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Sabretache



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THE MILITARY HISTORICAL
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(FOUNDED 1957)

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Clem Sargent, *The Royal Australian Survey Corps, 1915-1990*, joined the Australian Survey Corps as a sapper in the Interim Army in 1946. He retired as a lieutenant colonel, Commandant and Chief Instructor of the School of Military Survey in 1975. During his service he was employed on many of the post WWII projects in which the Corps was engaged — the Snowy Mountains surveys, at Woomera, on Project Cutlass in New Ireland, 1:250 000 and 1:100 000 mapping and survey control projects in Northern Australia and commanded the first Defence Aid Project in Indonesia in 1970. From 1982 to 1988 he held the honorary appointment of Colonel Commandant, Royal Australian Survey Corps. Clem has been a member of the Military Historical Society since 1959, holding several offices, including Federal Secretary 1978-1987 and is currently Vice-President of Federal Council. In addition to his interests in RA Svy he is at present working on a history of the 48th Regiment in New South Wales 1817-1824.

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Rod Pratt, *Queensland's Aborigines in the First A.I.F.*, is a graduate from the University of Queensland. This final article is an abridgement of his master's thesis in Australian History. He has an interest in local military history and has written several articles.

John Price, *Listings of Officers and Warrant Officers of the Australian Military Forces who served in Campaigns prior to, or other than, the South African War of 1899-1902*, is a long-time contributor to *Sabretache*, with a special interest in the Boer War and colonial military forces. John Price is the convenor of the Society's British Army in Australia Research Group.

CHARGE!?

Should we pay to visit the Australian War Memorial?

Federal Council

In November 1990, the Chairman of the Australian War Memorial Council announced the introduction from 1 January 1991 of a charge for adult visitors to the Memorial's galleries. There followed a storm of protests and criticism, which was continuing when this issue went to press.

Media Release, 23 November 1990

Dame Beryl Beaurepaire, Chairman of the Australian War Memorial Council, announced the introduction from 1 January 1991 of a levy for adult visitors to the Memorial's galleries.

The normal adult charge will be \$3, but there will be concessions for war veterans and pensioners. Children will be free, consistent with the Memorial's aim of encouraging the education of young people about the importance and impact of the Australian experience of war.

The charges will apply only to the Memorial's exhibition galleries and not to any of the commemorative areas. Admission on Anzac Day and Remembrance Day will be free to all.

The purpose of the charges is to assist the Memorial in its tasks of acquiring and preserving vital historical material and to further develop exhibition, education and other programs to enhance public access to the nation's military history and heritage.

Dame Beryl said that the Council's decision was unanimous and based on the current and likely future economic climate. There has been no government pressure, but the Council recognised there were limits to government funding, and the Memorial was looking to wider support for its programs to serve the Australian community.

Explanation

In supplementary explanatory material issued to the Press and to the War Memorial's main visitor groups, the Memorial's Public Affairs office said:

The Memorial is the nation's tribute to its war dead and this has been enshrined in successive Acts of Parliament since 1925. The Memorial is also a museum and this fact is recognised in those same Acts of Parliament.

C. E. W. Bean, the Memorial's founding father and mentor from the First World War until his death in 1968, said in 1918 'we are out to make our war museum, our war gallery, and our war library, if possible, not merely fine museums for Australia, but the finest that the world contains, so that it may be in the interests of scientists and historians and travellers to visit them for their own sakes'.

And in putting his plan to the Australian War Museum Committee in 1919 Dr Bean said the 'Commonwealth War Museum will be Australia's National Memorial to the Australians who fell in war'.

The charges will apply to the Memorial's exhibition galleries only. No charges will apply to the Memorial's commemorative areas (the courtyard, Roll of Honour and Hall of Memory); or to the Introductory Gallery, Bookshop and Research Centre.

The standard entry charge will be \$3.00. A concessional charge of \$2.00 will apply to war veterans and their dependents, and pensioners.

Entry will be free for children under 15 years and full time students under 25 years at a school, college or university.

A season pass may be purchased for a charge of \$10.00 entitling the holder to an unlimited number of visits to the exhibition galleries for a period of twelve months.

No charges will apply on Anzac Day and Remembrance Day.

In introducing the charges the Council recognises the practical limits to government funding and the need to look for broader community support for its many programs and activities.

Similar charges already apply in most comparable overseas institutions, significantly the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum, New

Zealand; the Imperial War Museum, London; the National Army Museum, London; the Royal Air Force Museum, London; the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa; and the Musee de L'Armee in Paris.

The admission moneys will be put to securing and preserving the nation's military history and heritage and to developing new and enhanced programs for the education of present and future generations of Australians about the impact of war on our people and our nation. The aim is to give even greater meaning to the commemoration of Australia's war dead.

Public Reaction

Public reaction to the announcement of an entrance charge was rapid and, generally, critical.

The RSL National President Brigadier Alf Garland said immediately that the plan was 'an affront to the memory of those to whom the memorial is dedicated' and that somebody was trying to turn the Memorial into a commercial venture.¹ In a letter to *The Canberra Times*, Brigadier Garland wrote:

The chairman says that the council is committed to the vision of the memorial as set down by C. E. W. Bean, the memorial's founding father. Why then are we trying to separate the area called by Bean the 'Assembly' from the galleries that house the 'National War Relics'?

The whole of the building at the top of Anzac Parade is the Australian War Memorial, not just these areas spelt out by the chairman of the council.

The decision to charge an entrance fee is crass commercialism.

The Australian War Memorial is a tribute from the citizens of Australia to those who have died and suffered so that the country can remain free. It must not be regarded as a museum, an art gallery or an educational institution. The Australian War Memorial is just what its title suggests it is and must remain as such.

The council should immediately rescind their unfortunate decision to charge an entrance fee to this national institution. They must listen to the voice of the public in this instance.²

In an Editorial, *The Canberra Times* took a different view:

The decision by the memorial's council, though no doubt reluctantly taken, is a reasonable one and should help the memorial develop and maintain its museum collection of some of Australia's greatest cultural and historical treasures while preserving the memorial side of the building for free access to the community.

It costs a lot of money to maintain the galleries, the quality of the exhibition material in which has constantly been improved over the years. Even more could be done to bring more of the memorial's material to the public, but the council's chances of getting extra resources from government are extremely slim. A modest fee as a contribution to these costs from some of the millions of visitors is appropriate, and the council has shown some sensitivity both in exempting children, for whom the memorial is a great educational resource, and in deciding to waive charges on Anzac Day and Remembrance Day, when it is most likely to be visited by families of those whose sacrifices and services it most commemorates.³

On the other hand, *The Daily Telegraph Mirror's* editor said:

There is no denying the memorial is an attraction just as there is no denying that it gets a grant of \$16 million a year from the taxpayers via the Federal Government. If that grant is not sufficient the Government should provide more funds.

The War Memorial Council blames the 'current economic climate' for its disgraceful impost on the children and grandchildren of those who made the supreme sacrifice.

Australia's war dead are entitled to better treatment.

The Australian War Memorial is no more or no less than a deserved tribute to those who served and died on behalf of their fellow men and women. It is a solemn record of the price Australians have paid to keep the world peace.

It is not a military Disneyland.⁴

The Government denied strongly that the Memorial had been forced to announce admission charges because it had been starved of funds. The Minister for Justice, Michael Tate, said in Parliament on 28 November that \$16 million had been appropriated for the War Memorial this financial year, mainly for stage one of a new exhibition hall. He rejected Brigadier Garland's criticism that the fee made the Memorial a commercial venture, saying that — *the many Australian or overseas visitors who visit the Memorial find it a very small payment indeed for the many hours of absolute fascination and almost literal entrancement that one has when one wanders around those particular exhibitions with no sense of time at all.*

'You can easily spend a day there for two or three dollars,' Senator Tate said.

The extra funding generated will enhance the exhibitions and the collections of the War Memorial and make them available for present and future generations in a way that is not always possible at the moment — despite the very generous funding of \$16 million per year.⁵

The Minister for Veterans' Affairs, Ben Humphreys, took up this theme in a letter to the *Hobart Mercury*:

Second, the council has made a clear distinction between the memorial's commemorative area, the courtyard, Hall of Memory and Roll of Honour — and the galleries in which war relics and artworks are displayed. The council would no doubt have been aware that no such distinction was made by Charles Bean who said that 'the memorial comprises the national collection of war relics, and the building in which these are preserved . . .' but I, and most visitors I feel sure, can and do differentiate between the two areas in the way that the council has.

I make the point in passing that people are charged to view the collections of war relics in the Imperial War Museum in London, the Musée des Invalides in Paris and other such institutions. Are their collections in some way less treasured and meaningful than ours because of this?

Third, in recognition of the educational significance of the memorial schoolchildren are to be admitted free of charge. Australian ex-servicemen and women will pay a concession rate. And fourth, the money raised is to be put towards enhancing the collection through the conservation and acquisition programs.

The memorial's appropriation for 1990/91 of about \$16 million includes money for construction of the first stage of a new exhibition hall. Against this amount, the money raised through charging (likely less than \$1 million a year) hardly constitutes a commercialisation of the memorial as some have suggested. Such claims are nonsense.

It needs to be stressed that the activities of the Australian War Memorial go well beyond displaying, conserving and adding to the national collection of war relics of which Charles Bean spoke. Many of these activities are not highly visible, but are most significant in the context of the AWM's obligation to commemorate Australia's war dead. They include educational programs in schools, travelling exhibitions, the recording of comparatively recent military history, and the provision of resource facilities to Australians wanting to research history . . . to name just some. These tasks involve considerable cost, and it is unlikely that they would have been

envisaged so many years ago by Charles Bean. But, in a changing world, I think he would have approved of the manner in which the AWM has continued to address the task of keeping alive . . . an awareness of past sacrifices, an awareness he did so much to create.

I administer a yearly budget of more than \$5 billion, and have to demonstrate that every dollar of it is delivered to veterans and their dependents to best advantage. Times are tough and there is no shortage of commentators and opponents of the Government calling for greater cuts in expenditure. I believe that it is against this background that the council has taken its decision. It is apparent that council members have appreciated the economic realities, and have decided that they will not simply allow the memorial to rest on its laurels; they want the memorial to improve on its collection, to grow, to strive for even higher levels of excellence. For that I applaud the council.

I acknowledge that the decision will not be universally accepted, but I do think that fair judges, particularly ex-servicemen and women for whom the memorial is especially important, will appreciate the objective underlying the decision.⁶

The Editor of *The Mercury* responded that, in London and Paris fees are charged to enter a museum. In Australia, fees were to be charged to enter a memorial, a sacred place. The London and Paris museums, the Editor said, exist primarily to exhibit the devices and memorabilia of battle, and to help tourists and visitors satisfy the curiosity about war and its implications. On the other hand, *The Mercury* believed that the Australian collection is there to help people understand and remember their nation's birth through the agonising experiences of Gallipoli and the country's maturation through other battles in other wars. The Government should provide the less than \$1 million a year that Mr Humphreys says the fee is likely to raise; and the fee should be scrapped.⁷

Many comments on this issue were more personal. The Defence Widows' Support Group the RDFWA (ACT) wrote:

Many of our members have donated uniforms and precious memorabilia, which were accepted with enthusiasm by the memorial staff. Our members thought that these would be housed in a national memorial, not just another 'cultural centre' as described by the director on radio and TV.

They are now distressed and angry to find that the original concept is to be commercialised, and they and their families will pay if they want to visit

*the galleries which tell the stories of where their husbands, fathers, or uncles served. (It should be remembered that the children of many of these men and women are now adults.)*⁸

And an ex-serviceman with a clear personal interest in military history took issue with the decision:

I have been toying with the idea of donating to the Australian War Memorial several World War II items of historical importance.

I have, previously, donated copies and photographs of concert party programs along the Burma-Siam railway to the museum, however, if I am to pay \$3 to visit the Memorial, then it would be better if I kept my proposed offerings at home where I could view them whenever I pleased with no cost to me.

L. J. ALLISON
South Hurstville, NSW⁹

Two former Directors of the War Memorial also took up the issue. Noel Flanagan (1975-82) said:

The Australian War Memorial is a special place. This is no museum of natural history, of art, of science. Here the nation commemorates the sacrifices and heroism of men and women who sought to secure peace. It is, as the great English historian Sir Kenneth Clark remarked, 'Australia's only national institution'.

*The memorial has within its walls the greatest collection in the world of material relating to conflicts from the Sudan to Vietnam. It needs no large sums to augment this.*¹⁰

Air Vice-Marshal Jim Flemming (1982-87), speaking at a protest rally of ex-servicemen and women outside the memorial on 1 January 1991, the day on which the new charges came into effect, said that he had fought the introduction of an entry fee for a long time himself and there was no reason for it. He went on:

'It's a national memorial for the war dead, you don't pay to go to national memorials. If you're going to pay for this public institution, why don't you pay to go to Parliament House? They don't need the money, there's nothing wrong with the Memorial as it is.'

He said the Government appropriation for the Memorial had been adequate, but if grandiose plans to change the Memorial and to hire more public servants needed more money, then the funds should be raised by donation.¹¹

There were some other views, one on the value for money of a \$3 visit to the memorial from a member of MHSA:

The decision to charge an entry fee for the War Memorial is to be applauded. It is high time this was done. I have pushed this idea for years but the bureaucrats came back with 'it is a museum in fact, but it is technically a memorial; and the law forbids entry fees to memorials'. Such rubbish!

The 'die for the flag' brigade has missed the essential point. Is a visit worth \$3? It certainly is not.

