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

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SABRETACHE

Vol XXXI Number 2

1990

SABRETACHE

The Journal and Proceedings of
The Military Historical Society of Australia
(founded 1957)

APRIL—JUNE 1990
VOLUME XXXI-NUMBER 2

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Contributions in the form of articles, book reviews, notes, queries or letters are always welcome. Authors of major articles are invited to submit a brief biographical note. The annual subscription to *Sabretache* is $26.

Published by authority of the Federal Council of the Military Historical Society of Australia. The views expressed in the articles in this journal are those of the contributor and not necessarily those of the Society.

Typeset and printed by
Koomarri Printers, Canberra (06) 251 3033

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SABRETACHE

The problems facing Australian military historians were recently highlighted in the *Canberra Times*, following an interview with Dr Peter Edwards. Appointed to complete an official history of the Vietnam War, Dr Edwards was responding to criticism by a Senate committee that writing official histories take too long.

Dr Edwards said an official history of World War I had taken 23 years to prepare and an official history of World War II had taken 34 years.

A British official history of World War II was not yet finished and the United States had only produced three volumes of an official history of the Vietnam War.

'It's a fact of life that when faced with volumes of material, that is what happens to official histories', he said.

There were seven tonnes of documents shipped back from Vietnam. Historians also faced 9.74 shelf kilometres of relevant top-secret records held by the Department of Defence between 1950 and 1970. Defence records classified restricted or above until 10 years ago amounted to 59.48 shelf kilometres.

'It was a nightmare', Dr Edwards said.

'There was also the skill of deciding what to leave in or omit in order to tell the story', he said.

However, despite the setbacks, five volumes were under way and two manuscripts were expected to be completed by the end of 1990, and published some time in 1991.

On the 75th Anniversary of the Gallipoli landing, Jack Hazlitt, now 92, recalls, 'We got to Gallipoli in mid-July and up till then I thought, "What a glorious chance to see the world for nothing". That attitude didn't last very long.

It was my first experience of fighting a war. I saw my first casualty in Shrapnel Gully. It was a shock I can tell you, especially as I'd trained with the man. I heard him call out and he pitched down. He died from loss of blood, I think.

After that I started to get shock after shock. I was alongside one of the fellas from my training tent in the front line when he stepped on an unexploded shell. It took his head clean off. He was a close mate and that upset me quite a bit.

I became a runner. The average life of a runner was 24 hours. Very few of us survived. You could say I'm one of the lucky ones. They carted me off in November a complete wreck'.

Professor Ken Inglis, ANU, with Major Keith Christianson of Duntroon

The Australian War Memorial Research Centre has been closed to the public for two months for essential building alterations and the installation of air-conditioning. It is expected to re-open in mid-August.

Researchers intending to visit Canberra on or after this date should contact the Memorial prior to their visit to check this date. The answering machines in the Research Centre will be updated to give the actual date of re-opening. The contact numbers are:
(06) 243 4315 (06) 243 4312

In a recent interview with *The Bulletin* the new Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General John Coates said that military history has application to today's problems. 'In my last year at the Defence Force Academy, I was really re-visiting the Malayan emergency, looking at Borneo and looking at our operations in Vietnam on a combat analysis basis to deduce lessons from them. There are an enormous number of lessons and, if you don't watch it, you continually re-invent the wheel.

It showed us that intelligence is enormously important. In Malaya, they decided to set up a highly centralised system. We got our first intelligence computer while I was still in Malaya. Its effect was electric. Up to then, if you wanted to know how many ambushes had taken place on a particular track or which routes the CTs [communist terrorists] used in the wet as distinct from the dry, you had to pour back through files and find it by steam. Once you got a computer, you could put it all on a database and ask those questions immediately.'

The Australian War Memorial commemorated the 75th anniversary of Gallipoli with a series of public lectures in May.

Professor Ken Inglis, who accompanied Gallipoli veterans on a trip to the Turkish battleground 25 years ago, discussed that visit in the context of the recent 75th anniversary commemoration. Dr Michael McKernan, Deputy Director of the War Memorial who took part in this year's visit to Gallipoli, gave the address. He spoke on the reaction of the soldiers returning to the scene of the fighting, and what has been described as the 'intense Australian response'.

Other lectures were given by Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Pugsley, a military historian who examined the part of New Zealanders at the Dardanelles; and Mr Peter Burness, War Memorial curator of military heraldry, who talked of the attack at the Nek, its commanders and the courage of the men making that fatal charge.

Robert O'Neill

For want of critics . . . The Tragedy of Gallipoli

***Sabretache** is indebted to Professor Robert O'Neill, Major-General J. S. Lee, MBE, and the Gallipoli Memorial Lecture Trustees for permission to publish Professor O'Neill's 1990 Gallipoli Memorial Lecture.*

The Lecture is one in an annual series organised by the Trustees. Inaugurated in 1985 in Holy Trinity, Eltham, the Gallipoli Memorial Lectures are an attempt to remember those who died at Gallipoli in a way which draws lessons for the contemporary world.

Professor O'Neill's address was given at the Holy Trinity Church, Eltham, London, on 26 April 1990.

I AM deeply conscious of the honour of the invitation to give the Gallipoli lecture, here in London, on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the landings. Given the nature of my predecessors as Gallipoli lecturers, who include HRH Prince Philip, Mr Edward Heath and the Archbishop of Canterbury, the invitation was both daunting and tempting. I accepted it in the understanding that the Trust knew what it was doing in asking me to speak, jumping down in standing and age, as well as crossing the now quite broad gap of nationality. As a working military historian who teaches the campaign at Oxford and takes an interest in current strategic issues, I am not about to philosophise after making brief mention of the campaign. Rather in this lecture I will give you fifty-five minutes worth on the events of 1915 and some thoughts they raise which are of wider relevance to the conduct of war in general. Rest assured I do not intend either to make this occasion exclusively an ANZAC celebration, particularly as I am conscious of the fact that I stand here in Holy Trinity Church only a few yards away from a memorial chapel to a British Division, and that a stated aim of the Trust which sponsors these lectures is to commemorate the fallen on both sides.

Few of the lectures that I have given have meant as much to me as this one. The Gallipoli campaign has been part of my consciousness since the age of five. I learned from witnessing my first ANZAC Day ceremony, in my first year in Primary school, some two months after the fall of Singapore, that it commemorated an event in Australian history like no other. In most of the forty-eight years since then I have attended commemorative services and absorbed both the ANZAC legend and the ANZAC facts which have been such dominant aspects of

Australia's political and social history in the twentieth century.

Nobody who has taken part in one of the hundreds of dawn services that are held in Australia and New Zealand on the 25th April each year is ever likely to forget their atmosphere of dedication. The faces of those taking part show a keen determination to remember and honour those who, in that same chilly darkness began clambering over the sides of their transports into small craft waiting to take them into their baptism of fire. The dawn services are a mark of respect for free men who willingly accepted huge risks in order to thwart what they saw as alien hegemonism, threatening Britain and therefore both Australia and New Zealand. The moral dilemma involved in invading a country remote from the theatre of war, which in the preceding months had done Britain little direct harm other than to defend itself against naval attack, has only recently found acknowledgement.

ANZAC Day services and parades are expressions both of compassion for those who died and pride in the military reputation that they helped to found. The services also have a wider significance in recognising the birth of a sense of national pride that has kept the 25th of April for seventy-five years the most poignant day of the year for Australians and New Zealanders. The more radical of antipodean nationalists today repudiate the Gallipoli experience as an expression of national worth, seeing it rather as a piece of deplorable imperial subservience and bellicism. But to anyone with a sense for history and an understanding of how times change, Gallipoli will continue to be seen as an important verifier of the claims of Australia and New Zealand to be regarded as significant international actors. It is also a key source of the confidence which is essential if people are to feel that they are an independent nation.

The campaign cost the lives of 7,594 Australians and 2,431 New Zealanders. Another 18,500 Australians and 5,140 New Zealanders were wounded. For young countries of small populations these were terrible sacrifices of the coming generation. Few Australian or New Zealand families were without cause to grieve at personal loss. It is no wonder that ANZAC Day became such a sacred act of remembrance in both countries.

Of course it is a day to remember not only for Australians and New Zealanders. The regular attendance of the Austrian, German and Turkish ambassadors at the 11 am service at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra showed that they well understood the significance of the 25th of April. After a service in the mid-1970's the newly arrived Austrian Ambassador remarked to me that he found the seating arrangements notable. He had been placed, as was the custom, together with his German and Turkish colleagues, at one side of the seating for the diplomatic corps. He observed with a broad smile of satisfaction: 'In the course of a long diplomatic career I have had to attend many war commemoration services but as I looked at the three of us sitting here I thought this one is unique - it commemorates the only occasion on which we won.'

And so they did, and for very good reasons, not the least of which were that they fought well and worked effectively together. In a campaign of extreme difficulty for all who took part, the Turkish infantryman distinguished himself not only by his bravery and sense of devotion to his comrades when under enormous pressure, but also by his humanity and evident regard for his enemy. Early fears about Turkish cruelty to prisoners and the wounded, and the use of dum-dum bullets, proved to be largely unfounded. Soon after the landings, Major Guy Dawnay, of General Sir Ian Hamilton's staff, wrote to his wife:

> '(The Turks) are treating our wounded splendidly! So believe no other stories you may hear.'[1]

The Turkish soldier, or Johnny Turk as his foes called him, was well served by his own leaders including the then Lieutenant Colonel Mustapha Kemal, better known to us as Ataturk, who at 10 am on 25th April personally blocked that very promising Australian foray led by Captain Tulloch which reached 2000 yards inland, across the shoulder of Battleship Hill and within sight of the Straits. That thrust, made in the first six hours of the landing, penetrated twice as far as the deepest advance made on the ANZAC front during the whole subsequent operation. It was to be the first of many that Kemal and his men were to contain.

The Turkish soldier was also fortunate in his German leaders and advisers, a band of some two hundred officers under the doughty Otto Liman von Sanders. By his own admission one of the oldest division commanders in the German Army, von Liman had not been intended for great heights in his own service when he was nominated on 15th June 1913 to lead the new German military mission to Turkey. In many ways he was a curious choice: perhaps it was the oriental flavour of his name which led to his selection. If so, someone had blundered because he was probably of Jewish descent. The 'Sanders' part of his name he assumed only with his ennobling, the granting of the right to use the prefix 'von' before his name. The Kaiser honoured him along with many others on the 25th anniversary of his ascent to the throne, a

month after Liman's appointment in Turkey. Liman intended thereby to commemorate his wife, Amelia von Sanders, who had died in 1906. He is properly referred to as General von Liman. It is formally correct to call him, on first use of his name, General Liman von Sanders. The practice of many British historians of referring to him as General von Sanders, as if Liman was his given name, is wrong.

Perhaps in sending him to Constantinople the German General Staff was simply ridding itself of a tiresome senior officer without being too brutal to his self esteem. A younger colleague, General Hans von Seeckt, who served as Chief of Staff in the Turkish General Headquarters in 1917-18, wrote of Liman's selection:

> 'The choice of the Chief of the Military Mission could scarcely have fallen more unfortunately. Found in Germany unsuitable for the command of an Army Corps, he was supposed to take over the re-building of the whole Turkish Army. One simply could not demonstrate indifference in worse terms: it was an admission that we had not understood the principle that for the representation abroad of a strong nation, only the best would suffice. General von Liman was well enough known in the German Army to deter the best from serving under him. To him went the unsuspecting, the enthusiasts, the adventurers or those who were tempted by higher pay.'[2]

Viewed in the light of Liman's performance in command of the Fifth Turkish Army, the formation defending the Dardanelles in 1915, these seem to be ungenerous comments. He made an early error in thinking that Besika Bay, on the southern shore, was the most likely place for a British landing. The forces he stationed on the peninsula were held too far back to frustrate a landing at its outset, but he wanted to keep them concentrated on the best axes for rapid movement. He was firmly of the opinion that an attempt to invade would be made and stirred up a whirlwind of controversy with War Minister Enver and those of his subordinates who in early 1915 discounted this possibility. Difficult, vain man that Liman undoubtedly was, he met the challenges of the campaign, and faced down his many arm-chair critics in Constantinople and Germany when the enemy pressure was at its most intense.

