unessential item stored in the baggage rooms. In his defence, Lyster stated that most of the men were undisciplined and had stubbornly refused to be parted from their luggage, even though it would have assisted their own comfort. He also advised that officers going on inspection rounds were constantly hooted and jeered at by the troops.

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2 The exact number of stowaways at any one point in the voyage was unknown, and a Melbourne *Argus* report went as far to say that there were none.

Finally, it was found that the Imperial Embarkation authorities in South Africa were responsible for the undue overcrowding of the vessel and the insufficiency of hospital accommodation.

In Sorrento General Cemetery, a tombstone stands over the grave of the five Australian Commonwealth Horse soldiers who died at Fort Franklin. This, together with a monument at Sorell, Tasmania, are probably the only surviving memorials to the *Drayton Grange* tragedy.

Deaths

Regimental No.	Name	Rank	Battalion and Corps	Nature of disease causing death	Date of death	Place of death
1768	Harland, T	Farrier	3 Bn ACH	Measles, bronchopneumonia, and heart failure	2 Aug 1902	At sea, between Albany and Melbourne
2065	Cundy, C	Trooper	3 Bn ACH	Measles, bronchopneumonia, and heart failure	2 Aug 1902	At sea, between Albany and Melbourne
1439	Smith, D	Trooper	3 Bn ACH	Measles, bronchopneumonia, and heart failure	2 Aug 1902	At sea, between Albany and Melbourne
107	MacGregor, R	Trooper	6 Bn ACH	Acute dysentery and heart failure	3 Aug 1902	At sea, between Albany and Melbourne
2026	Hodgman, V L	Trooper	3 Bn ACH	Measles, bronchopneumonia, and heart failure	5 Aug 1902	At sea, between Albany and Melbourne
1871	Thompson, B	Trooper	3 Bn ACH	Pneumonia	7 Aug 1902	Melbourne Hospital
50	Green, J	Trooper	1 Bn ACH	Bronchopneumonia	9 Aug 1902	Portsea, Victoria
911	Humphries, A	Trooper	1 Bn ACH	Bronchopneumonia	9 Aug 1902	Portsea, Victoria
137	Dudley, P	Farrier	6 Bn ACH	Dysentery	11 Aug 1902	Melbourne Hospital
1509	Sherringham, H	Trooper	3 Bn ACH	Pneumonia	12 Aug 1902	Portsea, Victoria
148	Barton, E P	Trooper	7 Bn ACH	Bronchopneumonia	14 Aug 1902	Portsea, Victoria
222	Croome, W	Trooper	1 Bn ACH	Bronchopneumonia	15 Aug 1902	Portsea, Victoria
125	McAndrew, A	Trooper	1 Bn ACH	Measles and pneumonia	19 Aug 1902	Melbourne Hospital
151	McFarlane, W	Trooper	3 NSW I Bush	Bronchopneumonia	20 Aug 1902	Portsea, Victoria
1747	Tarrant, E W	Trooper	3 Bn ACH	Measles and pneumonia	27 Aug 1902	Sydney, NSW
1418	Ryan, J S	Qmr Sgt	3 Bn ACH	Blood poisoning	6 Sept 1902	Sydney, NSW
—	Parker, —	Trooper	Scottish Horse	Cerebral spinal meningitis	1 Oct 1902	Ballarat, Victoria

The AIF Project

The AIF Project seeks to record comprehensive information on all 332,000 men and women (ie nurses) who served in the Australian Imperial Force 1914-19. The Project began in 1987 as an academic historical investigation designed to answer questions and test hypotheses about the composition and experience of the AIF, not, as hitherto, on the basis of a tiny sample but drawing on comprehensive information relating to the whole of the AIF.

Access to the database is now available to members of the public on payment of a fee of $20, for which enquirers will receive a consolidated statement of service suitable for framing, a full record as held on the database, information relating to the AIF, and a guide to further sources.