Gone are the days of glory, under Noel Flanagan. I have visited multitudes of war museums from Moscow to Buenos Aires, and it was then, in my opinion, the best in the world. Now it does not compare with the British Army museum. (Anything is better than the Imperial War Museum, even the Australian War Memorial.)

I used to push for a colonial, pre-Federation display, but the bureaucrats always said 'This is a war museum, we are forbidden by statute to show colonial items not related to war'. Such rubbish!

So finally a few items trickle forth. No-one has the wit to place the beautiful engineer and artillery tunics on dummies. The very rare green uniform of the Australian Horse is reduced to one hat. The famed NSW Lancer's chocolate-and-scarlet uniform is not to be seen. There is so much that the indolent bureaucrats will not bestir themselves to display.

It is very sad to see how low the famous War Memorial has sunk. It is now a shell of its great past.

J. C. GORMAN
Queanbeyan¹²

The War Memorial Council's authority to introduce charges for entry to the 'non-commemorative' areas of the Memorial flows from Section 42 of the *Australian War Memorial Act 1980*, which empowers the Governor-General to make regulations, 'not inconsistent with this Act', fixing charges for entry into memorial buildings. The necessary Regulations have been made, and the entry charges came into operation on 1 January 1991. But, by law, the Regulations must be tabled in both Houses of Parliament within 15 sitting days of their gazettal and are subject to disallowance by motion in either House. Disallowance has the same effect as repeal of the regulation.

Federal Council has considered the issues involved as they affect the MHSA and its aims. The functions of the War Memorial, as described in the *Australian War Memorial Act* are to 'maintain and develop the national

memorial' and 'to develop and maintain, as an integral part of the national memorial (our emphasis) a national collection of historical material'. Federal Council notes that Charles Bean made no distinction between the 'commemorative' and 'non-commemorative' areas of the memorial and, despite the views of the Minister for Veterans' Affairs quoted above, believes it is neither logical nor proper to do so. In Federal Council's view, it is not true to say that the War Memorial has two separate functions, commemoration and exhibition. The largest collection of Victoria Crosses in the world which is displayed in the 'exhibition areas' (and which was, by and large, donated to the memorial) is surely a national memorial? Should anyone — even those who gave them — have to pay to see them? Not a single member of the crew of HMAS *Sydney* survived her sinking off the West Australian coast in November 1941. The bullet-ridden life raft displayed in the 'exhibition areas' is the only relic of her — and them — the nation has. Surely there can be no case for charging admission to see a relic of those to whom the Memorial is supposed to be dedicated?

Parliament does not resume until the middle of February 1991. Federal Council intends to write to appropriate Government and Opposition Members of Parliament during January urging them to move and support a motion of disallowance of the regulations authorising the charging of entry fees, to advise the War Memorial Council of its opposition to the charges and to recommend that, if the War Memorial Council considers that supplementary funds are essential, that voluntary donations from visitors to the memorial be invited. The Federal Secretary will contact Branches to advise them of what action would be appropriate if Branches or individual members of MHSA wish to register a view opposing (or in support of) the charging of entry fees at the Australian War Memorial.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Canberra Times, 26 November 1990.
- ² Canberra Times, 24 December 1990.
- ³ Canberra Times, 27 November 1990.
- ⁴ Canberra Times, 29 November 1990.
- ⁵ Canberra Times, 29 November 1990.
- ⁶ The Mercury, 4 December 1990.
- ⁷ The Mercury, 4 December 1990.
- ⁸ Canberra Times, 9 December 1990.
- ⁹ The Australian, 6 December 1990.
- ¹⁰ Canberra Times, 12 December 1990.
- ¹¹ Canberra Times, 2 January 1991.
- ¹² Canberra Times, 30 December 1990.

Obituary, Major General R. N. L. Hopkins, CBE

One of Australia's most distinguished soldiers, and Vice Patron of The Military Historical Society of Australia, Major General R. N. L. Hopkins, died on 24 November 1990 after a short illness at the Walkerville Nursing Home. He was 93.

Major General Hopkins saw active duty in two wars and was Commandant of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, for three years.

He was the first chief executive officer of the Adelaide Festival of Arts in 1960 and a prominent businessman who also worked with *The Advertiser* in public relations for 12 years from 1954.

Ronald Nicholas Lamond Hopkins was born in Victoria in 1897 and educated at Melbourne Grammar School. After graduating from Duntroon, he served in Palestine near the end of World War I, and held posts in New Guinea and the Pacific in World War II, earning the American Legion of Merit and a CBE.

After the war Major General Hopkins became commander of the Australian occupying forces in Japan for two years, and held other major posts in Australia before retiring to civilian life and business.

Much of his later life was spent writing and playing golf. He leaves a widow, grandchildren and great grandchildren.

The Advertiser, 26 November 1990.



Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, with Major General Hopkins during her visit to the Royal Military College, Duntroon, 17 February 1954.



*Major General
R. N. L. Hopkins, CBE*


The Royal Australian Survey Corps, 1915-1990

Clem Sargent

In 1915, ten weeks after the landings at Gallipoli, the *Commonwealth Government Gazette*, No. 67 of 3 July 1915, announced approval for 'A corps to be called the "Australian Survey Corps" being raised as a unit of the Permanent Military Forces — with effect from 1st July 1915'. This was the precursor of the Royal Australian Survey Corps which accordingly celebrated the 75th anniversary of its formation on the first day of this month.

The establishment of a Survey Corps in the Australian Army was an enigma. In the British Army, at that time the model for Australian military development, the Canadian Army and the United States Army, the responsibility for survey and mapping rests with the engineer corps. It seems that the enigma will not be solved as the file 'Formation of permanent Survey Corps. Transfer present RAE Survey Section' was marked from the Army Headquarters registry to the office of the CGS on 24 September 1915 and never seen again. To gain some understanding of why this departure from precedent should have occurred it is necessary to examine the situation of military survey and mapping — topographical mapping — fourteen years after the raising of the Commonwealth permanent force.

Prior to Federation, surveying was the responsibility of the individual colonial Lands and Survey Departments, administered by their respective Surveyors General, and directed in the early years essentially to the need to define land boundaries for settlement. In most of the colonies progress was made with a framework of triangulation which, until recent times, was the skeleton on which detailed surveys and topographical maps were based, but the surveys were of varying degrees of accuracy, they were incomplete within colony boundaries and were not joined to form a homogenous Australian system. On their framework of triangulation, where it existed, the colonies based their 'parish' and 'hundreds' plans for land settlement. Any military mapping which was produced before Federation was for small areas around military installations and for limited training areas. No colony had any plans for a topographical mapping program nor was there any move by state departments for a program of mapping after Federation. However, the need for topographical maps for military purposes had been recognised by the newly created Commonwealth Defence Force. It was triggered by the experience of Australians in the South African War where the best maps available for some of the campaigns were school atlases.



Australian Survey Corps 1915.
 Back Row — Cpl A. Anderson,
 Cpl J. Bowen-Jones, CSM V.
 Radcliffe, Cpl O. Watson.
 Centre Row — WO N. L.
 Shiels, Sgt H. P. G. Clews, Sgt
 A. J. Clements, Cpl J. E.
 Bradley, Cpl D. Blaikey, Sgt A.
 S. Murray, CSM H. Rossiter.
 Front Row — WO J. H.
 Macdonald, Hon. Lt J. J.
 Raisbeck, Hon. Capt C. V.
 Quinlan, WO J. Lynch, CSM
 E. F. Davies, CSM H. A.
 Roseblade, WO R.J. Mollross.

In 1906 a proposal was put forward for the formation of a militia 'Corps of Guides', based on the concept of the Canadian Guides. This was to be a body of trained surveyors whose role in peace was to gather topographical data. A Corps of Guides was not acceptable to the First Member of the Military Board, Colonel W. T. Bridges, Chief of Intelligence, and the proposal faltered in spite of comments on the lack of maps in the 1906 annual report of the Inspector General, Major General H. Finn. In parliamentary debate on the 1907 Estimates not only the lack of 'ordnance' maps but also the standard of topographical maps based on parish plans was criticised. In November 1907 Bridges proposed raising an Intelligence Corps of 60 militia officers, including government and private surveyors and other professionals, whose duties would include topographical mapping. Authority for formation of the Australian Intelligence Corps (AIC) was promulgated in Military Order 305/1907 dated 6 December 1907.

By 1910 the staff of the Intelligence Corps had produced some maps including, in Victoria, the Seymour-Avenal district and, in Tasmania, a sketch map of the Ross area. The technique employed was to add cultural detail, timber boundaries and contours to portions of state lands department parish or hundred plans, apparently by chaining and other conventional survey methods, the plan providing the basic control for scale, azimuth and position. The maps turned out by this method lacked grids and consequently had no reference system. Nor could they be joined. The need for a systematic map series and the magnitude of the task facing the part-time militia staff of the AIC caused Bridges to seek the advice of Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Close, Chief of the Topographical Section of the Imperial General Staff (later the Geographical Section or GSGS). Close recommended the employment of fully qualified technical personnel and condemned any system of mapping not based on a triangulation survey.

As a result of this advice it was decided that mapping would become a responsibility of Permanent Force personnel, assisted by part-time officers of the AIC. A permanent survey section was established in 1910 as the Survey Section, Royal Australian Engineers, allotted for duty under the direction of the AIC. Four Royal Engineer other rank topographers were loaned for a period of two years from the British Army to assist in the development of the Australian mapping program. They arrived on 11 April 1910 and five days later the first of two Australian Warrant Draughtsmen was enlisted.

At this time decisions were made concerning the map scale, sheet size, contour interval and the map projection to be used for the Australian Military Map series. The international numbering system and breakdown for map sheets was adopted with each 1 Mile to 1 Inch map covering 30 minutes of longitude and 15 minutes of latitude.

W. L. Whitham, a South Australian licensed surveyor, was appointed lieutenant, RAE Survey Section, on 1 July 1910 and although nominally in charge, it seems that he may never have exercised command before resigning his commission in 1912. He was replaced in March 1913 by C. V. Quinlan, who had been employed on colonial surveys in Africa and Malaya. The introduction of compulsory training in 1911 exacerbated the need for maps of training areas and the Survey Section was expanded by the arrival of two more RE topographers in May 1912 and, in the following month, the local recruitment of six topographers and two draughtsmen.

The section was divided and employed in New South Wales and Victoria under the administrative control of the Headquarters 2nd and 3rd Military Districts. By August 1913, 3600 square miles of mapping had been completed to the field sheet stage at a cost of £12,000. The 1 Mile to 1 Inch sheets completed were, in NSW, Newcastle, Morna Point, in Victoria, Cranbourne, Anglesea, Western Port, Geelong and Woolamai and the Canberra map in the ACT. The field sheets were drawn on the ground using plane tables. The use of parish plans as a base for the topography was retained until 1914 when the errors and inconsistencies and lack of co-ordination of surveys between parishes demanded that a more reliable and stable framework on which to base the topographic surveys should be found.

Accordingly, in 1914 a triangulation sub-section was formed. It began work on the triangulation control for the Ballan, Sunbury, Meredith and Melbourne map sheets and later extended the control westward to the South Australian border. The topographers, with their plane tables, worked from the triangulation to produce the detailed field sheets which were then 'fair drawn' by the Draughting Section in Melbourne for reproduction by the Victorian State Government Printer using the lithographic process. A fair drawing of the Western Port-Woolamai areas was submitted to the General Staff as the prototype for the 1 Mile to

1 Inch series. The prototype conformed closely to the Ordnance Survey of Great Britain 1 Mile series and was adopted as the Australian standard..

The Australian Intelligence Corps was disbanded in July 1914 but the work of the Survey Section continued to be supervised and controlled by the Intelligence Section of the General Staff, under the general direction of the CGS. The strength of the section was then two officers and eighteen other ranks. The outbreak of World War I did not, at first, seriously affect the work of the members of the section as an embargo was placed on their enlistment in the AIF. This was not lifted until 1917 with the result that there were no mappers with the AIF in the Middle East nor at Gallipoli. There, series mapping had been undertaken by the British Army at a scale of 1:40 000 and later 1:20 000. In the Anzac area any additional mapping was done by personnel with a background in surveying or with a flair for landscape drawing. The results could usually be described as sketch mapping.

Meanwhile, in Australia, the Survey Section RAE went quietly on with its work and on 3rd July Military Order 396 of 1915 promulgated that approval had been given for:

- “(1) A corps to be called the ‘Australian Survey Corps’ being raised as a unit of the Permanent Military Forces.
- (2) All officers, warrant officers and men now serving with the Survey Section of the Royal Australian Engineers being transferred to the Australian Survey Corps with their present rank and seniority.
- (3) This Order in Council taking effect from 1st July, 1915.”

Order 396 did not abolish the Survey Section RAE which continued to exist nominally but without personnel. It was to reappear in the post WWI period. The Australian Survey Corps was placed in the Order of Precedence of Corps after the Royal Australian Engineers. Before the end of July the strength of the Corps was three officers and sixteen other ranks. The officers were Captain Quinlan, who was to resign on 31 January 1916, Lieutenant Lynch, commissioned from the rank of Warrant Officer, in July 1915, and Thomas Vance, appointed Lieutenant, 13 July 1915. When the embargo on enlistment in the AIF was lifted in 1917 the three officers and twelve other ranks enlisted. With their departure for the Middle East and the Western Front the mapping operations in Australia came virtually to a standstill.