He had his hour of glory in repelling the great offensive at ANZAC and Suvla in August. Within hours of its launching he had deduced British aims precisely and marshalled his none too numerous forces quickly and at the right places. He ordered counterattacks rapidly and unerringly, going forward himself to observe that to be made at Suvla. Would that his rival, Hamilton, had emulated his action in dismissing the local commander, Feizi Pasha, for inactivity. Handing the sector over to Kemal, Liman had the satisfaction of seeing the 6,000 men that he could assemble for this one desperate thrust pour over the ridge of Tekke Tepe and strike the British infantry at their most vulnerable phase, clambering up the steepest part of the slope, exhausted and confused. That success put paid to British hopes for a successful outcome to the campaign.

The great Suvla offensive was brought to nought at dawn on 9th August. Kemal, returning exhausted to the heights of the main ridge near Chunuk Bair late that evening, brought off a superb feat of front line leadership to remove the final threat to his position. Heartening his six remaining battalions that night he organized a counter attack to break the epic British and New Zealand drive for the crest. At 4.30 next morning he led the first assault line into battle, signalling direction with his whip. A few minutes later, when light had strengthened, that last band of Turkish reserves would have been swept off the forward slopes by naval gunfire. The New Zealand machine gunners took terrible toll of them as they advanced silently, with no fire support, holding their own fire until they were on their foes. Their determination and Kemal's leadership carried them through to success. The Turkish hold on the crest was thereafter never to be challenged.

We know the story well from our own side. It is well to think about it from that of the Turks if justice is to be done Kemal and his chief, von Liman. The old German may not have been one of his country's best officers but he had what it took when the chips were down. It is hard to believe that his qualities were not known to those who selected him for the position. For all his crustiness and obstinancy in dealing with Berlin and his ambassador in Constantinople, Liman served Turkey and Germany well as a senior commander and adviser in times of crisis.

It is only fair, however, to let the final word rest with Seeckt, who knew him well and showed by his own record that he also had what it took to exercise high command:

> 'It should not be disavowed that in stubborn repulse of the stubborn attack he fulfilled what was required of him, but in holding fast just as stubbornly to preconceived ideas he let the real victory slip through his fingers. His incapacity not only to lead military masses but also to nurture them, and his pathological mistrust of any expert German assistance provided to him let the Turkish Army emerge from the Dardanelles campaign victorious but in ruins.'[3]

It was not only the British survivors who were exhausted by the struggle for Gallipoli. We

remember the Turks and their Austro-Hungarian and German allies today, the former fighting in defence of their own native soil against the aggression which nobody can tolerate if they value freedom. But thinking of them also reminds us of a great disparity in the historiography of the Gallipoli campaign. There are hundreds of volumes on the British and ANZAC sides but only a handful covering the Turkish and German experience. With a few rare exceptions such as the memoirs of von Liman and General Kannengiesser, one of his subordinates, or the studies of Professor Ulrich Trumpener, they remain masked by the screen of a foreign language. If there is a task worth doing for those who want to keep alive the memory of this campaign it is surely to find ways of bringing the existing Turkish and German literature on the Gallipoli campaign to the reader of the new global language, English, and of commissioning new historical works by scholars of various nationalities which draw on Turkish and German sources.

Finally and most importantly let me acknowledge the British role in the campaign, and by British I mean United Kingdom as distinct from imperial. It is easy to forget how vast Britain's role was. The national importance of the Gallipoli campaign to Australians and New Zealanders is such that one is aware only of a sideshow down at Cape Helles. Perhaps the ANZAC public relations machine has also done its work internationally all too well, so that the world is more aware of the Australian and New Zealand role than of the United Kingdom's own part. If the role of the United Kingdom does not always receive its due share of attention, that of the Royal Navy has even less justice done to it, severely underplayed by comparison with that accorded to the forces ashore, to the infantry perched high up on the cliffs and ridges, clinging on desperately despite a fierce enemy, crumbling soil, constant thirst, malnutrition, logistic shortages of all kinds, and alternatively roasting and freezing temperatures. But it was initially wholly a naval operation and, apart from occasional withdrawals, the navy sustained and supported the army throughout eight long months.

Also we should remember the part played by the 29th Indian Brigade, particularly the 1st/6th Gurkhas on Chunuk Bair on 8th and 9th August. As an Australian I am delighted that through the auspices of the Gallipoli Memorial Lecture Trust, the United Kingdom is marking and keeping alive the memory of a campaign of rare significance, conceived, mounted and directed from this very city, in whose operations 119,696 men in British and Indian uniforms became casualties, including over 28,000 dead.

One hopes particularly in these days of European integration that there might be some counterpart to these Commemorative efforts in France. The French part in the campaign was notable and bloody, if brief. It is understandable, however, that an operation which cost a mere 47,000 casualties, including 10,000 dead, in a war in which France lost 1.3 million in dead alone, will play only a small part in that nation's thinking on war and its impact. It is also appropriate particularly in the wake of recent relaxations in East-West tensions to recall the Russians who fell in the appalling winter campaign against Turkey in the Caucasus and those manning the cruiser ***Askold***, a veteran of the Russo-Japanese war which had daringly outrun the Japanese navy to escape from Port Arthur to Shanghai. They represented the great ally on the Eastern Front which stood to gain so much had the operation been successful.

General Otto Liman von Sanders

As General Hans Kannengiesser, who commanded a Turkish division on the peninsula, observed in his study of the campaign:

> 'Seldom have so many countries of the world, races, and nations sent their representatives to so small a place with the praiseworthy intention of killing one another.'[4]

In toto nearly one million men fought in the campaign, and the largest contingent of all was that of the Turks, some 500,000. According to official Turkish figures, 86,000 were killed and 165,000 wounded, but these almost certainly are a severe understatement. Of the Allied half million over 250,000 became casualties, including 47,000 dead. Of the million men who fought at the Dardanelles, about one in seven died and a further one in three were casualties.

When one climbs the ridge of Chunuk Bair and surveys the tiny battlefields on the peninsula it is

astounding to realise that so much intense activity was concentrated in such tiny areas. The British area at Helles was some three miles deep and two wide. The ANZAC position was some two miles from north to south and much of it was half a mile or less in depth. One can walk the perimeter in a few hours. It is good to know that yesterday the Turkish government gave the seventy-fifth anniversary of the landings such prominent commemoration, and that ever since 1919, and particularly in recent years, it has been extremely co-operative with those who wish the battlefield to be marked more comprehensively for visitors from home and abroad.

It is ironic that we should know the campaign by the name Gallipoli, which derives from the Greek for 'nice town'. As the Turks seem to have been content to adapt that name only slightly, to 'Gelibolu', they will doubtless forgive us, even if the Greeks think we choose strange words to describe a peculiarly horrible battlefield. The Turkish name for the campaign as a whole, Canakkale, corresponds to our reference to it as the Dardanelles. The Turks call that same waterway the Straits of Canakkale after the major fortress and administrative centre on the southern shore. To the Turkish defenders, Canakkale was central to their concerns, and this is why Liman worried so much about a landing at Besika Bay. If they held Canakkale they could supply the peninsula and keep the Straits closed. If they lost it, their flank was turned.

The British invaders for their part focussed their attention on the northern side because it was there that they imagined their road to Constantinople to begin. It is a moot point as to whether a greater allied effort on the southern side would not have paid decisive dividends. The country was not easy and strong Turkish forces were concentrated in that sector, but they were led with nothing like the skill and ferocity of Kemal, and the initial French gains were impressive. But the possibility is simply one of the many 'ifs' of the campaign.

The Theme: The Campaign's Significance for the Conduct of War

To judge from recent events in Eastern Europe the whole subject of warfare may be heading fast for the dusty archives of history, at least in Europe. One hopes that it might be, but one also remembers that war will continue to afflict many other regions for a long time to come. One also has to remain aware of the possibility that the revolutions of 1989 may prove fragile. In other words, I do not believe that my subject is yet wholly of historical significance, nor do I teach it as such.

Not only is the mission of the Gallipoli Trust well chosen but so also is the wording of its constitution. The Trustees are charged with the holding of an annual lecture, to keep alive the memories 'of those who suffered and perished on both sides' and to see that the lessons of the campaign are not forgotten. That is a splendid mission: there is much worth remembering from the Turkish-German side of the struggle, as well as that of our own. And long before reading the constitution so thoroughly sent to me by General Lee in January, I had already decided to make my theme a study of aspects of the campaign which reveal problems encountered in most major military operations. As a historian I hesitate to call these 'lessons' but as a former soldier I know what the Trustees are aiming at.

By the end of their first day on Gallipoli Peninsula the ANZAC's main position had advanced east only about 1200 yards. Walker's Ridge formed the northern flank of the attacking forces, although some elements had advanced further north to Fisherman's Hut.

The terrain has changed little in the 75 years since the landing. This photograph, taken at Walker's Ridge in April 1990, shows the knoll known as No. 1 Post still devoid of vegetation, as it was in 1915. This knoll, in the middle foreground, is 150 feet high and is the end of the first spur which leaves the main ridge beyond The Nek. Fisherman's Hut is in the wooded area immediately beyond the saddle of No. 1 Post and the smaller knoll to the left. No. 1 Post was eventually held as an outpost by the New Zealanders.
Photograph by Michael McKernan

Infantry Combat

I would like to have your attention for several hours to do justice to the task, but as I have less than one at my disposal tonight I shall have to be highly selective. Let me begin at the sharp end. In thinking about its tactical impact one is inclined to wonder whether there is anything special to be said that could not be said about any of the opening campaigns of a major war. Troops on both sides were initially inexperienced and leaders had to learn to handle their responsibilities as they went. Soldiers had to learn that war is a twenty-four hours a day business, and come to terms with the fact that while on operations there is little real rest and there are no diversions except the boredom of inactivity. Aged and inadequate leaders chosen by the criteria of peacetime service had to be weeded out. They also had to learn prudence on the modern battlefield dominated by the machine gun. Will power, as General Fuller once observed in commenting upon French elan, does not make one bulletproof. All these things were learned smartly in the opening weeks, but they are so ***sui generis*** that they have to be learned anew in any war.

On Gallipoli there were the special arts of close-quarter trench warfare to be acquired, with front lines twenty yards apart and less, and the enemy in easy earshot or grenade and message tossing range. Senior commanders thought it a splendid idea for the

front line troops to throw messages to the Turks promising good treatment if they surrendered. The troops themselves knew the idea was crazy but they complied. On one occasion, at Quinn's Post, the reply came back squarely:

> You think there are no true Turks left. But there are Turks, and Turks' sons!'[5]

Communication also took place for other purposes. In November at Quinn's the Turks threw over a handsome cigarette case, inscribed in Turkish soldiers' French:

> 'Take, with pleasure. To our heroic enemy.'[6]

But the proximity of the trenches meant that life on both sides went on under constant threat of the bombs which could easily be tossed from one line to another and of the huge mines which patient sappers placed in tunnels beneath the feet of their enemies. Listening and counter-mining were the best defences against the latter. Men soon learned to fall on an incoming bomb with a full sandbag to smother its explosion, except those daredevils who caught and threw them back.

Both sides had to improvise, making devices such as periscopes so that they could fire without exposing heads above the parapet and home-made bombs cased in ration tins to supplement the meagre supply of ordnance coming from Alexandria or Constantinople. The life of a periscope soon became a matter of seconds as marksmanship improved to a phenomenal level, and the snipers who constantly covered the battlefield had to resort to the use of tiny, protected loopholes in sandbag fortifications built at night. Had mortars been widely available, they could have turned the course of the campaign, but at that point in the war Britain had only a handful of Japanese weapons, whose ammunition stock was soon exhausted, and the rather ineffective bomb thrower invented by Mr Garland of the Cairo arsenal.