Details on individuals are drawn from a number of publicly available sources as outlined below.

Embarkation Rolls

The Embarkation Rolls draw together the information given on the Attestation Forms, signed by each member of the AIF at the time of enlistment. At the end of the war, the individual Attestation Forms were conflated into unit lists, and then published. There are several sets in existence, and each differs in varying degrees from the others. The AIF Project has drawn in the first instance on the Embarkation Rolls held by the Australian War Memorial; other sets will be integrated into the database as time permits.

From the Embarkation Rolls the following information can be derived: name, address, age, religion, occupation, rank, number and unit on enlistment, date of enlistment, previous military service, next of kin, next of kin's address, relationship of next of kin to the enlistee, date of embarkation from Australia, ship and place of embarkation. Note that the Army did not ask for the date of birth, but only the stated age. Thus many men were able to provide a false age, sometimes because they were too young, more often because they were too old.

Nominal Roll

The Nominal Roll updates the information provided on the Embarkation Rolls in that it gives us details of each member of the AIF at the end of the war. Thus it tells us the number and rank of each person, and their unit, any decorations they might have received, their ultimate fate in the war (killed in action, died of wounds/disease/illness, returned to Australia) and the date of the fate. Unlike the 2nd AIF, an individual's number could change in the course of the war. For example, a soldier who was wounded at Gallipoli, sent back to Australia in 1915 and discharged, might have re-enlisted in 1916, at which time he would normally have been issued with a new number. Units could often change, especially with the Light Horse, most of which after 1915 was converted into other arms. Privates were sometimes promoted to non-commissioned rank, and the Nominal Roll provides the only comprehensive listing of such promotions.

Decorations

Details of decorations — the award, the date of its promulgation, and (sometimes) the circumstances leading to its conferral — are drawn from the Australian War Memorial.

Promotions

Details of all promotions at the commissioned level are drawn from the Army Lists, and include the date of promotion. No such consolidated list exists for non-commissioned officers: minimal details are drawn from the Nominal Roll, supplemented in some cases by information from the Roll of Honour circulars (see below).

Roll of Honour circulars

In the 1920s and early 1930s questionnaires were sent to the next of kin of those members of the AIF who had died during the war or whose death up to the end of 1921 was deemed to be the result of war service. Information was sought partly for the writing of the official history under the direction of C E W Bean and also for the drawing up of the official Roll of Honour, the bronze tablets of which now line the colonnades of the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Inevitably not all the forms were returned - next of kin had died or could not be traced, in which case the Records Section filled in what details it could from the individual's AIF dossier. These entries, written in a distinctive clerical script, do not contain much of the background information that was sought, but they usually list in outline form the movements and any promotions (at officer or NCO rank), together with the appropriate dates, which in the case of NCOs could only be obtained otherwise from the individual's dossier, since promotions at non-commissioned level were not centrally recorded in, for example, the Army List.

The quality of the forms that were returned varies enormously. Questions, for example "Place where killed or wounded", were often unanswered, or left with the poignant comment "I have never been told and would dearly like to know", or answered incorrectly: "Battle of Messines, France" instead of "Messines, Belgium". Where the answer is simply given as "France", this is recorded, but is open to correction. Where a place and country is given (Messines, France), this is corrected before being entered on the database. "What was his calling" produces a range of responses, from the expected statement of occupation to "King and Country", and even "John Smith". The request for additional biographical details that might have been of interest to the official historian brought enormous amounts of information, from accounts of pre-war achievements to war- time acts of bravery, often accompanied by letters, newspaper cuttings and photographs. The request for details of relatives killed or who distinguished themselves in the AIF usually brought a much less selective response: records of relations who served in the Napoleonic and Crimean wars, and lists of brothers, uncles, cousins and brothers-in-law who served in the AIF, whether or not they fitted into the criteria specified on the form. These details of relatives enable us to cross reference extended family networks.