The AIF members of the Corps left Australia in early 1918. Three, Warrant Officers Shiels, Murray and Macdonald were selected to serve in Sinai and Palestine. The remainder went on to France where some, including Lt Lynch, were attached to RE survey units working on triangulation in the rear areas and in updating trench maps from air photographs. Lt J. Raisbeck and Sgt Topographers Anderson, Roberts and Watson joined the Australian Corps Topographical Section which, in conformity



Captain J. J. Lynch with geodetic observing equipment on a triangulation station, circa 1932.

with the British policy of providing Topographical Sections in support of Corps, had been raised in support of the Anzac Corps on its creation on 15 February 1917. The section was commanded by Lt H. Buchanan, a Victorian engineer, and, on his arrival, Raisbeck was appointed second in command.

In preparation for the Battle of Amiens the section was responsible for the accurate fixing of gun positions to be occupied in the second and third phases of the advance. For his work Sgt W. C. Stafford was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for carrying out this task while totally exposed to German 5.9 in howitzer fire. In the Middle East Warrant Officer Alan Murray was also awarded the DCM for mapping under fire.

There was an inevitable loss of some personnel on return to Australia after the war and the remainder found themselves no longer Australian Survey Corps, from October 1920, but members of the Survey Section RAE (Permanent), still under the direction of the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff and administered by Headquarters of the Military District in which the various subsections worked. The Australian Survey Corps slipped into limbo until 1932. A small program of mapping (seven sheets) was completed in Western Australia by 1920 and then priority was

given to production of maps around Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. In 1923, following the reduction in Defence funds, the establishment of the Survey Section was fourteen all ranks. A notable recruit in this period was Corporal L. FitzGerald who was to serve in the Corps for 36 years, seventeen of them as Director of Military Survey.


Field sheets continued to be drawn by plane tabling but in 1930, work on the Albury 1 Mile to 1 Inch map, saw the introduction of air photographs to supplement ground survey methods of mapping until in 1936 the Section was able to produce the Sale 1 Mile to 1 Inch map using a British developed method of plotting from strips of overlapping air photographs. This technique, known as the 'Arundel' method, was adopted by the Australian Army surveyors as the standard method for map reproduction.

While the production of the Albury map with the aid of air photographs was a step forward, it also highlighted a problem which had its origin in the development of the disparate colonial survey organisations. The map lay across the border between New South Wales and Victoria and the triangulation systems of the two states, on which the map depended for its accuracy, would not join. A survey joining the two systems revealed differences of eight seconds in azimuth, one inch in every half mile length, one second in latitude and nine seconds in longitude.

These discrepancies led to a decision to adopt Sydney Observatory as the origin for geographical co-ordinates for Eastern Australia and to improve existing triangulation surveys by reobservation or recalculation. It made obvious the necessity to establish a geodetic sub-section in the Army survey organisation.

In the meantime, a Commonwealth-State Ministers' conference held in Melbourne in May 1929 had agreed that the State Surveyors General should meet with Defence representatives to examine ways of 'facilitating' the production of maps. Colonel J. D. Lavarack, then Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, chaired a meeting of the State Surveyors General at Melbourne in November 1929. He proposed that because of the benefits to be obtained, the states should contribute to the cost of map production. This was, of course, not acceptable to the states and so, with the depression looming, map production continued at the same slow rate. By 1931 sixty maps, or about 30 000 square miles, at the scale of 1 Mile to 1 Inch, had been published. This represents about 1% of the continental area.

In 1932 the Army survey organisation was retitled the Australian Survey Corps and the Survey Section RAE and its later variation, Survey Section RAE (Permanent), lapsed. The sub-sections were raised to the status of sections, each commanded by an officer; the total Corps establishment was raised by one! In 1934 Captain John Lynch, who had been the senior soldier in the group of RE topographers which arrived in Australia in 1910, retired with the honorary rank of major. In 1935 Federal Cabinet approved the setting up of a Commonwealth



*Australian Survey Corps —
3 MD, circa 1934.
Back Row — WO L.
FitzGerald, WO J. J. Cullen,
WO H. C. Raisbeck, WO W.
M. Sarle, WO H. A. Roseblade.
Front Row — Lt L. L.
Raisbeck, Lt J. Lynch, WO A.
L. Smith.*

Survey Committee consisting of the Commonwealth Surveyor General and representatives of the three armed services to 'take such steps as are necessary to bring about the co-ordination of survey work in Australia'. The committee accomplished little before the outbreak of WWII and then went into recess.

An increase of ten in Corps strength was authorised in 1935 — three draughtsmen and seven topographers — six of the latter were registered surveyors. This increment allowed the raising of No. 4 Section as an AHQ unit, in June 1937. Its role was geodetic survey — base line measurement, first order triangulation, astronomical observations for azimuth, latitude and longitude and the reduction, calculation and adjustment of the observations. Lieutenant FitzGerald was appointed to command the section.

Captain Thomas Vance was promoted to major, in March 1936, to command the Australian Survey Corps at Army Headquarters (AHQ) Melbourne, in March 1936. It is possible that more senior representation at AHQ led to a greater recognition of the mapping requirement so that in 1938 a 'Long Range Mapping Program' was adopted as part of the Defence program. The mapping program provided for a three year plan of expansion with an increase of Corps' strength to 15 officers and 82 other ranks, an increase in allocation of funds from £18 000 to £58 000 annually and a gradual increase in map production to 32 standard 1 Mile to 1 Inch maps and eight 2 Mile to 1 Inch maps per year. The first year of the program brought an increase of 25 other ranks in strength, some increase in equipment and orders submitted for further acquisitions for the second year. In July 1939 'Instructions for War — Survey' were promulgated. The aims of the Instructions were to provide

the basis for the formation of a field survey organisation, suited to Australian conditions and capable of undertaking an emergency mapping program and at the same time forming the nucleus for expansion to war establishment.

At this time the Corps had a strength of 50 all ranks, with little regimental and staff experience. It had no militia units and, although well equipped, had no resources for rapid expansion. As all maps had so far been printed by the Victorian State Government Printer there were no map reproduction facilities within the organisation. The Corps had completed over 50 000 square miles of standard topographical mapping but a further 63 500 square miles was outstanding to meet the commitment of the three year plan of expansion without considering other specific maps for which the defence need was becoming more apparent and more urgent. The state Lands and Survey Departments had continued to make little contribution to topographical mapping although they held much information which could be utilised for the production of emergency mapping. On the credit side, the staff of the Australian Survey Corps had a high proportion of professionally qualified and technically competent officers who were particularly alert to developments in the new field of photogrammetry and its application to topographic mapping.

The outbreak of WW II brought with it a realisation of the poor state of Australian mapping. The need for an expansion of Army survey resources beyond those envisaged in the 'Long Range Mapping Program' became immediately apparent. At AHQ Major Vance was appointed Assistant Director of Survey in February 1940 and Deputy Assistant Directors were appointed to each Command HQ. The Instructions for War provision for an emergency mapping program — the Strategic Mapping Scheme — was implemented in February 1940 through State Survey Liaison Officers, usually the Surveyor General or one of his senior officers. The 'Strat Map' scheme entailed the production of 4 Miles to 1 Inch maps in a coastal strip, 200 miles deep from Townsville to Port Augusta and 100 miles deep from Albury to Geraldton, with coverage only in strategic areas in Tasmania and around Darwin. The compilation of these maps was carried out by State and Commonwealth agencies using survey and map data available to those agencies from state resources. More remote areas of Australia were covered at a scale of 8 Miles to 1 Inch. The fair drawing and printing of these maps was carried out by the AHQ Cartographic Section, later the AHQ Cartographic Company. Ultimately, almost the whole of Australia, New Guinea, New Britain and New Ireland were covered and although the maps were sub-standard in accuracy and completeness, the scheme did provide much needed map coverage at a critical time.

The Permanent Survey Sections continued with their programmed tasks of geodesy and topographic mapping until, in 1940, authority for raising 2/1 Corps Field Survey Company RAE was issued. Captain Lawrence FitzGerald was appointed Major, OC,



*Drawing and 3 MD Sections,
circa 1936.*
*Back Row — WO J. Cullen,
 WO C. E. B. Stewart, WO H.
 C. Raisbeck, WO R. Westgarth,
 WO D. Macdonald, WO A. F.
 Kurlle, WO W. Sarle, WO C. S.
 Tyler.*
*Front Row — WO H. A.
 Roseblade, Capt J. J. Raisbeck,
 Lt L. FitzGerald, WO A. Smith.*

2/1 Coy and moved with the advance party of the unit into Puckapunyal on 28 May 1940.

Two Field Survey Units RAE (Militia) were also raised, one at Dungong in NSW, the other at Mount Martha in Victoria. Twelve months after the declaration of war, in September 1940, approval was given for the expansion of the Survey Corps and for civilian mapping sections to be set up within land and survey departments to produce an emergency series of 1 Mile to 1 Inch uncountoured maps pending the training of the newly raised Field Survey Companies. The Fd Svy Coys were allotted one to each Australian Command area and numbered 1 to 4 in accordance with the Command structure; 1 Fd Svy Coy later became No. 5 to avoid confusion with the 2/1 Coy. The new Fd Svy Coys absorbed the sections of the Aust Svy Corps (Permanent) in their respective commands and, in NSW and Victoria, the Fd Svy Units RAE (Militia). To meet the demand for survey personnel a Field Survey Training Depot was established at Burwood, a Melbourne suburb, in 1941. The AHQ Cartographic Company was formed in Melbourne on 1 February 1941, absorbing the Cartographic Section (Permanent). By June 1942 it was located at 'Fortuna' at Bendigo where it has remained under various establishments, titles and roles to the present day, currently the Army Survey regiment. In 1941 its role was map compilation, drawing and lithographic reproduction, not only of its original products but also those of Fd Svy Coys which did not have a lithographic section, as well as RAAF maps, charts and plotting sheets and Navy publications.

After seven months training, 2/1 Coy embarked for the Middle East in February 1941. The major problem met in equipping the unit for overseas service had been the acquisition of lithographic cameras, presses and ancillary equipment and their installation in trailers for complete unit mobility. 2/1 Coy disembarked at Suez on 17 March and entrained for Majdal, north east of Gaza. The unit mapped in Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon and Syria until

16 January 1942 when operations closed down in preparation for the return of 1 Aust Corps to Australia. The 2/1 Coy had then been employed on mapping tasks from Petra in the south to the Syrian-Turkish border in the north. It had developed further techniques of mapping from air photography, introduced new field survey techniques and overcome the problems of printing tight register, multi-colour maps in the field. Importantly the senior staff gained experience in the movement of maps from the production unit to the user in the field which led to the adoption of the policy of Survey Service responsibility for map supply down to Division HQ. The 2/1 Coy reached Melbourne on 4 April 1942.

Following the arrival of General MacArthur, General Headquarters South West Pacific Area was activated in April 1942. Allied Land Headquarters (ALQ) covering land forces in the area was placed under the command of General Blamey. The overall direction of mapping was placed with the Intelligence Section of the Office of the Chief Engineer GHQ. With the arrival of United States mapping units in the theatre agreement was reached that the Survey Corps would undertake the mapping for operations in which Australian formations were engaged.

A reorganisation of Survey units occurred in April 1942 following Blamey's appointment and his restructuring of the Australian Army command system. FitzGerald, promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and appointed Deputy Director of Survey 1st Aust Army recommended the move of the 2/1 Coy to Toowoomba and for the 1 and 2 Coys also be brought under the command of 1st Aust Army. These units began 1 Mile to 1 Inch standard mapping around Townsville and Cairns and later 4 Mile to 1 Inch of the Gulf country and Cape York. Drawing and printing support was provided by 2/1 Coy at Toowoomba and LHQ (previously AHQ) Carto Coy at Bendigo. No. 3 Coy, raised in Melbourne in January 1941, mapped in Victoria until July 1942 when it too was placed on the Order of Battle of 1st Army and moved to Brisbane, undertaking in conjunction with the other Fd Svy Coys the priority mapping of the coastal strip between Brisbane and Townsville. No. 4 Coy, raised in Perth in January 1941, remained in Western Australia for the duration of the war and worked mostly in the coastal fringe from Albany to Port Headland. A Survey Section — No. 7 — was deployed in the Northern Territory in March 1941 until relieved in April 1943 by a Section of 6 Aust Army Topo Svy Coy which did not move out until March 1945 when the Section was disbanded. No. 1 Mobile Lithographic Section was raised in December 1941. It undertook printing tasks under the direction of AD Svy Adv LHQ. No. 6 Army Topographical Survey Company was raised in December 1942 and from June 1943 to March 1945 was located near Toowoomba. Colonel FitzGerald was appointed Director of Survey LHQ in June 1942 to succeed Lieutenant Colonel Vance.

In early 1942, when the Japanese moves on the New Guinea mainland were developing, there were literally no maps of the country. Nor were there any military resources with which to produce them. To counter this the New Guinea Survey Section was raised locally on March 1942 with Lt E. C. O'Reilly, a government surveyor, appointed OC. The Section began work in the immediate vicinity of Port Moresby, extending to Koitaki, Uberi and on a proposed Eilogo to Rigo track. Three weeks before the Japanese took Kokoda, on 29 July 1942, the NG Section was reinforced by a section of 3 Coy and became 2 Aust Fd Svy Sect (it was to be renamed again in January 1943 — 8 Fd Svy Sect, AIF).

In four months this small unit completed maps of the Kokoda-Myola area, Kokoda-Oiui, Wairopi, Wairopi-Buna, and Wangila, reconnaissance surveys for roads to Kokoda through the Brown River and to the Yodda Valley via the Brown River Valley as well as work on the location of the Kokoda track. The maps were produced originally as provisional editions, some with form lines, uncontroled, and as there were no printing facilities in PNG initial copies were made as sun prints on dye-line paper. An early sketch map of the Kokoda area had a scale of 1 Inch to $\frac{1}{4}$ hours walk. It was used, with air photographs, as the basis for a map of the Kokoda area at a scale of 2 Miles to 1 Inch.