The Turks throughout the campaign lacked proper mortars. At least they were able to build cover over their trenches for protection, a facility that their enemies were unable through lack of resources to emulate. Had the Turks been well supplied with either mortars or howitzers they could have driven the invaders out of their precarious holds in a short space of time. Such support did not become available, however, until Bulgaria entered the war. The failure of the British August offensives having helped King Ferdinand to see on which side of the bread the butter then lay, he threw his lot in with that of the Germans and Austrians and opened the rail link through Turkey. The timing of the British evacuation of the peninsula was particularly fortunate from this perspective.

Every war is replete with problems of transition in tactical methods, whose solutions sadly are dearly bought by those unfortunate enough to have to face them for the first time. In the case of the Gallipoli campaign, these problems were severe. Not only did men have to learn to cope with an intensity of automatic fire they had not faced before, the invaders also had to co-ordinate gunnery support from warships with which they lacked direct communications against targets they could not see. They had to fight on tiny, often steepy sloping and sometimes precipitous battlefields, overlooked by the enemy.

They had to live under appalling conditions of monotonous, vitamin deficient food, primitive sanitation made worse by the crowding of the positions, the stench reinforced by the odour of the corpses decaying in front of their trenches, plagued by dysentry, enteric fever and lice, and with only rudimentary treatment for the wounded until they could be moved to hospital ships. They received little mail and news, and as a result were prey to rumours sweeping the trenches, particularly the ones which lifted their hopes such as that an Italian army of 100,000 or a Russian of 50,000 was about to land. Perhaps the worst problem of all was that of ever present thirst. What none of the operation's originators ever thought of was that their army would be trapped for months on a desert shore, with its ultimate source of water, the heaviest commodity the men must have in bulk to survive, several hundred miles away in Egypt and Malta. Wells provided some supply but in summer they dried. Men in the high forward posts often received only one water bottle per day, which had to meet all needs. The Turks, by contrast, were well supplied with water from springs and wells, although they had to endure all the other hardships.

The Art of Command and Control

One problem of tactical operations that was not resolved at the Dardanelles was that of command and control. You have, I imagine, all seen Peter Weir's splendid film Gallipoli, and its horrifying demonstration of the consequences of a failure to synchronize watches. A fateful seven minutes elapsed between the cessation of the artillery fire onto the Turkish trenches at 4.23 am on 7th August and the moment when the first line of the 8th Light Horse had to climb the walls of their trenches on the pegs they had hammered in for that purpose and spring out for the desperate fifty yard dash to the Turkish line. The Turks, badly battered by the barrage, had just enough time to recover their wits, take up fire positions, assemble relief personnel, organise the ammunition and take careful aim at

the Australian trenches to cut down the assault that was so obviously about to be made. Those seven minutes were sufficient for them to make absolutely certain that a nearly impossible task was absolutely impossible.

This episode is one of those few in which the screen understates reality, for there were not three but four successive charges by the light-horse men in the following forty-five minutes. The last was triggered by a misunderstanding while the local commanders were debating whether or not the operation should be abandoned after the third line had been shot down. Nearly half of those who made up the four waves of attack were killed and another quarter were wounded. As Weir showed and Bean, the Australian war historian, wrote, the last sight anyone had of Private Wilfred Harper was of him 'running forward like a schoolboy in a foot-race, with all the speed that he could compass.'[7] His elder brother Gresley, a Western Australian barrister, also a private, died in almost the same instant.

Co-ordination of fire support for the infantry was a major problem throughout the campaign. Not much artillery could be landed and it had to be sited near the beaches, hundreds of feet below the front trenches, facing the gunners with formidable crest clearance problems. For telling bombardments, naval gunfire was also needed, but ship to shore communications for target identification and correction of the fall of shot were meagre. The flatness of the trajectories of the naval guns made observation all the more vital when operations were taken close to the ridgetops. It is still not certain what caused the disaster which befell Major Allanson and his mixed force of Gurkhas, Warwicks and South Lancashires immediately after the had driven the Turks off the crest of Chunuk Bair on 9th August and could gaze down on the Straits. But it is certain that they were shelled from their own side and as a result had to cease their pursuit of the Turks down the far slope of the hill. The Turks were then able, with a great effort, to counter-attack successfully. Whether the shells came, as Allanson thought, from one of the ships or, as Bean and Rhodes James are inclined to think, from a shore battery, is immaterial to the point that the command and control system was hopelessly inadequate for operations of such complexity. These problems were never really rectified on Gallipoli but they set soldiers thinking about them, both to improve on the existing radio and telephone systems and to design better procedures for the preparation of orders and the control of fire support by forward observers. Thirty years later operations of comparable complexity to the assault on Chunuk Bair were being undertaken in the Mediterranean and the Pacific with high confidence.

The Technique of Amphibious Operations

Perhaps the most important tactical lessons to come from the Gallipoli campaign were those relating to amphibious warfare. This extremely complex art, often shown to be sadly deficient in earlier British operations such as those at Constantinople itself in 1807 and Walcheren in 1809, can hardly be regarded as having been mastered by Britain and her allies in 1915. The landings were marred by serious errors in navigation. The landing craft themselves were poorly suited for the task, being capable only of loading men, or what a man could lift, over their sides. It was difficult for troops to climb into their landing craft. Ships carrying supplies had to be unloaded into lighters. Piers had to be built before supplies could be brought ashore in any quantity. Command and control techniques were lamentable for coping with the problems of two services, army and navy, working together. There was no real understanding of how to cope with the most vulnerable phase of the landing - the moment when the troops hit the beach and have to be reorganized for the assault inland. The result was chaos and confusion among those who raced across the sand into the cover of scrub or cliffs and death for those who delayed while looking for the others of their section or platoon. The above-mentioned problems of fire-control were a further complication for the landings.

General Sir Ian Hamilton

The challenges of offensive amphibious operations were taken up by the United States Marine Corps immediately after the First World War. As early as 1913, Major Ellis had suggested that the future of the Marine Corps would lie not in base

defence as in the 1880s and 90s but in amphibious attack role, seizing Japanese bases across the Pacific in the event of a major US-Japanese war. This idea was taken up with a will and developed by General Lejeune, the Marine Corps Commanding General, in the early 1920s. The defensive Advanced Base Force became the offensive Expeditionary Force. Landing exercises were conducted and years of doctrinal development followed. Until the development of specialized landing craft with bow ramps or doors, the whole enterprise remained essentially one of theory.

By great good fortune this whole process came to fruition in 1941 with the successful testing of the Higgins bow ramp landing craft, the development of a tank lighter derived from the Higgins craft and the production of the first 200 Amtracs, or amphibious tractors, tracked vehicles which could swim to the beach and then drive on inland without pause. It would be interesting to know how closely the US Marine Corps studied and benefitted from the Gallipoli operations. The official history of the Corps has little to say on the subject, but it is difficult to believe that the biggest amphibious operation to that date was not the subject of close analysis by American specialists, and also by the Japanese, who were developing their amphibious capabilities in the 1920s and 30s.

Sadly Britain did little in the inter-war years to build on the experience so dearly bought by her own forces in 1915, but the outbreak of the Second World War transformed that situation. After the evacuation from Dunkirk, Churchill's mind turned to the problems of landing a force to liberate the European continent: his Dardanelles experience stood him in good stead. Combined Operations Command was established in 1940 and Churchill pressed for the development of the ships and landing craft needed to put a huge army back into a strongly defended Europe. There soon followed the development of the Landing Ship Tank, or LST (some of whose passengers were to claim that these initials stood for large, slow target); the smaller LCT; and the assault and mechanized landing craft. Without amphibious operations the Second World War could not have been won, and without the experience of thousands of British naval and army personnel in the Dardanelles landings, that capacity would not have been raised as swiftly and surely.

Problems of Theatre Command

At the level of theatre command there is much that the Gallipoli campaign can teach, but it is almost entirely of a negative nature. One thing in favour of the British-dominated force command structure was the organic politico-military nature of the Empire from which most of the force came Apart from the French, many of whom were at the Dardanelles for only a short period, and the Russians, whose direct contribution was marginal, the forces assembled for the operation, although nationally and geographically diverse, were all British or British-derived. In the light of the French refusal to stay ashore at Kum Kale and consolidate their unexpected success in the first two days of the operation, this composition was clearly fortunate. What other bond could have induced the Australian or New Zealand governments and people to sustain their total commitment to British authority throughout a long campaign in which so much went amiss?

The antipodean contingents had been raised and trained by British officers, and had continued their development during and after the South African war under close British tutelage. They were immature in that they had not yet thrown up a cohort of senior commanders of their own and therefore they were willing to accept British leadership in the field. The Australians had their own division commander but at the level of ANZAC Corps headquarters and higher, the command structure was entirely British. The British authorities had the good sense not to try too hard to break up the Australian and New Zealand national contingents, thereby preserving a sense of identity which helped maintain political support for the imperial war effort in the dominions.

The imperial system was not without its frictions but earlier experience of working together served to lubricate the mechanism and keep it from seizure even in times of great stress. British officers such as Birdwood and Sinclair-MacLagan already had acquired useful knowledge of independent-minded colonial troops and their sometimes touchy political masters during the South African war and since. The colonials, for their part, had also enjoyed similar opportunities for studying the peculiarities of their British superiors. The putting together of so diverse a force after the age of imperial devolution would have been a much more complex affair. The last conflict in which such an arrangement was used, the Malayan Emergency, is now thirty years behind us. The politics of any combined operations undertaken in future will make the Dardanelles command structure seem the utmost in simplicity.

It is not relevant to my theme to consider ***ad hominem*** issues such as the suitability of particular individuals for the posts they held during the campaign. There is much to be argued on that score about most generals and admirals involved, but much already has been said and written on it and it would be poor use of my time to add to it. What is of particular relevance to my theme are the arrangements, or lack of the, made by British government for overall theatre command. They reflected the

fundamental weakness of the whole British command structure at that time, namely the total separation of the Army from the Royal Navy, each under its own powerful political head, in a system where overall command could be exercised only at Cabinet level. It is difficult to believe that in 1915 the formation of a proper Ministry of Defence was still some thirty years away. Hence it is not surprising that such a system proved unable to conceive of the need for a joint force command, with one man in charge of all force elements, army and naval, in the theatre of operations.

The result was frequent chaos and confusion, as the Navy withdrew its ships for its own good reasons such as danger of enemy submarine attack, while the ground forces had to live with the consequences. Given General Hamilton's total dependence on the Navy for mobility and communications, this situation was potentially disastrous. At the height of the Suvla crisis in August, when Hamilton finally suspected that things were going badly and his presence was urgently required on the scene, he was held up for six hours because of boiler trouble in the destroyer assigned for his use. A call to Admiral de Robeck, the Fleet Commander, or his Chief of Staff, might have yielded another ship immediately, but both services were confined in their habitual straight-jackets and the necessary contact was not made until late in the day. A joint staff could have solved such a problem in a trice.

At the key conference of senior naval officers held on 9th May in ***Queen Elizabeth*** to consider resumption of the naval attack on the Straits, not a single soldier was present. Had de Robeck been of a more daring disposition and taken the fleet into the Straits, the army could have been left literally high and dry while their supporting warships were placed at great risk. In the worst case the army could have been virtually marooned on the peninsula. As events turned out, the unsuing crisis of relations between Churchill and Fisher killed the idea of a further naval offensive, but the fate of the army could have been prejudiced without its having had any effective voice in the matter.

When Churchill gave reluctant assent to the navy's call to withdraw the spanking new super-Dreadnought ***Queen Elizabeth*** from the theatre for her own protection, Kitchener was simply informed that the army's most powerful source of fire support was departing. He raged at Fisher alleging treachery and Fisher raged back but ***Queen Elizabeth*** went. When the German submarine U 21 appeared off the peninsula and sank ***Triumph*** on 25th May, de Robeck withdrew all larger ships from the support of the operations ashore. Army morale plummeted and the Turks were jubilant. The departure of the battleships deprived the army of its badly needed long range fire support. The Turkish batteries on the south side of the Straits were then left unmolested and brought their fire to bear more heavily on the troops on Cape Helles.