Post war deaths

The great majority of the members of the AIF returned to Australia and lived beyond the 1921 cut-off date for inclusion on the Roll of Honour. Those whose deaths post-1921 were attributed to war service are recorded by the Office of War Graves. Their place of burial can be recognised either by the distinctive white headstone or by the grave marked by a bronze tablet bearing the AIF emblem (the "Rising Sun"). From the consolidated records of such members of the AIF we can determine their date of death, age at death, place of burial or cremation, and whether or not they are commemorated by an appropriate plaque in an official Garden of Remembrance.

Many deceased members of the AIF are not recorded in this first category. There are several ways of locating information about some of them. Headstones often mention service in the AIF,

or simply use the words "Lest We Forget" or include the AIF Emblem. In smaller cemeteries it is possible to check local enlistment records against headstones bearing the appropriate life span dates. Death notices in newspapers and funeral notices will sometimes allude to previous military service where there is no other mention in the subsequent cemetery records. Major metropolitan newspapers and ex-servicemen's journals are being systematically read for this information, as are the cemetery transcripts where available. This last part of the database will inevitably take much longer than other sections, and in all likelihood will never be complete. Information relating to individuals is always welcome and will be added to our records as it is received.

AIF Database Information Fields

The database records information in the following fields.

Embarkation Roll

1. Name
2. Alias
3. Address
4. Age
5. Religion
6. Occupation
7. Next of kin
8. Next of kin's address
9. Relationship of next of kin to addressee
10. Date of enlistment
11. Regimental number
12. Unit on enlistment
13. Rank on enlistment
14. Previous military service
15. Date of embarkation
16. Ship of embarkation
17. Port of embarkation

Nominal Roll

18. Regimental number at end of war
19. Unit at end of war
20. Rank at end of war
21. Decorations
22. Fate (KIA/DOW/DOI/DOD/RTA etc)
23. Date of fate

Decorations

24. Award
25. Date of award
26. Circumstances of award

Promotions

27. Officers: rank and date
28. NCOs: rank and date

Roll of Honour circulars

29. Place of birth
30. Age to Australia if born outside Australia
31. School
32. Other training
33. Occupation
34. Previous military service
35. Place where killed or wounded
36. Age at death
37. Biographical information
38. Details of any relatives in the AIF who were killed or who distinguished themselves

Post-war deaths

39. Date of death
40. Age at death
41. Place of burial/cremation
42. Recorded in Garden of Remembrance

The AIF Project may be contacted at:

Department of History
University College, Australian Defence Force Academy
Canberra, ACT 2600
Telephone: (06) 268 8867 / 8829 Facsimile: (06) 2688879

Caring for your documents

Kathy Henderson and Bernard Kertesz[1]

Many people have letters, diaries, postcards or other paper documents that they wish to preserve. The key to preserving paper is to treat it with care.

Paper varies greatly. It may be weak or strong, low-quality or high-quality, depending on how old it is, where it was made and what it was made from. Paper over 100 years old is often strong, but more modern paper contains impurities that weaken and damage it.

We damage paper without meaning to if we fold or staple it, or use metal paper clips and pins. Attempting to mend paper can also damage it. Sticky tape causes many problems — it can stain, and it eventually falls off, leaving behind a sticky residue that is almost impossible to remove. Some glues can damage paper, too. Modern glues cause more problems than plain, old-fashioned starch paste. We recommend that you do not try to mend your valuable documents. They will be safer if you handle and store them correctly.

Do not write on your documents unless there is no alternative, and then use only a soft pencil, taking care not to press too hard. It is better to write any notes or extra information on a separate sheet of paper (preferably archival) and store it with the document.

Handling and displaying your documents

Handling and displaying your treasured letters, cards and other papers correctly prolongs their life. There are just a few simple rules to follow.

- Handle documents carefully, and only when necessary.
- Wash your hands first and make sure they are dry.
- Don't use any handcream as it can stain.