Compilations of the maps were sent to the 2/1 Coy at Toowoomba where they were printed and the printed copies returned to Post Moresby. A typical example of the speed with which this was done is recorded in a letter by Lt Gen E. F. Herring, GOC NG Force, to FitzGerald at Advanced LHQ, in Brisbane. Herring wrote:

'on 5 November a copy of Buna $\frac{1}{4}$ inch revised map was forwarded to you for reproduction and, it is presumed, was received by you on 6 November. 50 copies of this map reached HQ NG Force by safe hand on the evening of 8 Nov and a further 1000 copies arrived on 9 Nov, reaching forward formations on 10 Nov.

This is a further example of the noteworthy efficiency and splendid cooperation we are receiving from the Survey Directorate, and I would be glad if all ranks of your reproduction section be informed of our appreciation of the splendid service they are giving us here.'

Further detachments from the mainland based survey units began to reach New Guinea from November 1942 — 72 members of 2/1 Coy arrived in Port Moresby and a section of 3 Coy in Milne Bay. The remainder of 3 Coy reached Port Moresby in February-March 1943 and the main body of the 2/1 Coy also in March. This, along with the arrival of a Lithographic detachment of the US 69th Engineer Topographic Company in January 1943 created a capacity for map reproduction in the theatre — it became unnecessary to send urgent operational map compilations to the mainland for printing. Small parties of field surveyors, perhaps one officer and four to fifteen OR, were detached from



2/1 Corps Field Survey Company, AIF, passing the saluting base at the Melbourne Town Hall on the occasion of the pre-embarkation march, 24 January 1941.

2/1 and 3 Coys in support of specific task force operations and operated in the Wau-Markham area, Bena Bena-Dumpu-Bogadjim, Madang, Ramu Valley, Milne Bay and offshore islands and at Oro Bay. Some of these parties worked in close support of the advancing troops to allow the quickest possible revision of operational maps and, if possible, the co-ordination of features ahead of the advance.

The deployment of Survey units changed as the Japanese were pushed back in the South Pacific. A detachment of No. 5 Fd Svy Coy went to Merauke in September 1943 and a section of No. 2 Coy to Lae in December of that year. In April-May 1944 No. 3 Coy returned to the Atherton Tableland where, of the 150 personnel on strength, 114 were soon to be admitted to hospital with malaria and other ailments attributable to tropical service. In October 1943 General Douglas MacArthur sent a letter of commendation to General Blamey:

1. The performance of the 2/1 Australian Army Topographic Company, the 3rd Australian Field Survey Company and the 8th Australian Field Survey Section of the New Guinea Forces, assisted by a detachment of the 69th United States Engineer Topographic Company, towards the production of maps, photomaps, and hydrographic charts, is worthy of high commendation.
2. Great technical difficulties were surmounted in producing and distributing maps and photomaps covering more than twelve thousand square miles in time for operations, from combat type photography never before used in this theatre. Astronomic locations vital to the success of the Allied mapping efforts were obtained under conditions of hardship and great difficulties of transportation and, considerable risk.

3. This untiring effort to provide the combat units with the maps needed when they were needed, from the material at hand, reflects great credit upon the officers and men of these organisations.'

In October 1944 HQ 1st Army was located at Lae, with operations extending to Torokina in Bougainville, Jacquinot Bay in New Britain, and Aitape, on the mainland of PNG. Survey support at Lae was provided by 1 Section of No. 2 Coy until it moved to Torokina in December, following relief by 3 Section of the same Coy. Personnel of 6 Coy arrived at Lae in April but its heavy lithographic equipment did not reach the unit until August. In the meantime map reproduction was done in Australia. Much of the operational area was covered by provisional 1 Mile to 1 Inch maps produced by American units from air photographs without ground control. They needed much revision. Survey detachments operated in the 6 Division area, along the coast to Wewak, updating these 1 Mile maps and producing 1:25000 maps. Another detachment obtained control for 1:25000 maps in New Britain and 1 Sect of 2 Coy continued to give support to 11 Corps in Bougainville.

A lesson learned early in the New Guinea campaigns had been that mapping and survey support for a task force was prejudiced by the lack of Survey representation on the force. The advantages of close survey support had been amply demonstrated by the operations of the detachments of 3 and 2/1 Coys. Accordingly, 5 Coy was transferred from the Order of Battle 1st Aust Army to 1 Aust Corps. Its new role was to provide detachments of two officers and 22 ORs to infantry divisions employed as task forces and to carry out rapid compilation of maps of forward areas from air photographs, utilising any existing survey intelligence available as control. The composition of the detachments, three field survey and one drawing party, enabled them to provide co-ordinated points for control of air photographs and for artillery, to compile field sheets and from them make dye-line prints of areas urgently required by the Force HQ. Further data could be sent back to the Fd Svy Coy HQ for production of revised maps. The OC of the detachment was to act as survey adviser to the task force commander.

The last major operations of the war in which the Survey Corps participated were those to retake Borneo. To support these operations part of 2/1 Coy, 1 Aust Mob Litho Sect and 12 Aust Fd Svy Depot were moved to Morotai and detachments of 5 Coy were attached to each of 7 and 9 Divisions. Maps at various scales, photo-maps and terrain models were produced for the operations. Topographical information was overprinted as later air photography became available. After the landings the detachments were employed in the operational areas to update map grid systems and to provide additional map control. Major B. P. Lambert, AD Svy, HQ 1 Aust Corps, in his report on the operations, said '... the BALIKPAPAN 1:10 000 and 1:25 000

maps are thought to be the best operational maps produced by Aust Svy Corps during the war.'

It was a fitting finale to the service of the Corps in the South West Pacific Area that a Survey unit, 1 Mobile Lithographic Section, was given the task of producing the 'Instrument of Surrender' signed by Lieutenant General Teshima, Commander 11 Japanese Army, and General Sir Thomas Blamey at Morotai on 9 September 1945. At the cessation of hostilities the Survey Corps strength serving overseas was 862 all ranks — more than that remaining in Australia. However, even before the surrender document was signed, the discharge of men of the Corps and of women who served in AWAS postings in Survey units, both on the mainland and in New Guinea, had begun.

At the instigation of the Director of Survey (Army) and with a now greater appreciation of the importance of topographical mapping to the defence and development of Australia, a meeting of the Commonwealth Survey Committee, which had not met since 1936, was held in January 1945. The Committee recommended the formation of a National Mapping Council to co-ordinate and correlate mapping on a national basis and the establishment of a National Mapping Section under the control of the Commonwealth Surveyor General. Both these recommendations were adopted by the Federal Government, the Council was set up in 1945 and the Mapping Section in 1947. The National Mapping Section was to be removed from the control of the Surveyor General in 1951, with the creation of a position of Director of National Mapping in the same department. This was to have repercussions for the Survey Corps in the future.

In 1946 recruiting for an Interim Army began. Many 1939-1945 veterans and members of the pre-war permanent units elected to serve on with recruits who, with pre-requisite experience or suitable educational qualifications, were allocated from recruit training battalions. 5 Coy, located at Willoughby, in North Sydney, acted as a holding and training unit for Interim Army recruits to the Corps. From there personnel were posted to detachments of 3 Coy in Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia, LHQ Carto Coy at Bendigo and to a detachment of 5 Coy in South Australia. The detachments began 1 Mile to 1 Inch mapping and triangulation, with a nucleus of experienced staff providing 'on job training' for recruits.

The Corps undertook several projects which civilian departments were not yet capable of executing in the immediate post war period. In Queensland a chain of triangulation was established from Rockhampton to Emerald to facilitate mapping in the Nogoia and Comet River areas which, along with the Burdekin Basin, were being considered by the Queensland State Government for water conservation and closer settlement projects. In New South Wales detachments of 5 Coy were employed, from August 1946, in investigative surveys for the Snowy River

Diversion Scheme. In Victoria a detachment was employed in Melbourne on the production of maps for the 1947 Census.

From April 1946 Col L. FitzGerald, Director of Survey, was involved with the British General Evetts in the selection of a site for the Long Range Weapons Establishment Range (LRWER) and in organising its mapping. Major Lindsay Lockwood and a small detachment of 5 Coy carried out a reconnaissance which led to the adoption of the range head, soon to be called Woomera Rocket Range, at a location near Pimba in South Australia. Photomosaics of the proposed range were produced by July 1946 and the Woomera Special 1 : 31 680 map was printed in July 1947, the start of seven year's support of LRWER activities by the Survey Corps. Two units were employed — AHQ Fd Svy Sect (C Comd Det) — and the LRWER Svy Sect. Their work involved the extension of the first order geodetic triangulation chain from Port Augusta to Mount Eba, the measurement of a first order base line at Koolymilka, the last to be measured in Australia, extensive mapping in the range area and detailed surveys of range installations. Maps and surveys were also undertaken for the atomic testing range at Maralinga.

The Australian Regular Army was formed in August 1947 and most serving members of the Corps joined, leaving only a small residual of Interim Army enlistments to complete their terms. The Corps organisation was formalised by the establishment of Command Field Survey Sections (Comd Fd Svy Sect) of three officers and 22 OR based in the capital cities of each state, except Tasmania which has never had a survey unit. In Adelaide the unit was AHQ Field Survey Section (Central Command Detachment). The balance of AHQ Fd Svy Sect staffed an air photography library in Melbourne. It was also responsible for holding project stores. LHQ Carto Coy became AHQ Carto Coy and the Corps map store operated in the Kensington, Victoria, Ordnance Depot complex as the AHQ Field Survey Depot.

The School of Military Survey was established in 1948 at Balcombe, on the Mornington Peninsula, co-located with the newly formed Army Apprentice School and the School of Signals. It was commanded by Major H. F. Eggeling and was responsible for the basic training of recruit surveyors and draughtsmen and women and for promotion and specialist courses to meet Survey and other Corps requirements. During its history the School has also trained a considerable number of overseas students under various aid schemes.

Australian Army Order 99 of 31 December 1948 promulgated the grant of the title 'Royal' to the Australian Survey Corps, amongst others, 'in recognition of their services in World War II'. The title of the Corps is officially abbreviated to RA Svy.

In 1950 the Minister for Army invited Major General R. L. Brown, Director General, Ordnance Survey of Great Britain, to examine and report on the work of RA Svy and its integration

with civilian mapping. Brown found it necessary to extend his investigation beyond the terms of reference. His report of December 1951 made recommendations relating to the organisation and control of Commonwealth mapping as a whole, suggesting, amongst other matters, that a 'single authority would be responsible for all geodetic and topographic surveying and mapping of Australian territory required for all the general purposes of the Commonwealth'.

Because of the importance and wide range of Brown's recommendations his report was referred to the Prime Minister's Department for consideration. An inter-departmental committee was set up for this purpose in September 1952 and formed a working party to examine detail. Subsequently, as the result of some unethical actions by at least one senior public servant, a submission was put to Cabinet which placed the responsibility for control of geodetic and topography surveying and mapping effectively with the civilian Division of National Mapping. The submission which was approved by Cabinet on 22 July 1954, included a provision that all RA Svy personnel employed on mapping duties should be seconded for specific tours of full-time duty with the civilian organisation.

This was a most unfortunate decision. It was not acceptable to Army for several well founded reasons and in 1955 a compromise was reached in which the resources of RA Svy not needed for defence purposes could be applied to the national mapping program but under the control of the Head of Corps. That Cabinet decision was to poison relations between the two major Commonwealth mapping organisations for the next 33 years, until, after the 1987 election, the Division of National Mapping was once more placed under the Commonwealth Surveyor General. During those 33 years of administrative discord and in spite of it the mapping and surveying of Australia, in which the Survey Corps played a prominent part, proceeded with great success.

In August 1954 the Corps undertook the first of many post war operations outside the mainland. The operation — Project 'XYLON' — was mounted under the terms of a Co-operative Mapping Agreement between USA and Australia established in 1947. Of eleven months duration, it was carried out by a specially raised New Guinea Survey Unit, of three officers and 27 OR, commanded by Capt S. W. Snow. The Unit operated with personnel of the United States Army Map Service (USAMS) 29th Engineer Battalion (Base Topographic), to make a survey around the coast of New Britain for mapping control. The combined survey team was based on a USAMS Fast Supply (FS) ship of about 700 tons. The ship itself, was an integral part of the survey procedure, providing an apex target for a system of triangulation known as 'Shore-Ship' survey.

This operation was later followed by a second combined USAMS-RA Svy shore-ship task, Project 'CUTLASS', mounted



Members of AHQ Fd Svy Unit (C Comd Det) and LRWER Svy Sec engaged in base line measurement at Woomera, 1950
 Back Row — Maj W. B. Relf, Sgt K. J. Cook, Col L. FitzGerald, Cpl N. R. J. Hillier, Spr B. Dalton, Spr D. Carr, Spr M. Smith, Spr J. Reneker, Spr D. White, Spr L. Canard, Spr L. Arnold, Spr H. Smith, Cpl J. Hammond, Cpl D. R. Ridge, Lt S. W. Snow.
 Front Row — Cpl T. C. Sargent, Spr R. Laming, Spr N. Vaughan, Spr M. Cain, Spr W. Miller.

from August 1956 to November 1957, to survey New Ireland and New Hanover and their off-shore islands, and to effect ties to New Britain and Green Islands. Personnel of the Topographic Squadron of AHQ Svy Regt, supplemented by attachments from Comd Fd Svy Sects were allocated for the task which was again under the command of Major Snow.