The only place at which such conflicts of interest between the services could be resolved, the Cabinet, was by this stage in turmoil following the fall of the Liberal government and its replacement by a coalition. Inter-service disputes at the Dardanelles were simply overwhelmed by higher events and those at the front were the principal victims of an appallingly defective system.

The peculiar nature of the First World War enabled Britain to get away with its antiquated military command structure but the lessons of 1915 were not lost on Churchill in 1940. When faced with the overall responsibility for leading the nation in war he did not, like Asquith, sit idly in Cabinet meetings writing letters to a lady love. He took command in a very direct way as both Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, and he presided over the Chiefs of Staff Committee with great assiduity. It required yet further experience before the theatre command system finally evolved in the later stages of the Second World War, but again the Dardanelles played a useful rôle in educating Churchill and some of his later military subordinates in the need for proper joint service command arrangements at both chiefs of staff and theatre levels.

Vice-Admiral John de Robeck

The Conduct of War at Cabinet Level

The organization of the British Cabinet for the conduct of war in 1914-15 was so defective that virtually all one can say is 'Don't ever do it like that again!' Asquith, although a notable Prime Minister in peace, was most unsuited for the role of supreme national commander in war. He was fortunate in

having two strong subordinates to conduct the land and sea operations, but in the face of their strength, particularly that of Churchill, he came close to abdication of control. Small wonder that there were problems of inter-service friction. The Cabinet supporting staff were very inadequate for the task. Hankey did his best to transform his peacetime role as Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence into that of Secretary to a War Cabinet, but he lacked skilled assistants and the government had no idea of how to conduct a global war when the stakes were limitless and the nation's resources were at full stretch.

By early November 1914 it was clear that the traditional Cabinet system was in difficulty in conducting a major war. Churchill's order to bombard the Turkish forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles was given without Cabinet discussion, yet it was a major act of policy which carried consequences rightly called by Hankey 'far-reaching and unfortunate'.[8] It confirmed rather than challenged German influence in Constantinople, and it put the Turks on notice to improve the defences of the Straits. Kitchener's raising of his new army was a far-sighted move, but he took it on his own responsibility, and soon caused trouble because he was recruiting men totally necessary to defence production and the war economy.

Then followed the War Council, bringing in Balfour from the opposition and Fisher and General Wolfe Murray as service experts. It had obvious point, if obscure constitutional status, but in four months it expanded from eight to thirteen members, losing cohesion and control. And for the crucial period between 19th March and 14th May, an interval of eight weeks, it did not meet at all, believing that its work was done. But Hankey has made the stunning revelation that:

> 'After the failure of the naval attack on the Narrows on March 18th the naval and military officers in command at the Dardanelles soon decided that a landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula was more likely to succeed. The War Council was not summoned again to consider their recommendations.'[9]

The key decisions regarding the escalation of the attack to the level of a major amphibious operation were taken piecemeal by three men, Churchill, Kitchener and Asquith, who failed properly to examine the real difficulty of what they were attempting and the implications of meeting stout resistance. Hankey could see that matters were being handled badly. His dairy entry for 19th March shows his concern:

> 'Wrote a memo to Prime Minister imploring him to appoint naval and military technical committee to plan out military attack on Dardanelles in great detail so as to avoid repetition of naval fiasco, which is largely due to inadequate staff perparation.'[10]



He was barking at the moon. Asquith continued to permit Churchill and Kitchener to enmire themselves, their nation, the Empire and their allies in a swamp which was to claim the lives of 150,000 men, inflict colossal hardship on a further 850,000, expend untold amounts of money and resources, inflict misery on the thousands of families of the men who died and blight the lives of all those who had to tend the physically and psychologically maimed survivors over the next generation.

The political foundations of the operation were so weak that Fisher's resignation in mid-May pulled down the government and compelled Asquith to form a coalition. The War Council was replaced by the Dardanelles Committee, of eleven senior ministers, to whom a twelfth, the dissident Carson, was added in August. It proved impossible, however, to restrict such a high level body to the conduct of the Dardanelles campaign alone and it evolved, with Hankey's guidance, through the summer of 1915 into a full War Committee, finally taking that name in November. Then with the advent of the Lloyd George government in December 1916 a proper

The Dardanelles Campaign, 1915

War Cabinet was formed. It had been a long learning period, but much had been learned. Again it was fortunate that Churchill, who had held high office for much of this time, was able to bring the benefit of his experience to the conduct of war twenty-five years later.

I shall dwell no further on the myriad lessons there are to be derived from the Dardanelles for the conduct of war at the highest level. The system available at the outbreak of the war was ludicrously incapable of conducting a total war on a global basis. Unfortunately it took a very long time for men steeped in and dedicated to the Cabinet system of government to find ways of making it an efficient means of directing a national and imperial war effort.

At least since the Dardanelles the need for rigorous staff work and extensive debate has been recognized. As Churchill and some of his successors have shown, the outcome of debate may well be that the prime minister's mind is unchanged. So be it: leaders must be able to lead strongly when their country is in peril. But all leaders who have read anything about the Dardanelles will remember three sanctions that a democratic system can readily apply to those whose policies yield disaster: loss of office through reconstruction of the government; loss of power to govern; and the long trial by ordeal which commences when a commission of investigation is established. But they are inevitably damaging sanctions to have to apply and a wise leader sees to it that he does not incur that risk too closely.

In Conclusion

Let me close on a more positive note. Churchill was culpable in several ways. He countenanced and played a dominant role in a slipshod decision-making process. He manipulated the words of his subordinates such as the unfortunate Admiral Carden in order to get his way with Asquith and Kitchener. He bulldozed everyone from the Prime Minister and Kitchener through to Carden and de Robeck to ensure that his wishes were translated into action. Yet he did the nation and the Empire a service in hatching a brilliant alternative strategy. I do not mean that it was the right strategy, but it showed that a creative and subtle mind was at work to steer Britain and the Empire through to victory without driving the whole effort into the abattoir of the Western front. Abortive though the Dardanelles offensive proved, it was none the less the right sort of alternative to look for. The ultimate cause of the tragedy that we commemorate tonight was the lack of tough-minded, confident, well-informed people at Cabinet level who could criticize Churchill's ideas as he formed them. For want of critics one of Britain's best strategic minds led the Empire to disaster. ■

NOTES

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8. Lord Hankey, *The Supreme Command 1914-1918*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, Vol. 1, p. 223.
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Rod Pratt

Queensland's Aborigines in the First AIF

*The first part of this article appeared in **Sabretache**, Vol. XXXI, January/March 1990.*

WITH the outbreak of war in 1914 Australia offered her 'last man and last shilling' but not her Aborigines. Although it had been suggested that the Imperial Government was unwilling to accept the services of non-Europeans in a war against a European foe, the contributions of Indian, Gurkhas and Maoris does not support this view.[1]

In 1915 Australia conducted a war census in order to ascertain the nation's resources in terms of men and money. Arguably, this effort was a prelude to W. M. Hughe's conscription efforts and it is curious to note that while excluded from military service, Aborigines were not exempt from this census as noted by a memo from Queensland's Chief Protector of Aborigines, J. W. Bleakley:

> Please compile for war census purposes the following information regarding Aborigines and half-castes in your (local Protector's) districts and supply this office as early as possible. . . . List of civilised male Aborigines between 18 and 45 years showing name—town—occupation—wages. List all Aborigines and half-castes with money to credit in bank or other property showing name—sex—adult or child—amount to credit and estimated value of other property known.[2]

Not long after this census took place a concerted effort was made by the new Director-General of Recruiting, Donald McKinnon, to intensify recruiting methods. No effort was spared to fill the monthly quota of 5,400 men and recruitment centres were extended to remote areas of the state.[3] Due to the difficulties of sending potential recruits to Brisbane or a major provisional town for final medical attestation, new centres were opened in Bowen, Charleville, Cloncurry, Emerald, Hughenden, Mackay, Maryborough, Miles and Normanton.[4] Significantly, many of these latter centres were those from which many Aborigines enlisted. Men such as George Hill from Charleville, Tom Jaro from Maryborough and Frank Malthouse from Rockhampton now only had to face the insurmountable obstacle of military prejudice towards non-Europeans.

In February 1916 enquiries were made by the Chief Protector as to whether Aborigines might be permitted to volunteer for the AIF. The reply from the Army was uncompromising in its brevity, 'with reference to applications for the enlistment of Aborigines, full-blood, or half-caste, please note that it is not considered advisable that such should be enlisted for the Australian Imperial Forces'.[5] As noted in the previous article, country recruitment

officers were advised not to accept Aborigines of any caste as recruits.[6] Similarly, an effort was made by Archibald Meston in 1915, as in 1899, to raise a mounted force of Aboriginal sharp-shooters which predictably fell on deaf ears.[7]

By 1917 several remarkable circumstances came into play to create an easing of regulations concerning the racial question. Billy Hughes had failed two referenda on the conscription issue and the identity of the AIF as an independent fighting force was threatened by the difficulty of meeting recruit quotas. Apart from the more sophisticated approach to recruitment methods, the military regulations as well as the ***Defence Act*** rulings against non-Europeans underwent a drastic re-interpretation without a word of either being altered. By early 1917 this new interpretation was reflected in a military memo which stated:

> Half-castes may be enlisted in the AIF provided that the examining medical authorities are satisfied that one of the parents is of European descent.[8]

The wording of this memo raises more questions that it settles. Essentially this amended regulation is in accordance with the ***Defence Act's*** inistence upon 'substantially of European origin or descent', a 'half-caste' could be interpreted as coming within this category, at least the army now thought so. Yet if the wording of the ***Defence Act's*** section 61 (h) was the same in 1917 as in 1914, why was the more discriminatory interpretation used at the outset of the war? Clearly, an Aborigine with one white parent was not 'substantially of European origin or descent' in 1914, yet through some magical process over three years and falling recruitment quotas the same Aborigines could now be accepted into the AIF. It is also interesting to note that the memo places an emphasis upon 'half-castes' rather than 'full-bloods', but why this distinction? Apart from the army's oscillating definition of the ***Defence Act*** regarding Aborigines, there is a more insidious reason. The insistence upon 'half-castes' over 'full-bloods' was motivated by the belief (by no means universally held) that an admixture of European blood made the part-Abórigine more amenable to authority, reliable and familiar with European habits; in a word, 'civilized'. If this interpretation is correct, then it must surely be one of the most tragic ironies of the war that one's degree of 'civilization' should have been the criteria for participation in the bloodiest and most 'uncivilized' war the world then knew.