If documents are strong and flexible, unfold them and place them flat, if possible, in transparent plastic sleeves or in archival-quality folders to protect them. Transparent plastic sleeves are better because they allow you to see the documents clearly with less j handling. "Copy Safe" plastic sleeves (available from stationers) and food storage bags made of polyester, polyethylene or polypropylene (from supermarkets) are all suitable. Oven bags are especially suitable as they are made from polyester which is particularly safe for paper.

Do not unfold or unroll brittle papers as they can crack, especially along the folds. These papers need to be humidified first. Contact a conservator for advice. Display documents out of direct sunlight.

If you are framing your documents, refer to the framing advice in our Works of art on paper leaflet. Photograph albums may be a useful way to display your documents. See our Photographs leaflet for further information. Make photocopies if your documents are very fragile and avoid handling the original.

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1 Kathy Henderson and Bernard Kertesz, Paper Conservators at the Australian War Memorial, contributed the information. If you need more information, ring the Conservation Section on (06) 241 6122 and ask for a Paper Conservator.

And a few don'ts:

Don't fold documents. This weakens the paper along the fold. Don't glue documents to paper or cardboard to strengthen or mend them. Glues can damage paper and maybe very difficult to remove. The acidity in many cardboards can migrate to your document, causing deterioration.

Don't laminate documents that you want to keep. Although lamination is often advertised for preserving paper, we do not recommend it because the plastic is absorbed into the paper and can't be removed. It could also yellow the paper.

Storing your documents

Paper should be stored in a place that is dean and free of insects and other pests. The light levels should be low, and the temperature and humidity should be moderate and stable.

Don't store paper in direct sunlight. Avoid storing documents in cellars, attics, garden sheds or bookcases next to fireplaces. Mould grows quickly at high humidities, and paper can become brittle at low humidities or high temperatures.

Vacuum away dust regularly and inspect your storage areas for silverfish. Good housekeeping can often reduce the problem, but if infestation is severe, contact a licensed pest control company. If silverfish are present, seal ring binders, boxes and albums in plastic bags.

Place your documents in "Copy Safe" or other archival plastic sleeves. Put sheets of archival-quality paper behind them. You can write any extra information in pencil on this paper. Documents in archival plastic sleeves can be stored in an ordinary ring binder or in boxes. Boxes help to reduce damage and may also act as a buffer against extremes of temperature and humidity. You can also store documents in archival-quality photograph albums with plastic sleeves.

Remember to check your documents now and again for signs of mould, insect infestation or other damage.

If you refer to your documents often, consider photocopying them for everyday use.

Photocopying your documents

You can preserve many types of documents and printed material by photocopying them.

Modern electrostatic photocopiers (the dry, Xerox type) give copies with a reasonable lifetime, particularly if you use archival paper.

For example, newspaper clippings have a much shorter life than photocopies of the newspaper. You can use and handle photocopied family documents while the original is in safe storage. You can help guard against losing the information contained in the documents if you photocopy them and store them in places away from the originals.

Copying letters and similar small items is safe if you take care. However, serious damage can occur to books and large items. It is better to use a machine with a fixed platen (glass copy plate). For large items a fixed platen is essential. Photocopiers with mobile platens should only be used for single sheet materials or small books. Items hanging out of mobile platens are in danger of catching and tearing.

Never force a book down on a photocopier platen. Handle books carefully. Fragile bindings and tight spines can break if forced, and brittle paper can crack. A good rule is: if it has to be forced, it will break.

Since books need to be turned upside down for photocopying, make sure the book you want to copy is strong enough to take the handling. Beware of loose bits.

Maps and large sheet materials should not be copied on ordinary photocopier platens nor should they be folded to "fit". Another rule: if it is much bigger than the platen, it can't be safely copied. If a map or other large sheet object is brittle or torn, don't copy it on an auto-feed, plan copier. Strong maps can be copied on these machines if fed through between clear polyester sheeting (Mylar or Melinex). If your item is rolled, don't even try to copy it until it is properly relaxed and unrolled. If you can't easily handle an item you're photocopying, for example, a large and/or heavy book, get help.