1955 brought a minor reorganisation, S Comd Fd Svy Sect was disbanded, its personnel transferred to AHQ Carto Coy to create AHQ Survey Regiment which then had, for the first time, as the Topographic Squadron, a field survey capacity. It was this squadron which provided most of the manpower for project 'CUTLASS' and it was, in the future, to undertake extensive field surveys in Northern Australia and Papua New Guinea.

The following year saw a substantial change in mapping with the adoption of the metric scales of 1:50 000 and 1:250 000, in conformity with South East Asia Treaty Organisation standardisation agreements, replacing the traditional 1 Mile and 4 Mile to 1 Inch scales for Australia. At the same time the fair drawing of maps by pens was replaced by 'scribing', a technique involving the construction of a negative copy of the field sheet by using small burins to cut into a film facing on a stable plastic medium. This greatly reduced the time taken to draw the finished map for lithographic reproduction.

Helicopters were used in support of RA Svy field operations for the first time in 1957 when a civilian helicopter was chartered for operations by W Comd Fd Svy in the Kimberley region of Western Australia. From that time light fixed and rotary wing aircraft were employed to position field parties on survey stations, ferry personnel, stores and supplies and in actual technical operations. This enabled the effective utilisation of a range of new survey equipments and techniques being developed and would

change the face of survey operations conducted by the Corps. Later heavy aircraft were to be used to position survey units in the field in Australia and overseas.

In 1958 a ten year program to map all Australia at the scale of 1:250 000 and to extend and strengthen the geodetic control across the continent began. This program involved both Commonwealth and state mapping and surveying organisations. It aimed to provide first time total map coverage of the continent while the continental geodetic network would allow all mapping and surveys to be placed on a single datum. This was a formidable task and RA Svy undertook a major part of it. The difficulty of the geodetic task was made easier by the introduction of a South African developed electronic distance measuring equipment — the 'Tellurometer'. This transmits a known VHF signal from a master station to a remote or slave station and, by determination of the elapsed time of the returned signal, the distance between the two is measured to a high degree of accuracy. The Tellurometer demanded line of sight only between successive stations on a traverse line and released the surveyor from the stringent inter-visibility requirements of triangulation.

All Comd Fd Svy Sects and the Topo Sqn, AHQ Svy Regt, were deployed on the national task, mostly in Northern Australia the area of the greatest defence interest, but also in the desert country of Western Australia and in New South Wales and Victoria. Units frequently undertook the 1:250 000 mapping concurrent with the geodetic traverses in the same geographical area. Where geodetic control could not be provided for map compilation the astronomic method of position line fixes, brought home from the Middle East, was utilised. Rotary and fixed wing light aircraft were employed for reconnaissance, for establishing aneroid barometers heights by flying at low levels across the terrain, and as vehicles for annotation of aerial photographs with ground detail.

In a typical survey season's program undertaken by N Comd Fd Svy Sect in 1958 the unit completed 562 km of 1st order tellurometer traverse from Jondaryon, west of Toowoomba, to Rockhampton, establishing 21 stations and compiled five 1:250 000 maps. In the same season a detachment of the Topo Sqn, commanded by Major J. L. Stedman, completed 1637 km of traverse from Charters Towers to Tennant Creek, through 62 stations in four months. The section across the Barkly Tablelands from Cammooweal to Tennant Creek was observed on 'Bilby Towers'. These were steel towers, similar to windmill towers, assembled at each station to a height of 18 metres. An inner tower supported the instruments while an independent outside tower supported the platform on which the observer and his recorder operated. This operation typified the drive and enthusiasm with which RA Svy approached the national program.

Colonel Lawrence FitzGerald OBE retired in January 1960 after 36 years service, including seventeen years as Director of

Survey. During his service Col FitzGerald had a profound influence on the professional and technical status of the Corps. He had organised and guided the Corps through its war service from 1942 and in the difficult years of post-war re-establishment.

Survey operations recommenced in PNG in 1962 when the Topo Sqn was employed in establishing mapping and geodetic control by tellurometer traverse. Supported by RAE LSMs and charter aircraft, the unit traversed from Aird Hills, in the Gulf of Papua, east around Milne Bay and along the north coast to Lae, through the Markham Valley to Madang and on to the West Irian-PNG border in two seasons. During the second season of operations (1963) Radar Air Profile Recording equipment was deployed in PNG. This airborne equipment recorded the profile of a line of country over which the aircraft flew. It was extremely useful in the mountainous terrain of PNG which presented great problems in the determination of sufficient heights for contouring from air photographs.

Another new airborne field survey equipment was acquired the following year and also deployed in PNG. This was 'Aerodist', a distance measuring kit developed from the tellurometer. It transmitted a continuous micro-wave signal from a master in the aircraft simultaneously to two remote ground stations, so that, as the aircraft crossed the line joining the two stations, the minimum distance between them was measured. As the height of the aircraft was accurately determined the sea level distance between the two ground stations could be calculated. The introduction of Aerodist released the field surveyor from the constraint of line of sight between ground stations. Its application had as significant an effect on mapping operations as the earlier introduction of the tellurometer. Aerodist continued to be used extensively by the Corps in PNG, Indonesia and in Australia until satellite navigation equipment became available in 1974.

In 1962 the Comd Fd Svy Sects were redesignated Comd Fd Svy Units and in 1963 Army approval was given for raising 1 Topographical Survey Troop of three officers and 39 OR, based in Sydney co-located with E Comd Fd Svy Unit. Its role was to provide survey and mapping support to a task force. 'A' Section of the troop was later to be deployed in Vietnam. During this period more sophisticated photogrammetric and computer equipment was introduced into RA Svy use in conformity with overseas trends. This enabled the adoption of more accurate and more economical methods of map production which were to be of importance particularly for the 1:100 000 mapping program which began in 1967.

As the completion of the geodetic survey of Australia and the end of the 1:250 000 mapping program came in sight consideration was given by the Advisory Committee on Commonwealth Mapping to map Australia at a larger scale. Army preferred a scale of 1:50 000 to meet tactical requirements but the magnitude of this



*South Vietnam, July 1970.
Members of the Topo Svy Sec
observing with a theodolite
from the roof of an old French
pill box near Nui Dat.
Observer, Spr J. Walker;
Booker, 2nd Lt J Whitburn;
Radio Operator, Cpl K.
Gallagher.*

task and the resources to meet it were recognised. A 1965 submission to Federal Cabinet for a compromise 1 : 100 000 mapping program, to begin in 1966, was supported. Army agreed to undertake the production of maps in the areas of greatest defence interest, mainly in Northern Australia, with sufficient in the southern areas to allow units some respite from continual operations distant from home base. The program was eventually to begin in 1967.

'A' Sect, 1 Topo Svy Tp, commanded by Captain R. F. Skitch, was deployed in Vietnam in support of HQ IATF in May 1966. The unit, one officer and sixteen OR (later two officers and 20 OR) was located for a short while at Vung Tau before joining the Task Force HQ at Nui Dat. It remained there until withdrawn in October 1971. As there was adequate standard series mapping covering the Australian area of operations the roles of the unit were to provide intimate rapid response surveying and mapping support to the Task Force and to hold and issue maps.

Although equipped to meet a mobile role, the static employment of the section enabled it to provide a better service, producing, often overnight, sketch maps, patrol maps, large scale village maps and map overlays to accompany HQ IATF operational orders. These were printed on silk screen presses although late in the unit's service a printing press was 'acquired'. The field surveyors operated in close co-operation with artillery survey to extend the theatre grid throughout Phouc Tuy Province. As its field commitment was limited, the drawings and printing operations of the unit gave the draughtsmen and lithographers of the Corps ample opportunity to demonstrate that they were as capable as the field surveyors in

meeting operational demands. The versatility and resourcefulness of the section was exemplified in Corporal S. E. Snelson, a National Serviceman with the unit. With only the lens of an edipiascope to begin with, Corporal Snelson was able to build a process camera. The capability to reduce and enlarge material widened the range of product offered to the Task Force. The level of support given by this small unit, in which 150 RA Svy personnel served during its five and a half years in Vietnam, was better than that enjoyed by any other brigade size unit. On its return to Australia the section was allotted to support of 1st Division in Brisbane as HQ 1 Div Survey Section.

In Australia the Comd Fd Svy Units in 1967 embarked on the national program of 1:100 000 mapping, with a Corps commitment of 862 maps. The target was met by 1982. During this period an internal review committee examined the organisation and production capacity of the Corps, recommending an expansion, raising the Comd Fd Svy Units to Field Survey Squadrons with commensurate increases in manpower. Approval for these increases was given but before they could be fully implemented RA Svy suffered its share of the manpower reductions which followed the withdrawal from Vietnam.

On 14 June 1970 the City of Bendigo granted the honour of 'Freedom of Entry' to the City to AHQ Svy Regt. The honour was accepted at a public ceremony by the first Colonel Commandant of the Royal Australian Survey Corps, Brigadier D. Macdonald AM, on behalf of the regiment.

From 1970 onwards RA Svy became involved in another type of survey and mapping activity which continues to the present. From April to August of that year, 2 Fd Svy Sqn undertook a Defence Co-operation Program (DCP) project to map part of West Kalimantan in Indonesia. 'Operation Mandau' was carried out in partnership with the Indonesian Army survey organisation (JANTOP) and with a detachment of Royal Engineers (Survey) from Singapore. Air photography for the project was flown by the RAF. This has been the only DCP project which has had British support. Survey control was established by Aerodist trilateration and tellurometer traversing. Height control was established by airborne barometric traversing. As in most of the following projects Operation Mandau was given extensive support; the team was positioned and withdrawn by RAAF C130 aircraft, RAAF Caribou aircraft were in full time support, Army Aviation supplied operational helicopter and fixed wing support and there were small detachments from RA Sign, RAAMC, RAAOC, RACT, RAEME, RAAPC and AACC with the team.

For the next ten years RA Svy units were involved in operations in Indonesia, ultimately establishing mapping control for a large part of the country. In 1971 and 1972 2 Sqn worked in South Sumatera using Aerodist. The unit was positioned at Palembang by RAAF C130 and RAN LCH and was given RAAF Iroquois support in addition to Army Aviation light helicopters. 5 Sqn



*Colonel Lawrence FitzGerald,
OBE, Director of Military
Survey, 1942-1960.*

followed in the years 1973-75, completing the survey of Sumatera and effecting a tie to Malaysia across the Strait of Malacca. In 1974 5 Sqn operated, for the first time, Doppler satellite receivers, on loan from the US Defence Mapping Agency, allowing much simpler 'fixing' of control survey points than by using Aerodist.

2 Fd Svy Sqn continued the Indonesian operations in 1976-77 mounting Operation 'Cenderawasih' in Irian Jaya. Based on Biak, 2 Sqn established geodetic and mapping control using Doppler receivers and the airborne WREMAPS II Laser Terrain Profile Recorder developed by the Weapons Research Establishment and brought into operation by RA Svy in 1974 in New Guinea.

During the 1977 operation 2 Fd Svy Sqn experienced the worst disaster encountered by the Corps in the field. Two Iroquois helicopters, in support from 9 Sqn RAAF, were returning from an attempt, aborted due to bad weather, to position a survey party near Wamena in central Irian Jaya, when one aircraft disappeared. It was found next day, crashed in an inaccessible moss forest, 10,000 feet above sea level; the pilot had been killed and three others severely injured. Craftsman Phil Edwards, a RAEME technician, was only slightly injured. He had been able to move the injured men from the crashed aircraft and to keep them alive until two RA Svy NCOs, Staff Sergeant Greg Chambers and Sergeant Peter Jensen, were winched into the crash next morning. Craftsman Edwards was awarded the Bravery Medal for his actions, Chambers and Jensen received CGS's commendations and the pilot of the rescue aircraft was awarded the DFC.

The Irian Jaya project continued in 1978 and in 1979—81 operations by 2 Sqn moved to Maluka Province—the Spice Islands. The Indonesian projects were carried out with the full support and participation of the Indonesian Army particularly, of course, its mapping service, JANTOP. Following completion of field work, aerotriangulation of the relevant air photography was carried out at Army Svy Regt and the data returned to JANTOP for detailed plotting, cartography and final printing of the map.

From 1971 more RA Svy resources were directed, as a priority, towards the 1:100 000 mapping of PNG. 8 Fd Svy Sqn was established at Popondetta in 1971, moving to Wewak in 1974, to carry out geodetic surveys and 1:100 000 mapping. In 1972 and 1973 4 Fd Svy Sqn, from Adelaide, was deployed in the Highlands on Aerodist operations. Significant resources in cartography and lithography at AHQ Svy Regt, 50% of cartography in 1973 and 70% in 1974, were directed towards the finalisation of the PNG program which was completed in April 1980 giving first time complete coverage in a useful standard series. 8 Fd Svy Sqn was then reduced to a small staff acting as advisers to the PNG Survey Department. Work continued, concurrently, on the Australian 1:100 000 program.



*Operation — Gading I
Sumatera 1971
Cpl Jim Beard and an
Indonesian Army Surveyor
operate Aerodist.*

With the Australian and New Guinea 1:100 000 mapping programs in full swing it was a period of intense activity. This may be judged from the amount of aircraft support used in 1972:

Service Aircraft		Chartered Aircraft	
Caribou	691 hours	Queenair (Aerodist)	994 hours
Porter	1418	Cessna	113
Sioux	1898	Helicopter	288
Iroquois	823		

Following the reorganisation of the Australian Army on functional command lines in 1973, Field Survey Squadrons came under the control of HQ Field Force Command. AHQ Svy Regt was redesignated Army Survey Regiment and AHQ Fd Svy Dep, now at Bandiana, became the Army Map Depot, both under the control of Army Office.