With this change of recruitment policy (but not of attitude), the Queensland Chief Protector was able to announce on the 11th of May 1917, that:

> Advice has been received from the recruiting committee that half-castes will now be accepted for service in the Australian Expeditionary Forces (sic) provided that they satisfy the medical authorities that one parent was of European origin. As the enlistment of full-blood Aborigines is also being advocated, will you (local Protectors) as soon as possible ascertain and advise the probable number of full-bloods and half-castes, separately, under 45 years who would be prepared to enlist within the next three months.[9]

Private James Lingwoodcock of the 11th Light Horse. Photograph courtesy ***John Oxley Library***

If the Aboriginal enlistment figures from Queensland in this period are correct, the local Protectors must have been trampled by the rush of hopeful Aborigines.[10] Recording this incident in his memoirs, J. W. Bleakley noted the enthusiasm of these Aboriginal men as they fronted the recruitment centres:

> Large numbers immediately volunteered, all claimimng to come within that category ('half-caste/part-Aborigine)'. The recruiting officers scratched their heads, as one said, 'some of these are the blackest half-castes I've ever seen'. It seems a shame to disappoint them, but most, if not all, wormed themselves in at other centres and got into uniform eventually.[11]

When this primary account is compared with known enlistment dates for Queensland Aboriginal enlistees a very clear picture emerges:



* Announcement on 11 May 1917 by Chief Protector that Queensland Aborigines would be accepted into AIF
Number of Queensland Aborigines whose enlistment dates are known.
30
25
20
15
10
5
1
Jan.- June
July- Dec.
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918

As can be clearly seen from the graph on page 18 the peak enlistment period (shown as Jan.-Dec. 1917) corresponds well with their acceptance into the AIF. Even though only 54% of enlistment dates are known the trend is quite evident and should hold true for state-wide enlistments as a whole. It should also be noted that there are a few enlistments prior to 1917 which require some explanation. How did these Aborigines evade the legal obstacles? Since no Aboriginal soldiers left personal records we are forced to speculate. No doubt a few convinced recruiting officers that they were part-Indian or Maori while many other part-Aborigines had a sufficiently caucasian appearance to avoid embarrassing questions. Albert Tripcony is a clear example. Enlisting early in 1916, Tripcony served in the 25th Battalion and was killed in France. His Red Cross file observed that 'he was a dark man, clean shaven . . .' or '. . . a very dark chap, must have had foreign blood in him'. Tripcony himself maintained the mystery of his origins by telling people he came from Italy (then an ally).[12] This deception was undoubtedly a popular one. There is also evidence that some 'full-blood' Aborigines enlisted prior to 1917 as demonstrated by surviving photos and individual portraits published in *The Queenslander.*[13] One can only assume that these men were able to enlist through the leniency or gullibility of recruiting officers in Queensland's remote areas. The majority of these 'full-bloods', in spite of the military's insistence upon part-Aborigines, were able to enlist late in 1917 and early 1918 due to a broadening of the racial restrictions. Yet there is also one explanation that stems directly from the 1897 *Act*. In this piece of legislation, the position of the part-Aborigine was somewhat ambiguous. If they associated with 'full-blood' Aborigines they then ran the risk of being defined as a legal Aborigine under the 1897 *Act*. This in turn meant that their movements, financial matters, occupation and even personal affairs came under the control and scrutiny of the Chief Protector's office. Yet as a consequence of these definitions, many part-Aborigines were able to remain outside the authority of the *Act* (which also meant that no records showed their existence). The difficulty thus facing the Chief Protector in trying to ascertain the exact number of 'full-blood' and 'half-caste' Aborigines can now be appreciated more fully. In 1918 this same Protector's office noted that sixty-two Aborigines had enlisted from Queensland although in 1925 another, though only marginally more successful, survey had been carried out.[14]

While the enthusiasm to enlist by Aborigines is clear, what their motives were remains a difficult question. Some may have seen army life and particularly the pay much better than the tedious rural work and poor wages they had been used to. Other Aborigines may have viewed military service as a means of gaining social equality; for when placed in the same uniform, given the same training and exposed to the same risks, the issue of race would seem irrelevant. If this attitude was prevalent among even a minoroty of Aboriginal enlistees, then they were to be greatly disappointed.

At Barambah reserve (now Cherbourg), loyalty to Empire was a strong sentiment. These Aborigines referred to themselves as 'coloured members of the Empire' and contributed significantly to a variety of patriotic funds. Aborigines in the north of the State often auctioned off Hand-made model boats and aided the Red Cross in fund-raising displays. One Aborigine dressed in current military uniform participated in a recruit drive by bearing the placard 'By cripes! I'll fight for white Australia'.[15] An examination of reserve and mission life at this time easily provides an explanation for this imperial and national loyalty. Missionaries and reserve overseers inculcated these sentiments at a level no less than any white child would have received at the same time from schools. ■

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4. John Oxley Library (JOL) OM71–41.
5. QSA PRE 34 1916 letter 1633.
6. JOL OM71–41 Meston Papers.
7. Meston, A. *Brisbane Courier* 29/6/15, p. 7.
8. *AIF Military Regulations* circular No. 113, 1917.
9. QSA CPS 12/W8, 11/5/17.
10. Enlistment dates are known for around half of Queensland's Aboriginal recruits which had been compiled from embarkation rolls, nominal rolls and war gratuity registers.
11. Bleakley, J. W. *The Aborigines of Australia*, Jacaranda. Brisbane: 1961, 9170.
12. Red Cross File AWM IDRL 428.
13. Due to space it has not been possible to provide even a third of the photographs relevant to Aboriginal enlistments.
14. Chief Protector's Annual Report for 1918. Q.P.P. 1919, p. 2.
15. *Wide Bay and Burnett News*, 6/12/17.

ERRATA

Sabretache Vol. XXXI, January/March 1990
— add word *not* between words *should* and *be*, line 3, right column, page 19.
— substitue word *against* for word *in*, line 15, right column, page 22.

Barry Clissold

. . . that six-man patrol

JULY 1918 was the crucial, turning point of the First World War and the Battle of Amiens, the following month, was the decisive battle that lead to to the Allied victory. Planned in May the allies intention was to turn the Western Front and force the German Army east, in retreat, toward their homeland. Under the overall command of France's Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the main Allied strike force consisted of the Australian Corps and the Canadian Corps. Protecting the left flank of this force, the British Commander, General Haig, placed the British III Corps. There were, however, to be some uneasy moments on 8 August, the first day of the battle, when III Corps advance was stopped by the German 127th Wurttemburg Division at the French village of Chipilly. The impasse was broken on 9 August by a six-man patrol from 1 Battalion of the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade.

The battle began at 4.20 a.m. on 8 August. In the centre of the Somme Valley, between the River Somme, in the north and the River Luce, in the south, the Australian and Canadian troops, closely supported by the new Mark V tank, advanced on a frontage of 11,250 yards. At the same time, British III Corps formations, the 18th (London) Division, on the centre and right flank, and the 12th Division, on the left, advanced into heavy fog. The plans of their corps commander, General Butler, was for the 18th Division to capture the objectives Sailly Laurette and Malard Wood. The 58th Division would be held in reserve and once the 18th achieved its objective the Londoners would leap-frog through its fellow division, and Malard Wood, and steamroll their way onto Chipilly Spur and the village which nestled close to the river. Twenty-two tanks would support their advance, but from the outset the 18th, not being sure of the exactness of their starting line, and owing to the thick fog, got lost. It took nearly five hours before the first objective was made secure and then only to elements of the 53rd Brigade, who, having found their way, were moving up through the 18th to attack their own objective. Together these two divisions came under accurate machine-gun fire from Chipilly and Chipilly Spur. When they emerged from Malard Wood, the tanks which they were to marry-up with failed to arrive.

Unsupported, the infantry attempted to advance toward Chipilly but the German defence was too strong. British artillery was ineffective, their heavy guns firing over the German positions, some miles over, leaving German field artillery to pound the British infantry. And, despite repeated attacks, no ground could be made east of Malard Wood.

Meanwhile south of the river the Australians, having made good progress for most of the day now came under observation, and fire, from the same German positions that were battering the British. Monash, at his headquarters at Bertangles Chateau, viewed the carnage with concern. For despite some messages being received at Bertangles

that the British 58th Division of III Corps had taken Chipilly, it was obvious to Monash and all those fighting near the river that this was not so and that the Germans still held the village and the spur. At 12.30 p.m. Monash directed General MacLagan to move up his divisional reserve, the 1st Infantry Brigade, to support the beleaguered 15th Australian Infantry Battalion at Cerisy. In the two hours that followed, Monash showed increasing anxiety and at 2.56 p.m. he ordered the Corps reserve, the 10th Infantry Brigade, to advance to the Mericourt sector to support the 4th Infantry Brigade. The continuing general success of the Australians, was, in Monash's view, not to be jeopardised either by the Germans holding out at Chipilly or the inability of the British III Corps to remove them. Clearly the III Corps had failed to reach Chipilly. They had made heavy work all day in advancing onto Chipilly. Malard Wood, some 500 yards west of Chipilly, gave some protection to the attackers, but the advance route, east of the wood toward the German positions, which festooned the western side of the bare-topped spur, offered no cover apart from a number of re-entrants. Nor did the ground, with these steep gullies, give any opportunity for the employment of supporting tanks. It took until 6.25 p.m. before Butler, commanding III Corps, ordered an attack, 'at once', on Chipilly. Around this time the Germans blew up the steel bridge linking Cerisy and Chipilly. Nonetheless the 2/10th London Regiment attacked at 7.30 p.m. but despite their success in getting into the outskirts of the village they could not get the Germans to withdraw.

Across the river, patrols of the Australian 16th Infantry Battalion pushed into Mericourt but were driven back by heavy German machine-gun fire. Night fell with the Australians and Canadians having advanced six to eight miles. On the north flank the British had managed to advance just over one mile, falling short of its planned three-mile advance onto Chipilly and beyond.

By dawn the next day the British advance along the Somme had completely stalled. As a result the Australian's left flank remained exposed with the now added risk that the general advance itself could become stalled. Chipilly became the target for intense artillery bombardment throughout 9 August; commencing at noon through to 5.30 p.m. American troops, up to then held in reserve, were rushed up to reinforce the beleagured British. But despite these changes of plan the Germans continued to hold out. A company of the 2/10th London, who were ordered to advance onto the Germans, remained stationary, half a mile from Chipilly.

The Australians were increasingly frustrated. But for a patrol from 1 Battalion the morning of 9 August had been eventful, and rather successful. While the British continued to stall and be the target for relentless German small arms fire, the patrol, led by Company Quartermaster Sergeant Hayes, entered the village of Chipilly. They had crossed the river over the bridge linking the villages of Chipilly and Cerisy — which had not been successfully destroyed by the Germans the night before — and left unchallenged set out in search of souvenirs. They found a number of rifles, a machine gun but surprisingly, no Germans. The absence of Germans was considered important and Hayes, and his patrol, withdrew and reported the situation to the 2/10th Londoners who were still pinned down by German fire from the spur behind the village. But the British did not take action on the intelligence that Hayes brought and remained in their positions west of Chipilly. The only challenge to the Germans during the day were the artillery bombardments which, it would be learnt later, were largely ineffective.



British III Corps advance stalled in the 'U' shaped sector in top portion of shaded area.

Monash was increasingly impatient and critical of III Corps as the Australian's left flank continued to be threatened by the German positions on the high ground behind the French village. In theory Monash's responsibility was limited to south of the Somme while General Butler was responsible for securing the north. But by late afternoon Monash had had enough. At 5.30 p.m., on his instructions, Brigadier-General Mackay of the 1st Brigade ordered 1 Battalion to send a patrol across the river to find out what was holding up the British. Hayes, and his earlier patrol, was selected for the task. Members of the patrol were: Hayes, Sergeant H. Andrews, Lance Corporal J. Turpin and Privates G. Stevens, W. Kane and A. Fuller.

Using the same bridge, the patrol re-crossed the river, skirted the village and joined up with the British company of the 2/10th Londoners who were now preparing for a battalion attack on Chipilly and its threatening spur, to the east and behind the village. The British company commander, Captain J. Berrell, recognising the value of their local knowledge, readily agreed that the Australians could lead the attack.

Used as advancing scouts, the Australians quickly gained the village. Although coming under heavy German fire the Australians passed through Chipilly and worked up the spur, northward. In the lead of the following British, Hayes and Andrews, and Kane and Fuller over-ran German positions, taking and turning prisoners back toward the British. A heavy British barrage of smoke fell close to the advancing allied troops, forcing the British to retire. However, this same barrage was welcomed by Hayes and Andrews who now moved to the reverse side of the spur under cover of the smoke. More German prisoners were taken and Andrews, using a captured machine gun fired into the now retreating Germans.

Meanwhile the Americans, who had reinforced the British at Malard Wood, lead a spirited attack from the north of Chipilly. Working their way up and then along the spur they mistook the Australians for Germans. A few tense moments had the Australians on the ground before the Americans realized their error. By 10 p.m., having lead the British advance all the way, the Australians broke off the action and returned to their own positions south of the River Somme.

The members of that patrol were all decorated: Hayes was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal; Andrews was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal; Stevens, Kane and Fuller each received the Military Medal; and Turpin was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal.

At 8 a.m. on 10 August, Monash, having now obtained approval from General Rawlinson, commanding the British Fourth Army, moved the 4th Australian Division across the River Somme. Responsibility of securing the northern sector, bordering the river, now became the responsibility of the Australians. Both the ill-fated British 58th Division and the hard-fighting American 131st Regiment were placed under the command of General MacLagan, commanding the 4th Australian Division.