We suggest that you store a set of archival copies of your documents and use them if you need to make subsequent copies. This is important if your documents are very fragile.

Reprinted from the July, August, September and October 1992 issues of *Vetaffairs*, the Department of Veterans' Affairs newspaper for the veteran community.

Other leaflets in this series are:

- *Caring for medals*
- *Storing your photographs*
- *Specialist suppliers of conservation materials*
- *Caring for your books*
- *Caring for works of art on paper*

Book Reviews

RAAF Gallantry Awards 1939-1945 War, Leonard Barton, published by the author, $50.

The book is a two coloured blue, B5, soft cover with a side wired taped spine format. The binding is strong, yet flexible enough for the book to remain open at the desired page without the often encountered annoying tendency of self closure, characteristic of many research books. The presentation is simple, yet clean, clear, and concise.

Thankfully, the author has departed from the usual trend associated with this style of publication, of making the text print very small. The book's printing is of a heavy ink with a nice large print, making it very clear and easy for either quick scanning or detailed reading — a big plus.

The subject text consists of alphabetical listings, comprising each award recipient's regimental number, full name, award gained, *London Gazette* date and page number, together with the squadron that he was serving with when the award was won. Included are two additional listings of foreign awards, but unfortunately there is no gazettal or promulgation details for them — a small point but one often important to historical researchers.

Basically, the book consists of a comprehensive amalgamation of information drawn from eleven Imperial medal rolls as applicable to Australian recipients, and as a quick ready reference resource, it fills a gap that has existed in Australian medalology concerning the RAAF. Where a person has received more than one decoration, subsequent awards are listed and appear in order of gazettal promulgation.

The publication is a limited edition of 100 copies which obviously had an impact on its retail price. However, $50 per copy, is on the excessive side considering it is only a legal binding, soft cover style book. It comes down to value for money when compared with similar publications.

The book states "This is a record of all members of the Royal Australian Air Force ...", thereby establishing itself as an absolute accurate reference resource. The author's intentions are commendable, but in following that absolute line, he exposes his credibility should any inaccuracies be established, and other researchers in this field can, and will challenge the listings accuracy. It would have been better if the book had contained some reference to the fact that 100% accuracy is difficult to establish in these type of publications and that amendments or additions would be welcome.

The book contains a few minor errors which detract from its overall presentation. Such being the incorrect spelling of names, not including all third Christian names of those who have them. Space cannot be argued as the reason, because in the case of Bakewell H W R, a second line is used to include the full name. Appendix B is not centred squarely on the page, with the lettering going right to the edge of the page leaving no margin.

There appear to be inconsistencies in listing RAAF personnel who were serving in the RAF at the time of gaining awards. Some are included while others have been left out. Awards were still being promulgated in 1947 for war service activities.

In spite of such minor detractions, the book will be of significant benefit to a range of researchers, historians, genealogists and students of medalology. It is a valuable contribution

to the field of Australian medalology, especially as a ready reference resource, and can be recommended for both public and personal libraries. — **C M Fagg**

It Doesn't Take a Hero. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre. Linda Grey/Bantam Books. 530 pp. $39.95

The autobiography of General H Norman Schwarzkopf, the UN Commanding General in the 1990-91 Gulf War, is a fascinating and absorbing story. It does not concentrate on the Gulf War but is a vivid and detailed story of the life and 35 year army career of this extraordinary general.

Schwarzkopf's father was the son of German immigrants to America and was the only English speaking person in the family home. However, he managed to gain entry to West Point where he graduated in 1917 as a Second Lieutenant. After several years in the US Army, he joined the New Jersey State Police and was in charge of the investigation into the Lindbergh kidnapping. In World War II he was back in the Army as a Brigadier General and was sent to Teheran to organise the gendarmerie to protect convoys of supplies sent to Russia via Iran.