Field survey techniques began to change again in 1974 when Doppler satellite receivers 'Geoceivers' were used for the first time in North Sumatera to establish the geographical position of survey control stations. Aerodist and other methods continued to be used but were gradually phased out as more satellite equipment became available. Because of their cost satellite receivers were moved from unit to unit as their operations required.

Automap I, an integrated mapping system of sophisticated photogrammetric equipment, visual display units and plotters interfaced with computers, was installed in the Army Svy Regt in 1975. This was the first step in greater automation of map compilation and a move in the direction of recording and presenting geographical information in digital form. The development of this capability took a further step in 1984 with the acquisition of an even more sophisticated system — Automap II — which now enables greater flexibility in presenting data for use in command and control systems, modern weapon systems and the production of terrain models. It brings RA Svy towards world standards in military mapping techniques and resources of geographical information available for the conduct of military operations.

From 1978 to 1986 RA Svy units were employed on DCP projects in the South West Pacific, to assist in mapping programs and to establish survey control for the determination of Executive Economic Zones (EEZ). Additionally, survey personnel, both civilian and military, of the assisted countries have received on the job training in the home country or at the School of Military Survey. Projects were undertaken in the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, Vanuata and Western Samoa. Air photography was flown by RA Svy chartered aircraft, Army Nomad aircraft and a Lear 35 jet aircraft chartered by the RAAF. Initially, ground control was established by Aerodist but, as they became available, Doppler satellite receivers were used.

Executive

The projects in Tuvalu (Ellice Islands) and Kiribati (Gilbert, Phoenix and Line Islands), mainly commanded by Captain P. Blaskett of 2 Fd Svy Sqn, brought with them significant logistic problems in the movement and supply of survey parties and deployment of light aircraft across the South Western Pacific. The Gilbert Islands are 4000 kms from the unit base in Sydney and the Line Islands, many of them uninhabited, a further 2500 kms across Equator, the northernmost only 1500 kms from the Hawaii Islands. For these operations support was provided by ships of the Royal Fijian Military Forces and the Hydrographic Service of the Royal New Zealand Navy with helicopters operating from ship to shore and between ground stations where it would have been dangerous to land from small boats.

In 1982-84 further minor project work was carried out to fix the positions of Indonesian islands in the South China Sea and off Sumatera.

As the Corps was drawing close to the achievement of its 1:100 000 mapping target, which was completed in December 1982, planning began for mounting a program of 1:50 000 mapping specifically to meet Defence requirements—in northern Australia, Defence sensitive areas in the south and the main supply routes. The announcement of this intention to the National Mapping Council in 1981 brought its support but raised the ire of the Division of National Mapping which saw its role as the 'Authority' for Commonwealth mapping diminished. There followed the most acrimonious and divisive period in the relationship between the two Commonwealth topographical mapping bodies. This situation was to drag on until after the 1987 Federal election, when, in the reorganisation of Commonwealth departments, the Division of National Mapping was disbanded and its mapping functions absorbed, with the functions of the Australian Survey Office, into the Australian Surveying and Land Information Group under the control of the Commonwealth Surveyor General.

The Royal Australian Survey Corps Museum was reopened in new accommodation in Latchford Barracks at Bonegilla on Corps Day, 1st July 1988 by Rear Admiral Sir Brian Murray KCMG AO former Governor of Victoria and son of the late Lieutenant A. S. Murray who was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal while serving with the Survey Corps in World War I. Admiral Murray graciously donated his father's medal to the museum collection.

The various investigations and reviews conducted during the period of dispute with National Mapping alerted Army to the need to examine the role of RA Svy in the development of military geographical information systems, the Corps structure needed to enable this development and also to provide topographic support in areas of operations. A review of the Corps was completed in 1988 which recommended a significant



Senior serving and retired officers at a dinner to commemorate the opening of the Corps Museum, Bonegilla, 1 July 1988 (from left to right). Colonel T. C. Sargent, Colonel Commandant 1983-1989; Brigadier D. Macdonald, AM (retd), Director of Military Survey 1960-1967, Colonel Commandant 1967-1973; Lieutenant Colonel S. Lemon, Commandant and Chief Instructor, School of Military Survey 1988-1989; Colonel D. Swiney, MBE, Director of Military Survey 1988-; Colonel N. R. J. Hillier (retd), Director of Military Survey 1978-1983, Colonel Commandant 1989-; Colonel A. W. Laing (retd), Director of Military Survey 1983-1988; Brigadier L. FitzGerald, OBE (retd), Director of Military Survey 1942-1960; Brigadier F. D. Buckland, OBE (retd), Director of Military Survey 1967-1972, Colonel Commandant 1973-1978.

reorganisation. 2 and 5 Fd Svy Sqns were disbanded, 1 Fd Svy Sqn and 1 Div Svy Sect were reorganised to form 1 Topographical Survey Squadron as an integral 1 Div unit. 4 Fd Svy Sqn was placed under the command of Army Svy Regt and, with an increased strength, was made responsible for carrying out all field survey projects. The strength of the Army Svy Regt was increased by 8% to facilitate greater utilisation of the Automap systems. At the same time 7th Military Geographic Information Section was raised in Darwin, as a forerunner to the establishment of similar sections in each Military District. The role of the MGIS will be to gather geographical information from all sources, to transmit it for processing and to disseminate the information to the military user. The development of the Military Geographical Information Service within the Australian Defence Force is the challenge facing the Royal Australian Survey Corps in the 1990s.

NOTES

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The importance of the Australian Corps' re-taking of Hamel, July 1918

Barry Clissold


By the early months of 1918 it was evident to the Allied armies in Europe that a crisis was approaching. This crisis quickly developed as a result of the Russian Revolution, in November 1917, and peace between the Bolsheviks and Germans. An armistice, signed on 15 December 1917, removed the need for the Germans to defend the Eastern Front which bordered Russia.¹ Thus relieved Germany began transferring its divisions from the Russian to the Western Front. By the middle of February 1918 preparations for a German offensive on the latter front, had nearly been completed. In just three months, 28 German infantry divisions has been transferred from the Eastern theatre and six from the Italian. In all, Germany had 73 infantry divisions to batter Allied defences on the Somme.

Clearly the Germans were intending a major, decisive battle to defeat the British and French forces before the Americans could pour sufficient reinforcements into France to tip the scales. The German hammer-blow fell on the British shortly before 5 am on 21 March 1918. On a 54 mile front from La Basse to La Fere, a meagre 46 British infantry divisions reeled before the onslaught. The Germans advanced 14 miles in four days—the longest advance on the Western Front since the opening of hostilities in 1914.² The Germans appeared unstoppable as both British and French defences crumbled, the French eventually fearing for Paris itself.

The British were bewildered. After years of virtual siege warfare and trenches, they were suddenly confronted with a war of movement. Preliminary bombardments of British positions was followed by Germans rapidly advancing between British strong points leaving pockets of resistance to following troops. Most of the leading troops had slung rifles and relied on grenades to eliminate opposition to their advance. Some carried the new Bergmann, the first genuine sub-machine gun, capable of high rates of fire.

The speed of the attack surprised all but eventually the German attack became disjointed as a result of its own impetus. By committing their reserves, and withdrawing through prepared rear positions, the British eventually stopped the German advance, as it ran out of steam, the infantry outpacing its own artillery and other supporting units. By 5 April the threat to Paris receded.

Undeterred however by their inability to capture Amiens, now Ludendorff's primary objective, the Germans struck again at the



This map shows the positions of British forces prior to the German offensive on 21 March 1918. In the centre of the Allied position is the French cathedral city of Amiens defended by the British 5th Army. Hamel, a small town just over 10 miles directly east of Amiens, fell to the Germans on 5 April 1918.

British on 9 April. On a twelve-mile front the Germans hurled themselves at Lys, just south of Ypres, about 50 miles north-east of Amiens. In the desperate days that followed, General Haig, Commander-in-Chief, British Army, issued his famous order, 'every position must be held to the last man'.³ The British line miraculously held. Then, in disbelief, the Allies watched as the Germans assembled, once again, and with 42 divisions on a 25-mile front, launched itself against the French at Aisne, 70 miles south of Amiens on 27 May 1918. A salient about 32 miles was eventually hammered into the French position, and on 9 June the German Army attempted to exploit further that gain. Despite winning another six miles it was not enough to be decisive. General Ludendorff, First Quartermaster-General of the German Army, later noted that the German Army had not been able to deal the Allies a decisive blow before the Americans arrived on the battlefield in considerable force.⁴

Thus, despite the exhilaration of early victories in March, the German offensive failed; the separation of the French and British defences, as hoped for by the Germans, did not occur: in fact under the threat of the German offensive the Allies were now unified under the supreme command of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, only recently promoted. But the cost, both in men and material was immense. Haig wrote that at the beginning of May 'no less than eight divisions have been reduced to cadres and were temporarily written off altogether as fighting units'.⁵

The Germans, too, had lost the bulk of many of their divisions, among them the best and most highly-trained. Time would be required to refit the depleted units before any further major offensive. Notwithstanding this Haig was concerned that the German Army had advanced to within ten miles of Amiens; Hamel had been lost on 5 April and was now firmly in German hands and a threat to Amiens. A stalemate resulted in the Amiens area with both the German and Allied armies now stationary and exhausted. And it was back to the trench warfare.

For many reasons an Allied offensive was needed and General Rawlinson, now in command of the British 4th Army, agreed that the Australian Corps, now part of the 4th, supported by tanks and aircraft, could launch an attack to recapture Hamel and thus straighten the British front line.⁶ This action was to be Australia's first as a Corps with General Monash as its commander.

Although Rawlinson claimed that the Hamel operation was his idea,⁷ the architect of the operation was Monash.⁸ The action was significant in two ways, both of which would have important bearings on the Battle of Amiens the following month. The first was the planning: the meticulous attention to detail; a complex but precise artillery fire plan; the training of the infantry to work with the tanks; the use of aircraft to parachute ammunition to machine gun crews on the move; Australian infantry scouts to guide individual tanks through fog and smoke; and the use of American troops to support the Australians.⁹ Deception tactics, including bogus radio transmissions and troop movements of no tactical consequence, were employed to conceal the Allies real intention from the Germans. The second factor resulted from the first; it was a successful operation with infantry leading armour and not one that followed the original British Tank Corps plan of tanks leading infantry. Monash, in his first 'proposal'¹⁰ to Rawlinson agreed that British tanks could lead his Australian infantry. He also agreed to plans of General Courage, Commander British 5th Tank Brigade, that the operation would have no artillery support once the infantry crossed the starting line. Courage proposed that his tanks, a new and more reliable Mark V series, would provide the 'artillery' support for the infantry during the advance to the objective. In agreeing, Monash based his attack using only ten infantry battalions, advancing on a three and one half mile frontage, behind tanks.¹¹ His subordinate generals, however, particularly Chief-of-Staff Blamey, and General MacLagen, commanding the 4th Australian Division, opposed the plan.¹² The generals wanted cover for their troops, and the tank, in the past, had shown itself suspect, if not totally unreliable.

These attitudes were well founded following an action at Bullecourt in April the previous year involving the Australians and British tanks. In this action the Australians were left exposed and unsupported when, firstly, the tanks did not arrive at the starting line when the Australians began their advance, and then, the loss of the remaining few on the battlefield.¹³ Monash was forced to change his plans on 24 June. Hamel was to be thereafter a joint infantry/armour assault,¹⁴ advancing behind an artillery barrage laying down a wall of fire always just ahead of the leading infantry. Monash devised a complex artillery program employing separate light/medium and heavy artillery and heavy machine gun fire plans. Courage accepted this and the plan was adopted.¹⁵

Although the result justified the plan, the attack could easily have failed. Despite the fundamental change in employing the tank in the advance *behind* the infantry, which increased risks to the



General Monash (seated) with some of his senior staff.

NOTES

¹ C. E. W. Bean, *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Volume IV The A.I.F. in France: 1917, St Lucia, 1982, p 938.*

² Hansen Baldwin, *World War I, An Outline History, London, 1963, p 141.*

³ Barrie Pitt, *1918 The Last Act, London, 1962, p 125.*

infantrymen, Monash did not reduce the three and a half mile frontage, nor, surprisingly, increase the number of troops. He certainly had the opportunity and the resources to do so. That he did not could have been due to a knowledge of a weakened German defence or a case of 'digger pride' that the Australians were capable of feats many British would think impossible. On the other hand there are suggestions that Monash overdesigned the plan, took no risks and went for an 'overkill'.¹⁶ His artillery program engulfed the Germans, shattering whatever morale they might have had to defend their positions once the Australians crossed the start line.

Hamel was an outstanding success. Liddell Hart viewed the assault as a 'masterpiece of detailed planning on the part of the Australians and Tank Corps staff'.¹⁷ The employment of the new, more reliable Mark V tank in support of aggressive, well-disciplined troops was one of the deciding factors. However, despite the support the tanks provided, they had difficulty operating in the dark and through smoke. At Pear Trench, identified before the operation as one of three main obstacles, the infantry were left without their allocated tanks, the latter having been lost in the dark. Against strong German opposition at this strongpoint, the 15th Infantry Battalion, enfiladed by machine guns, disregarded Monash's orders and attacked without tank support. This was successful, as was another, in similar circumstances by the 16th Battalion in Vaire Woods. But overall the infantry and tanks operated successfully together.