Thus, delayed for over a day, the advance of the Battle of Amiens resumed. The actions of six Australians had regained the initiative for the British Fourth Army north of the River Somme. ■



The map shown above indicates the critical Chipilly area on the River Somme and the situation on 8/9/ August 1918.

The advance route of the III Corps looking east from Morcourt Malard Wood is on the left with Chipilly to the right in the bend of the River Somme

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Record, Subject 12.2 Final Offensive 1-4 August 1918, *18th Division HQ and Branches*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

Map

The map on page 22 reprinted from C. E. W. Bean, *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume VI, The A.I.F. in France: May 1918—The Armistice*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson Ltd, 1942, page 652.

John Fenby

A history of post-war patrol craft of the Royal Australian Navy

THE first of the Royal Australian Navy's post-war Patrol Boats was of the ***Attack*** class, named after the first one of this type of vessel built, ***HMAS Attack***.

These ocean-going boats had a variety of tasks, which included, the patrolling of fishing grounds close to the coast. They also gave assistance to RAN survey ships in sounding and survey work, and were also used for Reserve training.

The twenty patrol boats of the class were built in Queensland shipyards and were based around the Australian coast, but principally in Sydney, Cairns and Darwin.

The builders of the boats were, Evans Deakin Ltd and Walkers Ltd, with Evans Deakin Ltd building ten of the boats including the first of the class and Walkers Ltd, building the remainder.

The vessels were:

Name	Side No.	Laid Down	Launched	Commis-sioned
Acute	81	Apr 67	26.8.67	26.4.68
Adroit	82	Aug 67	3.2.68	17.8.68
Advance	83	Mar 67	16.8.67	24.1.68
Aitape	84	Nov 66	6.7.67	13.11.67
Samarai	85	Dec 66	14.7.67	1.3.68
Archer	86	Jul 67	2.12.67	15.5.68
Ardent	87	Oct 67	27.4.68	26.10.68
Arrow	88	Sept 67	17.2.68	3.7.68
Assail	89	Aug 67	18.11.67	12.7.68
Attack	90	Sept 66	8.4.67	17.11.67
Aware	91	Jul 67	7.10.67	21.6.68
Ladava	92	Feb 68	11.5.68	21.10.68
Lae	93	May 67	5.10.67	3.4.68
Madang	94	Mar 68	10.8.68	29.11.68
Bandolier	95	Jul 68	2.10.68	14.12.68
Barbette	97	Nov 67	10.4.68	16.8.68
Barricade	98	Dec 67	29.6.68	20.10.68
Bombard	99	Apr 68	6.7.68	5.11.68
Buccaneer	100	Jun 68	14.9.68	11.1.69
Bayonet	101	Oct 68	6.11.68	22.2.69

Technical Data:

(a) Displacement, 149 tonnes.
(b) Length, 32.6 metres.
(c) Beam, 6.1 metres.
(d) Armament, 40/60 Bofors gun, machine gun and a variety of light arms.
(e) Machinery, two 16 cylinder diesels, producing more than 2240 kw.
(f) Speed, more than 20 knots.
(g) Ship's company, 19.

Details of the vessels being decommissioned and transferred are:

Name	Decom-missioned	Remarks
Acute	6.5.83	Transferred to Indonesia, 6.5.83
Archer	21.10.74	Transferred to Indonesia, 12.12.74
Assail	18.10.85	Transferred to Indonesia, 18.10.85
Attack	21.2.85	Transferred to Indonesia, 24.5.85
Bandolier	17.3.69	Transferred to Indonesia, 16.11.73
Barbette	21.2.85	Transferred to Indonesia, 22.2.85
Barricade	20.5.82	Transferred to Indonesia, 20.5.82
Bombard	12.9.83	Transferred to Indonesia, 12.9.83
Aitape	14.11.74	Transferred to PNG, 14.11.74
Samarai	14.11.74	Transferred to PNG, 14.11.74
Lae	14.11.74	Transferred to PNG, 14.11.74
Ladava	14.11.74	Transferred to PNG, 14.11.74
Madang	14.11.74	Transferred to PNG, 14.11.74
Adroit		In service with the RANR, W.A.
Ardent		In service with the RANR, Tas.
Aware		In service with the RANR, S.A.
Bayonet	26.6.88	Training platform at ***HMAS Cerberus***
Advance	6.2.88	Transferred to the Australian National Maritime Museum
Arrow	25.12.74	Wrecked by Cyclone Tracy, Darwin, 25.12.74
Buccaneer	27.7.84	Sunk by gunfire exercise, 8.10.88

During their service with the Royal Australian Navy, support for the Patrol Boats was rendered by North Queensland Engineers' and Agents (NQEA), Cairns. With an engine refit being carried out on ***HMAS Samarai***, in November 1969, ***HMAS Bayonet*** was the next vessel in the slipway for a complete refit.

One problem experienced, with the Attack class Patrol Boat design, was that the stack was shaped in such a way that the exhaust fumes curled around the Fly Bridge and entered the forced air ducts. The stacks were modified higher to carry the fumes away, as part of the refit programme.

In 1975, the Commonwealth called for expressions of interest to construct new Patrol Boats for the Royal Australian Navy.

Companies involved in tendering were:

(a) North Queensland Engineers and Agents (NQEA).
(b) Vickers Cockatoo.
(c) Dillinghams, W.A., and
(d) Carrington Slipways, Newcastle.

Brooke Marine, Lowestoft UK, designed and built the first vessel.

In September 1977, construction began on a new class of Patrol Boat to supplement and in due course replace the capabilities offered by the existing Attack class Boats. The new Boats were built to a British design.

The first of the Fremantle class Patrol Boats was accepted in 1979, with the last of the class entering service in early 1985.

NQEA formed an alliance with the Swedish Company Karlskrona Varvet and submitted to the Commonwealth a joint Swedish/Australian proposal. This proposal was rejected on political grounds and NQEA was invited to re-submit proposals on German and British designs, chosen by the Commonwealth.

NQEA's tender, based upon design details purchased by the Commonwealth from Brooke Marine, was successful and NQEA signed a contract, for fourteen Patrol Boats with the Commonwealth in December 1977. The contract was to get off to a bad start due to major shortfalls, in lead-yard services from the UK company, who failed to finalise the design of the first craft to agree with the data supplied for tender purposes. Their failure to achieve the normal level of accuracy with the production of the drawing and materials ordering package, also led to serious cost over-runs for both themselves and NQEA.

These problems were compounded when it was revealed that the first of class craft was completed at an all-up finished weight 45 tonnes in excess of the design package figure. The original design was modified by NQEA.

The Patrol Boats are deployed to bases around Australia's coastline, at Sydney, Cairns, Darwin and ***HMAS Stirling*** in W.A. The Patrol Boats fulfil a wide variety of tasks, from the Tropic North, to the inclement Bass Strait, patrolling for unlicensed fishing craft, oil rig surveillance and providing a response to National Civil Coast surveillance and enforcement, as required. In the event of war, they would be tasked to control the waters close to the Australian main-land.

Due to their small size, the performance of the Patrol Boats are limited in rough weather. The vessels are well prepared for their patrol duties, as well as for any other operational requirements. Each is equipped with high definition navigation radar, high and ultra high frequency communications equipment, gyro compasses and echo sounder. In addition, they are equipped with a satellite navigation system, which enables the Patrol Boats position to be determined with great accuracy.

The Fremantle class Patrol Boats, carry the names of the Bathurst class Australian Corvette Minesweepers, which served during and after the Second World War.

HMAS Bucaneer Attack Class Patrol Boat (100)

HMAS Bayonet, Royal Australian Navy Attack Class Patrol Boat (101)

HMAS Geelong Fremantle Class Patrol Boat (215)

HMAS Fremantle

The vessels are:

Name	Side No.	Laid Down	Launched	Commis-sioned
Fremantle	203	Nov 77	16.2.79	17.3.80
Warrnambool	204	Sept 78	25.10.80	14.3.81
Townsville	205	Mar 79	16.5.81	18.7.81
Wollongong	206	Sept 79	17.10.81	28.11.81
Launceston	207	Nov 79	23.1.82	6.3.82
Whyalla	208	Jun 80	22.5.82	3.7.82
Ipswich	209	Oct 80	23.9.82	13.11.82
Cessnock	210	Feb 81	15.1.83	5.3.83
Bendigo	211	Jul 81	9.4.83	28.5.83
Gawler	212	Jan 82	9.7.83	27.8.83
Geraldton	213	Mar 82	22.10.83	10.12.83
Dubbo	214	Aug 82	21.1.84	10.3.84
Geelong	215	Nov 82	14.4.84	2.6.84
Gladstone	216	Jul 83	28.7.84	8.9.84
Bunbury	217	Jun 83	3.11.84	15.12.84

Technical Data:

(a) Displacement, 240 tonnes. Light ship, 170 tonnes.
(b) Length, 42 metres.
(c) Beam, 7.12 metres.
(d) Depth, 4.7 metres.
(e) Armament, 40/60 Bofors gun, one 81 mm Mortar, two 0.5 inch calibre Browning machine guns.
(f) Machinery, two MTU538 series 16 cylinder main propulsion engines, each producing 3,600 hp. One Dorman 12 cylinder auxiliary propulsion engine. Propellers, four bladed.
(g) Speed, about 30 knots.
(h) Ship's company, 22.
(i) Construction:
  (i) Steel hull, aluminium superstructure.
  (ii) Hull plates, 4.6 mm thick.
  (iii) Bow region (underwater), 6.00 mm thick.
  (iv) Dupont B10, metallic strip used to join the hull to the superstructure.

Two Attack class and one Fremantle class Patrol Boat, were used in the production of the television series 'Patrol Boat'. These were ***HMAS Advance*** and ***HMAS Bombard*** in 1978/79 and ***HMAS Launceston*** in 1982/83.

Mottos, of the Attack class Patrol Boats:

Name	Motto
Acute	Swift To The Point.
Adroit	Quick And Sure.
Advance	Never Look Back.
Aitape	Tread Warily.
Samarai	Ready For Action.
Archer	Swiftly Sure.
Ardent	Flame And Fury.
Arrow	Straight As An Arrow.
Assail	Cut Deep.

HMAS Warrnambool

Attack	Never Waver.
Aware	Forever Alert.
Ladava	Fight The Good Fight.
Lae	Dare All.
Madang	Our Ship Your Shield.
Bandolier	Dressed To Kill.
Barbette	Taut And Trim.
Barricade	They Shall Not Pass.
Bombard	Hit Hard.
Buccaneer	Seek And Find.
Bayonet	We Fix.

Mottos, of the Fremantle class Patrol Boats:

Name	Motto
Fremantle	Incorruptible.
Warrnambool	Protect And Avenge.
Townsville	Bold And Ready.
Wollongong	Heed The Call.
Whyalla	Thrust Ahead.
Ipswich	Dare To Defy.
Cessnock	No Steps Backward.
Bendigo	Advance With Purpose.
Gawler	Serve With Pride.
Geralton	Fortune To The Brave.
Dubbo	Fight To The Finish.
Geelong	Strive To Succeed.
Gladstone	Defend The Right.
Bunbury	Nothing Without Toil.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

G. Odgers, *The Royal Australian Navy. An Illustrated History.*

The Navy Today Publication.

Department of Defence—Navy. The Naval Historical Section.

Additional data provided by *NQEA Australia Pty Ltd.* Reproduced and published with permission of *NQEA Australia Pty Ltd*, Cairns, Queensland.



Photographs courtesy Defence Public Relations, Canberra.

Reg Ball

The Defence of the Torres Straits – World War II

FOR some time I wondered, after watching the Anzac Day march over several years, what was the reason for the absence of the 5th Australian MG Bn. All the other MG battalions, the 2/1st, 2/2nd, 2/3rd, 2/4, 6th and 7th marched. I eventually wrote in 1972 to the Australian War Memorial and received a reply that the Battalion had left Thursday Island on 7th July, 1944 and after arriving at Glenfield, NSW, was effectively wound up in October, 1944.[1]

Much later in 1984 I again wrote to the Australian War Memorial seeking information on any records held on the activities of the 5th Australian MG Bn. The reply informed me that they held a War Diary for this Battalion which contained enough information for further research.[2] I have since written a Chronological History, which is unpublished, but a copy has been donated to and accepted for inclusion in the historical records of the AWM Research Section.[3]

In the summary to this history I have recorded the formation of the 5th Australian MG Bn from the Instruction to Colonel R. L. Hawke, on the 4th September, 1942, to organize the Battalion through to its service in the Torres Strait Force and its final disbandonment by the 4th October, 1944. A forgotten battalion in a forgotten area of the war.