The young Schwarzkopf with the rest of the family joined his father in Iran where all the family had learnt the language by the end of his tour. After schooling in Switzerland, Schwarzkopf entered West Point where he graduated in 1952. His description of life at West Point and of the US Army following the Korean War is detailed and thoughtful. His two tours in Vietnam make some of the most interesting reading in the book. His tour as a battalion commander in the latter years of the war is a fine study on the strengths and weaknesses of the US Army in Vietnam. His was wounded in Vietnam but his descriptions of his recovery from a near crippling back operation throws insights into himself and on the care in VA hospitals in America. He is also candid when discussing personal issues such as his mother's alcoholism.



Schwarzkopf's account of the Gulf War describes the difficulties he encountered, the personalities of the various senior members of his commanded and the problems in dealing with the political issues in Washington. The tactics and strategy of the war are discussed from the issue of how he managed to keep his casualties remarkably low to why he did not follow through with his troops to Baghdad. — **A J Staunton**

Transfer of First AIF Service Records to Australian Archives[1]

The service records of some 420,000 members of the First Australian Imperial Force are currently being transferred to Australian Archives' repository at Mitchell, ACT. It is expected that some 2.4 shelf kilometres of records will have been moved from Melbourne to Canberra by the end of August 1993.

An operation on this scale will inevitably cause some disruption to services. It will also be necessary to train new reference staff to handle the expected level of inquiries.

It is hoped that the processing of the backlog of inquiries which will have built up during the move will begin in early October 1993 and that new inquiries be dealt with from the beginning of 1994. Members of the public are asked not to lodge further requests for information from First AIF personnel records until advised that the new arrangements are fully operational. This advice will be published as widely as possible.

Public access to the First AIF records will be in accordance with Australian Archives' normal procedures as set out in the Archives Act. Inquirers will have the choice of purchasing photocopies of records of interest to them or (subject to adequate notice) inspecting copies of the records at the Archives' Mitchell Search Room. Medical documents will not be released and certain other medical information will be also be withheld if the subject or his widow is still alive.

The Defence Department will continue to handle inquiries about medals and about information contained in the records. Inquiries about entitlements should be directed to the Department of Veterans' Affairs.

Inquiries about those who served in the Second World War and more recent campaigns should continue to be addressed to SCMA Medals Section, 360 St Kilda Road, Melbourne, Victoria 3004.

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1 The article is taken from a leaflet dated May 1993, produced by the Australian Archives, ACT Regional Office.

Historic Shipwrecks Act Amnesty

Alan Roberts

Our earliest known shipwreck is the *Trial*, an English East Indiaman which sank off Western Australia in 1622. Since then, an estimated 5,000 ships have foundered around the coast of Australia and its Territories.

The remains of some of these are of international significance such as HMS *Pandora*, sent to capture the Bounty mutineers, whose hull is largely intact. Some have great heritage value to the nation such as First Fleet flagship HMS *Sirius* at Norfolk Island. Many others are important as examples of maritime technological development or because they assisted the exploration and economic development of various settlements, such as the *Gothenburg* sunk when returning from the Northern Territory to its colonial capital, Adelaide. Others, like the *Yongala* near Townsville, continue to contribute to local economic development by becoming major tourist attractions and the centre of a recreational diving industry. Some have become prominent in our folklore like the *Dunbar* and the *Loch Ard* from which only one or two people survived.

The introduction of SCUBA diving in the 1960s accelerated the discovery of wrecks and the removal of relics for commercial gain and souvenirs. The use of explosives to get at silver bullion on the old Dutch shipwrecks off Western Australia led the Western Australian Government to introduce the first legislation to protect shipwrecks. But because most of them lie in waters under Commonwealth, rather than State, jurisdiction, the Commonwealth was forced to step in with the *Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976*.