For the British Tank Corps, Hamel was a testing ground. Clearly the tank emerged as a potential battlefield winner, but not alone; it required aggressive infantrymen in support and not ones that would wait, whatever the cost, for the tanks to move up to provide close fire support. Furthermore, close artillery fire support was essential. But it also needed a skilful commander to bring it all together. It required vision to employ, to effect, the advances made in tank design and the success achieved in artillery shell proofing and ranging techniques.¹⁸ It also required a commander who could resist the temptation to pound the German position for many days (and so alert the defences) prior to the attack being launched, as was the current doctrine in the British Army.¹⁹ From Hamel, Monash emerged as that commander.

Thus Hamel was to become a model; its tactics and plan were studied by many, including Fuller, and guidelines for infantry/armour co-operation were issued. Hamel can be seen as a catalyst, for it started a chain of events that brought about the collapse of the German Army in the First War War and lay the foundation for future armoured tactics.

⁴ *General Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918 Volume II, London, p 677.*

⁵ *J. H. Boraston (ed), Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915-April 1919), London, 1919, p 245.*

⁶ *Frederick Maurice (ed), Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent, Great Britain, p 221.*

⁷ *ibid., p 221.*

⁸ *Gregory Blaxland suggested that Monash was both the planner and architect; Rawlinson merely agreeing to the proposal. Gregory Blaxland, Amiens: 1918, London, 1968, p 145.*

⁹ *Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, The Australian Victories in France in 1918, London, 1920, p 59.*

¹⁰ *C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Volume VI The A.I.F. in France: May 1918—The Armistice, St Lucia, 1983, p 247.*

¹¹ *ibid., p 251*

¹² *ibid., p 253*

¹³ *C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 Volume IV The A.I.F. in France: 1917, Chapter IX, St Lucia, 1982.*

¹⁴ *Bean, Volume VI, op. cit., p 255.*

¹⁵ *ibid., p 256*

¹⁶ *Robin Prior, 'What manner of victory?: reflections on the termination of the first world war', Paper, Australian War Memorial, 1989, p 19.*

¹⁷ *Liddell Hart, op. cit., p 171.*

¹⁸ *Prior, op. cit., p 15.*

¹⁹ *J. E. Edmonds (ed), History of the Great War, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 May-July, London, 1939, p 202.*

Queensland's Aborigines in the First AIF

Rod Pratt

This is the final part in a series. Earlier parts appeared in Sabretache, Vol XXXI, Numbers 1, 2 and 3.

With the conclusion of the Great War the AIF returned home to a nation which was largely grateful. The *Repatriation Act*, soldier settlement and employment preferences helped these men re-establish their lives. For returned Aborigines, however, the prospects were not optimistic. The Queensland Chief Protector (J. W. Bleakley) noted in his report for 1919 that a few Aborigines had been granted land under the soldier settlement scheme, but any other concessions involving the managing of their own finances were strictly withheld.¹

While entry for Aborigines into the AIF had been difficult, once in they experienced an equality denied them in civilian life. Men such as Chris Saunders, father of Australia's first Aborigine to be commissioned in the Australian Army, found he could be accepted as a Digger.² The support returned Aborigines received from the R.S.S.I.L.A. (later R.S.L.) was mixed when it came to the issue of citizen rights as a just reward for active service. In N.S.W. the Murrumbidgee local repatriation authority asked the Aborigines Protection Board if returned Aborigines might be granted citizenship within their own country after having fought for it. Their reply was uncompromising; N.S.W. Aborigines could not '... be removed from the care or supervision exercisable by the Board ... neither does it relieve that Board of its duties towards the Aboriginal'.³ One could almost hear these officials quoting Kipling's *White Man's Burden*.

In Queensland, the Chief Protector in 1919 praised his department's wisdom in controlling the finances of serving Aborigines by depositing part of their military pay in an account. In contrast to this, Bleakley condemned the military authorities for handing over to these discharged Aborigines their entire reserve pay whereupon it was wasted '... in vice and drink'.⁴

As part of each returned soldier's honorium payment, the men were entitled to their full war gratuity which was calculated on their period of service and was only withheld if the soldier was dishonourably discharged. While the vast majority of soldiers received their war gratuity bond, there were considerable difficulties for black returned Diggers. Pte Frank Morris had served honourably in the 11th Light Horse and also possessed an Exemption Certificate which declared that he no longer came under the authority of the Queensland Aboriginal Protection Act.



Depicted in back row second from right in Tpr Fred Coolwell of the 3rd reinforcements to the 11th Light Horse. His identity was uncovered by chance when the original photograph was subjected to high magnification to reveal service numbers stamped on the bandoliers. Photo courtesy G. Cross.

Even so, he was not automatically entitled to his bond money as were white soldiers. Morris's local Protector (a police sergeant) was asked personal questions about Morris's ability to handle money. 'Is he thrifty with his money—does he pay his way?', 'would he be intelligent enough to be allowed to have the care of his own war bond?' and 'is he in employment, if not, why?' were typical of the questions about which Morris was never personally consulted.⁵ Considering that Morris was exempt from the provisions of the *Protection Act*, there existed no legal grounds to withhold his bond.

This form of intrusive financial control extended itself even to the soldier's relatives and their access to his military pay. Mrs Esme Fisher, wife of Frank Fisher of the 11th Light Horse, complained bitterly about the restrictions placed by the Chief Protector on her husband's pay.

I am having a bit of trouble with my husband's military pay, I used to draw at the Murgon Post Office, and Mr Bleakley has taken it to Brisbane without my consent, and I don't see why I can't draw my husband's pay here...⁶

Bleakley himself seemed uncertain as to whether he had requested control of these Aboriginal soldiers' pay or whether the army had asked him to act as trustee. His reply to Mrs Fisher states that the Military Pay Office asked him to control their pay while in his *Aborigines of Australia* he states that he sought control.^{7,8}

To many Aborigines, it seemed as though their service and sacrifice had done nothing to change their status at home. George Dutton, a Queensland Aborigine who attempted to enlist in 1914 but was rejected, was still bitter when interviewed in the 1950s.

'These darkies have got no right to go fighting for whites that stole their country. Now they won't let 'em into the hotel. They've got to gulp down plonk in the lavatory'.⁹ In 1955, Augustus 'Gus' Davies who had served in the 41st Bn and later in the Militia during WWII, drowned in the Pine River and his local R.S.L. cannot remember his name.¹⁰ Alic Reily, a veteran of the 25th Bn in France, died in 1936. His death only provoked the Chief Protector to remark that he was a good fencer and would be missed 'for this sort of work'.¹¹ Martin Bligh, a hard worker, home owner and married man with children was banished to Palm Island when he was unjustly accused of interfering in a horse race.¹² John Cobbo, who had served in the 5th Light Horse was often referred to as lazy, 'not a good type of native' and was denied an Exemption Certificate when he dared to question Bleakley's management of his insurance. Bleakley's letter to the Home Secretary on the matter described Cobbo as a dangerous 'educated agitator' who should never be granted exemption.

Conclusion

While this study has only looked at the service of Queensland Aborigines during the First World War, its implications are less provincial. Only in the last two decades has Australian history seriously considered the experiences of Aborigines in the post-contact period and, more importantly, articulate Aborigines have begun to write from their own perspective. In the process several myths regarding the passive settlement of Australia have been debunked.

It is undeniable that the Anzac legend, in all its individual interpretations, is a significant aspect of our national self image. Fortunately, the racial images which were once so firmly attached to this image have passed and an obligation exists for all Australians to recognise that non-European Australians also played a part in founding an enduring and intimate aspect of our national identity.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ *Chief Protector's Annual Report for 1919*. Q.P.P. 1920, p. 2.
- ² *Gordon, Harry* The Embarrassing Australian, Cheshire-Lansdowne, Melbourne: 1965, pp 36-37.
- ³ *Australian Archives Office A2487 19/320 Position of Aboriginal Soldiers 1919*.
- ⁴ *Chief Protector's Report*, op cit.
- ⁵ *Queensland State Archives (QSA) a/20595 Nebo Protector to Bleakley*.
- ⁶ *QSA HOM J269 letter 18/7396*.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸ *Bleakley, J. W.*, Aborigines of Australia. *Jacaranda*, Brisbane: 1961, p. 170.
- ⁹ *Beckett, Jeremy* 'Marginal Men: A study of two half-caste Aborigine' Oceania. Vol. 29, 1958-59, p. 102.
- ¹⁰ *Pratt, Rod*, 'The A. H. Davies Story' Mentioned in Despatches, 1:11, 1980, p. 3.
- ¹¹ *QSA A/3862 1936 letter 3809*.
- ¹² *QSA A/3932 1937 letter 7942*

Listing of Officers and Warrant Officers of the Australian Military Forces who served in Campaigns prior to, or other than, the South African War of 1899-1902

John Price

H. P. Airey, D.S.O.	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai. Burmese Expedition 1886-7. Severely wounded. Mentioned by Government of India Despatches.*
C. F. Bartlett	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.
R. J. Beaman	New Zealand Campaign, 1860-66.
A. J. Bennett, D.S.O.	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.*
J. T. Blanchard	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.
M. M. Boam	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.
A. J. Brady†	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.
C. St. C. Cameron, C.B.	Afghan Campaign 1878, 9,80. 9th Lancers.*
Hon. R. Carrington, D.S.O.	Zulu War 1878.*
G. Conway†	Zulu War 1879. Skirmish of the White Umvolotozie, Engagement at Iteleza, Battle of Ulundi. At defeat and capture of Sacoconie 1879. 1st Boer War 1881-2, Siege of Standerton, special mention for services rendered.
W. Cope	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.*
J. Costello†	Egyptian Campaign 1882.
T. H. Fiaschi, D.S.O.	Served with Italian Army in the Abyssinian War 1897-98.*

H. Finn, D.C.M.	Afghan War 1878-80. Actions of Killa Kazi and Sillah Sung with subsequent actions around Kabul and Sherpur. Mentioned in Despatches. Nile Expedition 1898, Battle of Khartoum (charged with 21st Lancers). Mentioned in Despatches.
T. Goucher†	Zulu War 1879.*
W. Granger	Zulu War 1879.
Hon. C. F. Greville	Matabele War 1896.
J. F. Hayter	Egyptian Expedition 1882. Bombardment of Alexandria forts.
H. C. Holman, D.S.O.†	Bechuanaland Expedition 1884-85.
W. Horn	Burmese War 1851 (Pegu), Second China War 1857-58.
Sir E. T. H. Hutton, K.C.M.G.	1st Boer War 1878-81 (commanded a squadron of Mounted Infantry). Zulu War 1879. Action of Ginginhlovo and Relief of Eshowo. Mentioned in Despatches, Egyptian Expedition 1882, reconnaissance of 5th August and battle of Tel-El-Kebir (horse killed). Mentioned in Despatches, Medijidie 4th Class. Sudan Expedition 1884-5, Nile.*
H. W. Ilott†	Egyptian Expedition 1882. Battle of Tel-El-Kebir.
C. W. Kelly	Afghan War 1880. Sudan 1884-85, El-Teb, Tamaai, Medijidie 4th Class.*
P. M. Keogh	Third China War 1900.
L. H. Kyngdon	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.*
H. B. Lassetter, C.B.	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.*
H. E. Lofts	Third China War 1900.*
T. J. Lynch†	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin.*
M. Lyons†	India 1882-85, Bikanir Expedition 1883-84, Zhob Valley Expedition 1884, Sudan Expedition 1885, with Punjab Camel Corps.*
H. D. Mackenzie	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.
J. P. L. McCall	Bechuanaland Expedition 1884-85.*
W. D. McIlvride	Galeka and Gaika Campaigns, South Africa.

G. H. Manley†	Afghan War 1878-9-80, including the forcing of Piewar Khotal, Battle of Charasiah, Operations in the neighbourhood of Kabul, and defence of Sherpur.
E. P. Mason†	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin.*
H. Muller†	Served with German Army in Franco-Prussian War 1870-71, Iron Cross.
H. Naghten†	Egyptian Expedition 1882-85. Defence of Alexandria, Operations at Ramleh, reconnaissance 5th August. Surrender of Kafr-el-Dowlah.
T. H. Oakes†	Zululand 1885.*
J. M. W. Onslow	Chitral Relief Force 1895, including storming of Malakand Pass and action at Khar.*
C. Parton	Zulu War 1879. Battle of Inyenza, Blockade of Eshowo, Operations before Ulundi. Nile Expedition 1884-85.
J. Patterson	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin. Advance on Tamaai. Raid on Thakool.
P. Rigby†	Sudan Expedition 1885, Action at Hasheen. Operations at and destruction of Tamaai.*
A. E. Roberts†	Egyptian Expedition 1882, Battle of Tel-el-Kebir.
G. Sadler†	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.
J. Shaw†	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai.
R. M. Shears	Basutoland Rebellion 1882.
E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan, D.S.O.	Waziristan Field Force 1894-95.*
H. C. Somerset	Zulu War 1879. Actions at Inyenza and occupation of Eshowe.
A. J. N. Tremearne	Ashanti 1900.*
E. R. N. Walton	Afghan War 1879.
A. F. West†	West Africa 1897-98, Operations on the Niger, including expedition to Illah.
W. D. C. Williams, C.B.	Sudan Expedition 1885, Suakin, Advance on Tamaai. Principal Medical Officer, New South Wales Contingent, Mentioned in special Despatch.*

EXPLANATORY NOTES† *Warrant Officer** *Saw service in the South African War 1899-1902*

The material for this article was gleaned from The Military Forces List of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1st February 1904. Whilst every name appears in the Alphabetical Index of that work, many only appear in the Record of War Services section, thereby rendering it difficult to give a particular rank at the time the volume was printed. As always, with my listings, I do not claim that the list complete, either in naming of individuals or the campaign/s in which they served, and look forward to hearing from anyone who might be able to shed further light on the topic.