It is the intention of this paper to introduce the Torres Strait Force and its role in the defence of Australia.

The Torres Strait Force

I have recently described the Torres Strait Islands including Thursday Island, Horn Island (Air Base), Prince of Wales Island, Hammond Island, Goode Island, and also the mainland (or Jacky Jacky) including Red Island Point and Mutee Head.[4]

The Cadre formed to defend these islands were known as the Torres Strait Force. This force also included The Merauke Force. Both are described in the Moultrie Plan which is mentioned later in this paper.

The HQ Torres Strait Force has a War Diary.[5] The commander of the force was Colonel Langford. The first record of the force, found to date, is that of 5th October, 1942 and stated that the HQ moved to the Court House building, Vivien Point (Thursday Island). This move enabled the whole of HQ offices to be in the one building. The Force included, as well as the Merauke Force mentioned above, the Thursday Island Land Force, Horn Island Land Force. The US Army had an administration headquarters on Horn Island.

In the History of the 49th Battalion[6] it is stated that when war was declared in the Pacific in 1941, a problem existed with a large permanent community of Japanese business men and pearlers. 363 Japanese including 14 women and children were interned and guarded by the '49 Battalion Details' and the 'Torres Strait Infantry Force'. The internees were eventually evacuated south on the SS *Zealandia*. This Torres Strait Infantry Force could well have been the embryo of the Torres Strait Force.

At the time of the setting up of the HQ Torres Strait Force in October, 1942 the 13th Australian Garrison Battalion was involved in an exercise with 75 Squadron RAAF on Prince of Wales Island.[7] The 5th Australian MG Bn arrived at Thursday Island on the SS *Taroona* on 31 January, 1943.[8] They became part of the Force and set up machine guns on Thursday Island, Horn Island (around the airstrip) and Goode Island. On the 1st March, 1943 the Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion was formed from the local Islanders, with white officers, and also became part of the Force.[9]

In an Operation Order No. 22 First Australian Army on 22nd December, 1942 the role of the Torres Strait Garrison (Torres Strait Force) was;

(a) The defence of Horn Island and Jacky Jacky aerodromes.
(b) The denial to the enemy of such sea channels as are covered by Fixed Defences.
(c) The protection of such installations including Fixed Defences on Thursday, Hammond, Goode and Entrance Islands and at Red Island Point.[10]

A Most Secret document headed Moultrie Plan Stage I, and signed by Major General Berryman, on 1st April, 1943, stated that units for the First Stage of The Plan had been completed and these were listed in Appendices.

A later Most Secret Document[11] included;

Section 3 Vital Areas and Installations.

Section 38(d) All islands to be cleared of all units except fighting units, fixed defences and services required for immediate and local maintenance. Units outside these categories to be tranferred to the mainland.

Airstrip Horn Island

Recently Bob Piper wrote of the bombings at Horn Island — 'a target eight times in the last war'.[12] Earlier he had written two papers on these bombings.[13][14] In the War Diaries of both the HQ TSF and 5th Australian MG BN, apart from the bombings mentioned above, were recorded many air raids 'yellow' several being upgraded to air raid 'red' without any bombs being dropped. Many of the warnings were recee planes over the area.

Conclusions

The History of the 5th Australian Machine Gun Battalion has been written, and several members of the unit marched on Anzac Day (1990) for the first time. So very little has been written about the Torres Strait Force, the Forgotten Force in a Forgotten Area of the War. Research is continuing and will include the Moultrie Plan devised from a direction emanating from McArthur's General Headquarters, on 12th April, 1943, for the Defence of the Torres Straits, by co-ordinated action of land, naval and air.[15] ■

NOTES:

1. Letter from *AWM 449/9/90* of 7 February 1972.
2. Letter from *AWM 449/9/90* of 20 June 1984.
3. R. Ball (1990) 5th Australian MG Bn (AIF) — Torres Strait Force (unpublished). See *AWM 90/0019*.
4. R. Ball (1990) *The Torres Strait Force and the Moultrie Plan*, submitted for publication.
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6. Always Faithful — *49th Battalion*, Boomerang Publications, Brisbane (1983).
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Larry Noye

Early Days at Duntroon Recalled

Two of the three top-ranking graduates from Duntroon's first intake of officers died at Gallipoli. The survivor, Walter James Urquhart, tells the story of that first course at the Royal Military College in a 10-minute video. It was replayed at the Australian National University when an exhibition marking the 75th anniversary of the historic campaign was opened.

MR 'Jo' Gullett, MC and former MHR was the after-dinner speaker on 'Anzac Day — 75 Years After', which opened an exhibition in the Menzies Library at the Australian National University. The exhibition comprised photo and memorabilia and a video interview with Walter Urquhart.



Jo Gullett MC

Walter Urquhart, from Queensland, was the ***No. 1*** attested cadet when Duntroon opened about the colourful two-storey former Campbell homestead, nestling in the lee of a picturesque Canberra hill. It was 1911.

He recounted to viewers how the outbreak of the Great War on August 4, 1914, meant the officers' training course was hurried on. The demands of a Nation arming up to fight the war required their release for service.

'It was decided that the whole of the first class would be commissioned immediately,' said Urquhart. 'On the 14th of August we were given two-star commissions and sent off all over Australia to join various units.'

'The problem was to get officers for that First Division of the AIF formed under General Bridges.'

Walter Urquhart himself graduated as No. 2 in the course.

The top cadet, Lieutenant Clarence William Wolfenden, from Prahan, Melbourne, and third-

placed Lieutenant William Henry Dawkins, also from Melbourne, both lost their lives during the months of the campaign on the Turkish peninsula.

Mr Urquhart also served at Gallipoli, in the artillery, and survived - 'by the grace of God', as he put it. He went on to serve through into World War 2, in which he became a Brigadier.

A comrade of the first Duntroon course, Lieutenant P. J. Patterson, died on the bullet-ridden beaches of Gallipoli on the first, Anzac Day, assault on April 25, 1915. He was leading his platoon of the 12th Battalion.

Walter Urquhart told his story as an old man of 91, interviewed for the video by John Moore, who gives the commentary at Duntroon passing-out parades. The old soldier died in Adelaide in November 1985, aged 91, the same year in which the film was taken.

The film included photos of the barrack rooms and equipment in use during the Royal Military College's first years. Canberra was being won from the treeless hills and plains of the Monaro uplands. Duntroon then was a far remove from its trim and sometimes-tall buildings and grass-bordered lanes of today.

'Uniforms had been some sort of a problem', said Urquhart. 'We were issued the same uniform as the Universal Service, including breeches, puttees and khaki shirt'.

The first class of 1911 totalled 41 trainees, including 10 New Zealanders. The Governor-General, Lord Denman, officiated at the opening a few weeks later, when 'the world and his wife' seemed to be present.

Horses were an important part of training, but many cadets had never been on a horse. However, they had a sympathetic riding master, an ex-Royal Horse Artillery officer.

'We had artillery and cavalry training, both with six-horse teams,' he recalled. 'There was a lead driver, centre driver and wheel driver and we had to learn all three.'

He touched on other aspects of the historic first officers' course at Duntroon.

'No more than 50 per cent of the class would have survived World War 1,' he said.

H. B. S. 'Jo' Gullett, MC, guest speaker at the Friends' dinner, has strong associations with Australian history.

His father, Sir Henry Gullett, served at Gallipoli and, between the wars, was an outstanding journalist.

He was Minister for Information in the Menzies Government when he was among 10 men killed in a tragic air crash in Canberra on August 13, 1940.

With the war news already grim, the Nation was shocked to learn of the deaths of three Federal ministers and the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Brudenall White. The ministers included the Minister for the Army, Brigadier G. A. Street, and Minister for Air, Mr J. V. Fairbairn.

The scene where the RAAF bomber travelling from Melbourne crashed on a hill about a mile on the Queanbeyan side of Canberra 'Aerodrome' is today marked with a memorial.

Cadet Walter Urquhart

With the loss of such political leaders, the Prime Minister, Mr Menzies, took steps to retrieve Mr Harold Holt from the Army. He had joined the AIF earlier in 1942, when only 32 and though he had already been a Minister. Menzies 'manpowered' him back into Parliament.

Jo Gullett rose to Major in World War 2. He had a kind of distinction in being wounded in turn at the hands of the Italians, Germans and Japanese. He was awarded the Military Cross for his part in an action in Wau, New Guinea.

Jo Gullett's home has been in Canberra for 62 years, much of the time farming at Lambrigg, near Tharwa. Lambrigg is still in a rural area in the ACT though it was where William Farrer, an English-born public servant and experimenter, worked tirelessly over two decades before the turn of the century to develop a famed variety of wheat which boosted the fortunes of the Australian industry.

Jo Gullett was an MHR, 1946-55, and a journalist.

Howard Brabyn

A Museum for Peace

Following Professor Miller's review in the last issue of Malcolm Saunder's ***A Bibliography of Books, Articles and Theses on the History of the Australian Peace Movement****, it is particularly appropriate we follow it up with Howard Brabyn's fine piece on a museum for peace. It first appeared in the January 1990 issue of* ***The UNESCO Courier.***

IF you stand in the grassed-over quarry that now forms part of the gardens of the Memorial Museum for Peace, on the outskirts of Caen in Normandy, France, your eye will perhaps be caught by a seemingly insignificant, newly-planted sapling.

Under two metres in height, there is nothing to distinguish it from the other trees in the garden except the plaque that informs the curious that it is a gift from the people on the United States, a ***sequoia sempervirens***, a Redwood, the world's tallest species of tree, that one day will tower above its neighbours at its maximum height of 90 metres or more.

Opened in 1988, the Memorial Museum for Peace was built to commemorate those who died in the Battle of Normandy in 1944, the biggest battle in the history of mankind. It also honours the people of Caen, who saw their city reduced to rubble around them in the struggle for liberation.

But the Museum is not just another memorial, not just another war museum full of rusty war relics and a somewhat distasteful hint of glorying over the vanquished enemy. It is a monument to the obstinate determination of human beings to safeguard their freedom, and a laboratory in which to study the causes and prevention of armed conflict. Today, it could well claim to be on the way to becoming the world's first University of Peace.

In January this year, thirty-four selected American students are to come together at the University of Texas, Austin, to take part in the first Normandy Scholar Program, sponsored by the US Normandy Foundation and devised with the advice of a board of leading American historians. They will spend

four weeks at the University of Texas, eight weeks at the Memorial Museum for Peace, and a final two weeks back in Austin.

According to Anthony Stout, Chairman of the US Normandy Foundation, whose father was closely involved with General Eisenhower in the planning and execution of the Normandy landings, 'the idea of this course is to teach the Second World War as a "case study" and to find out how people who don't want to wind up in a war wind up in a war'.

This 'case study' approach will involve an in-depth examination of conditions in Europe before, during and after the two World Wars with the aim of finding answers to such questions as:

- How did the Second World War happen so soon after another, gruelling war between many of the same combatants, and could it have been avoided?
- Why were the Allies reluctant to resist the Nazis until it was almost too late?
- What role did world economic conditions play as the war approached?
- What role was played by the press, the Churches and other institutions?

Many of these questions and others raised by the conflict are as relevant to peace now as they were in 1939. Many are central to issues being faced and debated by leaders today and to issues which will be faced as society moves into the next century.

The initial pilot programme will consist of four major courses covering the economic background, the cultural and intellectual history of France in the European context from the 1880s, communications and an assessment of the role of all the media, and leadership and stategy before and during the Second World War.