Since then, all States and the Northern Territory have enacted legislation to protect shipwrecks in State waters, ie on the landward side of low water mark and including rivers, bays and between some islands and the coast. The States and the Commonwealth now cooperate in a national historic shipwrecks program for wrecks in Commonwealth waters. The principal objectives of this program are to conserve and protect shipwreck sites and recovered relics, to foster research into our underwater heritage, to encourage community appreciation of shipwrecks and to gain their support for the protection of shipwrecks as a cultural resource of the nation'.

Why protect shipwrecks? The remains of wrecks and the cargoes and personal effects they carried are an important part of Australia's heritage. They provide irreplaceable evidence about many aspects of Australian history that is not available in the documentary record.

For example, excavation of the *Sydney Cove* at Preservation Island in Bass Strait, wrecked in 1797, is yielding examples of speculative trade goods brought to Australia for which there are no ships' manifests. The goods include footwear, rum and Chinese porcelain. They can be precisely dated because of the wreck event. In many cases they survive surprisingly well under water, as they may not have done had they reached their destination. For example, sealed bottles of rum from the days of the Rum Corps, having escaped the thirst of early settlers, can now be subjected to scientific analysis! Shipbuilding was for long a craft passed on orally, with only rudimentary plans which often do not survive. So the structure of the *Sydney Cove* itself, built in India, tells us about the colonial construction and adaptation of merchant vessels. Through professional excavation of this shipwreck, a richer picture is being built up of Australia's economic development in the first decade of European settlement. Material

recovered from the site will be displayed in the local community and at Hobart, and may be lent for display elsewhere. The total assemblage and all excavation records will be conserved and available for study.

What would the result be if it had been looted for profit or souvenirs, and dispersed? The Historic Shipwrecks Act aims to protect wrecks for both their heritage and recreational values. Sports diving is a growing industry. The Act does not lock wrecks away except for a mere ten sites of outstanding heritage value which are at particular risk of human damage, and even these may be visited by permit. The rest may be freely visited.

Over the years, 158 wrecks in Commonwealth waters were declared protected under the Act. But on 1 April 1993, all shipwrecks aged 75 years or more under control (ie on the seaward side of the low water mark) became protected. Protection under the Act means it is illegal to damage or disturb the remains of the wreck or to take souvenirs. Bona fide archaeological work can only be done with a permit. The Commonwealth wants to protect them for the enjoyment of people now and in the future. The Act also requires any person who finds a shipwreck or a relic of a ship in Commonwealth waters, or who has possession of a relic from a protected shipwreck, to report it to the Minister.

There is an amnesty from 1 May to 30 October 1993 in respect of due notifications that were not given prior to 1 April 1993 and where a person voluntarily submits the required notification within the period of the Amnesty. It does not apply in the case of an offence committed or detected after 1 April or where charges are current or pending.

For further information or to obtain reporting forms, contact the Maritime and Historical Archaeology Unit, PO Box 262, Albert Park, Victoria 3206, tel. 03 690 5322, or telephone toll free 008 819461.

Committee of Inquiry into Defence and Defence-related Awards

The Commonwealth Government announced on 27 May 1993 the establishment of a Committee to examine issues relating to Australian honours and awards in recognition of service in Defence and Defence-related areas. The Committee is chaired by General Peter Gration, AC OBE. The terms of reference of the Committee are:

1. examine claims for recognition of categories of service;
2. identify any categories of service, including those which involved non-Defence personnel in operational areas, which you consider should be recognised by an Australian award;
3. examine the appropriateness of extending the eligibility of existing awards for such purposes;
4. consider the need, if any, to introduce additional awards to recognise service in past defence-related activities of either a warlike or non-warlike nature;
5. consider any other relevant matters in relation to defence-related awards; and
6. make appropriate recommendations.