SOURCE MATERIAL

The Military Forces List of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1904, *Govt. Printer, Melb.*

British Battles and Medals, 3rd edition, Major L. L. Gordon, 1962.

The Armed Forces of South Africa 1659-1954, *Trophy Press reprint, Johannesburg 1982.*

Book Review

Arthur Marder, Mark Jacobsen and John Horsfield, *Old Friends and New Enemies - The Royal Navy and the Japanese Imperial Navy, Volume II: The Pacific War, 1942-45*, 621 pp, 9 pp B & W plates, Oxford University Press, 1990. RRP \$A145.

This is the second of the late Professor Marder's two volumes on the Royal Navy and the Japanese Imperial Navy during World War II. It deserves a detailed review. It was a long time in preparation and may never have been published. Given its importance, that would have been a tragedy. Marder died on Christmas Day in 1980 when only six chapters of the manuscript were complete. The task of completing the book was taken up by two of Marder's doctoral students who took the manuscript through to publication. It is a work of which Marder would have been proud. It certainly bears his indelible mark.

In recent years we have seen the release of a number of important works on the formulation of allied strategy during World War II. In this country, Horner's analysis of Australia strategy has been crucial. Yet the overall Allied strategy against Japan and the particular role to be played by British naval power, has been to some extent neglected.

Marder's starting point in this volume is early 1942 when Britain was, as Churchill remarked, 'everywhere weak and naked'. The description of the near hopelessness of Britain's position establishes the context for a long and tortuous recovery that saw the Royal Navy as important but controversial player. Using HMS *Exeter* as a case study, Marder focuses on the experiences of the participants looking at their fears and abject pessimism.

The Australian naval position is covered in some detail although there is regrettably little assessment of the Royal Navy's role in the leadership and organisation of the RAN, and from 1941, the Royal New Zealand Navy. For instance, what criteria was used to select senior officers for service in Australia and how well did they perform, as far as their contemporaries were able to comment.

The gradual decline of the Allied position throughout 1942 comes, therefore, as little surprise. What is still surprising, however, is that Japan's fortunes seemed to peak then decline rapidly as a result of some poor decisions. For their part, the Allies struggled to decide on a base from which to conduct naval operations and the problem of what to do about the Indian Ocean. After a period of retreat and several months in early 1943 that Marder refers to as 'the doldrums', and with the European theatre showing marked signs of a reverse, an Allied strategy for the East gradually and almost reluctantly emerges.

The war against the Japanese was clearly divided into two distinct phases. The first clearly ends in September 1943. The Italian Fleet had surrendered, the *Tirpitz* had been crippled, the

Japanese advance had been arrested and British naval forces that had been required in the Mediterranean and in Home Waters were available for use in the East. To this stage, Allied strategy was largely reactive and involved fighting in areas determined by the Japanese who held the initiative.

The main problem for Britain after September 1943 was its standing with respect to American naval power. Churchill believed that the United States could defeat Japan largely without British help and that such a situation would leave Britain without a role in the East where she still had significant interests, not least her colonial possessions. The Chiefs of Staff took a different view. They were concerned less with the post-war order and more with supporting the United States. In their minds, a strong British naval commitment was the most economical means of bringing about the defeat of the Japanese.

There was no single role for the Dominions to play. The Canadians favoured a closer co-operation with the United States and were unwilling to become part of an enlarged British naval force. India was stretched to the limit while New Zealand was not well placed to assist. The relationship Britain shared with Australia was, as far as Churchill was concerned, acrimonious to say the least.

The Royal Navy appears to have had a low view of Australia's naval readiness and organisation although it was largely led and directed by its own officers. Australia had actually made an enormous contribution to the war effort although most of this was obscured from British view. Australia's ability to support a naval force was consistently overstated as well. Dockyard and maintenance facilities together with an industrial infrastructure were being built but much of it was too late. There was also the matter of Australia's close co-operation with the United States, and the intimate personal relationship between Curtin and MacArthur.

Australia was in an unenviable position. Britain realised she could count on marginal support from the Dominions and would carry the major burden of the Imperial load on her own. Churchill envisaged a vast naval, air and military involvement in the East. Yet, the strategy to be adopted was never clear. For the first half of 1944 and set against the Allied major Allied Conferences, British planning was chaotic and conflicting. The planning and decision-making processes were not clear and it appeared no endorsed strategy would be achieved. Time and events overtook earlier plans.

By mid-1944, it was apparent that only the naval force would be in place to assist in operations against Japan, and that force might be relegated to the naval backwater of the South-west Pacific by the Americans. It was the despatch of Somerville from the Eastern Fleet command to head the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington to stand up to Admiral Earnest King and the



On 18 August 1966, the most intense battle ever to involve Australian soldiers and forces of the National Liberation Front (NLF), commonly called the Vietcong (VC), was fought in a rubber plantation at a place called Long Tan, Phuoc Tuy Province, in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Although battles involving larger Australian units were fought before and after Long Tan, on no other occasion was so small an Australian force engaged for so long, and so intensely, by so large an enemy.

Arrow Books have re-issued Lex McAulay's absorbing account of this historic three hour battle.

Available from leading booksellers, The Battle of Long Tan, Arrow Books Limited, 1987, \$10.95.

Americans, and the arrival of the very affable Bruce Fraser to the new Pacific Command, that marked a turning point for the Royal Navy.

Marder is fair and judicious in his narrative and conclusions. There is a genuine respect for all the participants in spite of their human weaknesses or failures, if only because they were confronted with a world in crisis. His comments on Churchill's persistent enthusiasm for Operation 'Culverin', which was never a realistic option, serve to illustrate the point. His criticism of Churchill's sometimes superficial and optimistic thinking is to remind readers of Force Z and Gallipoli. The point is well made.

The handling of strategy options is competent and concise with proper emphasis on the dispute over action to be taken in Burma and the Indian Ocean. However, I thought the authors' treatment of the 'Middle Strategy', which emerged after months of deadlock in April 1944, did not clearly establish that his strategy was a faint designed to end ultimately an Indian Ocean option and lead Britain into a determined Pacific strategy. It was not meant to be a compromise or an attempt to split the difference between two opposing views. The role of Operation Dracula, which was never carried out, could also have been discussed in this context and cited as an example of joint planning problems.

Old Friends, New Enemies is a tribute to the narrative style of history. It manages to incorporate the outworking of international relations through the Allied Conferences, disagreement between Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff, the various levels of strategy and the planning processes that developed, the tensions within and between the three services, domestic industry and technological development and their effect war-fighting capacities and capabilities, and the sheer enormity of the task of bringing to bear the greatest military force against Japan. It is never rushed nor forced.

Using a selection of Japanese sources, always difficult to obtain and to use, Marder paints a broad landscape of Japan's successes and failures, and offers some explanations for each. Yet, these sources are unavoidably general and this leave room for a detailed account of the minutiae of Japanese concerns and difficulties. It is also the case that Japan's role is portrayed inasmuch as it is reflected on Allied actions. But this book does a good job of highlighting the differences between Japanese naval and military staffs, the attitudes to naval warfare held by officers of varying rank and seniority, and the place of the Imperial Japanese Navy within domestic politics and the supreme military command. It emerges, for instance, that seagoing Japanese officers in the surface Navy were generally quite proper and humane in their treatment of British naval POWs. The Japanese submariners adopted a different attitude although the mode of their operations was to some degree responsible. An appendix dealing with this subject is thankfully included.

Old Friends, New Enemies is a big book with an enormous amount of detail but it rises above them to present a moving and


engrossing story. The style is still very much that of Marder although the manuscript was taken up by Jacobsen and Horsfield at a fairly early stage, and reads very easily indeed. The prose is crisp and direct.

The story is interspersed with vignettes of the main players and the struggle between them. Those of Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton and Lord Mountbatten are first class. The tensions and rivalries fought out between the naval commanders is handled very well. Based on a number of interviews that Marder recorded before his death and before the murder of Mountbatten, and using the correspondence and recollections of those who served nearest to those who wielded executive power, a vivid picture of the personal dimensions is accurately portrayed. Of the commanders dealt with, Somerville appears to come out looking the best, Mountbatten much less so. Given the depth and breadth of the rivalry between those two, the appointment of Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser to command the British Pacific Fleet was timely and handled extremely well. I found this part of the book fascinating reading if only because it exposes the essential humanness of very great men.

A word about the price of this book. At \$145 this volume will find its way into the hands of readers principally through libraries. Only those with a very deep and abiding passion for the subject, such as researchers in the area, or those for whom money is no object, will be able to afford it. However, one suspects that the sheer importance of this work will see many libraries, both public and institutional, ensuring that it is available. Thus, I would encourage librarians and library users to lobby for the purchase of this book.

It is very well produced and attractively packaged, which is invariably the case for Oxford University Press publications, with a small selection of photographs which are mainly of principal characters. The selection of maps are clear and helpful. My only lament is that it could not have been offered at a much reduced price. Highly recommended.

TOM FRAME



For twenty-six days during May and June 1968 the 1st Australian Task Force fought a series of actions around Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral, north-east of Saigon.

Author of The Battle of Long Tan, Lex McAulay's detailed account of the biggest unit level battle involving Australian soldiers during the Vietnam War is a masterly piece of reconstruction.

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Society Notes

Federal Council

As reported in the last issue there have been a number of minor changes in the membership of the Federal Council. Personal details of present Council members are:

President Tan Roberts has been a member of the Federal Council since 1982 when he was elected Vice-President. In July 1984 he became President. Brigadier Roberts entered Officer Cadet School Portsea in January 1952 and graduated in June of that year to Royal Australian Infantry. He served in Korea, Peninsular Malaysia, Borneo and Vietnam. Before resigning from the Army in 1983 he had Staff appointments in London, Canberra and Kuala Lumpur and was Deputy Chief of the Army Reserve during 1981-83. He is currently an officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra and is a Fellow, Australian Institute of Management. He was editor, *The Anzac Battalion 1970-71*, Printcraft Press, 1972.

* * *

Vice-President Clem Sargent joined the Military Research and Collectors Society, the predecessor of the Military Historical Society, in Victoria in 1959. Since then he has been an inaugural member and office bearer of both the ACT and WA Branches of the MHSA. He was Federal

Secretary from 1978 to 1988 during a period of some difficulty for the Society. He was a member of the Royal Australian Survey Corps from 1946 to 1975 and Colonel Commandant of the Corps 1982 to 1989. He is now retired. Clem Sargent's military historical interests lie in the Peninsular War and the Peninsular veteran in Australia. He has been, for some time, researching the history of the Northamptonshire Regiment, the 48th Foot, in New South Wales from 1817 to 1824. He has been, for many years, a contributor to *Sabretache* of articles relevant to his areas of interest.

* * *

Secretary Anthony Staunton joined MHSA in 1975 and was a member of the Victorian Branch until moving to Canberra in 1985. Been active in the ACT Branch since then and was elected Federal Vice-President in 1989 and Federal Secretary this year. A public servant since 1969 and presently Acting Director (Research and Information) with the Veterans' Review Board. Studied at RMIT where a Fellowship Diploma of Business Studies and a Bachelor of Business (Administration) with distinction were obtained. Subsequently received a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Deakin University. Research interest in the Victoria Cross, George Cross and Medal of Honor. Co-editor of the second and revised edition of *They dared mightily* and author of numerous medal and historical articles.

Treasurer Neville Foldi has been a member of the MHSA for many years. In 1982 he was elected Secretary on Federal Council. He was an officer of the Army Reserve for thirteen years; commissioned in 1949, promoted Captain in 1955, and placed on the Reserve of Officers in 1961. Currently he is an officer in the Australian Customs Service responsible for barrier support involving control of drug detector dog units, customs vessels, radio communications and electronic support measures.

* * *

Editor Barry Clissold joined the MHSA in 1982 and was editor of *Sabretache* in 1982-84. He served in Australian Commando Units during 1956-1974 and was commissioned in 1964. In 1972 he served in India and Pakistan with UN Peace-Keeping Forces. As an Australian diplomat he served in Indonesia and China during the period 1977-1986. He resigned from government service in 1988 and currently is an officer of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia in Canberra. This year he was awarded a Masters Degree by the University of New England.

* * *

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The aims of the Society are the encouragement and pursuit of study and research in military history, customs, traditions, dress, arms, equipment and kindred matters; the promotion of public interest and knowledge in these subjects, and the preservation of historical military objects with particular reference to the armed forces of Australia.

ORGANISATION

The Federal Council of the Society is located in Canberra. The Society has branches in Brisbane, Canberra, Albury-Wodonga, Melbourne, Geelong, Adelaide and Perth. Details of meetings are available from Branch Secretaries whose names and addresses appear on the title page.

SABRETACHE

The Federal Council is responsible for the publication quarterly of the Society Journal, *Sabretache*, which is scheduled to be mailed to each member of the Society in the last week of the final month of each issue. Publication and mailing schedules are:

Jan.-March edition mailed last week of March
Apr.-Jun. edition mailed last week of June

July-Sept. edition mailed last week of September
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1 April for April-June edition

1 July for July-September edition
1 October for October-December edition

QUERIES

The Society's honorary officers cannot undertake research on behalf of members. However, queries from members received by the Secretary will be published in the 'Notes and Queries' section of the Journal.

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Society publications advertised in *Sabretache* are available from:
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