The Memorial Museum for Peace provides the ideal setting for studies of this kind. Located on the outskirts of Caen, the pivot around which the Battle of Normandy revolved, only a few miles from the beaches at which the Allied forces landed, it is sited literally on top of the underground bunker that served as the command post of General Wilhelm Richter of the German 716th Infantry Division which faced the Anglo-Canadian forces advancing on Caen. Even today there are many people still living in the area who can give first-hand accounts of life under the Nazi occupation and of the battle that raged throughout Normandy for seventy-six days.

The Museum is designed as 'a voyage through history', starting with the signing of the armistice in 1918. Visitors enter a huge cylinder, round which a descending spiral ramp leads them through an impressive collection of photographs, posters, and audio-visual displays covering the period 1918 to 1938. The scenes depicting 'the failure of peace and the rise of the dictators' include not only political events such as the coming to power of Adolf Hitler or the ***Anschluss***, but also background evocations of the Jazz Age, the world economic depression, the Wall Street crash of 1929, and so on.

The ramp leads down to a large black dome where a huge, out-of-focus picture of Hitler is projected in an eerie violet light and the dictator's voice is heard as a menacing, incomprehensive mumble. The world has reached the pit of despair.

As visitors move out of the cylinder they come to the first of a maze of rooms in which are successively depicted the French surrender in 1940; France under the Nazi occupation and the Vichy Government, with all the horror of the execution of hostages and resistance fighters, the desparate daily search for food; the entry of the United States into the fighting and the period of 'Total War'; a restrained treatment of the deportations, the concentration camps and the mass murder of the Jews of Europe; films of the key points of the war such as the Battle of Britain, Midway, El-Alamein, Guadalcanal and Stalingrad.

The next section of the Museum is perhaps more conventional, with displays of weapons and military equipment that reflect the technological and industrial progress that the urgent demands of war provoked.

After climbing up a short stairway visitors enter an area which sets the scene for a truly amazing documentatary film, projected on a wide, split screen and simultaneously showing the Normandy landings as seen from both the Allied and German sides.

The grand finale of the visit is reserved for a film on the defence of liberty and human rights, an explanation of the philosophy of the Museum and a special message of peace and hope.

Writing about the Museum, its founding father Jean-Marie Girault, French senator and mayor of Caen, declared: 'It is our intention to arouse the consciousness of all men and women who visit the Museum, from whatever country, so that they may realize that the tragedies surrounding liberty are as much a part of our contemporary world as they are of history, and that it is imperative that each individual person should renew his efforts on behalf of peace, fraternity and solidarity.'

This intention the Memorial Museum for Peace triumphantly fulfils. Inside its walls there is no glorification of war but an unforgettable lesson in peace. ■

Clem Sargent

MHSA Seminar - Geelong - Easter 1990

THE 1990 MHSA Seminar was held at the Wool Museum, Geelong, on Easter Saturday, 14 April 1990, and followed by a visit to Fort Queenscliff, location of the Command and Staff College, on Sunday, 15 April, where kindred organisations mounted supporting activities.

The Seminar, organised by the Geelong Branch was held in the Wool Auction Room of the Museum. It was a most suitable venue. Unfortunately attendance fell below expectations with some fifteen-twenty members only attending. Prize for enthusiasm must go to Major Bill Benson (US Army Retired) and his wife Joan who drove down from Queensland for the occasion. Four ACT members managed to make the distance.

Speakers included Lindsay Cox on 'Towards an Australian Uniform' describing the evolution of Australian Army uniforms, delivered in Lindsay's inimitable manner, Ben Hirsh on 'Jewish Servicemen in World War I', with accounts of some of the more notable participants. Peter Burness gave an informative talk on the areas of the Australian War Memorial collection for which he is responsible as Curator of Heraldry. He was able to answer a multitude of queries on the collections. Two of the scheduled speakers were, at the last moment, unable to attend and their time was taken up by Major Ian Barnes who gave an interesting and informative talk on the involvement of Australians in the North Russian Campaign 1917-1919, a subject which was new to most of his audience. He also gave an outline of the history of Fort Queenscliff which was to be visited by the seminar group on the following day.

The Geelong Branch had organised a dinner to be held in a restaurant in part of the Museum building, for Saturday night. This was a relaxed social evening thoroughly enjoyed by all who attended.

The group regathered on Sunday morning at Fort Queenscliff and enjoyed a conducted tour of the Fort with a commentary by one of the College staff and, of course, the Old Gunner. Although the weather was very changeable, with rain squalls coming in along Bass Strait members were able to inspect displays by the Peninsula Light Horse and the Military Vehicles Association, to listen to stirring music provided by the combined Navy and Army Cadets band and to be both impressed and entertained by the activities of the detachment of the Victorian Horse Artillery under the command of Sergeant Lindsay Cox who, besides commanding the detachment also doubled as buglar. The half-hourly firings of the six pounder were something to see.

In the afternoon a General Meeting of MHSA members was held in the Model Room of the College.

For those who attended this was a worthwhile and enjoyable weekend and it provided an opportunity to wish well the six Geelong and four Victorian members who were beginning their pilgrimage to Gallipoli on Easter Monday. ■

Book Review

T. R. Frame and G. J. Swinden, ***First In, Last Out. The Navy at Gallipoli***, 200 pp, Kangaroo Press, Sydney, 1990.

This excellent publication highlights the role played by the Royal Australian Navy at Gallipoli in 1915.

The authors are both serving officers in the RAN and have been granted access to navy files that were not previously available.

The Australian submarine ***AE2*** was 'first in' to the Dardanelles in 1915 when she entered the Straits just after midnight on 24 April. Over the next couple of days she played havoc with the Turkish ships at anchor, sinking a small cruiser and causing a profound psychological effect on the Turks.

AE2 was finally hit by gunfire from a Turkish torpedo boat and was scuttled by her captain Lt Commander Henry Stoker. The crew were all captured by the Turks.

Part Two of the book covers the raising of a unique unit, the Australian Naval Bridging Train. Basically the Bridging Train were sailors in soldiers uniform . . . half Navy and half Army and this confused situation led to many problems for the officers and men.

At first there was no clear plans for the use of this unit by the powers that be. It was presumed that intensive training in bridging and other engineering work would take place at Chatham Naval Depot in Britain. The unit would then be deployed in France where there was a need for extra units capable of quickly throwing down pontoon bridges across rivers and canals and to carry out other engineering tasks.

Most of the recruits came from the Royal Australian Naval Reserve. Many of the men were tradesmen. The unit embarked for overseas service on 3 June 1915. Some of the last recruits received no formal training, having joined only days before embarking for active service.

On the 8th of August the Bridging Train landed at Suvla Bay and from then until December 1915 they experienced all the frustrations and rigours of the Gallipoli campaign. Members of the unit were the last Australians to leave Anzac Cove on the 20th of December 1915.

Brigadier General E. H. Bland wrote that the Bridging Train had set a fine example of endurance, good organisation and discipline, and could be relied upon to do its best under difficult circumstances. The Bridging Train then experienced further trials and tribulatons in the Middle East including a mutiny due to lack of pay before final disbandment in 1917.

The book includes nominal rolls for the Officers and Ship's Company of the ***AE2*** and the Bridging Train. Biographies of the officers and some of the men are also included.

First In, Last Out proves that the RAN's contribution to the Gallipoli campaign was a substantial one. It is a welcome addition to the Gallipoli story in the 75th anniversary year of the landings.

M. DOWNEY

Letters to the Editor

Military Historical Society of Australia
GPO Box 30
Garran, ACT 2605

35 Simmat Avenue
Condell Park, NSW 2200
25/2/1990

Ref: No. 4 Squadron AFC's Badge

Dear Sir,

We the ex members of No. 4 Squadron RAAF have been trying to locate our Squadron's Badge. After nearly forty-five years we have been told of its existence. Group Captain A. J. White of RAAF HQ in the Defence Establishment at Russell has confirmed what we have for a long time suspected. That is that when No. 4 Squadron was renamed No. 6 Squadron in 1939 its badge went to No. 6 Squadron. However, Group Captain White states that we can use it ***(See following item. Ed.)***

The badge has a centre roundel with an inverted boomerang in it and the French words "Nous reviendrons". "We will Return" on it. That is OK but as in the letter No. 4 Squadron had the honour to use the French Fleur de Lis, on it. We do not know how many of these there were nor the replacement of them.

As the squadron was a section of the AIF we think that it just be possible that your Association may be of help to us. We have been for some time asking the Defence Department to re activate No. 4 Squadron. Should this occur it would be of great value to it to have its own badge once more.

We fought with it from 1940 until the end of 1945 without a badge. We felt like lost souls.

Please excuse this ramble but this means a great deal to us.

Yours faithfully
PAUL MUIR
Secretary
No. 4 Squadron RAAF Association

Department of Defence
(Air Force Office)
11 December 1989

Mr M. Lackey
President
No. 4 Squadron RAAF Association
35 Simmat Ave
CONDELL PARK NSW 2200

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter of 28 October 1989 requesting information on the No. 4 Squadron unit badge. Although the Squadron's original badge incorporated a boomerang with a fleur-de-lys superimposed, indicating the unit's service in France during World War I, this badge was never formally approved by the Sovereign.

In 1939 when No. 4 Squadron was renamed No. 6 Squadron, the boomerang was retained but the fleur-de-lys was deleted as the new Squadron could not rightly claim an honour which would no doubt be sought by No. 4 Squadron in the event it was ever reformed.

As the original No. 4 Squadron badge was not formally approved and registered with the UK College of Arms, it cannot be included in that section of the RAAF Museum's display which shows only officially approved unit badges. Nor can any action be taken to have the badge approved by the Sovereign until such time as No. 4 Squadron is reformed. The fact that the badge has not been officially approved and registered, however, should not be construed as a slight on the Squadron's history or traditions, nor as a brake on the continued usage of the insignia by your Association.

I trust this information clarifies the situation for your members.

Yours faithfully
A. J. WHITE
Group Captain
Director Personnel Service
Conditions - Air Force

Unit 1, 573 Neerim Rd,
Oakleigh, Vic. 3166.
Sunday, May 27, 1990

Dear Sir,

Probably most readers of ***Sabretache*** are aware of David Littlejohn's four volume study 'Foreign Legions of the Third Reich'. Recently I wrote to Mr Littlejohn with queries regarding some of the flags mentioned in his work. In his reply he said, among other things, that he is engaged in research (together with J. Angolia) on his current project — a book on the NSKK (Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahr Korps) and NSFK (Nationalsozialistische Flieger Korps), and he asked: 'If you know of any unusual and not previously illustrated NSKK or NSFK flags or pennants, I would be very pleased to hear of them.'.

Unfortunately I am unable to help him; however I have written to you in the hope that if you print my letter in ***Sabretache*** it may be seen by readers with relevant information — not only on flags or pennants but on any rare or unusual (but authentic!) NSKK/NSFK devices, emblems, badges, etc. This is an opportunity, seldom given, to assist in the preparation of a work on a subject about which little authoritive has yet been published in English.

Please forward any such information to me at the address above, together with name and address and covering letter for Mr Littlejohn, and I will ensure that the material is sent on to him.

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,
JOHN EDWARDS

ERRATA

Sabretache Vol. XXXI, January/March 1990
— page 4, HMAS Glowworm to read HMS Glowworm
— page 32, line 24, pacifists to read pacificists

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The Federal Council of the Society is located in Canberra. The Society has branches in Brisbane, Canberra, Albury-Wodonga, Melbourne, Geelong, Adelaide and Perth. Details of meetings are available from Branch Secretaries whose names and addresses appear on the title page.

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The Federal Council is responsible for the publication quarterly of the Society Journal, *Sabretache*, which is scheduled to be mailed to each member of the Society in the last week of the final month of each issue. Publication and mailing schedules are:

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Apr.-Jun. edition mailed last week of June
July-Sept. edition mailed last week of September
Oct.-Dec. edition mailed last week of December

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The Society's honorary officers cannot undertake research on behalf of members. However, queries received by the Secretary will be published in the 'Notes and Queries' section of the Journal.

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THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA

Please address all correspondence to:

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