The Committee will not be inquiring into honours and awards of gallantry or meritorious or distinguished service for individuals or units, for which appropriate award procedures existed or now exist, nor will it be concerned with entitlements under the *Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986*. Written submissions should be submitted, by 6 August 1993, to Mr Lembit Suur, Secretary, Committee of Inquiry into Defence Awards, GPO Box 688, Canberra ACT 2601.

Letters

The Battle of Maryang San

The Editor

Neil Smith's review of *The Battle of Maryang San* in *Sabretache* of Jan/Mar 1993 gives an accurate account of this record of one of the Australian Army's most impressive victories. I can understand the view that this book may not be found on many booklists, but I obtained my copy last year from K R White Military Books in Canberra.

Reading again of operation COMMANDO reinforced my belief that 3 RAR deserves greater recognition for its role. While 28th British Commonwealth Brigade was awarded the Battle Honour "Kowang San" for the early phase of the operation, the only awards of the Battle Honour "Maryang San", the decisive battle, were to the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Royal Leicestershire Regiment. Anyone interested can read of the exploits of these units subsequent to the capture of Maryang San.

Lt Gen Sir Thomas Daly KBE CB DSO expressed his opinion in the January 1993 issue of *United Service*, the journal of the Royal united Service Institution of NSW, at page 47:

> "There is one aspect of the aftermath operation COMMANDO that I have never been able to comprehend: that the King's Own Scottish Borderers, who relieved 3 RAR on Maryang San and who were afterwards driven off it, were awarded the Battle Honour "Maryang San" while 3 RAR, who captured it after fighting the enemy to a standstill, were denied it. I can only hope that, even at this late stage, this anomaly may be rectified."

With respect, I agree with the General.

I hope that Branches and members of MHSA will also agree and will encourage Federal Council to support a move for award of appropriate recognition of 3 RAR, even though more than 40 years have passed.

Neville Foldi
9 Parnell Place
Fadden ACT 2904

Major General H W Lloyd—Good's Battery—Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion

The Editor,

Your January-March 1993 issue raised a few points for further mention: Firstly, how did Major General H W Lloyd get the Order of the White Eagle of Serbia, 4th Class with Swords?

I spent the last few months of the 2nd World War at HQ Second Australian Army (sometimes described as "the army without troops". It then controlled the Fixed Defences from Brisbane to Port Kembla, Training Centres from Toorbul Point to Bonegilla, Troop Movements and Demobilization. The General's staff lived and worked at "Gowen Brae", on the northern side of Pennant Hills Road; we were in huts on Oatlands Golf Course, on the opposite side. ADA & QMG was Major W. McMahon.

Secondly, Major General Whitelaw comments on the unusual placement of one gun above the other at Praed Point, Rabaul. A similar arrangement was used at Good's Battery on the

western approaches to Torres Strait, installed in 1940/41 by Lt Col R J R Hurst. Situated on the narrow Tucker Point, two 6" Mk XI guns covered Normanby Sound, the approach to Thursday Island on the south side, and Prince of Wales Channel, the main through-passage of Torres Strait on the north side, an arc of 266°. The "catch 22" position was that to sink a ship at too close a range would block the Channel. These two guns were from the old HMAS *Sydney* and *Melbourne* and were recovered recently by the Navy for restoration. They are now at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, and Garden Island, Sydney, respectively.

Elizabeth Burchill's "Thursday Island Nurse" records that the HMAS *Sydney* called at Thursday Island in 1916. Peter Goode was a botanist with Matthew Flinders.

Thirdly, re Torres Strait Islanders who assisted the Australian Defence Forces (p.37), the Torres Strait Force included the Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion of Islanders (Regimental Lists October '44) and many Island gunners helped man the Fixed Defences.

Allan Gosper[1]



Torres Strait Island Gunners

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[1] Allan Gosper joined the Sydney Garrison Artillery Militia in 1935, and served as WOII to Captain in the Torres Strait Coast Artillery (1941-43). He is at present a working member of the RAA Historical Society at the National Artillery Museum at North Head, Manly, NSW.

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